C 19^)
Robert L.
Heilbroner
THE
WORLDLY
PHILOSOPHERS
The Lives, Times, and Ideas
of the Great Economic Thinkers
WASHINGTON SQUARE PRESS, INC. • NEW YORK
To
Adolph Lowe
with deepest respect
and to
Joan
with deepest love
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
A Special Student edition
1st printing . July* 1968
4
\
WSP
V r
Inl
Published by
Washington Square Press, Inc,, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York. N.Y.
Washington Square Press editions are distributed in the
U.S. by Simon & Schuster, Inc., 630 Fifth Avenue, New
York, N.Y. 10020 and in Canada by Simon & Schuster
of Canada. Ltd., Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada.
Copyright, 1951, ©. 1961, 1967, by Robert L. Heilbroner. All rights
reserved. This Washington Square Press edition is published by
arrangement with Simon 6? Schuster, Inc, Printed in the U.S.A,
CONTENTS
\
Preface to the Third Revised Edition
I. Introduction
II. The Economic Revolution
III. The Wonderful World of Adam Smith
IV. The Gloomy Presentiments of
Parson Maltlius and David Ricardo
V. The Visions of the Utopian Sociahsts
VI. The Inexorable System of Karl Marx
VII. The Victorian World and tlie Underworld
of Economics
VIII. The Savage Society of Thorstein Veblen
IX. The Heresies of John Maynard Keynes
X. The Modem World
XI. Beyond the Economic Revolution
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
INDEX
Vll
1
6
30
64
94
124
158
201
237
277
305
323
325
333
PREFACE TO THE THIRD REVISED EDITION
This is the third time I have revised The Worldly Philos-
o^heis-tohich is to say, the third time I have read the
book cover to cover since I wrote it. Each reading has
come as a surprise, partly pleasurable and partly not. It
is very satisfying when I find that 1 still agree with myself
over the years. It is not when I don’t.
Some of these disagreements are simply the fruit of new
knowledge about the past-knowledge that rarely changes
the main outlines of our conception of economic thought
and history, but that requires alterations in detail and
emphasis. These are scattered here and there throughout
the book and will he unnoticeable except to the eye of an
expeii.
More important are the disagreements when the book
turns to the interpretation of the present or the prognosis
for the future. In the sections on imperialism, Marxism,
the population problem, and current American problems,
I have been forced to throw out paragraphs, arid even
pages, to give voice to an increasing disquietude I have
felt since the last edition was published. The central
theme of this book is, after all, ihe evolution of capital¬
ism, and whereas I am, if anything, more sanguine about
the long-term evolutionary possibilities for America, I am
also much more concerned about the chances for short-
run miscalculation and tragedy. All this is, however, in
V
vi PREFACE TO THE THIRD REVISED EDITION
the background of the book; the purpose of these pages
remains, as before, to propound the views of the Worldly
Philosophers and not my own.
Finally, 1 should like to thank the many readers, espe¬
cially students and instructors, who have been kind
enough to write to me, instead of making the usual ex¬
clamation marks in the margins of their books, when they
objected to my prose, or caught me out in some fact, or
q uarreled with my interpretation of ideas. I have lepaired
a lot of prose, have altered some facts, and have at least
thought hard about the ideas in question, even if I have
not always changed them. In my Acknowledgments I
have said that this book owes its existence in large paH
to my teachers. I am happy that I can now number so
many readers and students among those teachei s.
Robert L. Heilbroner
March 1967
I
Introduction
Tffls is a book about a handful of men with a curious
claim to fame. By all the rules of schoolboy history
books, they were nonentities: they commanded no aimies,
sent no men to their deaths, ruled no empires, took little
part in history-making decisions. A few of them achieved
renown, but none was ever a national hero; a few were
roundly abused, but none was ever quite a national villain.
Yet what they did was more decisive for history than
many acts of statesmen who basked in brighter glory,
often more profoundly distrurbing than the shuttling of
armies back and forth across frontiers, more powerful for
good and bad than the edicts of kings and legislatures. It
was this: they shaped and swayed men’s minds.
And because he who enlists a man’s mind wmlds a
power even greater than the sword or the scepter, these
men shaped and swayed the world. Few ofTliem ever
lifted a finger in action; they worked, in the main, as
scholars-quietly, inconspicuously, and without much re¬
gard for what the world had to say about them. But they
left in their train shattered empires and exploded conti¬
nents, they buttressed and undermined political regimes,
they set class against class and even nation against na¬
tion— not because they plotted mischief, but because of
the extraordinary power of their ideas.
Who were these men? We know them as the Great
Economists. But what is strange is how httle we know
1
2
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
about them. One would think that in a world tom by
economic problems, a world that constantly worries about
economic aflfairs and talks of economic issues, the great
economists would be as familiar as the great philosophers
or statesmen. Instead they are only shadowy figures of
the past, and the matters they so passionately debated are
regarded with a kind of distant awe. Economics, it is
said, is undeniably important, but it is cold and difficult,
and best left to those who are at home in abstruse realms
of thought — - -
Nothing could be further from the truth. A man who
thinks that economics is only a matter for professors for¬
gets that this is the science that has sent men to the bar¬
ricades. A man who has looked into an economics text¬
book and concluded that economics is boring is like a
man who has read a primer on logistics and decided that
the study of warfare must be dull.
No, the great economists pursued an inquiry as excit¬
ing— and as dangerous— as any the world has ever known.
The ideas tliey dealt with, unlike the ideas of the great
philosophers, did not make Little difference to our daily
working lives; the experiments they urged could not, un¬
like the scientists*, be carried out in the isolation of a
laborator^^ The notions of the great economists were
world-shaking, and their mistakes nothing short of ca¬
lamitous.
‘The ideas of economists and political philosophers,”
wrote Lord Keynes, himself a great economist, “both
when they are right and when they are wrong, are more
powerful tlian is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual in¬
fluences, are usuallv the slaves of some defunct econo-
mist. Madmen in authorit\% who hear voices in the air,
are distilling their frenz.v from some academic scribbler
of a few years back. T am sure that the power of vested
interests is vastK' exaggerated compared with the gradual
encroachment of ideas.’*
To be sure, not all the economists were such titans.
Thousands of them wrote texts, some of them monu-
INTRODUCTION
3
ments of dullness, and explored mmutiae with all the
zeal of medieval scholars. If economics today has httle
glamour, if its sense of great adventure is often lacking,
it has no one to blame but its ovm practitioners. For the
Great Economists were no mere intellectual fusspots.
They took the whole world as their subject, and por¬
trayed that world in a dozen bold attitudes: angry, des¬
perate, hopeful. The evolution of their heretical opinions
into common sense, and their exposure of common sense
as superstition, constitute nothing less than the gradual
construction of the architecture of contemporary life.
An odder group of men— one less apparently destined
to remake the world— could scarcely be imagined.
There were among them a philosopher and a madman,
a parson and a stockbroker, a revolutionary and a noble¬
man, an aesthete, a skeptic, and a tramp. They were of
eveiy nationality, of every walk of life, of every turn of
temperament. Some were brilliant, some were bores;
some ingratiating, some impossible. At least three made
their own fortunes, but as many could never master the
elementary economics of their personal finances. Two
were eminent businessmen, one was never much more
than a traveling salesman, another frittered away his
fortune.
Their viewpoints toward the world were as varied as
their fortunes there was never such a quarrelsome
gioup of thinkers. One was a lifelong advocate of wom¬
en s rights; another insisted that women were demon¬
strably inferior to men. One held that “gentlemen” were
only barbarians, whereas another maintained that non¬
gentlemen were savages. One of them— who was- veiy rich
—urged the abolition of riches; another— quite poor— dis¬
approved of charity. Several of them claimed that with
all Its shortcomings, this was the best of all possible
worlds; several others devoted their lives to proving that
it wasn t. ■t'
All of them wrote books, but a more varied library
was never seen. One or two wrote best sellers that
reached to the mud huts of Asia; others had to pay to
4 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
have their obscure works published and never touched
an audience beyond the most restricted circles. A few
wrote in language that stirred the pulse of millions; others
—no less important to the world— wrote in a prose which
tlien, as now, fogs the brain.
It was neither their personahties, their careers, their
biases, nor even their ideas which bound them together.
Their common denominator was something else: a com¬
mon curiosity. They were aU fascinated by the world
about them, by its complexity and its seeming disorder,
by the cmelty which it so often masked in sanctimony
and the successes of which it was so often unaware. They
were all of them absorbed in the behavior of their fel¬
low man, first as he created material wealth, and then
as he trod on the toes of his neighbor to gain a share of it.
Hence they can be called the worldly philosophers, for
they sought to ^mbtRce in a scheme of philosqplPf^^the
most worldlv of all of man’s activities— his. drive. for
*
wealth. It is not, perhaps, the most elegant kind of
philosophy, but there is no more intriguing or more im¬
portant one. Who would think to look for Order and De¬
sign in a pauper family and a speculator breathlessly
awaiting ruin, or seek Consistent Laws and Principles in
a mob marching in a street and a greengrocer smiling at
his customers? Yet it was the faith of the great econo¬
mists that just such seemingly unrelated threads could
be woven into a single tapestry, that at a suflBcient dis¬
tance the milling world could be seen as an orderly pro¬
gression, and the tumult resolved into a chord.
A large order of faith, indeed! And yet, astonishingly
enough, it turned out to be justified. For once the econo¬
mists had unfolded their pattems before the eyes of their
generations, the pauper and the speculator, the green¬
grocer and the mob were no longer incongruous actors
inexplicably thrown together on a stage; but each was
understood to play a role, happy or otheiwise, which was
essential for the advancement of the human drama itself.
When the economists were done, what had been only a
humdrum or a chaotic world became an ordered society
with a meaningful life history of its own.
INTRODUCTION
5
It Js this search for the order and meaning of social
hi^orjT tfel: of economics. Hence it is
the central theme of this book. We are embarked not on
a lecture tour of principles, but on a journey through
history-shaping ideas. We will meet not only pedagogues
on our way, but many paupers, many speculators both
ruined and triumphant, many mobs, even here and there
a grocer. We shall be going back to rediscover the roots
of our own society in the welter of social patterns which
the great economists discerned, and in so doing we shall
come to know the great economists themselves— not
merely because their personalities were often colorful
but because their ideas bore the stamp of their origina¬
tors.
It would be convenient if we could begin straight off
with the first of the great economists— Adam Smith him¬
self. But Adam Smith lived at the time of the American
Revolution and we must account for the perplexing fact
that six thousand years of recorded history had rolled by
and no worldly philosopher had yet come to dominate
the scene. An odd fact: man had struggled with the
economic problem since long before the time of the
Pharaohs, and in these centuries he had produced philoso¬
phers by the score, scientists, political thinkers, histori¬
ans, artists by the gross, statesmen by the hundred dozen.
Why, then, were there no economists?
It will take us a chapter to find out. Until we have
probed the nature of an earlier and far longer-lasting
world than our own— a world in which an economist
would have been not only unnecessary but impossible—
we cannot set the stage on which the great economists
may take their places. Our main concern will be with
the handful of men who lived in the last two centuries.
Fii'st, however, we must understand the world which
preceded their entrance and we must watch that earlier
world give birth to the modem age— the age of the
economists— amid all tire upheaval and agony of a major
revolution.
n
The Economic Revolution
SINCE he came dowm from the trees, man has faced the
problem of survival, not as an individual but as a
member of a social group. His continued existence is testi¬
mony to the fact tliat he has succeeded in solving the
problem; but the continued existence of want and misery,
e^’en in the richest of nations, is evidence tliat his solu¬
tion has been, at best, a partial one.
Yet man is not to be too severely censured for his fail¬
ure to achieve a paradise on earth. It is hard to wring a
livelihood from the surface of this planet. It staggers the
imagination to think of the endless efforts that must-
have been expended in the first domestication of ani¬
mals, in the discoveiy of planting seed, in the first work¬
ing of surface ores. It is only because man is a socially
cooperative creature that he hias succeeded in perpetu¬
ating himself at all.
But the ver>' fact that he has had to depend on his
fellow man has made the problem of suiwival extraordi¬
narily difficult. Man is not an ant, conveniently equipped
with an inborn pattern of social instincts. On the con-
lrar\% he seems to be stubbomly endowed with a fiercely
self-centered nature. If his relatively weak physique
forces him to seek cooperation, his untamed inner drives
constantly threaten to disimpt his social working partner¬
ships.
6
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
7
In primitive society, the struggle between aggression
and cooperation is taken care of by the environment;
when the specter of starvation looks a community in the
face every day— as with the Eskimos or the African hunt¬
ing tribes— the pure need for self-preservation pushes so¬
ciety to the cooperative completion of its daily tasks.
But in an advanced community, this tangible pressure
of the environment is lacking. When men no longer work
shoulder to shoulder in tasks dii'ectly related to survival
—indeed when half or more of the population never
touches the earth, enters the mines, builds with its hands,
or even enters a factory— the perpetuation of the human
animal becomes a remarkable social feat.
So remarkable, in fact, that society’s existence hangs
by a hair. A modem community is at the mercy of a
thousand dangers: if its farmers should fail to plant
enough crops, if its railroad men should take it into their
heads to become bookkeepers or its bookkeepers should
decide to become railroad men; if too few should offer
their sei*vices as miners, puddlers of steel, candidates for
engineering degrees— in a word, if any of a thousand in¬
terlined tasks of society should fail to get done— indus¬
trial life would soon become hopelessly disorganized.
Every day the community faces the possibility of break¬
down— not from the forces of nature, but from sheer hu¬
man unpredictability.
Over the centuries man has found only three ways of
guarding against this calamity.
He has ensured his continuity by organizing his so¬
ciety around tradition, by handing down the varied and
necessary tasks from generation to generation, according
to custom and usage: son follows father and a pattern is
preserved. In ancient Egypt, says Adam Smith, “eveiy
man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the
occupation of his father, and was supposed to commit
me most horrible sacrilege if he changed it for another.”
imi ar y, in India, until recently, certain occupations
were traditionally assigned by caste; in fact, in much of
8
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
the uiiindustrialized world, one is still bom to one's
metier.
Or society can solve the problem differently. It can
use the whip of central authoritarian rule to see that its
tasks get done. The pyramids of ancient Egypt did not
get built because some enterprising contractor took it
into his head to build them, nor do the Five Year Plans
of the Soviet Union get carried out because they happen
to accord with hand-me-down custom or individual self-
interest. Both Russia and Egypt are authoritarian so¬
cieties; politics aside, they have ensured their ecofiotnic
survival by the edict of one authority and by the penal¬
ties that supreme authority sees fit to issue.
For countless centuries man dealt with the problem
of survival according to one or the other of these solu¬
tions. And as long as the problem was handled by tradi¬
tion or command, it never gave rise to that special field of
study called economics. Although the societies of histoiy
have shown the most astonishing economic diversity,
although they have exalted kings and commissars, used
dried codfish and immovable stones for money, distrib¬
uted their goods in the simplest communistic patterns or
in the most highly ritualistic fashion, so long as they ran
by custom or command, they needed no economists to
make them comprehensible. Theologians, political theo¬
rists, statesmen, philosophers, historians, yes— but, strange
as it may seem, economists, no.
For the economists waited upon the invention of a
third solution to the problem of survival. They waited
upon the development of an astonishing game m which
society assured its o\\m continuance by allowing each
indi^'idual to do exactly as he saw fit-provided he fol¬
lowed a central guiding rule. The game was called the
“market svstein,” and the rule was deceptively simple:
each should do what was to his best monetary advantage
In the market system the lure of gain, not the pull ot
tradition or the whip of authority, steered each man to
his task. And vet, although each was free to go wherever
his acquisitive nose directed him, the interplay ot one
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 9
man against another resulted in the necessary tasks of
society getting done.
It was this paradoxical, subtle, and difficult solution to
the problem of survival that called forth the economist.
For unlike the simplicity of custom and command, it
was not at all obvious that with each man out only for
his own gain, society could in fact endure. It was by no
means clear that all the jobs of society— the dirty ones
as well as the plush ones— would be done if custom and
command no longer ran the world. When society no
longer obeyed one man’s dictates, who was to say where
it would end?
It was the economists who undertook to explain this
puzzle. But until the idea of the market system itself had
gained acceptance, there was no puzzle to explain. And
until a very few centuries ago, men were not at all sure
that the market system was not to be viewed with sus¬
picion, distaste, and distrust. The world had gotten along
for centuries in the comfortable rut of tradition and com¬
mand; to abandon this security for the dubious and per¬
plexing security of the market system, notliing short of
a revolution was required.
It was the most important revolution, from the point
of view of shaping modem society, that ever took place
—fundamentally more disturbing by far than the French,
American, or even the Russian revolutions. To appre¬
ciate its magnitude, to understand the wrenching which
it gave society, we must immerse ourselves in that earlier
and long-forgotten world from which our own society
finally sprang. Only then will it be clear why the econo¬
mists had so long to wait.
First stop: France. The year, 1305.
It is a fair we visit. The traveling merchants have ar¬
rived that morning with their armed guard, have set up
their gaily striped tents, and are trading among them¬
selves and with the local population. A variety of exotic
goods is for sale: silks and taffetas, spices and perfumes,
hides and furs. Some have been transported from the
Levant, some from Scandinavia, some from only a few
lO
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
hundi’ed miles away. Along with the common people,
local lords and ladies frequent the stalls, eager to relieve
the tedium of their boring, draughty, manorial lives;
along with the strange goods from Araby they are eager¬
ly acquiring new words from that incredibly distant land:
divan, syrup, tariflE, artichoke, spinach, jar.
But inside the tents we meet 'with a strange sight.
Books of business, open on the table, are sometimes no
more than notebooks of transactions; a simple extract
from one merchant reads: “Owed ten gulden by a man
since Whitsuntide. I forgot his name.” Calculations are
made largely in Roman numerals and sums are often
wrong; long division is reckoned as something of a mys¬
tery and the use of zero is not clearly understood. And
for all the gaudiness of the display and the excitement
of the people, the fair is a small thing. The total amount
of goods which comes into France in a year over the
Saint Gothard Pass (on the first suspension bridge in
history) would not fill a modem freight train; the total
amount of merchandise carried in the great Venetian
fleet would not fill one modem steel freighter.
Next stop: Germany. The year, 1550 odd.
Andreas Ryff, a merchant, bearded and fur-coated, is
coming back to his home in Baden; he writes in a letter
to his wife that he has visited thirty markets and is trou¬
bled with saddle-bum. He is even more troubled by the
nuisances of the times; as he travels he is stopped ap¬
proximately once every six miles to pay a customs toll;
between Basle and Cologne he pays thirty-one levies.
And that is not all. Each community he visits has its
own money, its own rules and regulations, its own law
and order. In the area around Baden alone there are 112
different measures of length, 92 different square meas¬
ures, 65 different dry measures, 163 different measures
for cereals and 123 for liquids, 63 special measures for
liquor, and 80 different pound weights.
We move on: we are in Boston in the year 1644.
A trial is in progress; one Robert Keayne, “an ancient
professor of the gospel, a man of eminent parts, wealthy
and having but one child, and having come over for
THE ECONOMIC REVOLtJTION 1 1
conscience" sake and for the advancement of the gospel,""
is charged with a heinous crime: he has made over six¬
pence profit on the shilling, an outrageous gain. The
court is debating whether to excommunicate him for his
sin, but in view of his spotless past it finally relents and
dismisses him with a fine of two hundred pounds. But
poor Mr. Keayne is so upset that before the elders of
the Church he does “with tears acknowledge his covetous
and corrupt heart."" The minister of Boston cannot resist
this golden opportunity to profit from the living example
of a wayward sinner and he uses the example of Keayne"s
avarice to thxmder forth in his Sunday sermon on some
false principles of trade. Among them are these:
“1. That a man might sell as dear as he can, and
buy as cheap as he can.
“11. If a man lose by casualty of sea, etc., in some
of his commodities, he may raise the price of the
rest.
“HI. That he may sell as he bought, though he
paid too dear. . .
All false, false, false, cries the minister; to seek riches
for riches" sake is to fall into the sin of avarice.
We turn back to England and France.
In England a great trading organization. The Mer¬
chant Adventurers Company, has drawm up its articles
of incorporation; among them are these rules for the
participating merchants: no indecent language, no quar¬
rels among the brethren, no card playing, no keeping of
hunting dogs. No one is to carry unsightly bundles in
the streets. This is indeed an odd business firm; it sounds
more nearly like a fraternal lodge.
In France there has been entirely too much initiative
displayed of late by the weaving industry, and reglement
has been promulgated by Colbert in 1666 to get away
from this dangerous and disruptive tendency. Hence¬
forth the fabrics of Dijon and Selangey are to contain
1,408 threads including selvages, neither more nor less.
At Auxerre, Avallon, and two other manufacturing towns.
12
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
the threads are to number 1,376; at Chatillon, 1,216. Any
cloth found to be objectionable is to be pilloried. If it is
found three times to be objectionable, the merchant is to
be pilloried instead.
There is something common to all these scattered frag¬
ments of bygone worlds. It is this: first, the idea of the
propriety (not to say the necessity) of a system organ¬
ized on the basis of personal gain has not yet taken root.
Second, a separate, seU-contained economic world has
not yet lifted itself from its social context. The world of
practical affairs is inextricably mixed up with the world
of political, social, and religious life. Until the two worlds
separate, there wiU be nothing that resembles the tempo
and the feeling of modem life. And for the two to sep¬
arate, a long and bitter struggle must take place.
It may strike us as odd that the idea of gain is a rela¬
tively modem one; we are schooled to believe that man is
essentially an acquisitive creature and that left to him¬
self he will behave as any self-respecting businessman
would. The profit motive, we are constantly being told,
is as old as man himself.
But it is not. The profit motive as we know it is only
as old as “modem man.” Even today the notion of gain
for gain’s sake is foreign to a large portion of the world’s
population, and it has been conspicuous by its absence
over most of recorded history. Sir William Petty, an as¬
tonishing seventeenth-century character (who was in his
lifetime cabin boy, hawker, clothier, physician, professor
of music, and founder of a school named Political Arith-
metick), claimed that when wages were good, labor was
“scarce to be had at all, so licentious are they who labor
only to eat, or rather to drink,” And Sir William was not
merely venting the bourgeois prejudices of his day. He
was observing a fact which can still be remarked among
the unindustrialized peoples of the world: a raw work¬
ing force, unused to wagework, uncomfortable in factory
life, unschooled to the idea of an ever-rising standard of
living will not work harder if wages rise; it will simply
take liiore time off. The idea of gain, the idea that each
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
13
man not only may but should constantly strive to better
luTlnateriai lot, is an idea v^hich was quite foreign to
the great lower and middle strata of Egyptian, Greek,
Roman, and medieval cultures, only scattered through¬
out Renaissance and Reformation times, and largely
absent in the majority of Eastern civilizations. As a
ubiquitous characteristic of society, itjs as rnodem an
invention as printing.
""”Not only is t^e idea of gain by no means as universal
as we sometimes suppose, but the social sanction of gain
is an even more modem and restricted development. In
the Middle Ages the Church taught that ‘‘No Christian
ought to be a merchant,” and behind that dictum lay the
thought that merchants were a disturbing yeast in the
leaven of society. In Shakespeare's time the object of life
for the ordinary citizen, for everybody, in fact, except
the gentility, was not to advance his station in life, but to
maintain it. Even to our Pilgrim forefathers, the idea that
gain might be a tolerable— even a useful— goal in life
would have appeared as nothing short of a doctrine of
the devil.
Wealth, of course, there has always been, and covetous¬
ness is at least as old as the Biblical tales. But there is
a vast deal of difference between the envy inspired by
the wealth of a few mighty personages and a general
struggle for wealth diffused throughout society. Mer¬
chant adventurers have existed as far back as the Phoe¬
nician sailors, and can be seen all through histoiy, in
the speculators of Rome, the trading Venetians, the Han¬
seatic League, and the great Portuguese and Spanish
voyagers who sought a route to the Indies and to their
personal fortunes. But the adventures of a few are a far
different thing from an entire society moved by the
venture spirit.
Take, for example, the extraordinary family of the
^gg^rs, the great bankers of the sixteenth century. At
their height, the Fuggers owned gold and silver mines,
trade concessions, and even the right to coin their own
money; their credit was far greater than the wealth of
the kings and emperors whose wars ( and household ex-
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
penses) they financed. But when old Anton Fugger died,
his eldest nephew, Hans Jacob, refused to take over the
banking empire on the ground that the business of the
city and his own affairs gave him too much to do; Hans
Jacob's brother, George, said he would rather live in
peace; a third nephew, Christopher, was equally uninter¬
ested. None of the potential heirs to a kingdom of wealth
apparently thought it was worth the bother. ✓
Apart from kings (those that were solvent) and a
scattering of families like the Fuggers, the early capital¬
ists were not the pillars of society, but often its outcasts
and deracines. Here and there an enterprising lad like
Saint Godric of Finchale would start as a beachcomber,
gather enough wares from the wrecks of ships to become
a merchant, and after making his fortune, retire in sanc¬
tity as a hennit. But such men were few. As long as the
paramount idea was that life on earth was only a tiying
preamble to Life Etemal, the business spirit was neither
encouraged nor did it find spontaneous nourishment.
Kings wanted treasure and for tliat they fought wars;
the nobility wanted land and since no self-respecting
nobleman would willingly sell his ancestral estates, that
entailed conquest, too. But most people— serfs, village
craftsmen, even the masters of the manufacturing guilds
—wanted to be left alone to live as their fathers had and
as their sons would in turn.
The absence of the idea of gain as a normal guide for
daily life— in fact the positive disrepute with which the
idea was held by the Church— constituted one enormous
difference between the strange world of the tenth to six¬
teenth centuries and the world that began, a centuiy or
two before Adam Smith, to resemble our own. But there
was an even more fundamental difference. The idea of
“making a living” had not yet come into being. Economic
life and social life were one and the same thing. Work
was not yet a means to an end— the end being money
and the things it buys. Work was an end in itself, en¬
compassing, of course, money and commodities, but
engaged in as a part of a tradition, as a natural way of
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
15
life. In a word, the great social invention of '"the market''
had not yet been made.
Markets, of course, have existed as far back as history
goes. The Tablets of Tell-el-Amama tell of lively trade
between the Pharaohs and the Levantine kings in 1400
B.C.: gold and war chariots were swapped for slaves and
horses. But while the idea of exchange must be very
nearly as old as man, as with the idea of gain, M^e must
not make the mistake of assuming that all the world has
the bargaining propensities of a twentieth-century Amer¬
ican schoolboy. Purely by way of curious illusti*ation, it
is reported that among the New Zealand Maoris you
cannot ask how much food a bonito-hook is worth, for
such a trade is never made and the question would be
regarded as ridiculous. By way of tumabouts, however,
in some African communities it is perfectly legitimate to
inquire how many oxen a woman is worth— an exchange
which we look upon as the Maoris do swapping food and
fishhooks (although where dowries still exist, they nar¬
row the gap between us and the Africans ) .
But markets, whether they be exchanges between
primitive tribes where objects are casually dropped on
the ground or the exciting traveling fairs of the Middle
Ages, are not the same as the market system. For the
market is not just a means of exchanging goods; it is a
tnechanism for sustaining and maintaining an entire so¬
ciety.
And that mechanism was far from clear to the minds
o the medieval world. The concept of widespread Gi;ain
was blasphemous enough, as we have seen. The broader
notion that a general struggle for gain might actually
bmd together a community would have been held as
little short of madness.
There was a reason for this blindness. The Middle
Reformation-indeed the whole
woild unbl the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries-could
system for the thoroughly sound
on a and. Labor, and Capital— the basic agents
^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
of production which the market system aUocates-did not
yet exist Land, labor, and capital in the sense of soil,
human beings, and tools are of course coexistent with
society itself. But the idea of abstract land or abstract
labor did not immediately suggest itself to the human
mind, any more than did the idea of abstract energy or
mattei. Land, labor, and capital as “agents” of produc¬
tion, as impersonal, dehumanized economic entities, are
as much modem conceptions as the calculus. Indeed,
they are not much older.
Take, for example, land. As late as the fourteenth or
fifteenth centuiy there was no land, at least in the mod¬
ern sense of freely salable, rent-producing property.
There were lands, of course— estates, manors, and princi¬
palities— but these were emphatically not real estate to
be bought and sold as the occasion warranted. Such
lands formed the core of social life, provided the basis
for prestige and status, and constituted the foundation
for the military, judicial, and administrative organization
of society. Although land was salable under certain con¬
ditions (with many strings attached), it was not gener¬
ally for sale. A medieval nobleman in good standing
would no more have thought of selling his land than the
governor of Connecticut would think of selling a few
counties to the governor of Rhode Island.
And the same lack of salability was true for labor.
When we talk of the labor market today, we mean the
endless bargaining process in which individuals sell their
seiwices to the highest bidder. There simply was no such
process in the precapitalist world. There was a vast
hodgepodge of serfs, apprentices, and journeymen who
labored, but most of this labor never entered a market
to be bought and sold. In the country, the peasant lived
tied to his lord’s estate; he baked at the lord’s oven and
ground at the lord’s mill, tilled the lord’s fields and served
his lord in war, but he was rarely if ever paid for any
of his services: these were his duties as a serf, not the
“labor” of a freely contracting agent. In the towns the
apprentice entered the service of a master; the length of
his apprenticeship, the number of his colleagues, his rate
THE ECONOMIC REVOLITTION
17
of pay, his hours of work, the very methods he used were
all regulated by a guild. There was little or no bargain¬
ing between servant and master except for sporadic
strikes when conditions became intolerable. This was no
more of a labor market than is provided by intends in a
hospital.
Or take capital. Certainly capital existed in the pre¬
capitalist world, in the sense of private wealth. But al¬
though the funds existed, there was no impetus to put
them to new and aggressive use. Instead of risk and
change, the motto was safety first. Not the shortest and
most efficient, but the longest and most labor-consuming
process was the preferred technique of production. Ad-
veitising was forbidden and the idea that one master
guildsman might produce a better product tlian his col¬
leagues was regarded as treasonable. In sixteenth-cen¬
tury England, when mass production in the weaving
trade first reared its ugly head, the guilds protested to
the king. The wonder workshop— two hundred looms and
a service staflF including butchers and bakers to take care
of the working force— was thereupon outlawed by His
Majesty: such efficiency and concentration of wealth
would set a bad precedent.
Hence the fact that the medieval world could not con¬
ceive the market system rested on the good and suffi¬
cient reason that it had not yet conceived the abstract
elements of production itself. Lacking land, labor, and
capital, the Middle Ages lacked the market; and lacking
the market (despite its colorful local marts and traveling
fairs), society ran by custom and tradition. The lords
gave orders and production waxed and waned accord¬
ingly. Where no orders were given, life went on in its
established groove. Had Adam Smith lived in the years
before 1400 he would have felt no need to construct a
theory of political economy. There was no mystery to
penetrate in understanding what made the Middle Ages
hang together and no veil to piece to discover both order
and design. Ethics and politics, yes; there was much
to be explained and rationalized in the relations of lower
lords to higher lords and higher lords to kings, and a
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
gi eat deal to be puzzled over in the conflict between the
teachings of the Church and the incorrigible tendencies
of the merchant class. But economics, no. Who would
look for abstract laws of supply and demand, or cost, or
value, when the explanation of the world lay like an
open book in the laws of the manor and the Church and
the customs of a lifetime? Adam Smith might have been
a great moral philosopher in that earlier age, but he
could never have been a great economist; there would
have been nothing for him to do.
There would be nothing for any economist to do for
several centuries— until this great self-reproducing, self-
sufficient world erupted into the bustling, scurrying, free-
for-all of the eighteenth century. “Erupted” is perhaps too
dramatic a word, for the change would take place over
centuries rather than in a single violent spasm. But the
change, long drawn out though it was, was not a peace¬
ful evolution; it was an agonized convulsion of society,
a revolution.
Just to commercialize the land— to convert the hier¬
archy of social relationships into so many vacant lots and
advantageous sites— required nothing less than the up¬
rooting of an entrenched feudal way of life. To make
“workers” out of the sheltered serfs and apprentices—
no matter how exploitative the cloak of paternalism may
have been— required the creation of a frightened dis¬
oriented class called the proletariat. To make capitalists
out of guild masters meant that the laws of the jungle
had to be taught to the timid denizens of the barnyard.
Hardly a peaceful prospect, any of this. Nobody
ioanted this commercialization of life. How bitterly it
was resisted can only be appreciated if we take one last
journey back to watch the economic revolution taking
place.
We are back in France; the year, 1666.
Tlie capitalists of the day face a disturbing challenge
which the widening market mechanism has inevitably
brought in its wake: change.
The question has come up whether a guild master of
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
19
the weaving industry should be allowed to try an innova¬
tion in his product. The verdict; “If a cloth weaver in¬
tends to process a piece according to his own invention,
he must not set it on the loom, but should obtain pennis-
sion from the judges of the town to employ the number
and length of threads that he desires, after the question
has been considered by four of the oldest merchants and
four of the oldest weavers of the guild.” One can imagine
how many suggestions for change were tolerated.
Shortly after the matter of cloth weaving has been dis¬
posed of, the button-makers guild raises a cry of out¬
rage; the tailors are beginning to make buttons out of
cloth, an unheard-of thing. The government, indignant
that an innovation should threaten a settled industry,
imposes a fine on the cloth-button makers and even on
those who wear cloth buttons. But the wardens of the
button guild are not yet satisfied. They demand the right
to search people’s homes and wardrobes and even to ar¬
rest them on the streets if they are seen wearing these
subversive goods.
And this dread of change and innovation is not just the
comic resistance of a few frightened merchants. Capital
is fighting in earnest against change, and no holds are
barred. In England a revolutionary patent for a stocking
frame is not only denied in 1623, but the Privy Council
orders the dangerous contraption abolished. In France
the importation of printed calicoes is threatening to un¬
dermine the clothing industry. It is met with measures
which cost the lives of sixteen thousand people! In Val¬
ence alone on one occasion 77 persons are sentenced to
be hanged, 58 broken on the wheel, 631 sent to the gal¬
leys, and one lone and lucky individual set free for the
crime of dealing in forbidden calico wares.
But capital is not the only agent of production which
is frantically seeking to avoid the dangers of the market
way of life. What is happening to labor is still more des¬
perate.
Let us turn back to England.
It is the end of the sixteenth century, the great era of
English expansion and adventure. Queen Elizabeth has
20
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
made a triumphal tour of her kingdom. But she returns
with a strange plaint. “Paupers are everywhere!” she
cries. This is a strange observation, for only a hundred
years before, the English cormtryside consisted in large
part of peasant proprietors tilling their own lands, the
yeoman, the pride of England, the largest body of inde¬
pendent, free, and prosperous citizens in the world. Now,
“Paupers are everywhere!” What has happened in the
interim?
What has happened has been an enormous movement
of expropriation— or, rather, the beginning of such a
movement, for it was then only in its inception. Wool has
become a new, profitable commodity, and wool demands
grazing pastures for the wool producer. The pastures are
made by enclosing the common land; the patchwork
crazy quilt of small scattered holdings (unfenced and
recognizable only by a tree here and a rock there divid¬
ing one man’s land from another) and the common lands
on which all might graze their cattle or gather peat, are
suddenly declared to be all the property of the lord of
the manor and no longer available to the whole parish.
Where before was a kind of communality of ownership,
now there is private property. Where there were yeomen,
now there are sheep. One John Hales in 1549 wrote:
“. . . where XL persons had their lyvings, now one man
and his shepherd hath aU. ... Yes, those shepe is the
cause of all theise meschieves, for they have driven hus-
bandrie out of the countries, by the which was encreased
before all kynde of victuall, and now altogether shepe,
shepe.”
It is almost impossible to imagine the scope and im¬
pact of the process of enclosure. As early as the middle
of the sixteenth century riots had broken out against it:
in one such uprising, 3,500 people were killed. By the
mid-eighteenth centuiy, the process was still in full
swing; not until the mid-nineteenth would it run its
terrible historic course. Thus in 1820, nearly fifty years
after the American Revolution, the Duchess of Sutherland
dispossessed 15,000 tenants from 794,000 acres of land,
replaced them with 131,000 sheep, and by way of com-
21
TOE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
pensation rented her evicted families an average of two
acres of submarginal land each.
But it was not merely the wholesale land-grabbing
warrants attention. The tragedy is what happened to the
peasant. Deprived of the right to use the^ common land,
he could no longer maintain himself as a farmer.
no factories were available, he could not— even if he him
wanted to-metamorphose into a factory worker. Instead,
he became that most miserable of all social classes, an
argricultural proletarian, and where agricultural work
was lacking, a beggar, sometimes a robber, usually a
pauper. Terrified at the alaraiing increase in pauperism
throughout the countiy, the English Parliament tried to
deal with the problem by localizing it. It tied paupers
to their parishes for a pittance of relief and dealt with
wanderers by whipping, branding, and mutilation. A
social reformer of the time of Adam Smith seiiously
proposed to deal with the migrant pauper by confining
him to institutions for which he candidly suggested the
name Houses of Terror. But what was worst of all was
that the very measures which the country took to protect
itself from the pauper— tying him to his local parish
where he could be kept alive on poor relief— prevented
the only possible solution to the problem. It was not that
the English ruling classes were utterly heartless and
cmel. Rather, they failed to understand the concept of
a fluid, mobile labor force which would seek work
wherever work was to be found according to the dictates
of the market. At every step, tlie commercialization of
labor, like the commercialization of capital, was feared,
fought, and misconceived.
The market system with its essential components of
land, labor, and capital was bom in agony— an agony tliat
began in the thirteenth century and did not mn its
course until well into the nineteenth. Never was a revolu¬
tion less well understood, less welcomed, less planned.
But the great mai*ket-making forces would not be denied.
Insidiously they ripped apart the mold of custom, in¬
solently they tore away the usages of tradition. For all
the clamor of the button makers, cloth buttons won the
22
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
day. For all the action of the Privy Council, the stocking
frame became so valuable that in another seventy years
the same Privy Council would forbid its exportation. For
all the breakings on the wheel, the trade in calicoes in¬
creased apace. Over last-ditch opposition from the Old
Guard, economic land was created out of ancestral estates,
and over the wails of protest from employees and masters
alike, economic labor was ground out of unemployed ap¬
prentices and dispossessed farm laborers.
The great chariot of society, which for so long had run
down the gentle slope of tradition, now found itself
powered by an internal combustion machine. Transac¬
tions, transactions, transactions and gain, gain, gain
provided a new and startlingly powerful motive force.
What forces could have been sufficiently powerful to
smash a comfortable and established world and institute
in its place this new unwanted society?
There was no single massive cause. The new way of
life grew inside the old, like a butterfly inside a chiysalis,
and when the stir of life was strong enough it burst the
old structure asunder. It was not great events, single
adventures, individual laws, or powerful personalities
which brought about the economic revolution. It was a
O
process of internal growth.
First, there was the gradual emergence of national
political units in Europe. Under the blows of peasant
wars and kingly conquest, the isolated existence of early
feudalism gave way to centralized monarchies. And with
monarchies came the growth of the national spirit; in turn
this meant royal patronage for favored industries, such
as the great French tapestiy works, and the development
of armadas and armies with all their necessary satellite
industries. The infinity of rules and regulations which
plagued Andreas Eyff and his fellow sLxteenth-century
traveling merchants gave way to common laws, common
measurements, common currency.
An aspect of the political change which was revolu¬
tionizing Europe was the encouragement of foreign
adventure and exploration. In the tliirteentli centuiy,
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
23
the brothers Polo went as unprotected merchants on
their daring journey into the land of the great Khan; in
the fifteenth century Columbus sailed for what he hoped
would be the same destination under the royal auspices
of Isabella. The change from private to national explora¬
tion was part and parcel of the change from private to
national hfe. And in turn the great national adventures
of the English and Spanish and Portuguese sailor-capita¬
lists brought a flood of treasure and treasure-conscious¬
ness back to Europe. “Gold,” Christopher Columbus had
said, “is a wonderful thing! Whoever possesses it is master
of eveiything he desires. With gold one can even get
souls into heaven.” The sentiments of Christopher Co¬
lumbus were the sentiments of an age and hastened the
advent of a society oriented toward gain and chance
and activated by the chase after money. Be it noted, in
passing, that the treasures of the East were truly fabulous.
With the share received as a stockholder in Sir Francis
Drake’s voyage of the Golden Hynd, Queen Elizabeth
paid off all England’s foreign debts, balanced its budget,
and invested abroad a sum large enough, at compound
interest, to account for Britain’s entire overseas wealth
in 1930!
A second great current of change was to be found in
the slow decay of the religious spirit under the impact of
the skeptical, inquiring, humanist views of the Italian
Renaissance. The world of Today elbowed aside the
world of Tomorrow, and as life on earth became more
important, so did the notion of material standards and
ordinary comforts. Behind the change in religious toler¬
ance was the rise of Protestantism, which hastened a new
attitude toward work and wealth. The Church of Rome
had always regarded the merchant with a dubious eye
and had not hesitated to call usury a sin. But now that
this merchant was every day climbing in society, now
that he was no longer a mere useful appendage but an
integial part of a new kind of world, some re-evaluation
of his function became necessary. The Protestant leaders
paved the way for an amalgamation of spiritual and
tempoiai life. Far from eulogizing the life of poverty
24
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
and spiritual contemplation, as separate from worldly
life, it became the part of positive piety to make the
most of one s God-given talents in daily business. Ac¬
quisitiveness became a recognized virtue — not immedi¬
ately for ones private enjoyment, but for the greater
gloiy of God. From here it was only a step to the identifi¬
cation of riches with spiritual excellence, and of rich men
with saintly ones.
In the twelfth century a local folk tale tells of a
usurer about to be married who was crushed by a falling
statue as he was entering the church. On examination,
the statue was also of a usurer, tlius reveahng God's dis¬
pleasure with dealers in money. Even in the mid-1600’s,
as we may remember, poor Robert Keayne collided head
on with the Puritan religious authorities because of his
business practices. In such an atmosphere of hostility,
it was not easy for the market system to expand. Hence
the gradual acceptance by the spiritual leaders of the
innocuousness, indeed the benefits, of the market way
was essential for the full growth of the system.
Still another deep current lies in the slow social changes
that eventually made the market system possible. We are
accustomed to thinking of the Middle Ages as a time of
stagnation and lack of progress. Yet in five hundred
years, the medievahsts fathered one thousand towns (an
immense achievement), connected them with rudimen¬
tary but usable roads, and maintained their populations
with food brought from the countryside. All this de¬
veloped the familiarity with money and markets and the
buying and selling way of life.
Progress was not only a matter of this slow urbaniza¬
tion, There was technical progress, too, of a vastly
important sort. The commercial revolution could not
begin until some form of rational money-accounting had
developed: although the Venetians of the twelfth centuiy
were already using sophisticated accounting devices, the
merchants in Europe were little better than schoolboys
in their accounting ignorance. It took time for a recogni¬
tion of the need for bookkeeping to spread; not until the
seventeenth centur>^ was double entry a standard prac-
the economic REVOLtrriON 25
tice. And not until money was rationally accounted for
could large-scale business operation run successfully.
Perhaps most important of all in the pervasiveness of
its eflFect was a rise in scientific curiosity. Although the
world would wait until the age of Adam Smith for its
cataclysmic burst of technology, the Industrial Revolu¬
tion could not have taken place had not the ground been
prepared by a succession of basic subindustrial dis¬
coveries, The precapitalist era saw the birth of the
printing press, the paper mill, the windmill, the mechani¬
cal clock, the map, and a host of other inventions. The
idea of invention itself took hold; experimentation and
innovation were looked on for the first time with a
friendly eye.
No single one of these currents, acting by itself, could
have turned society upside down. Indeed, many of them
may have been as much the effects as the causes of a
great convulsion in human organization. History turns
no sharp comers, and the whole vast upheaval sprawled
out over time. Evidences of the market way of life sprang
up side by side with older traditional ways, and remnants
of the former day persisted long after the market had
for all practical purposes taken over as the guiding prin¬
ciple of economic organization. Thus guilds and feudal
privileges were not finally abolished in France until 1790,
and the Statute of Artificers which regulated guild prac¬
tices in England was not repealed until 1813.
But by the year 1700, twenty-three years before Adam
Smith was bom, the world which had tried Robert
Keayne, prohibited merchants from carrying unsightly
bundles, worried over ^just” prices, and fought for the
privilege of carrying on in its fathers’ footsteps was on
the wane. In its place society has begun to heed a new
set of self-evident” dicta. Some of them are:
“Every man is naturally covetous of lucre.”
^o laws are prevalent against gaine.”
Gaine is the Centre of the Circle of Commerce.”
A new^ idea has come into being: “economic man” — a
pale wraith of a creature who follows his adding-machine
26
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
brain wherever it leads him. The textbooks will soon come
to talk of Robinson Crusoes on desert isles who will
organize their affairs as if they were so many penny-
pinching accountants.
In the world of affairs a new fever of wealth and
speculation has gripped Europe. In France in 1718 a
Scottish adventurer named John Law organized a wild
blue-sky venture known as the Mississippi Company,
selling shares in an enterprise which would mine the
mountains of gold in America. Men and women fought
in the streets for the privilege of winning shares, mur¬
ders were committed, fortunes made overnight. One
hotel waiter netted thirty million livres. When the com¬
pany was about to topple with frightful losses for all
investors, the government sought to stave off disaster by
rounding up a thousand beggars, arming them with picks
and shovels, and marching them through the streets of
Paris as a band of miners off for the Land of Eldorado.
Of course the structure collapsed. But what a change
from the timid capitalists of a hundred years ago to the
get-rich-quick mobs jostling in the Rue de Quincampoix;
what a money-hungry public this must have been to
swallow such a bare-faced fraud!
No mistake about it, the travail was over and the
market system had been bom. The problem of survival
was henceforth to be solved neither by custom nor by
command, but by the free action of profit-seeking men
bound together only by the market itself. The system
was to be called capitalism. And the idea of gain which
underlay it was so firmly rooted that men would soon
vigorously affirm that it was an eternal and omnipresent
attitude.
The idea needed a philosophy.
The human animal, it is repeatedly said, is distin¬
guished above all by his self-consciousness. This seems
to mean that, having set up his society, he is not content
to let things be; he must tell himself that the particular
society in which he lives is the best of all possible soci-
THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 27
eties, and that the arrangements within it mirror in their
own small way the arrangements which providence has
made outside. Hence every age breeds its philosophers,
apologists, critics, and reformers.
But the questions with which the earliest social philos¬
ophers concerned themselves were focused on the politi¬
cal rather than the economic side of life. As long as
custom and command ruled the world, the problem of
riches and poverty hardly struck the earlier philosophers
at all, other than to be accepted with a sigh or railed at
as another sign of man’s inner worthlessness. As long as
men, like bees, were bom to be drones, no one much
worried over the rationale of the laboring poor— the
vagaries of queens were infinitely more elevating and
exciting.
“From the hour of their birth,” wrote Aristotle, “some
are marked out for subjection and some for command,”
and in that comment was summed up not so much the
contempt as the disinterest with which the early philos¬
ophers looked at the workaday world. The existence of
a vast laboring substratum was simply taken for granted,
and money and market matters were not only too sweaty
but too vulgar to engage the consideration of a gentleman
and a scholar. It was the rights of kings, divine and other¬
wise, and the great questions of power temporal and
power spiritual which provided the arena for the con¬
test of ideas— not the pretensions of pushy merchants.
Although personal riches had their role to play in making
the world go round, imtil the struggle for riches became
general, ubiquitous, and patently vital to society, there
was no need for a general philosophy of riches.
But one might ignore the nasty straggling aspect of
me market-place world for just so long; then one might
fulminate against it. Finally when it penetrated to the
very sanctums of the philosophers themselves, it was
better to ask whether even here the evidences of some
master pattern might not yet be seen. To this end, for
two hundred years before Adam Smith, the philosophers
spun their theories of daily life.
But into what a strange succession of molds they cast
28
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
the world as they sought to penetrate to its underlying
puiposes!
At first the wretched struggle for existence found its
be-all and end-all in tlie accumulation of gold. Cliris-
topher Columbus, Cortez, or Francis Drake were not
only state adventurers; they were thought to be the
agents of economic progress as well. To the Bullionists,
as the sixteentli- and seventeenth-century philosophers
called themselves, it was quite self-evident that gold was
the natural mainspring and the proper object of all mun¬
dane aflFairs. Theirs was a philosophy of great armadas
and adventures, kingly wealth and national stinginess,
and an overriding belief that if all went well in the
search for treasure, a nation could scarcely fail to prosper.
But by the eighteenth century, tlie Bullionists were
already looked upon as a trifle naive. A new school had
grown up— the school of Political Arithmetick — and for
the political aritlimeticians, the great unifying principle
of society was not treasure but commerce itself. Hence
the philosophical question to wliich they addressed
themselves was not how to comer the gold market, but
how to create ever more and more wealth by assisting
the rising merchant class in the furtherance of its tasks.
The new philosophy brought with it a new social
problem: how to keep the poor poor. It was generally
admitted that unless the poor were poor, ihey could not
be counted upon to do an honest day s toil without ask¬
ing for exorbitant wages. “To make society happy, wrote
a leading moralist in 1723, “it is necessary that great
numbers should be wnetched as well as poor. So the
political arithmeticians looked on tlie cheap agncultural
and industrial labor of England and gravely nodded ap-
proval. , . T, 1 ,
But pold and commerce were by no means the only
ideas that superimposed some kind of order over the
chaos of daily life. There were countless pamphleteers,
parsons, cranks, and bigots who sought Ae just^cation-
or the damnation-for society in a dozen different explana¬
tions. But the trouble was, all the models were so un¬
satisfactory. One man said a nation obviously must not
29
THE ECONOMIC BEVOLUTION
buy more than it sells, while another as stoutly main¬
tained that a nation was quite obviously better off if it
took in more than it gave in exchange. Some insisted it
was trade which made a nation rich and exalted the
trader; others argued that trade was only a parasitical
growth on the strong body of the farmer. Some said the
poor were meant by God to be poor and even if they
weren’t, their poverty was essential to the wealth of tlie
nation; others saw in pauperism a social evil and could
not see how poverty could create wealth.
Out of the mSlee of contradictory rationalizations one
thing alone stood clear: man insisted on some sort of
intellectual ordering to help him understand the world
in which he lived. The economic world loomed harsh
and yet more and more important. No wonder Dr.
Samuel Johnson himself said, *‘There is nothing which
requires more to be illustrated by philosophy than trade
does.” In a word, the time for the economists had arrived.
Out of the melee came also a philosopher of astonish¬
ing scope. Adam Smith published his Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 1776,
thereby adding a second revolutionary event to that
fateful year. A political democracy was bom on one
side of the ocean; an economic blueprint was unfolded
on the other. But while not all of Europe followed Amer¬
ica s political lead, after Smith had displayed the first
true tableau of modem society, all of the Western World
became the world of Adam Smith: his vision became
the prescription for the spectacles of generations. Adam
Smith would never have thought of himself as a revolu¬
tionist; he was only explaining what to him was very
clear, sensible, and conservative. But he gave the world
the image of itself for which it had been searching.
After the Wealth of Nations^ men began to see the
world about themselves with new eyes; they saw how
the tasks they did fitted into the whole of society, and
ey saw that society as a whole was proceeding at a
majestic pace toward a distant but clearly visible goal.
in
The Wonderful W^orld
of Adam Smith
A\^sitor to England in the 1760's would quite prob¬
ably have learned of a certain Dr. Smith of the Uni¬
versity of Glasgow. Dr. Smith was a well-known, if not a
famous, man; Voltaire had heard of him, David Hume was
his intimate, students had traveled aU the way from Russia
to hear his labored but enthusiastic discourse. In addi¬
tion to his scholastic accomplishments. Dr. Smith was
known as a rather remarkable personality. He was, for
example, notoriously absent-minded: once he had fallen
into a tanning pit walking along in earnest disquisition
with a friend, and it was said that he had brewed himself
a beverage of bread and butter and pronounced it the
worst cup of tea he had ever tasted. But his personal
quirks, which were many, did not interfere with his intel¬
lectual abilities. Dr. Smith was among the foremost philos¬
ophers of his age.
At Glasgow Dr. Smith lectured on problems of Moral
Philosophy, a discipline a great deal more broadly con¬
ceived in that day than in ours. Moral Philosophy covered
Natural Theology, Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Political
Economy: it thus ranged all the way from mans
sublimest impulses toward order and harmony to his
somewhat less orderly and harmonious activities in the
grimmer business of gouging out a living for himself.
30
31
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH
Natural Theology— the search for design in the con¬
fusion of the cosmos— has been an object of the human
rationalizing impulse from earliest times; our traveler
would have felt quite at ease as Dr. Smith expounded
the natural laws that underlay the seeming chaos of the
universe. But when it came to the other end of the spec¬
trum— the search for a grand architecture beneath the
hurly-burly of daily life— our traveler might have felt that
Dr. Smith was really stretching philosophy beyond its
proper limits.
For if the English social scene of the late eighteenth
century suggested anything, it was most emphatically
not rational order nor moral purpose. As soon as one
looked away from the elegant lives of the leisure classes,
society presented itself as a bimte struggle for existence
in its meanest form. Outside the drawing rooms of Lon¬
don or the pleasant rich estates of the counties, all that
one saw was rapacity, cruelty, and degradation mingled
with the most irrational and bewildering customs and
traditions of some still earlier and already anachronistic
day. Rather than a carefully engineered machine where
each part could be seen to contribute to the whole, the
body social resembled one of James Watt’s strange steam
machines: black, noisy, inejBScient, dangerous. How cu¬
rious that Dr. Smith should have professed to see order,
design, and purpose in all of tliisl
Suppose, for example, our visitor had gone to see the
tin mines of Cornwall. There he would have watched
miners lower themselves dovra the black shafts, and on
reaching bottom draw a candle from their belts and
stretch out for a sleep until the candle guttered. Then for
two or three hours they would work the ore until the
next traditional break, this time for as long as it took to
smoke a pipe. A full half day was spent in lounging, half
in picking at the seams. But had our visitor traveled up
north and nerved himself against a descent into the pits
of Durham or Northumberland, he would have seen
something quite different. Here men and women worked
togethei, stripped to the waist, and sometimes reduced
from pure fatigue to a whimpering half-human state.
32
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
The wildest and most bmtish customs were practiced;
sexual appetites aroused at a glance were gratified down
some deserted shaftway; children of seven or ten who
never saw daylight during the winter months were used
and abused and paid a pittance by the miners to help
drag away their tubs of coal; pregnant women drew coal
cars like horses and even gave birth in tlie dark black
caverns.
But it was not just in tlie mines that life appeared
colorful, traditional, or ferocious. On the land, too, an
observant traveler would have seen sights hardly more
suggestive of order, hannony, and design. In many parts
of the countiy bands of agricultural poor roamed in
search of work. From the Welsh highlands, Companies
of Ancient Britons (as they styled themselves) would
come trooping down at harvest time; sometimes they had
one horse, unsaddled and unbridled, for the entire com¬
pany; sometimes they all simply walked. Not infrequently
there would be only one of the lot who spoke English and
so could serve as intermediary between the band and the
gentlemen-fanners whose lands they asked permission to
aid in harvesting. It is not surprising that wages were as
low as sixpence a day.
And finally, had our visitor stopped at a manufacturing
toNvn, he would have seen still other remarkable sights—
but again, not such as to betoken order to the uneducated
eye. He might have maiweled at the factory built by the
brothers Lombe in 1742. It was a huge building (for
those days), five hundred feet long and six stories high,
and inside were machines described by Daniel Defoe as
consisting of “26,586 Wheels and 97,746 Movements,
which work 73,726 Yards of Silk-Thread every time the
Water-Wheel goes round, which is three times in one
minute.” Equally worthy of note were tlie children who
tended the machines round the clock for twelve or four¬
teen hours at a turn, cooked their meals on the grimly
black boilers, and were boarded in shifts in barracks
where, it was said, the beds were always warm.
A strange, cruel, haphazard world tliis must have ap-
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH 33
peared to eighteenth-century as well as to our modem
eyes.
All the more remarkable, then, to find that it could be
reconciled with a scheme of Moral Philosophy envisioned
by Dr. Smith, and that that learned man actually claimed
to fathom within it the clear-cut outlines of great purpose¬
ful laws fitting an overarching and meaningful whole.
What sort of man was this urbane philosopher?
‘1 am a beau in nothing but my books,” was the way
Adam Smith once described himself, proudly showing
off his treasured library to a friend. He was certainly not
a handsome man. A medallion profile shows us a protrud¬
ing lower hp thrust up to meet a large aquiline nose and
heavy bulging eyes looking out from heavy lids. All his
life Smith was troubled with a nervous affliction; his
head shook, and he had an odd and stumbling manner
of speech.
In addition, there was his notorious absent-mindedness.
In the 1780’s when Smith was in his late fifties, the in¬
habitants of Edinburgh were regularly treated to the
amusing spectacle of their most illustrious citizen, at¬
tired in a light-colored coat, knee breeches, white silk
stockings, buckle shoes, flat broad-brimmed beaver hat,
and cane, walking down the cobbled streets with his
eyes fixed on infinity and his hps moving in silent dis¬
course. Every pace or two he would hesitate as if to
change his direction or even reverse it; his gait was
described by a friend as ‘Vermicular.”
Accounts of his absence of mind were common. On
one occasion he descended into his garden clad only in
a dressing gown and, falling into a reverie, walked fifteen
miles before coming to. Another time while walking with
an eminent friend in Edinburgh, a guard presented his
pike in salute. Smith, who had been thus honored on
countless occasions, was suddenly hypnotized by the
saluting soldier. He returned the honor with his cane
and then further astonished his guest by following exactly
in the guard’s footsteps, duplicating with his cane every
motion of the pike. When the spell was broken. Smith
34
THE WOULDLY PHILOSOPHERS
was standing at the head of a long flight of steps, cane
held at the ready. Having no idea that he had done
anything out of the ordinary, he grounded his stick and
took up his conversation where he had left off.
This absent-minded professor was bom in 1723 in the
town of Kirkcaldy, County Fife, Scotland. Kirkcaldy
boasted a population of fifteen hundred; at the time of
Smith’s birth, nails were still used as money by some of
the local townspeople. When he was four years old, a
most curious incident took place. Smith was kidnapped
by a band of passing gypsies. Through the efforts of his
uncle (his father had died before his birth), the gypsies
were traced and pursued, and in their flight they aban¬
doned young Adam by the roadside. “He would have
made, I fear, a poor gypsy,” says one of his biographers.
From his earliest days, Smith was an apt pupil, although
even as a child given to fits of abstraction. He was
obviously destined for teaching and so at seventeen he
went to Oxford on a scholarship— making the journey
on horseback— and there he remained for six years. But
Oxford was not then the citadel of learning which it
later became. Most of the public professors had long ago
given up even a pretense of teaching. A foreign traveler
recounts his astonishment over a public debate there in
1788. All four participants passed the allotted time in
profound silence, each absorbed in reading a popular
novel of the day. Since instruction was the exception
rather than the rule. Smith spent the years largely un¬
tutored and untaught, reading as he saw fit. In fact he
was once nearly expelled from the university because a
copy of David Humes A Treatise of Human Nature was
found in his rooms — Hume was no fit reading matter, even
for a \\^ould-be philosopher.
In 1751— he was then twenty-eight— Smith was offered
the Chair of Logic at the Universitv of Glasgow, and
shoi*tl\^ thereafter he was given the Chair of Moral Phi-
losophv. Unlike Oxford, Glasgow was a serious center of
studv. and boasted a galaxy of talent. But it still differed
considerably from the modem conception of a university.
The prim professorial group did not entirely appreciate
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH
35
a certain levity and enthusiasm in Smith's manner. He
was accused of sometimes smiling during rehgious serv¬
ices (no doubt during a reverie), of being a firm friend
of that outrageous Hume, of not holding Sunday classes
on Christian Evidences, of petitioning tlie Senatus Aca-
demicus for permission to dispense with prayers on the
opening of class, and of delivering prayers that smacked
of a certain “natural religion.” Perhiips this all fits into
better perspective if we remember that Smith's own
teacher, Hutcheson, broke new ground at Glasgow by
refusing to lecture to his students in Latin!
But for all the inevitable academic rivalry. Smith was
happy at Glasgow. In the evenings he played whist— his
absent-mindedness made him a somewhat undependable
player— attended learned societies, and lived a quiet and
sheltered life. He was beloved of his students, noted as
a lecturer— even Boswell came to hear him— and his odd
gait and manner of speech gained the homage of imita¬
tion. Little busts of himself even appeared in booksellers'
windows.
It was not merely his eccentric personality that gave
him prestige. In 1759 he published a book which made
an instant sensation. It was entitled The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, and it catapulted Smith immediately into
the forefront of English philosophers. The Theory was an
inquiry into the origin of moral approbation and dis¬
approval. How does it happen that man, who is a ci*eature
of self-interest, can form moral judgments in which self-
inteiest seems to be held in abeyance or transmuted to
a highei plane? Smith held that the answer lay in our
ability to put ourselves in the position of a third person,
an impartial observer, and in this way to form a sym¬
pathetic notion of the moral (as opposed to the selfish)
merits of a case.
The book and its problems attracted widespread in¬
terest. In Germany das Adam Smith Problem beeame a
avorite subjeet for debate. More importantly, from our
point of view, the treatise met with the favor of an in-
tngumg man named Charles Townshend.
Townshend is one of those wonderful figures with
36 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
which the eighteenth century seems to abound. A witty
and even learned man, Townshend was, in the words of
Horace Walpole, “a man endowed with every great
talent, who must have been the greatest man of his age,
if only he had common sincerity, common steadiness,
and common sense,” Townshend's fickleness was noto¬
rious; a quip of the times put it that Mr. Townshend was
ill of a pain in his side, but declined to specify which
side. As evidence of his lack of common sense, it was
Townshend, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, who helped
precipitate the American Revolution, first by refusing the
colonists the right to elect their own judges and then by
imposing a heavy duty on American tea.
But his political shortsightedness notwithstanding,
Townshend was a sincere student of philosophy and
politics, and as such a devotee of Adam Smith. What is
more important, he was in a position to make him an
unusual offer, In 1754 Townshend had made a brilliant
and lucrative marriage to the Countess of Dalkeith, the
widow of the Duke of Buccleuch, and he now found
himself casting about for a tutor for his wife’s son. Educa¬
tion for a young man of the upper classes consisted largely
of the Grand Tour, a stay in Europe where one might
acquire that polished finish so highly praised by Lord
Chestei-field. Dr. Adam Smith would be an ideal com¬
panion for the young duke, thought Townshend, and ac¬
cordingly he offered him three hundred pounds a year
plus expenses and a pension of three hundred pounds a
year for life. It was too good an offer to be declined. At
best Smith never realized more than one hundred seventy
pounds from the fees which, in those days, professors
collected directly from their students. It is pleasant to
note that his pupils refused to accept a refund from Dr.
Smith when he left, saying that they had already been
more than recompensed.
The tutor and His young Grace left for France in 1764.
For eighteen months they stayed in Toulouse where a
combimition of abominably boring company and Smith’s
execrable French made his sedate life at Glasgow look
like dissipation. Tlien they moved on to the south of
the WONDERFXJL world of ADAM SMITH 37
France (where he met and worshiped Voltaire and
repulsed the attentions of an amorous marquise), thence
to Geneva, and finally to Paris. To reheve the tedium of
the provinces. Smith began work on a treatise of pohtical
economy, a subject on which he had lectured at Glasgow,
debated many evenings at the Select Society in Edin¬
burgh, and discussed at length with his beloved friend
David Hume. The book was to be the Wealth of Nations,
but it would be twelve years before it was finished.
Paris was better going. By this time Smitlis French,
although dreadful, was good enough to enable him to
talk at length with tlie foremost economic thinker in
France. This was a M. Quesnay, a physician in the court
of Louis XV and personal doctor to Mme. Pompadour.
Quesnay had propounded a school of economics known
as Physiocracy and devised a chart of the economy called
a tableau economique. The tableau was truly a physician s
insight; in contradistinction to the ideas of ihe day
which still held that wealth was the solid stuff of gold
and silver, Quesnay insisted that wealth sprang from
production and that it flowed through the nation, from
hand to hand, replenishing the body social like the
circulation of blood. The tableau made a vast impression
— Mirabeau the elder characterized it as an invention
deserving of equal rank with writing and money. But the
ti'ouble widi Physiocracy was that it insisted that only
the agricultural classes produced tnae "wealtli” and that
the manufacturing and commercial classes merely manip¬
ulated it in a sterile way. Hence Quesnay’s system had
but limited usefulness for practical policy. True, it
advocated a policy of laissez faire—a radical departure for
the times. But in denigrating the industrial side of life
it flew against the sense of history, for the whole develop¬
ment of capitalism unmistakably pointed to the emer¬
gence of the industrial classes to a position of superiority
over the landed classes.
This was not a congenial philosophy to Adam Smith.
The notion of the circulation of wealth he gladly ac¬
cepted and acknowledged, but the idea that industry
was somehow sterile and barren struck him as a peculiar
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
38
construction of the world. After all, had he not grown
up in Kirkcaldy and Glasgow where one could see wealth
being created at every hand in the workshops and fac¬
tories of craftsmen? But despite his rejection of the
agricultural orientation of the Physiocrat cult (M.
Quesnay's followers, like Mirabeau, were nothing if not
adulatory). Smith had a profound personal admiration
for the French doctor. Had it not been for Quesnay’s
death, the Wealth of Nations would have been dedicated
to him.
In 1766 the tour was brought to an abrupt halt when
the duke’s younger brother, who had joined them, was
murdered in the streets of Paris. His Grace returned to
his estates at Dalkeith, and Smith went first to London,
and then to Kirkcaldy. Despite Hume’s entreaties, there
he stayed, for the better part of the next ten years, while
the great treatise took shape. Most of it he dictated,
standing against his fireplace and nervously rubbing his
head against the wall imtil his pomade had made a dark
streak on the paneling. Occasionally he would visit his
former charge on his estates at Dalkeith, and once in
a while he would go to London to discuss his ideas with
tlie literati of the day. One of them was Dr. Samuel
Johnson, to whose select club Smith belonged, although
he and the venerable lexicographer had hardly met
under the most amiable of circumstances. Sir Walter
Scott tells us that Johnson, on first seeing Smith, attacked
him for some statement he had made. Smith vindicated
the truth of his contention. “What did Johnson say?”
was the universal inquiry. “Why, he said,” said Smith,
with the deepest impression of resentment, “he said,
Tfou lie!’ ” “And what did you reply?” “I said, "You are
a son of a —1’ ” On such terms, says Scott, did these two
great moralists first meet and part and such was the
classical dialogue between two great teachers of philos-
ophy.
Smith met as well a chaiming and intelligent American,
one Benjamin Franklin, who provided him with a wealth
of facts about tlie American colonies and a deep apprecia-
THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF ADAM SMrTH 39
tion of the role which they might someday play. It is
undoubtedly due to Franklin's influence that Smitli
subsequently wrote of the colonies that they constituted
a nation “which, indeed, seems very likely to becorne
one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in
the world."
In 1776, Wealth of 'Nations was published. Two years
later Smith was appointed Commissioner of Customs for
Edinburgh, a sinecure worth six hundred pounds a year.
With his mother, who lived until she was ninety, Smith
lived out his bachelor's life in peace and quiet; serene,
content, and absent-minded to the end.
And the book?
It has been called “the outpouring not only of a great
mind, but of a whole epoch." Yet it is not, in the strict
sense of the word, an “original” book. There is a long
line of observers before Smith who have approached
his understanding of the world: Locke, Stewart, Law,
Mandeville, Petty, Cantillon, not to mention Quesnay
and Hume again. Smith took from all of them: there are
over a hundred authors mentioned by name in his treatise.
But where others had fished here and there. Smith spread
his net wide; where others had clarified this and that
issue. Smith illuminated the entire landscape. The Wealth
of Nations is not a wholly original book, but it is un¬
questionably a masterpiece.
It is, first of all, a huge panorama. It opens with a
famous passage describing the minute specialization of
labor in the manufacture of pins, and covers, before it
is done, such a variety of subjects as “the late disturb¬
ances in the American colonies" (evidently Smith thought
the Revolutionary War would be over by the time his
book reached the press), the wastefulness of the student's
life at Oxford, and the statistics on the herring catch
since 1771.
A glance at the index compiled for a later edition by
Cannan shows the range of Smith's references and
thoughts. Here are a dozen entries from the letter A:
40
THE WORIDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Abassides, opulence of Saracen empire under
Abraham, weighed shekels
Abyssinia, salt money
Actors, public, paid for the contempt attending their
profession
Africa, powei-ful king much worse off than European
peasant
Alehouses, the number of, not the eflBcient cause of
drunkenness
Ambassadors, the first motive of their appointment
America [a solid page of references follows]
Apprenticeship, the nature ... of this bond servitude
explained
Arabs, their manner of supporting war
Army, . . . no security to the sovereign against a dis¬
affected clergy
In fine print the index goes on for sixty- three pages:
before it ends it has touched on everything: “Riches, the
chief enjoyment of, consists in the parade of; Poverty,
sometimes urges nation to inhuman customs; Stomach,
desire for food bounded by narrow capacity of the;
Butcher, brutal and odious business.” When we have
finished the nine hundred pages of the book we have a
living picture of England in the 1770's, of apprentices
and journeymen and rising capitalists, of landlords and
clergymen and kings, of factories and farms and foreign
trade.
The book is heavy going. It moves with all the delibera¬
tion of an encyclopedic mind, but not with the precision
of an orderly one. This was an age when authors did not
stop to qualify their ideas with ifs, ands, and buts, and
it was an era when it was quite possible for a man of
Smith s intellectual stature virtually to embrace the
great body of knowledge of his times. Hence the book
ducks nothing, minimizes nothing, fears nothing. What
an exasperating book! Again and again it refuses to
wrap up in a concise sentence a conclusion it has labori¬
ously arrived at over fifty pages. The argument is so full
of detail and observation that one constantly has to chip
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH 4I
away the ornamentation to find the steel structure which
holds it together underneath. Coming to silver. Smith
detours for seventy-five pages to write a ''diversion on
it; coming to religion, he wanders oflE in a chapter on the
sociology of morality. But for all its weightiness, the text
is shot through with insights, observations, and well-
turned phrases that imbue tliis great lecture with life.
It was Smith who first called England "a nation of shop¬
keepers”; it was Smith who wrote, **By nature a philos¬
opher is not in genius and disposition half so different
from a street porter, as a mastiflf is from a greyhound.
And of the East India Company, which was tlien ravag¬
ing the East, he wrote: “It is a very singular government
in which every member of tlie administration wishes to
get out of the country ... as soon as he can, and to
whose interest, the day after he has left it and carried
his whole fortune wdth him, it is perfectly indiflFerent
though the whole country was swallowed up by an
earthquake.”
The Wealth of Nations is in no sense a textbook. Adam
Smith is writing to his age, not to liis classroom; he is
expounding a doctrine which is meant to be of impor¬
tance in running an empire, not an abstract treatise for
scholastic distribution. The dragons which he slays (such
as the Mercantile System, which takes over two hundred
pages to die) were aHve and panting, if a little tired, in
his day.
And finally, the book is a revolutionary one. To be sure.
Smith would hardly have countenanced an upheaval
which disordered the gentlemanly classes and enthroned
the common poor. But the import of the Wealth of Na¬
tions is revolutionary, nonetheless. Smith is not, as is
commonly supposed, an apologist for tlie up-and-coming
bourgeois; as we shall see, he is an admirer of their work
but suspicious of their motives, and mindful of the needs
of the great laboring mass. But it is not his aim to espouse
the interests of any class. He is concerned with promot¬
ing the wealth of the entire nation. And wealth, to Adam
Smith, consists of the goods which all the people of
society consume; note aH— this is a democratic, and hence
4^ THE WORUDLY PHILOSOPHERS
radical, philosophy of wealth. Gone is the notion of gold,
treasures, kingly hoards; gone the prerogatives of mer¬
chants or farmers or worldng guilds. We are in the modem
world where the flow of goods and services consumed by
everyone constitutes the ultimate aim and end of eco¬
nomic life.
And now, what of the lessons of the text?
Two great problems absorb Adam Smithes attention.
First, he is interested in laying bare the mechanism by
which society hangs together. How is it possible for a
community in which everyone is busily following his
self-interest not to fly apart from sheer centrifugal force?
What is it which guides each individuars private business
so that it conforms to the needs of the group? With no
central planning authority and no steadying influence of
age-old tradition, how does society manage to get those
tasks done which are necessary for survival?
These questions lead Smith to a formulation of the
laws of the market. What he sought was “the invisible
hand,” as he called it, whereby “the private interests
and passions of men” are led in the direction “which is
most agreeable to the interest of the whole society.”
But the laws of the market will be only a part of Smith’s
inquiry. There is another question which interests him:
whither society? The laws of the market are like the laws
which explain how a spinning top stays upright; but
there is also the question of whether the top, by virtue
of its spinning, will be moved along the table.
To Smith and the great economists who followed him,
society is not conceived as a static achievement of man¬
kind which will go on reproducing itself, unchanged and
unchanging, from one generation to the next. On the
contrary, society is seen as an organism which has its
own hfe history. To discover the shape of things to come,
to isolate the forces which impel society along its path—
this is the grand objective of economic science.
But until we have followed Smith’s unraveling of the
laws of the market, we cannot rush to this larger and
more fascinating problem. For the laws of the market
the WONDERFXJL world of ADAM SMITH
43
themselves will be an integral part of the larger laws
which cause society to prosper or decay. The mechanism
by which the heedless individual is kept in line with
everybody else will aflFect the mechanism by which society
itself changes over the years.
Hence we begin with a look at the market mechanism.
It is not the stuff that excites the imagination or stirs the
pulse. Yet, for aU its dryness, it has an immediacy which
should lead us to consider it with a respectful eye. Not
only are the laws of the market essential to an under¬
standing of the world of Adam Smith, but these same
laws will underlie the very different world of Karl Marx,
and the still different world in which we live today. Since
we are all, knowingly or otherwise, under their sover¬
eignty, it behooves us to scrutinize them rather carefully.
Adam Smithes laws of the market are basically simple.
They tell us that the outcome of a certain kind of be¬
havior in a certain social framework will bring about
perfectly definite and foreseeable results. Specifically
they show us how the drive of individual self-interest in
an environment of similarly motivated individuals will
result in competition; and they further demonstrate how
competition will result in the provision of those goods
that society wants, in the quantities that society desires,
and at the prices society is prepared to pay. Let us see
how this comes about.
It comes about in the first place because self-interest
acts as a driving power to guide men to whatever work
society is willing to pay for, ‘Tt is not from the benev¬
olence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we
e^ect our dinner," says Smith, ‘^ut from their regard to
their self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their hu¬
manity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of
our necessities, but of their advantages."
But self-interest is only half the picture. It drives men
to action. Somethmg else must prevent the pushing of
profit-hungry individuals from holding society up to
exorbitant ransom: a community activated only by self-
iMerest would be a community of ruthless profiteers.
This regulator is competition, the socially beneficial con-
THE WORLDLY PHU^OSOPHERS
sequence of the conflicting self-interests of aU the mem¬
bers of society. For each man, out to do his best for
himself with no thought of social cost, is faced with a
flock of similarly motivated individuals who are in
exactly the same boat. Each is only too eager to take
advantage of his neighbor’s greed if it urges him to
exceed a common denominator of acceptable behavior.
A man who permits his self-interest to run away with
him will find that competitors have shpped in to take
his trade away; if he charges too much for his wares or
if he refuses to pay as much as everybody else for his
workers, he will find himself without buyers in the one
case and without employees in the other. Thus very
much as in the Tlxsovy of MotoI Sentiments, the selfish
motives of men are transmuted by interaction to yield
the most unexpected of results; social harmony.
Consider, for example, the problem of high prices. Sup¬
pose we have one hundred manufacturers of gloves. Tme
self-interest of each one vvdU cause him to vnsh to raise his
price above his cost of production and hereby to realize
an extra profit. But he cannot. If he raises his price his
competitors wfil step in and take his market away from
him by underselling him. Only if aU glove manufacturers
combine and agree to maintain a solid front will an un¬
duly high price be charged. And in this case, the collusive
coalition could be broken by an enterpnsmg manufac¬
turer from another field-say, shoemal^g-who decided
to move his capital into glove manufacture where he
could steal away the market by shading his price.
But the laws of the market not only impose a competi¬
tive price on products. They also see
ducers of society heed society’s demands for the quan
tities of goods it wants. Let us suppose
decide they want more gloves than bemg i^med o b
aS fewer shoes. Accordingly the pubUc scramble
for the stock of gloves on Ae market, ^se
n«s ^vill be f
“jrattand^nd aZ prices rviU tend to fall as the
pubUc passes the shoe stores by. But as glove pnees nse,
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH 45
profits in the glove industry will rise, too; and as shoe
prices fall, profits in shoe manufacturing will slump.
Again self-interest will step in to right the balance.
Workers wiU be released from the shoe business as shoe
factories contract their output; they will move to the
glove business where business is booming. The result is
quite obvious: glove production will rise and shoe
production faU.
And this is exactly what society wanted in the first
place. As more gloves come on the market to meet de¬
mand, glove prices will faU back into hne. As fewer shoes
are produced, the surplus of shoes will soon disappear
and shoe prices will again rise up to normal. Through the
mechanism of the market, society will have changed the
aUocation of its elements of production to fit its new
desires. Yet no one has issued a dictum, and no planning
authority has established schedules of output. Self-
interest and competition, acting one against the other,
have accomplished the transition.
And one final accomplishment. Just as the market
regulates both prices and quantities of goods according
to the final arbiter of public demand, so it also regulates
the incomes of those who cooperate to produce those
goods. If profits in one line of business are unduly large,
there wiU be a rush of other businessmen into that field
until competition has lowered surpluses. If wages are
out of line in one kind of work, there will be a rush of
men into the favored occupation until it pays no more
than comparable jobs of that degree of skill and training.
Conversely, if profits or wages are too low in one trade
area, there will be an exodus of capital and labor until
the supply is better adjusted to the demand.
All this may seem somewhat elementary. But consider
what Adam Smith has done, vdth his impetus of self-
interest and his regulator of competition. First, he has
explained how prices are kept from ranging arbitrarily
away from the actual cost of producing a good. Second,
he has e^lained how society can induce its producers of
commodities to provide it with what it wants. Third, he
has pointed out why high prices are a self-curing dis-
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
46
ease, for they cause production in those lines to increase.
And finally, he has accounted for a basic similarity of in¬
comes at each level of the great producing strata of the
nation. In a word, he has found in the mechanism of tire
market a self-regulating system for society's orderly
provisioning.
Note “self-regulating.” The beautiful consequence of
the market is that it is its own guardian. If output or
prices or certain kinds of remuneration stray away from
their socially ordained levels, forces are set into motion
to bring tliem back to the fold. It is a curious paradox
which thus ensues: the market, which is the acme of
individual economic freedom, is the strictest taskmaster
of all. One may appeal the ruling of a planning board or
win the dispensation of a minister; but there is no appeal,
no dispensation, from tlie anonymous pressures of the
market mechanism. Economic freedom is thus more
illusory than at first appears. One can do as one pleases
in the market. But if one pleases to do what the market
disapproves, the price of individual freedom is economic
ruination.
Does the world really work this way? To a very real
degree it did in the days of Adam Smith. Even in his
time, of course, tliere were already factors which acted
as restraints against the free operation of the market
system. There were combinations of manufacturers who
rigged prices artificially high and associations of jour¬
neymen who resisted tlie pressures of competition when
it acted to lower their wages. And already there were
more disquieting signs to be read. The Lombe brotl^M
factory was more than a mere marvel of engineering
a source of wonderment to the visitor: it betokened tfe
coming of large-scale industry and the emergence of
employers who were immensely powerful individual
actors in the market. The children in the cotton mills
could surely not be considered market factors of equal
power with the employers who bedded, boarded, and
exploited them. But for all its ominous portents,
eighteenth-century England approached, even if it did
not wholly conform to, the model which Adam Smith had
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH 47
in mind. Business was competitive, the average factory
toas small, prices did rise and fall as demand ebbed and
rose, and prices did invoke changes in output and occu¬
pation. The world of Adam Smith has been called a world
of atomistic competition; a world in which no part of the
productive mechanism, laborer or capitalist, was large
enough to interfere with or to resist the pressures of
competition. It was a world in which each agent was
forced to scurry after his self-interest in a vast social free-
for-all.
And today? Does tlie competitive market mechanism
still operate?
This is not a question to which it is possible to give a
simple answer. The nature of the market has changed
vastly since the eighteenth centuiy. We no longer live
in a world of atomistic competition in which no man can
afiFord to swim against the current. Today’s market
mechanism is characterized by the huge size of its par¬
ticipants; giant corporations and equally giant labor
unions obviously do not behave as if they were individual
proprietors and workers. Their very bulk enables them to
stand out against the pressures of competition, to dis¬
regard price signals, and to consider what their self-
interest shall be in the long run rather than in the im¬
mediate press of each day’s buying and selling.
Then, in addition, the growth of government inter¬
vention has altered the scope of the market mechanism.
Like a medieval lord, the government does not recognize
its master in the market; more often than not it sets the
maiket rather than abiding by it. That all these factors
have weakened the primary guiding function of the mar-
ket is apparent: later we will be concerned with what
contemporaiy economists have to say about this problem.
But It would seem, nonetheless, that for all the new
quality of twentieth-century industrial society, the great
pnnciples of self-interest and competition, however
watered down or hedged about, still provide basic rules
ot behavior which no economic participant can afford to
disregard entirely. It is not the neat world of Adam Smith
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
48
in which we hve, but the laws of the market* can still be
discerned in it if we look beneath the surface.
But the laws of tlie market are only a description of
the behavior which gives society its cohesiveness. Some¬
thing else must make it go. Ninety years after the Wealth
of Nations, Karl Marx was to make the portentous an¬
nouncement that he had unearthed “laws of motion”
wliich described how capitalism proceeded slowly, un¬
willingly, but ineluctably to its doom. But tlie Wealth
of Nations already had its own laws of motion. However,
quite unlike the Marxist prognosis, Adam Smith’s world
went slowly, quite willingly, and more or less inevitably
to Valhalla.
Valhalla would have been the last destination that
most observers would have predicted. Sir John Byng,
touring the North Country in 1792, looked from his coach
window and wrote: “Why, here now, is a great flaring
mill ... all tlie Vale is disturb’d. ... Sir Richard Ark¬
wright may have introduced Much Wealth into his
Family and into his Country, but, as a Tourist, I execrate
his Schemes, which having crept into every Pastoral
Vale, have destroyed the course, and the Beauty of
Nature.” “Oh! What a dog’s hole is Manchester,” said
Sir John on aniving there.
In truth, much of England was a dog s hole. The three
centuries of turmoil which had prodded land, labor, and
capital into existence seemed to have been only a prepara¬
tion for still further upheaval, for the recently freed
agents of production began to be combined in a hew and
uglv form: the factory. And ^^^th tlie factory came new
problems. Twenty years before Sir John’s tour, Richard
Arkwright, who had gotten together a little capital ped¬
dling women’s hair to make ivigs, invented (or stole) the
spinning throstle. But having constmcted his machine
he found it was not so easy to staff it. Local labor could
not keep up M'ith the “regular celerity” of the process-
wagework was still generally despised and sorne capita -
ists^found their new-built factories burned to the ground
out of sheer blind malice. Arkwright was forced to turn
49
the WONDEKFtJL WORLD OF ADAM SMITH
to children-'their small fingers being active." Further¬
more, since they were unused to the independent lire or
farmig or crafts, children adapted themselves more
readily to the discipline of factory life. The move was
hailed as a philanthropic gesture— would not the employ¬
ment of children help to alleviate the condition of the
‘‘unprofitable poor"?
For if any problem absorbed the public mind, besides
its mixed admiration of and horror at the factory, it was
this omnipresent problem of the unprofitable poor. In
1720 England was crowded with a million and a half of
them— a staggering figure when we realize that her total
population was only twelve or thhteen million. Hence the
air was full of schemes for their disposition. Despairing
schemes, mostly. For the common complaint was the
ineradicable sloth of the pauper, and this was mixed with
consternation at the way in which the lower orders aped
their betters. Workpeople were actually drinking teal The
common folk seemed to prefer wheaten bread to their
traditional loaf of rye or barley! Where would all this
lead to, asked the thinkers of the day; were not the wants
of the poor (“which it would be prudence to relieve, but
folly to cure,” as a contemporary pamphlet expressed it)
essential for the welfare of the state? What would happen
to Society if the indispensable gradations of society were
allowed to disappear?
But if consternation described the prevalent attitude
of the day toward the great amorphous mass of working
England, it certainly did not describe Adam Smiths
philosophy. “No society can surely be flourishing and
happy, of which by far the greater part of the numbers
are poor and miserable," he said. And not only did he
have the temerity to make so radical a statement, but he
proceeded to demonstrate that society was in fact con¬
stantly improving; that it was being propelled, willy-nilly,
toward a positive goal. It was not moving because any¬
one willed it to, or because Parliament might pass laws,
or England win a battle. It moved because there was a
concealed dynamic beneath the surface of things which
powered the social whole like an enormous engine.
50
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
For one salient fact struck Adam Smith as he looked
at the English scene. This was the tremendous gain in
productivity which sprang from the minute division and
speciahzation of labor. Going into a pin factory, this is
what Smith saw; “One man draws out the wire, another
straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds
it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head
requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is
a pecuhar business; to whiten it is another; it is even a
trade by itself to put them into paper. ... I have seen a
small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were
employed and where some of them consequently per¬
formed two or three distinct operations. But though they
were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accom¬
modated witli the necessary macliinery, they could, when
they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve
pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards
of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten per¬
sons, therefore, could make among tliem upwards of
forty-eight thousand pins in a day. . . . But if they had
all wrought separately and independently . . . they
certainly could not each of them make twenty, perhaps
not one pin a day. . .
There is hardly any need to point out how infinitely
more complex present-day production methods are from
those of the eighteenth century. Smith, for all his dis¬
claimers, was suflBciently impressed with a small factory
of ten people to comment on it; what would he have
thought of one employing ten thousandl But the great
gift of the division of labor is not its complexity-indeed
it simplifies most toil. Its advantage Ues in its capacity
to increase what Smitli calls “that universal opulence
which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people.
That universal opulence of the eighteenth century looks
like a grim existence from our modem vantage point. But
if we view the matter in its historical perspective, if we
compare the lot of the workingman in eighteenth-centuiy
England to his predecessor a century or two before, it is
clear that mean as his existence was, it constituted a con¬
siderable advance. Smith makes the point vividly:
THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF ADAM SMITH
Observe the accommodation of the most common
artificer or day labourer in a civilized and thriving
country, and you will perceive that the number of
people of whose industry a part, though but a small
part, has been employed in procuring him this ac¬
commodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen
coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as
coarse and rough as it may seem, is the produce of
the joint labour of a great multitude of woikmen.
The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-
comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spin¬
ner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many
others, must all join their different arts in order to
complete even this homely production. How many
merchants and carriers, besides, must have been em¬
ployed . . . how much commerce and navigation . . .
how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope
makers . . ,
Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the
different parts of his dress and household furniture,
the coarse linen shirt which he wears next to his
skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which
he lies on . . . the kitchen-grate at which he prepares
his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that
purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and
brought to him perhaps by a long sea and a long
land carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all
the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the
earthen or pewter plates upon which he serves up
and divides his victuals, the different hands em¬
ployed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glass
window wliich lets in tlie heat and the light, and
keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the kmowl-
edge and art requisite for preparing that beautiful
and happy invention . . , ; if we examine, I say, all
those things . , . we shall be sensible that without the
assistance and cooperation of many thousands, the
very meanest person in a civilized country could not
52
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
be provided, even according to what we very falsely
imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is
commonly accommodated. Compared indeed with
the more extravagant luxury of the great, his ac¬
commodation must no doubt appear extremely sim¬
ple and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that
the accommodation of a European prince does not
always so much exceed that of an industrious and
frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the latter
exceeds that of many an African king, the absolute
master of the lives and hberties of ten thousand
naked savages.
What is it that drives society to this wonderful mul¬
tiplication of wealth and riches? Partly it is the market
mechanism itself, for the market harnesses man^s creative
powers in a milieu which encourages him, even forces
him, to invent, innovate, expand, take risks. But there are
more fundamental pressures behind the restless activity
of the market. In fact. Smith sees deep-seated laws of
evolution which propel the market system in an ascend¬
ing spiral of productivity.
The first of these is the Law of Accumulation.
Let us remember that Adam Smith lived at a time
when the rising industrial capitalist could and did realize
a fortune from his investments. Richard Arkwright, ap¬
prenticed to a barber as a young man, died in 1792 leav¬
ing an estate of £500,000. Samuel Walker, who started a
forge going in an old nailshop in Rotherham, left a steel
foundry on that site worth £200,000. Josiah Wedgwood,
who stumped about his pottery factory on a wooden leg
scrawling "This won’t do for Jos. Wedgwood” wherever
he saw evidence of careless work, left an estate of
£240,000 and much landed property. The Industrie
Revolution in its early stages provided a veritable grab
bag of riches for whoever was quick enough, shrewd
enough, industrious enough to ride with its current. ^
And the object of the great majority of the rising
capitalists was first, last, and always, to accumulate their
savings. At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH 53
£-2,500 was collected in Manchester for the foundation of
Sunday schools. The sum total contributed to this worthy
cause by the single largest employers in the district, the
cotton spinners, was £90. The young industrial aristoc¬
racy had better things to do with its money than con¬
tribute to unproductive charities— it had to accumulate,
and Adam Smith approved wholeheartedly. Woe to him
who did not accumulate. And as for one who en¬
croached on his capital— “like him who perverts the
revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes,
he pays the wages of idleness with those funds which the
frugality of his forefathers had, as it were, consecrated
to the maintenance of industry.”
But Adam Smith did not approve of accumulation for
accumulation’s sake. He was, after all, a philosopher, with
a philosopher s disdain for the vanity of riches. Rather,
in the accumulation of capital Smitli saw a vast benefit to
society. For capital— if put to use in machineiy— provided
just that wonderful division of labor which multiplies
man s productive energy. Hence accumulation becomes
another of Smith’s two-edged swords: the avarice of pri¬
vate greed again redounding to the welfare of the com¬
munity. Smith is not worried over the problem which will
face twentieth-century economists: will private accumula¬
tions actually find their way back into moi'e employment?
For him the world is capable of indefinite improvement
and tlie size of the market is limited only by its geo¬
graphical extent. Accumulate and the world will benefit,
says Smith. And certainly in the lusty atmosphere of his
time there was no evidence of any unwillingness to ac¬
cumulate on the part of those who were in a position to
do so.
But— and here is a difficulty— accumulation would soon
ead to a situation where fui-ther accumulation would be
impossible. For accumulation meant more machinery and
more machinery meant more demand for workmen. And
tos m turn would sooner or later lead to higher and
igher wages, until profits— the source of accumulation—
were eaten away. How is this hurdle surmounted?
THE WOIUJDLY PHLLOSOPHEBS
54
It is surmounted by the second great law of the system:
the Law of Population.
To Adam Smith, laborers, hke any other commodity,
could be produced according to the demand. If wages
were high, the number of workpeople would multiply;
if wages fell, the numbers of the working class would de¬
crease.
Nor is this quite so naive a conception as it appears at
first blush. In Smith’s day infant mortality among the
lower classes was shockingly high. It is not uncommon,
says Smith, “. . . in the Highlands of Scotland for a mother
who has borne twenty children not to have two ahve. In
many places in England, half the children died brfore
they were four, and almost everywhere half the children
only lived to the age of nine or ten. Malnutrition, evil
living conditions, cold, and disease took a horrendous
toll among the poorer element. Hence although higher
wages may have affected the birth rate only sfightly, it
could be expected to have a considerable influence on the
number of children who would grow to working age.
Hence if the first effect of accumulation would be to
raise the wages of the working class, this m turn would
bring about an increase in the number of workers And
now the market mechanism takes over. Just as higher
prices on the market will bring about a larger production
of gloves and the larger number of gloves in turn press
down the higher prices of gloves, so higher waps will
bring about a larger number of workers, and the increap
in their numbers will set up a reverse pressure on the
level of their wages. Population, like glove production,
is a self-curing disease-as far as wages are concerned.
And this meant that accumulation might go safely oa
Tlie rise in wages which it caused and which threatened
to make further accumulation unprofitable is tempere
by the rise in population. Accumulation leads to its
undoing, and then is rescued in the nick of time. The
obstacle of higher wages is undone by the growth in
population which those very higher wages made feasible.
There is something fascinating in this automatic process
THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF ADAM SMITH 55
of aggravation and cure, stimulus and response, in which
the very factor which seems to be leading the system to
its doom is also slyly bringing about the conditions neces¬
sary for its further health.
And now observe that Smith has constructed for society
a giant endless chain. As regularly and as inevitably as a
series of interlocked mathematical propositions, society is
started on an upward march. From any starting point
the probing mechanism of the market first equalizes the
returns to labor and capital in all its different uses, sees
to it that those commodities demanded are produced in
the right quantities, and further ensures that prices
for commodities are constantly competed down to their
costs of production. But fmther tlian this, society is
dynamic. From its starting point accumulation of wealth
will take place, and this accumulation will result in in¬
creased facilities for production and in a greater division
of labor. So far, all to the good. But accumulation will
also raise wages as capitalists bid for workers to man the
new factories. As wages rise further accumulation begins
to look unprofitable. The system threatens to level off. But
meanwhile workmen will have used their higher wages to
rear their children with fewer mortahties. Hence the
supply of workmen will increase. As population swells,
the competition among workmen will press down on
wages again. And so accumulation will continue, and an¬
other spiral in the ascent of society will begin.
This is no business cycle which Smith describes. It is a
long-teiTO process, a secular evolution. And it is wonder-
fuUy certain. Provided only that the market mechanism is
not tampered with, everything is inexorably deteimined
by the preceding Link. A vast reciprocating machinery is
set up with aU of society inside it: only the tastes of the
pubhc-to guide producers-and the actual physical re-
Sec?^ outside the chain of cause and
And observe, fui*thermore, that what is foreseen is a
constantly improving state of affairs. True, the rise in the
worfang population will always force wages back toward
a subsistence level. But toward is not to; as long as the
$6 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
accumulation process continues— and Smith sees no reason
why it should cease— there is virtually endless opportunity
for society to improve its lot. Smith did not imply that
this was the best of all possible worlds: he had read
Voltaire's Candide and was no Dr. Pangloss himself. But
there was no reason why the world should not move in
the direction of improvement and progress. Indeed, if one
left the market mechanism alone and allowed it and the
great social laws to work themselves out, it was inevitable
that progress would result.
In the very long run, well beyond the horizon, one
could just discern the final destination for society. By then
the “natural” level of wages would have risen consider¬
ably (for Smith assumed that basic subsistence wages
were a sociological phenomenon rather than a brute ani¬
mal fact). The landlord would also have fared well, for
population would be large and pressing on what was,
after all, a God-given and fixed supply of land. The
capitalist alone would have suffered a difficult fate; since
riches would have multiplied almost beyond calculation,
the capitalist would realize tlie wages of management,
but precious fittle profit beyond that: he would be a
hard-working, well-remunerated, but certainly not luxuri¬
ously rich person. A strange paradise of hard work, much
real wealth, and little leisure this would be.
But the road to society’s eventual resting place was long
and there was too much to be done between the world
of Adam Smith and that final campground to warrant
spending much time on its detail. The Wealth of Nations
is a program for action, not a blueprint for Utopia.
Oddly enough, the book did not immediately take hold.
It was actually ridiculed by Charles James Fox, the most
powerful man in Parliament, and it was to be eight years
until the book was quoted in Commons. Then when
recognition came— as it did — it was from an unexpected
ally. The rising capitalists-and let us remember that this
sturdy, upstart class of parvenus was not bothered with
twentieth-century ideas about equality or economic
justice— found in Smith’s treatise the perfect theoretical
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH 57
justification for their own opposition to factory legislation.
The fact tliat Smith had written of ‘'the mean rapacity,
the monopolizing spirit of the merchants and manufac¬
turers” and that he had said they ‘ neither are, nor ought
to be, the rulers of manlcind” — all this was ignored in
favor of the great point which Smith drew from his in¬
quiry: let the market alone.
What Smith had meant by this was one thing; what his
proponents made him out to mean was another. Smith, as
we have said, was not the proponent of any one class. He
was a slave to his system. His whole economic philosophy
stemmed from his unquestioning faith in the ability of the
market to guide tlie system to its point of highest return.
The market— that wonderful social macliine— would take
care of society’s needs if it was left alone, so that the laws
of evolution might take over to lift society toward its
promised reward. Smith was neither antilabor nor anti¬
capital; if he had any bias it was in favor of the con¬
sumer. “Consumption is the sole end and pui*pose of all
production,” he wrote, and then proceeded to castigate
those systems which placed the interest of the producer
over that of the consuming public.
But in Smith’s panegyric of a free and unfettered mar¬
ket the rising industiialists found the theoretical justifica¬
tion they needed to block the first government attempts
to remedy the scandalous conditions of the times. For
Smith s theory does unquestionably lead to a doctrine of
laissez faire. To Adam Smith the least government is
certainly the best: governments are spendthrift, irre¬
sponsible, and unproductive. And yet Adam Smith is not
necessarily opposed— as his posthumous admirers made
him out to be— to all government action which has as its
end the promotion of the general welfare. He warns, for
example, of the stultifying effect of mass production,
which robs men of their creative natural powers, and
prophesies a decline in the manly virtues of the laborer,
unless the government takes some pains to prevent it.”
S^larly he is in favor of public education to raise the
citizenry above the level of mere uncomprehending cogs
in a vast machine.
58 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
What Smith is against is the meddling of the govern¬
ment with the market mechanism. He is against restraints
on imports and bounties on exports, against government
laws which shelter industry from competition, and against
government spending for improductive ends. Notice that
these activities of the government largely have the in¬
terest of the merchant class at heart. Smith never faced
the problem— which was to cause such intellectual agony
for later generations— of whether the government is weak¬
ening or strengthening the market mechanism when it
steps in with welfare legislation. Aside from poor relief,
there was virtually no welfare legislation in Smith’s day—
the government was the imabashed ally of the governing
classes, and the great tussle within the government was
whether it should be the landowning or the industrial
classes who should most benefit. The question of whether
the working class should have a voice in the direction
of economic afFairs simply did not enter any respectable
person’s mind.
The great enemy to Adam Smith’s system is not so
much government per se as monopoly— in any form. “Peo¬
ple of the same trade seldom meet together,” says Adam
Smith, ‘T>ut the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the public, or in some diversion to raise prices.” And the
trouble with such goings on is not so much that they are
morally reprehensible in themselves— they are, after all,
only the inevitable consequence of man’s self-interest— as
that they impede the fluid working of the market. And of
course Smith is right. If the working of the market is
trusted to produce the greatest number of goods at the
lowest possible prices, anything that interferes with the
market necessarily lowers social welfare. If, as in Smiths
time, no master hatter anywhere in England could em¬
ploy more than two apprentices or no master cutler in
Sheffield more than one, the market system cannot pos¬
sibly yield its full benefits. If, as in Smith’s time, paupers
are tied to their local parishes and prevented from seek¬
ing work where work might be found, the market cannot
attract labor where labor is wanted. If, as in Smith’s time,
great companies are given monopolies of foreign trade,
59
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH
the public cannot realize the full benefits of cheaper
foreign produce. ,
Hence, says Smith, all these impediments must go. Ine
market must be left free to find its own natural levels or
prices and wages and profits and production; whatever
interferes with the market does so only at the expense of
the time wealth of the nation. But because any act of
the government — even such laws as those requiring the
whitewashing of factories or preventing the shackling
of children to machines— could be interpreted as hamper¬
ing the free operation of the market, the Wealth of
'Nations was liberally quoted to oppose the first humani¬
tarian legislation. Thus by a strange injustice the man
who warned that the grasping eighteenth-century indus¬
trialists “generally have an interest to deceive and even
to oppress the public” came to be regarded as their
economic patron saint. Even today— in blithe disregard
of his actual philosophy— Smith is generally regarded as
a conservative economist, whereas in fact, he was more
avowedly hostile to the motives of businessmen than most
New Deal economists.
In a sense the whole wonderful world of Adam Smith
is a testimony to the eighteenth-century belief in the in¬
evitable triumph of rationality and order over arbitrari¬
ness and chaos. Don't try to do good, says Smith. Let good
emerge as the by-product of selfishness. How like the
philosopher to place such faith in a vast social machinery
and to rationalize selfish instincts into social virtues!
There is nothing halfhearted about Smith's abiding trust
in the consequence of his philosophical beliefs. He urges
that judges should be paid by the litigants rather than by
the state, since in that way their self-interest will lead
them to expedite the cases brought before them. He sees
little future for the newly emerging business organizations
called corporations since it seems highly improbable that
such impersonal bodies could muster the necessary self-
interest to pursue complex and arduous undertakings.
Even the greatest humanitarian movements, such as the
abolition of slavery, are defended in his own terms; best
6o
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
abolish slavery, says Adam Smith, since to do so will
probably be cheaper in the end.
The whole complex irrational world is reduced to a
kind of rational scheme where human particles are nicely
magnetized in a simple polarity toward profit and away
from loss. The great system works, not because man
directs it, but because self-interest and competition line
up the filings in the proper way; the most that man can do
is to help this natural social magnetism along, to remove
whatever barriers stand before the free working out
of this social physics, and to cease his misguided efforts
to escape from its thralldom.
And yet for all its eighteenth-century flavor, its belief
in rationality, natural law, and the mechanized chain of
human action and reaction, the world of Adam Smith is
not without its wanner values. Do not forget that the
great beneficiary of the system was the consumer not
the producer. For the first time in the philosophy of
everyday life, the consumer is king.
Of the whole, what has survived?
Not the great scheme of evolution. We shall see that
profoundly altered by the great economists to follow. But
let us not regard the world of Adam Smith as merely a
primitive attempt to arrive at fonnulations which were
beyond his grasp. Smith was the economist of preindus¬
trial capitalism; he did not live to see the market system
threatened by enormous enterprises or his laws of ac¬
cumulation and population upset by sociologica devel¬
opments fifty years off. When Smith lived and wrote
there had not yet been a recognizable phenomenon which
might be called a “business cycle.” The world he wrote
about actually existed, and his systematization of it,
mechanical though it was, provides as good an explana¬
tion as any. , .
Yet something must have been missing from Smiths
conception. For although he saw an evolution for society,
he did not see a revolution-the Industnal Revolution
Smith did not see in the ugly factory system, m the new y
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH
tried corporate fomi of busiiress organization, or in the
weak attempts of journeymen to form protective organi¬
zations, the first appearance of new and disruptively
poweiiul social forces. In a sense his system presupposes
that eighteenth-century England will remain unchanged
forever. Only in quantity will it grow; more people, more
goods, more wealth; its quality will remain unchanged.
His are the dynamics of a static community; it grows but
it never matures.
But although the system of evolution has been dis¬
carded, the great panorama of the market remains as a
major achievement. To be sure, Smith did not “discover”
the market; others had preceded him in pointing out how
the interaction of self-interest and competition brought
about the provision of society. But Smith was the first to
understand the full philosophy of action which such a
conception demanded, the first to foiniulate the entire
scheme in a wide and systematic fashion. He was the man
who made England, and then the whole Western World,
understand just how the market kept society together and
the first to build an edifice of social order on the under¬
standing he achieved. Later economists will embroider
Smith’s description of the market and will inquire
anxiously into the defects which subsequently appeared
in it. None will improve on the richness and life vsdth
which Smith imbued this aspect of the world.
For Smiths encyclopedic scope and knowledge there
can be only admiration. It was only in the eighteenth
century that so huge, all-embracing, secure, caustic, and
profound a book could have been written. Smith antici¬
pated Veblen by a hundred and fifty years when he
wrote: “With tlie greater part of rich people, the chief
enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which
in their eye is never so complete as when they appear to
possess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody
can possess but themselves.” He was a statesman ahead
of his time when he wrote: “If any of the provinces of the
totish Empire cannot be made to contribute towards
e support of the whole empire, it is surely time that
62
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Great Britain should free herself from the expence of
defending those provinces in time of war, and of support¬
ing any part of their civil or military establishments in
time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future
views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circum¬
stances.”
And perhaps no economist will ever again so utterly
encompass his age as Adam Smith. Certainly none was
ever so serene, so devoid of contumacy, so penetratingly
critical without rancor, and so optimistic without being
utopian. To be sure, he shared the beliefs of his day, in
fact he helped to forge them. It was an age of humanism
and reason, and while both could be perverted for the
crudest and most violent purposes. Smith was never
chauvinist, apologist, or compromiser. “For to what pur¬
pose,” he wrote in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, “is
all the toil and bustle of this woi*ld? What is the end of
avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power,
and pre-eminence?” The Wealth of Nations provides his
answer: all the grubby scrabbling for wealth and glory
has its ultimate justification in the welfare of the com¬
mon man.
At the end of his life, Smith was ripe with honors and
respect. Burke traveled to Edinburgh to see him; he was
elected Lord Rector at his old University of Glasgow; he
saw the ^^ealth of Nations translated into Danish,
French, German, Italian, Spanish. Only Oxford ignored
him; it never deigned to give him an honorary degree. At
one time Pitt the Younger, then Prime Minister, was
meeting with Addington, Wilberforce, and Grenville, and
Adam Smith had been invited to attend. As the old
philosopher walked into the room, everyone rose. “Be
seated, gentlemen,” he said. “No, replied Pitt, we will
stand until you are first seated, for we are all your
scholcirs
In 1790 Smith died; he was sixty-seven. Curiously, his
passing attracted relatively little notice; perhaps people
were too busy worrying about the French Revolution an
the repercussions it might have on the English country-
the wonderful world of ADAM SMITH D3
side. He was buried in the Canongate churchyard with an
unpretentious tombstone; it states that Adam Smith,
author of M^ealth of Nations, lies here. It would be hard
to conceive of a more durable monument.
rv
The Gloomy Presentiments
of Parson Malthus
and David Ricardo
IN ADDITION to the Omnipresent problem of poverty, a
bothersome question worried England throughout
most of the eighteenth century: the question of how many
Englishmen there were. The worrisome aspect of the
problem lay in the fact that EnglanTs natural enemies
on the Continent bulged with what, to British eyes, must
have appeared as a veritable flood of humanity, while
England, with her slender resources, was convinced that
her own population was on the decline.
Not that England was any too sure exactly how many
Britishers there were; in hypochondriacal fashion, she
prefen*ed to worry in a factual vacuum. It would not be
until 1801 that the first real census would be held and
when it came it would be heralded as “totally subversive
of the last remnants of English liberty. Hence, Britain s
earlier knowledge about the state of her human resources
depended on the efforts of amateur statisticians: Dr. Price,
a Nonconformist minister; Houghton, an apothecary and
dealer in coffee and tea; and Gregory King, by trade a
maker of maps. , i i
Drawing on records of hearth taxes and baptismal
registers, in 1696 King reckoned up the number of sou s
in the British Isles as something near five and a halt
64
THE GLOOMY PRESENTIMENTS
million— what seems to have been an extraordinarily ac¬
curate estimate. But King was concerned not only with
the contemporary state of affairs. Looking into the future
he wrote: “In all probability, the next doubling of the
people of England will be in about six hundred years to
come, or by the year of our Lord 2300. . . . The next
doubling after that will be, in all probability, in less than
twelve or thirteen hundred years, or by the year of our
Lord 3500 or 3600. At which time the kingdom will have
22 million souls ... in case,” the map maker added cir¬
cumspectly, “the world should last so long.”
But by the time of Adam Smith, King's projection of a
gently rising population had given way to another view.
Comparing eighteenth-century records of hearth-money
taxes with those of an earher day. Dr. Richard Price
proved conclusively that the population of England had
declined by over thirty per cent since the Restoration.
The validity of his computation was obviously dubious
and other investigators hotly disputed his findings; nev¬
ertheless what Dr. Price believed to be so was taken as
fact, and what with the political exigencies of the times,
highly unpalatable fact. “The decay of population,”
moaned William Paley, the theologist reformer, “is the
greatest evil the state can suffer, and the improvement
of it the object which ought ... to be aimed at, in
preference to every other political purpose whatsoever.”
Paley was not alone in his belief; the younger Pitt, the
Prime Minister, even introduced a new poor-relief bill
for the specific purpose of boosting the population. The
bill was to pay liberal allowances for children, since it
was quite apparent to Pitt that by having children a man
enriched his country,” even if his offspring should turn
out to be paupers.
What IS striking about the population question to our
modem eyes is not whether England actually was or was
not in danger of petering out as a nation. In retrospect,
what IS interesting is how harmonious either view of the
population problem was with a philosophy which put its
laSnyi^-'* progress. Was the popu-
ation declining? Then it should be encouraged to grow.
66
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
and grow it would under the august auspices of the laws
which Adam Smith had shown to be the guiding prin¬
ciples of a free-market economy. Was the population
growing? All to the good, since everyone agreed that a
growing population was a national source of wealth. No
matter which way one cut the cake, the result was favor¬
able to an optimistic prognosis for society; or to put it
differently, there was nothing in the population question,
as it was understood, to shake men s faith in their future.
Perhaps no one summed up this optimistic outlook so
naively and completely as William Godwin. Godwin, a
minister and pamphleteer, looked at the vulgar world
about him and shrank back in dismay. But he looked into
the future and what he saw was good. In 1793 he pub¬
lished Political Justice^ a book which excoriated the
present but which gave promise of a distant future in
which “there would no longer be a handful of rich and a
multitude of poor. . . . There will be no war, no crime, no
administration of justice, as it is called, and no govern¬
ment. Besides this there will be no disease, anguish,
melancholy, or resentment.” What a wonderful visionl It
was, of course, highly subversive, for Godwin’s Utopia
called for complete equality and for the most thorough¬
going anarchic communism: even the property contract
of marriage would be abolished. But in view of the high
pi'ice of the book (it sold for three guineas) the Privy
Council decided not to prosecute the author, and it
became the fashion of the day in the aristocratic salons
to discuss Mr. Godwin’s daring ideas.
One home in which this debate took place was Albury
Plouse, not far from Guildford, where there resided a
curious old gentleman who was described by Gentlemans
Magazine on his death in 1800 as “an eccentric character
in the strictest sense of the tei*m.” This eccentric was
Daniel Malthus, a friend of David Hume and a passion¬
ate admirer of Rousseau with whom he had gone on local
botanizing walks and from whom he had received a
herbarium and a set of books in one of the French phi¬
losopher’s recurrent urges for self-dispossession. Like so
many leisurely but inquiring gentlemen of his day, Dan-
THE GLOOMY PRESENTIMENTS 67
iel Malthus enjoyed nothing better than a stimulating
intellectual dialogue, and for an opponent he usually
turned to his gifted son, the Reverend Thomas Robeii:
Malthus.
Quite naturally Godwin’s paradise came up for con¬
sideration and as might perhaps be expected of an eccen¬
tric disciple of Rousseau, Malthus the elder felt sympa¬
thetically inclined toward the supremely rational Utopia.
But young Malthus was not so hopeful as his father. In
fact, as the argument progressed, he began to see an in-
sunnountable barrier between human society as it existed
and tliis lovely imaginary land of everlasting peace and
plenty. To convince his father he wrote his objections
down at length, and so impressed was Daniel Malthus
with his son’s ideas that he suggested the thesis be pub-
hshed and presented to the public.
It was. In 1798 an anonymous treatise of fifty thou¬
sand words appeared on the scene. It was entitled An
Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the
Future Improvement of Society, and with it perished at
one blow all the fond hopes of a harmonious universe.
In a few pages young Malthus pulled the carpet from
under the feet of the complacent thinkers of the times,
and what he offered them in place of progress was a
prospect meager, dreary, and chilling.
For what the essay on population said was that there
was a tendency in nature for population to outstrip all
possible means of subsistence. Far from ascending to an
ever higher level, society was caught in a hopeless trap
in which the human reproductive urge would inevitably
shove humanity to the sheer brink of the precipice of
existence. Rather than headed for Utopia, the human lot
was forever condemned to a losing struggle between
rawnous and multiplying mouths and the eternally in¬
sufficient stock of Natures cupboard, however diligently
that cupboard might be searched.
No wonder that after he read Maltlius, Carlyle called
economics the dismal science,” and that poor Godwin
complained that Malthus had converted friends of prog¬
ress into reactionaries by the hundreds.
68
THE WOBLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
In one staggering intellectual blow Malthus undid all
the roseate hopes of an age oriented toward self-satis¬
faction and a comfortable vista of progress. But as if this
were not enough, at the same time a quite different kind
of thinker was also preparing the coup de grdce for yet
another of the lulling assumptions of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. David Ricardo, an aston¬
ishingly successful stockbroker, was soon to outline a
theoiy of economics which, while less spectacular than
Malthus’ inundation of humanity, would be in its own
quiet way just as devastating to the pleasant premises
of the age of Adam Smith.
For what Ricardo foresaw was the end of a theory of
society in which everyone moved together up the esca¬
lator of progress sketched out by Smith. On the contrary,
Ricardo saw that the escalator worked with different
effects on different classes, that some lode tiiumphantly
to the top, while others were carried up a few steps and
then kicked back down to the bottom. Woise yet, those
who kept the escalator moving were not those who rose
with its motion, and those who got the full benefit of the
ride did notliing to earn their reward. And to cany the
metaphor one step further, if you looked carefully at
those who were ascending to the top, you could see that
all was not well here either; there was a furious strug¬
gle going on for a secure place on the stairs.
Society to Adam Smith was a great family; to Ricardo
it was a bitter contest for supremacy, and small wonder
that he should have seen it as such. In the forty years
since the Wealth of Nations England had divided into
two hostile camps; the rising industrialists, busy with
their factories and fighting for parliamentary represen¬
tation and social prestige, and the great landowners, a
rich powerful, and entrenched aristocracy, who looked
resenSully at the encroachments of the brassy nouveaux
"^t'^was not the fact that the capitalists were making
monev which enraged the landowners. It was the dam¬
nable fact that the? kept insisting
too high. For what had happened m the short sp
THE GLOOMY PRESENTIMENTS 69
time since Adam Smith was that England, which had
long been a grain-exporting nation, was now being forced
to buy foodstuffs from abroad. Despite the mutterings
of Dr. Price who saw England’s population rapidly dwin¬
dling away, the actual growth of population had caused
the demand for grain to exceed the supply and had
quadrupled the price of a bushel of wheat. And as prices
rose, so did profits; on a fann in East Lothian, Scotland,
profits and rent together averaged fifty-six per cent of
invested capital; on another farm of three hundred acres
owned by a Mr. Birkhead— a very typical medium-sized
establishment— profits were £-88 in 1790, £121 in 1803,
and £160 ten years later. And on the large estates of
thousands of acres profits rose accordingly.
As grain soared, enterprising merchants began to buy
wheat and com abroad and bring them into the coun¬
try. Quite naturally, the landlord looked on this practice
with dismay. Fanning was not merely a way of life for
the aristocracy, it was a business— a big business. On
the Reevesby estate in Lincolnshire in 1799, for instance,
Sir Joshua Banks needed two rooms for his offices, sep¬
arated them with a fireproof wall and an iron door, and
was proud of the fact that it took a hundred and fifty-
six drawers to classify all the papers pertaining to the
farm. Although such a landlord lived on his land and
loved the land, although he saw his tenants daily, joined
societies for the purpose of discussing crop rotation and
the virtues of competing fertilizers, he did not lose sight
of the fact that his income depended on the price at
which he sold his crop.
Hence the flow of inexpensive grain from overseas was
hardly viewed in a tolerant light. But fortunately for the
landlord, the means were readily at hand to combat this
distressing development. Dominating Parliament, the
landlord simply legislated himself an ironclad system of
the Com Laws, which imposed
shdmg duties on the importation of grain; the lower the
domestic price fell, the higher went the duty. In effect
a floor was established to keep low-priced wheat penna-
nently out of the English market.
70
THE WORUDLY PHILOSOPHERS
But by 1813 the situation had gotten out of hand. Bad
crops and the war with Napoleon conspired to bring
about virtual famine prices. Wheat sold at a price of
118 shilhngs a quarter— approximately 14 shillings per
bushel. Thus a bushel of wheat sold for a price equal to
nearly twice a worlanan’s whole weekly wage~to put
this into perspective, compare the highest price ever
reached by American wheat: $3.50 per bushel in 1920
when weekly wages averaged $26.00.
Patently, the price of grain was fantastic, and what to
do about it became a question of enormous moment to
the country. Parliament studied the situation carefully—
and came up with the solution that the duty on foreign
grain should be raised still higher! The rationale was
that higher prices in the short run would act to stimu¬
late a larger production of English wheat in the long
rmi.
This was too much for the industrialists to take. Con-
traiy to the landed proprietors, the capitalists wanted
cheap grain, for the price of food largely determined the
amount they would have to pay for labor. It was not out
of humanitarian motives that the industrialists fought for
cheaper food. A great London banker, Alexander Baring,
declared in Parliament: . . the labourer has no interest
in this question; whether the price be 84 shillings or 105
shillings a quarter, he will get di*y bread in the one
case and dry bread in the other.” By this Baring meant
that regardless of the price of bread, the laborer would
get wages enough to buy his crust and no more. But
from the point of view of those who met payrolls and
sought after profits, it made a vast deal of difference
whether grain— and wages— were cheap or dear.
The business interests organized; Parliament found it¬
self flooded with more petitions tlian it had ever received
before. In view of the temper of the country, it became
obviously inexpedient to push through the new higher
Com Laws without some deliberation. New committees
were appointed in Commons and in Lords, and the issue
was temporarily shelved. Fortunately, the next year saw
the defeat of Napoleon and grain prices subsided again
THE GLOOMY PRESENTIMENTS
71
toward more normal levels. But it is an index to the politi¬
cal power of the landholding class that thirty yeais
would have to pass until the Corn Laws were final y
wiped from the books and cheap grain permitted to
come freely into Britain. _ ,
Writing in the midst of such a period or crisis, it is
not difficult to understand why David Ricardo saw
economics in a different and far more pessimistic light
than Adam Smith. Smith had looked at the world and
had seen in it a great concert; Ricardo saw a vicious
conflict. To the author of the Wealth of 'Nations there
was every reason to believe that everyone could shaie
in the benefits of a benign providence; to the inquiring
stockbroker writing about a half century later, society
was not only rent into warring groups, but it seemed in¬
escapably true tliat the rightful winner of the conflict—
the hard-working industrialist— was bound to lose. For
Ricardo believed that the only class that would benefit
from the progess of society was the landlord— unless his
hold on the price of grain could be broken.
“The interest of the landlords is always opposed to
the interest of every other class in the community,” he
wrote in 1815, and with that unequivocal sentence an
undeclared war became recognized civil strife. And with
the open declaration of hostilities there perished the last
forlorn hope that this might after all turn out to be the
best of all possible worlds. Now it seemed that if so¬
ciety did not drown in the Malthusian swamp of hu¬
manity, it would tear itself to pieces in the fight to secure
places on David Ricardo’s treacherous
movinn' .<;tnir<;
We must look more closely at the profoundly disturb-
ing ideas of the gloomy parson and the skeptical stock-
bioker. But first let us look at the men themselves.
It would be hard to imagine two persons more widely
sepaiated in their backgrounds and careers than Thomas
Robert Malthus and David Ricardo. Malthus, as we
know, was the son of an eccentric member of the Eng-
*sh upper middle class; Ricardo was the son of a Jewish
72
THE WORUDLY PHILOSOPHERS
merchant-broker who had immigrated from Holland.
Malthus was tenderly tutored for a university under the
guidance of a philosophically minded father ( one of his
tutors went to jail for expressing the wish that the French
revolutionaries would invade and conquer England)-
Ricardo went to work for his father at the age of four¬
teen. Malthus spent his life in academic research; he was
the first professional economist, teaching at the college
founded in Haileybury by the East India Company to
train its young administrators; Ricardo set up in busi¬
ness for himself at the age of twenty-two. Malthus was
never well-to-do; by the time he was twenty-six, Ricardo
who had started with a capital of eight hundred pounds
—was financially independent, and in 1814, at the age of
forty-two, he retired with a fortune variously estimated
to be worth between £.500,000 and £.1,600,000.
Yet oddly enough it was Malthus, the academician,
who was interested in the facts of the real world, and
Ricardo, the man of affairs, who was the theoretician;
the businessman cared only for invisible “laws” and the
professor worried whether these laws fitted the world
before his eyes. And as a final contradiction, it was Mal¬
thus with his modest income who defended the wealthy
landowner, and Ricardo, a man of wealth and later a
landlord himself, who fought against their interests.
Different as they were in background, training, and
career, so they were accorded utterly different recep¬
tions. As for poor Malthus, in the words of a biographer,
James Bonar: “He was the best abused man of his age,
Bonaparte himself was not a greater enemy of his species.
Here was a man who defended small-pox, slavery, and
child-murder— a man who denounced soup-kitchens,
early marriages, and parish allowances— a man who ‘had
the impudence to marry after preaching against the evils
of a family.' ” “From the first,” says Bonar, “Malthus was
not ignored. For thirty years it rained refutations.”
Such abuse was bound to befall a man who urged
“moral restraint” on the world. And yet Malthus was
neither a prude (by the standards of his times) nor,
73
THE
certainly an ogre. It is true that he urged the abolition
of poor relief and even opposed housing projects for le
working classes. But all this was done with the -smceiest
interest of the poorer classes at heart-and indeed me y
be contrasted with the view of some contemporaiy so¬
cial theorists who suggested blandly that the poor be a -
lowed to die peacefully in the streets.
Hence Malthus’ position was not so much a hard¬
hearted as a supremely logical one. Since according to
his theory the basic trouble with the world was that
there were too many people in it, anything which tended
to promote “early connections” only aggravated the sum
of mankind’s misery. A man for whom “at Natures
mighty feast there is no cover” might be kept alive by
charity, but since he would then propagate, such chaiity
was only cruelty in disguise.
But logic does not always win popularity, and a man
who points out the gloomy end of society can hai dly ex¬
pect to gain popular esteem. No doctrine was ever so
reviled: Godwin described his theory as “that black
and terrible demon that is always ready to stifle the
hopes of humanity.” In the eyes of less sophisticated
readers, the demon was not so much Malthus' theory as
the figure of the Reverend himself.
Ricardo, on the other hand, was a man on whom For¬
tune smiled from the start. A Jew by birth, he had broken
with his family and adopted Quakerism to marry a
handsome Quaker girl with whom he had fallen in love;
but in a day when tolerance was hardly the rule—his
father had traded in a part of the Exchange known as
the Jews Walk—Ricardo achieved both social status and
widespread private respect. Later in life, when he was
in Commons, he was called on to speak from both sides
of the House. “I have no hope,” he said, “of conquering
the alarm with which I am assailed the moment I hear
the sound of my own voice.” That voice was described
by one witness as “harsh and screamy,” by another as
“sweet and pleasant” although “pitched extremely high”;
but when it spoke, the House listened. With his earnest
and brilliant expositions which ignored the toss of events
74 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Structure of society “as if
he had dropped from another planet ” Ricardo became
known as the man who educated Commons. Even his
radicalism-he was a strong supporter of freedom of
speech and ass^bly, and an opponent of parliamentary
corruption and Catholic persecution— did not detract from
the veneration in which he was held.
It is doubtful whether his admirers understood much
of what they read, for there is no more difficult econo¬
mist to understand than Ricardo. But although the text
might have been complex and involved, its import was
plain: the interests of the capitahsts and the landlords
were irrevocably opposed and the interests of the land¬
lords were inimical to the community. Hence, whether
they understood him or not, the industrialists made him
their champion: political economy even became so popu¬
lar with them that ladies who hired governesses inquired
whether they could teach its principles to their children.
But while Ricardo, the economist, walked like a god
(although he was a most modest and retiring person),
Malthus was relegated to a lower status. His essay on
population was read, admired, and then disproved again
and again— the very vehemence of the disproofs a dis¬
quieting testimony to the strength of his thesis. And
while Ricardo’s ideas were avidly discussed, Malthus’
contributions to economics — aside from his essay on popu¬
lation— were largely looked on with a kind of benevolent
tolerance, or ignored. For Malthus had a sense that all
was not well with the world, but he was utterly incapa¬
ble of presenting his arguments in a clear-cut logical
fashion: he was even heretical enough to suggest that
depressions— “general gluts,” he called them— might upset
society, an idea which Ricardo had no trouble in proving
to be absurd. How exasperating for a modem reader!
Intuitive and fact-minded, Malthus had a nose for trou¬
ble, but his woolly-headed expositions had no chance
against the incisive brilliance of the stockbroker who
saw the world only as a great abstract mechanism.
Hence they argued about everx^thing. When Malthus
published his oxvm Principles of Political Economy in
the gloomy presentiments / !?
1820 Ricardo went to the trouble of taking some 220-
odd pages of notes to point out the flaws in the Rever¬
end’s arguments, and Malthus positively went out ot his
way in his book to expose the fallacies he was sure were
inherent in Ricardo’s point of view.
Strangest of all, the two were the closest of frienOs.
They met in 1809 after Ricardo had published a senes
of masterful letters to the Morning Chronicle on the
question of the price of bullion, and then had demolished
a Mr. Bosanquet, who was rash enough to venture an
opposing view. First James Mill and then Malthus sought
out the author of the letters and a friendship foiTned
among all three which endured to the end of their lives.
A stream of correspondence passed between them, and
they visited each other endlessly. "They hunted together
in search of the Truth,” wrote Maria Edgeworth, a con¬
temporary writer, in a charming diary, and huzzaed
when they found her, without caring who found her
first.”
It was not all serious discussion; these were vei*y hu¬
man beings. Malthus, whether out of deference to his
theories or other reasons, had married late, but he was
fond of social gatherings. After his death, someone who
had known him mused on his life at East India College:
"The subdued jests and external homage and occasional
insurrections of the young men; the archeiy of the young
ladies; the curious politeness of the Persian professor . . .
and the somewhat old-fashioned courtesies of the sum¬
mer evening parties "are all over now.”
The pamphleteers compared him with Satan, but
Malthus was a tall and handsome man and a gentle soul:
his students called him “Pop” behind his back. He had
one odd defect: from his great-great-grandfather he had
inherited a cleft palate and his speech was difficult to
understand; I was his worst letter and there is an amus¬
ing account of his saying into the ear tmmpet of a deaf
and famous lady: ‘^Would not you like to have a look at
the lakes of Killamey?” This defect and the indissoluble
association of his name with overpopulation led one ac¬
quaintance to write:
76 THE WORU3LY PHILOSOPHERS
Philosopher Malthus was here last week. I got an
agreeable party for him of unmarried people ... he
is a yood-natured man and, if there are no signs of
approaching fertility, is civil to every lady. . . . Mal¬
thus is a real moral philosopher, and I would almost
consent to speak as inarticulately, if I could think
and act as wisely,
Ricardo at home also loved to entertain: his breakfasts
were famous, and he seems to have indulged in a fond¬
ness for charades. In her Life and Letters, Miss Edge-
worth tells of one round:
coxcomb— Mr, Smith, Mr. Ricardo, Fanny, Harriet,
and Maria, crowing. Ditto, ditto, combing
hair. Mr. Ricardo, solus strutting, a cox¬
comb, very droll.
He was extraordinarily gifted as a businessman. ‘The
talent for obtaining wealth,” wrote his brother, “is not
held in much estimation, but perhaps in nothing did Mr.
R. more evince his extraordinary powers than he did in
business. His complete knowledge of all its intricacies—
his surprising quickness at figures and calculation— his
capability of getting through, without any apparent exer¬
tion, the immense transactions in which he was concerned
—his coolness and judgment— enabled him to leave all
his contemporaries at the Stock Exchange far behind.”
His son later declared that his father’s success was based
upon his observation that people in general exaggerated
the importance of events. “If therefore, dealing as he dealt
in stocks, there was reason for a small advance, he
bought, because he was certain the unreasonable advance
would enable him to realize; so when stocks were fall¬
ing, he sold in the conviction that alarm and panic would
produce a decline not warranted by circumstances.
It was a curiously upside-down arrangement: the
theoretical stockbroker versus the practical divine— par¬
ticularly curious since the theoretician was at home in
77
the gloomy presentiments
the world of money whereas the man of facts and ligures
was utterly at sea. ,
During the Napoleonic Wars Ricardo was an unde -
writer in a syndicate which bought government securi¬
ties from the Treasury and then offered them to the
subscribing public. Ricardo often did Malthus a favoi
and carried him for a small block of securities on which
the parson made a modest profit. On the eve of Waterloo
Malthus thus found himself a small "bull^ on the Ex¬
change and the strain was too much for his nerves, lie
wrote to Ricardo urging him ‘'unless it is wrong oi in¬
convenient ... to take an early opportunity of realizing
a small profit on the share you have been good enough
to promise me.” Ricardo did, but with the stronger stay¬
ing power of the professional speculator bought himself
into a maximum bull position. Wellington won; Ricaido
made an immense killing, and poor Malthus could not
help being discomfited. Ricardo, on the other hand, wrote
casually to the Reverend, “This is as great an advantage
as ever I expect or wish to make by a rise. I have lieen
a considerable gainer by the loan. Now for a little of our
old subject,” and he plunges back into a discussion of
the theoretical meaning of a rise in the price of com¬
modities.
Their endless debate went on, by letter and visit, until
1823. In his last letter to Malthus, Ricardo wrote: “And
now, my dear Malthus, I have done. Like other dis¬
putants, after much discussion, we each retain our own
opinions. These discussions, however, never influence
our friendship; I should not like you more than I do if
you agreed in opinion with me.” He died that year sud¬
denly, at the age of fifty-one; Malthus was to go on
until 1834. As for his opinion of David Ricardo: “I never
loved anybody out of my own family so much.”
Although Malthus and Ricardo disagreed on almost
eveiything, they did not disagree about what Maltiuis
had to say about population. For in his celebrated Essay
in 1798 Malthus seemed not only to elucidate the ques¬
tion once for all but also to shed a great deal of light
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
pLr ’J*'® “f‘‘ poverty which haunted
the Lnghsh social scene. Others had vaguely felt that
somehow population and poverty were related and a
concerned an
landed Fernandez
landed two goats in case he should later wish to find
meat there. On revisiting the island he found that the
goats had multiplied beyond reason, so he then landed
I “'“ml f multiplied and cut down the
goats Thus, wrote the author, a Reverend James Town-
shend a new kind of balance was restored. The weakest
of both species were the first to pay the debt of nature;
the most active and vigorous preserved their lives.” To
which he added: It is the quantity of food which regu¬
lates the number of the human species.”
But while this paradigm recognized the balance that
must be struck in nature, it still failed to draw the final
devastating conclusions implicit in the problem. This
was left for Malthus to do.
He began with a fascination in the sheer numerical
possibilities contained in the idea of doubling, “. . . If
any person will take the trouble to make the calculation,”
he wrote, “he will see that if the necessaries of life could
be obtained without limit, and the number of people
could be doubled every twenty-five years, the popula¬
tion which might have been produced from a single pair
since the Christian era, would have been sufficient, not
only to fill the earth quite full of people, so that four
should stand in every square yard, but to fill all the
planets of our solar system in the same way, and not
only them but all the planets revolving around the stars
which are visible to the naked eye, supposing each of
them ... to have as many planets belonging to it as our
sun has.”
And in this appreciation of the staggering multiplica¬
tive powers of reproduction, he is quite right. One biolo¬
gist has calculated that a pair of animals, each pair pro¬
ducing ten pairs annually, would at the end of tAventy
years be responsible for 700,000,000,000,000,000,000 off¬
spring; and Havelock Ellis mentions a minute organism
79
THE GLOOMY PRESENTIMENTS
which, if unimpeded in its division, would produce from
one single tiny being a mass a million times larger than
the sun— in thirty days.
But such examples of the prolific power of nature aie
meaningless in themselves. The vital question is: how
great is the normal reproductive power of a human be¬
ing? Malthus made the assumption that the human ani¬
mal would tend to double his numbers in twenty-five
years. In the light of his times this was a relatively mod¬
est assumption. It necessitated an average family of six,
two of them were presumed to die before reaching the
age of maiTiage. Tuining to America, Malthus pointed
out that the population there had in fact doubled itself
eveiy twenty-five years for the preceding century and
a half, and that in some backwoods areas where life was
freer and healthier, it was doubling every fifteen years!
But against the multiplying tendencies of the human
race— and it is inconsequential to the argument whether
it tended to double in twenty-five years or in fifty— Mal¬
thus opposed the obdurate fact that land, unlike people,
cannot be multiplied. Land can be added to laboriously,
but the rate of progress is slow and hesitant; unlike
population, land does not breed. Hence while the num¬
ber of mouths grows geometrically, the amount of cul¬
tivable land grows only arithmetically.
And the result, of course, is as inevitable as a proposi¬
tion in logic; the number of people is bound, sooner or
later, to outstrip the amount of food. ‘‘Taking the whole
earth,” wrote Malthus in his Essay, . . and supposing
the present population to be equal to a thousand mil¬
lions, the human species would increase as the numbers
I, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, and subsistence as I, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. In tw^o centuries the population would
be to the means of subsistence as 256 to 9; in three cen¬
turies as 4096 to 13, and in two thousand years the dif¬
ference would be incalculable.”
Such a dreadful view of the future would be enough to
discourage any man: “The view,” Malthus wrote, “has
a melancholy hue. The troubled Reverend was driven
to the conclusion that the incorrigible and irreconcilable
8o
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
divergence between mouths and food could have only
one result; the larger portion of mankind would forever
be subjected to some kind of misery or other. For some¬
how the huge and ever potentially widening gap must be
^aled: population, after all, cannot exist without food.
Hence among the primitives such customs as infanticide-
hence war, hence disease, and above all, poverty.
And if these are not enough: “Famine seems to be the
last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power
of population is so superior to the power of the earth
to provide subsistence . . . that premature death must
in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices
of mankind are active and able ministers of depopula¬
tion. . . . But should they fail in this war of extermina¬
tion, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague
advance in terrific array and sweep off their thousands
and tens of thousands. Should success still be incomplete,
gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one
mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the
world.”
No wonder poor Godwin complained that Malthus
had converted friends of progress into reactionaries. For
this is tmly the doctrine of despair. Nothing, nothing can
rescue mankind from the constant threat of drowning
under its own weight but the frail reed of “moral re¬
straint.” And how dependable is moral restraint against
the great passion of love?
The prospect that Malthus foresaw has come true.
Recently the Foreign Policy Association wrote:
The statistics are almost beyond belief. Each day
about 10,000 people in the underdeveloped coun¬
tries die as a result of illnesses caused by malnutri¬
tion. Of ever>^ 20 children bom in these countries,
10 are likely to perish in infancy from hunger or
from the effects of an improper diet. Another seven
may suffer physical or mental retardation.
This Malthusian nightmare will worsen, not improve,
over the coming decades. For population in the backward
THE
bl
areas is arrowing faster than the output of food-growing
at a rate°that, in tlie opinion of the world s food authoii-
ties portends a famine of unprecedented and unimagin-
matters stand/’ writes J. J. ^pengler, an expert on the
population problem, “the prospect is definitely M.
thusian, with man sitting on a demographic tune bomb
Can the bomb be defused? The date of the explosion
can be delayed somewhat if we manage to increase the
output of food. To feed ( at present semistaiwation levels )
the three billion humans who will arrive on the planet
before the year 2000 will require a doubling of world
food output, and this may strain- capabihties to the
breaking point. But even if a miracle quadrupled the
output of food, we should only be deferring the famine
by perhaps a generation. And meanwhile, theie aie
other strains-housing the prospective billions will re¬
quire the construction, in the next forty years, of as much
shelter as has been built since the beginning of civiliza¬
tion.
If the time bomb is to be defused, all agree that it must
be done through population control. Throughout history
birth control has been practiced by the upper classes of
all societies— which is one reason for the adage that the
rich got richer and the poor got children. Now the prob¬
lem is to introduce a knowledge of birth control among
hundreds of millions of peasants, most of whom cannot
read, do not trust doctors, and are suspicious of out¬
siders telling them how to change their ways of life.
Can it be done, before famine begins? Perhaps. The
techniques exist. More important, there is evidence from
a few areas (South Korea and Taiwan) where the effort
has been made that peasants tcill accept birth control,
not to please the economic planners, but to escape from
the miserable cycle of birth followed by premature death.
\Vhat we still do not know is whether the enormous ad¬
ministrative and medical effort needed to bring birth con-
trol to remote villages and urban slums can be mounted
in time, and (to a lesser extent) whether religious oppo-
82
the worij)ly philosophers
It is too early to answer these questions. We only know
that m our own day we are witnessing a last stage of
the fearful progression that Malthus foresaw in 1798-
fertility of humanity finaUy
outstrips that of the soil, enforcing a ghastly limit on
the quantity of human life.
Malthus did not aim his shafts at the then largely ig¬
nored continents of the East and South. His warning was
directed at the Western World. There, miraculously, he
was wrong. Something happened in England, on ’the
Continent, in the United States, to retard the flood of new
rnouths. In 1860, sixty-three per cent of the couples mar¬
ried in Great Britain had families of four or more chil¬
dren; by 1925 only twenty per cent had more than four.
Over the same span of time, the number of families with
only one or two children increased from ten per cent
of the total to more than half.
Why? What saved tlie West from the Malthusian
doubling and redoubling? We do not fully understand
the reasons; the laws of population growth are not yet
completely clear. Birth control, of course, played a part.
Originally it was called neo-Malthusianism, a name
which would have made Malthus wince: he quite dis¬
approved of the practice. But something else seems to
have been equally important. The process of industrial¬
ization itself appears to have a tempering influence on
the size of families. Marriages tend to take place later
in advanced countries (this is the “moral restraint” on
which Malthus pinned his slim hopes). The status of
women is elevated from mere childbearers to active and
working members of society. There are competing pleas¬
ures and desires which make a large family seem less de¬
sirable than in a simpler way of life.
To be sure, population in the United States is growing
—and in recent years has been growing fairly fast. We
too face a population problem, although we will experi¬
ence it first in terms of crowding rather than hunger. As
our numbers mount— there will be 300 million Americans
the gloomy presentiments 83
before the year 2000— space dwindles. Lines of traffic
lengthen, national parks get more and more like va^
picnic grounds, resources such as water get consumed
dangerously fast. Yet nothing like famine threatens the
United States, for advances in agricultural technology
have raced out ahead of sheer numbers of mouths. Mal-
thus did not see that the yield from cultivable land could
grow much more rapidly than the area of land. Indeed,
the problem in the United States is that agricultural pro¬
ductivity has been increasing too fast, that we have been
threatened with uneatable surpluses of food.
Cannot the world follow our example? The problem is
that American agriculture is productive because it is the
beneficiary of enoimous capital investments. The average
American fanner works v^th a larger value of equip¬
ment than the average factory worker. It will be decades
before sufficient capital can be accumulated in the back¬
ward lands. By then it will be too late.
None of this could be accurately foreseen in Malthus*
day. In 1801 despite severe misgivings and inmors to
the effect that this was merely a prelude to a military
dictatorship, the first scientific census was undertaken in
Great Britain. John Rickman, a civil servant and statis¬
tician, calculated that England's population had in¬
creased by twenty-five per cent in three decades. Al¬
though this was far from doubling, no one doubted that
were it not for the disease and poverty of the masses, the
population would have grown like an avalanche. No one
saw the future slowing down of the birth rate; rather it
seemed as if Britain was forever to face the mean poverty
which sprang from an insatiably spawning humanity
scrabbling for an insufficient supply of food. Poverty no
longer seemed accidental, or an act of God, or the result
even of human indifference. It seemed as though some
malign providence had condemned the human race to
eternal dolor, as if all of mankind's efforts toward self-
improvement were made a farce through the stinginess
of nature.
It was all very discouraging. Paley, who had urged a
larger population ‘ m preference to every other political
^4 the worldly philosophers
purpose whatsoever,” now became a convert to Malthus"
banner; Pitt, who had wanted his country enriched with
more children, now withdrew his bill for higher poor
relief in deference to the parson’s opinions. Coleridge
summed up the doleful outlook. “Finally, behold this
mighty nation,” he wrote, “its rulers and wise men listen¬
ing to-Paley and-to Malthus! It is mournful, mournful.”
Anyone who was not suflBciently depressed by Mal¬
thus had only to turn to David Ricardo.
At first glimpse this was not a particularly terrifying
world— at least not after the Malthusian. The universe of
David Ricardo, set forth in his Principles of Political
Economy in 1817, is dry, spare, and condensed; there is
none of the life, the lively detail of Adam Smith. Here
is nothing but principle, abstract principle, expounded
by an intellect which is focused on something more per¬
manent than the changing flux of daily life. This is as
basic, bare, unadorned and architectural as Euclid, but,
unlike a set of pure geometrical propositions, this system
has human overtones: it is a tragic system.
To understand that tragedy, we must take a moment to
introduce the main characters in the drama. They are
not, as we have said, people: they are prototypes. Nor
do these prototypes, in the ever>'day sense of the word,
live: they follow “laws of behavior.” There is none of the
bustle of Adam Smith’s world here; instead we watch a
kind of model puppet show in which the protean aspects
of the real world have been reduced to a kind of one¬
dimensional caricature; this is the world stripped of
evervthing but its economic motivations.
\\"hom do we meet? First, there are the workers, un¬
differentiated units of economic energy, whose only hu¬
man aspect is a hopeless addiction to what is euphemis¬
tically called “the delights of domestic society.” Their
incurable penchant for these delights results in evety
rise in wages promptly being met with an increase in
population. The workers get their dry cinst, as Alexander
Baring put it, for without it they could not peipetuate
themselves. But over the long mn they are condemned by
the gloomy presentiments 85
their own weakness to a life at the margin of subsistence.
Like Malthus, Ricardo saw only “self-restraint as a solu¬
tion for the working masses and although he wished the
workers well, he did not put too much faith in their pow¬
ers of self-control.
Next we meet the capitahsts. They are not Adarn
Smith’s conniving merchants. They are a gray and uni¬
form lot, whose entire purpose on earth is to accumulate
-that is, to save their profits and to reinvest them by
hiring still more men to work for them; and this they
do with unvarying dependability. Perhaps Ricardos
training in the dispassionate world of international finance
blinded him to the variety of motives besides money¬
making which motivated even a nineteenth-century in¬
dustrialist; but for whatever reason, his capitalists aie
nothing but economic machines for self-aggrandizement.
But the capitalists' lot is not an easy one. For one thing,
by competing among themselves, they quickly erase any
undue profits which might accrue to one lucky soul who
invented a new process or found an unusually profitable
channel of trade. For another thing, their profits depend
largely on the wages they have to pay, and as we shall
see, this leads them into considerable difficulties.
But so far, save for the lack of realistic detail, it is
not a world too far removed from that of Adam Smith. It
was when Ricardo came to the landlord that things were
different.
For Ricardo saw the landlord as a unique bcneficiaiy
in the organization of society. The worker worked, and
for this he was paid a wage; the capitalist ran the show,
and for this he gained a profit. But the landlord benefited
from the powers of the soil, and his income— rent— was
not held in line by either competition or by the power of
population. In fact, he gained at everyone else's expense.
We must pause for a moment to understand how Ri¬
cardo came to this conclusion, for his morbid outlook for
society hangs on his definition of the landlord's rent.
Rent, to Ricardo, was not just the price one paid for the
use of the soil, much as interest was the price of capital,
and wages the price of labor. Rent was a very special
86
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
kind of return which had its origin in the demonstrable
xRct thclt not a.11 land was equally productive.
Suppose, says Ricardo, there are two neighboring
landlords. On one landlord s fields the soil is fertile, and
with the labor of a hundred men and a given amount
of equipment he can raise fifteen hundred bushels of
giain. On the second landlord’s fields, the soil is less
fecund; the same men and their equipment will raise
only one thousand bushels. This is merely a technical
fact of nature, but it has an economic consequence: grain
will be cheaper, per bushel, on the fortunate landlord’s
estate. Obviously since both landlords must pay out the
same wages and capital costs, there will be an advan¬
tage to the man who secures five hundred more bushels
than his competitor.
Now it is from this difference in costs that rent springs,
according to Ricardo. For if the demand is high enough
to warrant tilling the soil on the less productive farm, it
will certainly be a very profitable operation to raise grain
on the more productive farm. Indeed, the greater the dif¬
ference between the two fanns, the greater will be the
differential rent. If, for example, it is just barely profit¬
able to raise grain at a cost of $2.00 a bushel on very
bad land, then certainly a fortunate landowner whose
rich soil produces grain at a cost of only 50 cents a
bushel will gain a large rent indeed. For both farms will
sell their grain in the same market, and the owner of the
better ground will pocket the difference of $1.50 in their
costs.
All this seems innocuous enough. But now let us fit
it into the world that Ricardo envisaged, and its unpleas¬
ant consequences will become quite clear.
To Ricardo the economic world was constantly tend¬
ing to expand. As capitalists accumulated, they built
new shops and factories. Therefore, the demand for labor¬
ers increased. This boosted wages, at least temporarily,
for better pay would soon tempt the incorrigible working
orders to avail themselves of those treacherous delights
of domestic society and so to undo their advantage by
flooding the market with still more workers. But-and
the gloomy presentiments
87
here is where the world of Ricardo turns sharply away
from the hopeful prospects of Adam Srmth-as pop^i^-
tion expanded, it would become necessary to push the
margin of cultivation out further. More mouths would
demand more grain, and more grain would ^eman
more fields. And quite naturally, the new fields put into
seed would not be so productive as those aheady m
use for it would be a foolish farmer who had not al¬
ready used the best soil available to him.
Thus, as the growing population caused more and
more land to be put into use, the cost of grain would
rise. So of course would the selling price of grain, and
so too would the rents of well-situated landlords. Arid
not only rents, but wages would rise, as well. For as
became more expensive to produce, the laborer would
have to be paid more, just to enable him to buy his dry
crust and stay aliv^:'
And now see the tragedy. The capitalist— the man re¬
sponsible for the progress of society in the first place—
has been put in a double squeeze. First, the wages he
has to pay are higher, since bread is dearer. Secondly,
the landlords are much better off, since rents have been
rising on good land, as worse and worse land has got
pushed into use. And as the landlord’s share in society s
fmit increases, there is only one class that can get el¬
bowed aside to make room for him— the capitalist.
What a different conclusion from Adam Smith’s great
pageant of progress! In Smith’s world everybody grad¬
ually became better off as the division of labor increased
and made the community more wealthy. In Ricardo’s
world, only the landlord stood to gain. The worker was
forever condemned to the margin, for, poor fellow, he
tended to chase after every wage rise with a flock of
children and thereby to compete his wages right back
down to subsistence. The capitalist, who worked and
saved and invested, found that all his trouble was for
nothing; his wage costs were higher, his profits smaller,
and his landed opponent far richer than he. And the
landlord, who did nothing but collect his rents, sat back
and watched them increase.
88
THK WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
No wonder that Ricardo fought against the Com Laws
and showed the advantages of free trade which would
bring cheap grain into Britain. No wonder the landlords
iought tooth and nail for thirty years to keep cheap grain
out of the country. And how natural that in Ricardo s
exposition the young industrialist class saw the theory
which just fitted their needs. Were they responsible for
low wages? No, since it was only the worker’s own
blindness which drove him to multiply his numbers.
Were they responsible for the progress of society? Yes,
and what did it avail them to expend their energies and
save their profits for still further adventures in produc¬
tion? All they got for their pains was the dubious satis¬
faction of watching rents and money wages rise, and
their own profits shrink. It was they who drove the eco¬
nomic machine, and the landlord, lolling in the back
seat, who gained all the pleasure and reward. Indeed a
sensible capitalist would really have to ask himself if
the game were worth the candle.
Now who was to pop up and say that Ricardo was un¬
fair to the landlords but Parson Malthusl
Let us remember that Malthus was not just an expert
on the population question. He was first and foremost an
economist, and he had, as a matter of fact, propounded
the “Ricardian” theory of rent before it was taken up
and refined by Ricardo himself. But Malthus did not
draw the same conclusions from his theory as his friend.
“Rents,” said Malthus, in his Principles of Political £con-
07771/, which appeared three years after Ricardo’s, “are
the reward of present valour and wisdom, as well as of
past strength and cunning. Every day lands are pur¬
chased with the fiTiits of industry and talent. In fact,
Malthus adds in a footnote, “Mr. Ricardo himself is a
landlord and a good example of what I mean.”
It was not a very convincing rebuttal. Ricardo did not
paint the landlord as a machinating figure of evil. He
merely showed how the forces of economic development
placed him unwittingly in a position where he stood to
benefit from society's growth.
the gloomy presentiments
But we cannot stop here to trace all the pennutations
of this debate. What is important is that the dire impli¬
cations of rent envisioned by Ricardo never came to pass.
For the industrialists finally did break the power of the
landlords and they did finally secure the importation of
cheap food. The bleak hillsides up which the wheat-
fields were ominously climbing in Ricardos day were,
within a few decades, returned to pasture. Equally im¬
portant, the population never grew so fast as to swamp
the resources of the country. For the Ricardian theoty
says that rent arises from the inequahties between the
best land and the worst; obviously, if the population
problem is under control, this difference will not de-
velop to such a degree that rental returns assume social¬
ly alarming proportions. But consider for a moment the
situation if Britain today were forced to feed her present
population of fifty millions entirely from the produce cu
home-grown crops— suppose the old Corn Laws had
never been repealed. Is there any doubt that Ricardo s
picture of a landlord-dominated society would be a
frightening reality? The problem of rent has become al¬
most an academic side issue in the modem Western
World. But tliis is not because Ricardos analysis was
faulty; we have been spared the Ricardian dilemma only
because the tempo of industrial life has rescued us from
the Malthusian plight: industrialism has not only given
us a brake on births, but it has enormously increased our
ability to raise food from the land at our disposal.
But while Malthus regarded the landlord as a valiant
fellow who contributed to the wealth of nations ( Ricardo
said he contributed as a capitalist^ making agricultural
improvements, but not as a mere beneficiary from the
property rights of soil), the parson found yet another
cause for concern. He was worried over the possibility
of what he called a “general glut”— a flood of commodi¬
ties without buyers.
Such an idea is by no means foreign to us who have
worried about depressions all our lives. But it appeared
foolish beyond belief to Ricardo. England had had up¬
sets in trade, but all of these appeared to be traceable
90
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
to
some specific cause-a bank failure, or a burst of
unwarranted speculation, or a war. And more important
or Ricardos mathematical mind, the concept could be
shown ^to be logically impossible. Therefore, it could
never happen. wuiu
Ricardo s proof had been discovered by a young
Frenchman named J. B. Say. Say had two iery simplf
propositions. First, he beheved that the desire for com-
modities was infinite. The desire for food might be lim-
ited hy the capacity of a mans stomach, as Adam Smith
had said, but his desire for clothes, furniture, luxuries
and ornaments seemed incalculably large. But not only
was demand infinitely large, said Ricardo and Say, but
tlie ability to purchase was guaranteed as well. For every
good that was produced cost something— and every cost
was some man s income. Whether that cost was wages,
rent, or profits, its sale price accrued as someone's income.
And so how could a general glut ever occur? The goods
existed, the demand for them existed, and the incomes
to buy them existed as well. Only pure perversity could
prevent the market from finding the buyers it needed to
clear its wares.
But although Ricardo accepted this as valid on the face
of it, Malthus did not. It was not an easy argument to
puncture, for it did seem logically watertight. But Mal¬
thus looked behind the process of swapping commodi¬
ties for incomes, and came up with a strange idea. Was
it not possible, he said, for the act of saving to make the
demand for goods too small for the supply?
Again, to the modem world, this seems like a dis¬
turbingly fruitful line of inquiry. But Ricardo said it
was plain and simple nonsense. “Mr. Malthus never ap¬
pears to remember that to save is to spend, as surely, as
what he exclusively calls spending,” writes Ricardo in a
reproving note. What he meant was that it was incon¬
ceivable to him that a man would bother to save his
profits for any reason except to put them back into in¬
dustry and earn still more profits.
This put Malthus in a quandary. Like Ricardo, he be¬
lieved that saving meant spending— for industrial pur-
the gloomy presentiments 91
poses of course. But still, there seemed to be something
in his argument— if only he could put his finger
He never could. He -wrote, for example, to prove tlmt
accumulation was not quite so essential as Bicardo
thought:
Many a merchant has made a large fortune although,
during the acquisition of this fortune, there was
perhaps hardly a single year in which he did not
rather increase than diminish his expenditure on
objects of luxury, enjoyment, and hberahty.
To which Ricardo penciled this annihilatory comment:
True, but a brother merchant who avoided an in¬
creased expenditure on objects of luxuiy, enjoyment,
and liberahty with the same profits would get rich
faster than him.
Poor Malthus! He never came off best in the exchange.
His arguments were confused, and it was neither the
fault of his generation that they failed to understand
him nor his error that he failed to understand Ricardo.
For Malthus was stumbling on a phenomenon which
would not absorb the attention of economists for fifty
years— the problem of booms and depressions, whereas
Ricardo was entirely taken up with quite a different prob¬
lem. For Malthus, the issue was the immensely impor¬
tant one of How Much Is There? For Ricardo it was
the far more explosive question of Who Gets What? No
wonder they disagreed so endlessly; they were talking
about different things.
What was their contribution, when all the argument
was over?
Ricardo’s gift to the world was plain. Here was a world
stripped to its essentials and laid open for everyone to
examine: the watchworks were exposed. In its very un¬
reality lay its strength, for not only did the bare stmcture
of a greatly simplified world reveal the laws of rent, but
92 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
it elucidated as well vital questions of foreign trade
money, taxation, and economic policy. By building a
model world, Ricardo gave the powerful tool of abstrac¬
tion to economics-a tool that is essential if the distrac¬
tion of everyday life is to be pierced and its underlying
mechanism understood. ^
Malthus was never so successful in building an abstract
world, and so his long-lasting academic contribution is
smaller. But he pointed out the appalling problem of
population and for that reason alone, his name is still
alive. And he sensed, even if he could not explain, the
problem of general depression which would occupy
economists a century after his book.
The main issues with which both men wrestled are, in
a sense, dead. For the Western World, at least, the popu¬
lation question is no longer a source of immediate con¬
cern— although it is a burning issue in the East and
South — and the landlord's domination over the economy
is a textbook curiosity. But between them, Malthus and
Ricardo did one astonishing thing. They changed the
viewpoint of their age from optimism to pessimism. No
longer was it possible to view the universe of mankind
as an arena in which the natural forces of society would
inevitably bring about a better life for everyone. On the
contrary, those natural forces which once seemed teleo¬
logically designed to bring harmony and peace into the
world now seemed malevolent and menacing. If human¬
ity did not groan under a flood of hungry mouths, it
seemed that it might suffer under a flood of commodi¬
ties without takers. And in either event, the outcome of
a long struggle for progress would be a gloomy state
where the worker just barely subsisted, where the capi¬
talist was cheated of his efforts, and where the landlord
gloated o\'er his unearned and constantly growing spoil.
It was no small achievement for two men to convince
the world that it was living in a fool’s paradise. But they
did; and so convincing was their proof that men sought
to find a way out for society, not within the framework
of the supposed natural laws, but in defiance of them.
Malthus and Ricardo had shown that, left to itself, so-
the gloomy presentiments
93
ciety would proceed to a kind of barely living bell. No
wonder that reformers said, if that is the case, we wi
put our efforts to fighting against the natural tendencies
of society. If drifting will land us on the rocks we w
swim against the current; and so the Utopian Socialists
broke away from the faithful trust in the essential right¬
ness of the world as it was. , i . o
In a sense, Malthus and Ricardo were the last ot a
generation which pinned its faith on reason, order, and
progress. They were not apologists, nor were they de-
fenders of an order of which they disapproved. Rather,
they were impartial; they stood away from and above
the social flux and with an impersonal eye plotted the
direction of its current. And if what they saw was un¬
pleasant — well, they were not to blame foi that.
For these were the most scrupulously honest of men,
who tracked down their ideas, regardless of where they
led. Perhaps we should quote that footnote in which
Malthus points out that Ricardo, the enemy of landlords,
is a landlord himself:
It is somewhat singular that Mr. Ricardo, a consider¬
able receiver of rents, should have so much under¬
rated their national importance; while I, who have
never received, nor expect to receive any, shall
probably be accused of overrating their importance.
Our different situations and opinions may serve at
least to shew our mutual sincerity, and afford a
strong presumption, that to whatever bias our minds
may have been subjected in the doctrines we have
laid down, it has not been that, against which per¬
haps it is most difficult to guard, the insensible bias
of situation and interest.
After they were both gone, Sir James Mackintosh, the
Scottish philosopher, paid them a wonderful tribute. ‘1
have known,” he said, “Adam Smith slightly, Ricardo
well, and Malthus intimately. Is it not something to say
for a science that its three greatest masters were about
the three best men I ever knew?”
V
The Visions of the
Utopian Socialists
IT IS not difficult to understand why Malthus and
Ricardo should have conceived of the world in gloomy
terms. England in the 1820s was a gloomy place to live: it
had emerged triumphant from a long struggle on the Con¬
tinent, but now it seemed locked in an even worse
struggle at home. For it was obvious to anyone who cared
to look that the burgeoning factory system was piling up
a social bill of dreadful proportions and that the day of
reckoning on that bill could not be deferred forever.
Indeed, a recital of the conditions that prevailed in
those early days of factory labor is so horrendous that
it makes a modem readers hair stand on end. In 1828,
The Lion, a radical magazine of the times, published
the incredible history of Robert Blincoe, one of eighty
pauper-children sent off to a factoiy at Lowdham. The
boys and girls— they were all about ten years old— were
whipped day and night, not only for the slightest fault,
but to stimulate their flagging industiy. And compared
with a factory at Litton where Blincoe was subsequently
transferred, conditions at Lowdham were rather humane.
At Litton the children scrambled with the pigs for the
slops in a trough; they were kicked and punched and
sexually abused; and their employer, one Ellice Need¬
ham, had the chilling habit of pinching the childrens
94
95
the visions of the utopian socialists
ears until his nails met through the flesh. The foreimn
of the plant was even worse. He hung Blincoe up y is
wit: ier a machine so that his k-es were bent and
then he piled heavy weights on his shouldeis. The
and his co-workers were almost naked m the cold o
winter and (seemingly as a purely gratuitous sadistic
flourish) their teeth were filed down!
Without a doubt such frightful brutality was the excep¬
tion rather than the rule; indeed we suspect a little ot
the reformers zeal has embellished the account. But
with full discount for exaggeration, the story was
theless all too illustrative of a social climate in which
practices of the most callous inhumanity were accepted
as the natural order of events and even more important,
as nobody s business. A sixteen-hour working day was
not uncommon, with the working force tramping to the
mills at six in the morning and trudging home at ten at
night. And as a crowning indignity, many factory opera¬
tors did not permit their workpeople to carry their own
watches, and the single monitory factory clock showed a
strange tendency to accelerate during the scant few
minutes allowed for meals. The richest and most far¬
sighted of the industrialists may have deplored such
excesses, but their factory managers or hard-pressed
competitors seem to have regarded them with an in¬
different eye.
And the horrors of working conditions were not the
only cause for unrest. Machinery was now the rage, and
machinery meant the displacement of laboring hands by
uncomplaining steel. As early as 1779 a mob of eight
thousand workers had attacked a mill and burned it to
the ground in unreasoning defiance of its cold implacable
mechanical eflBciency, and by 1811 such protests against
technology were sweeping England. Wrecked mills dot¬
ted the countryside and in their wake the word went
about that “Ned Ludd had passed.” The rumor was that
a King Ludd or a General Ludd was directing the activi¬
ties of the mob. It was not true, of course. The Luddites,
as they were called, were fired by a purely spontaneous
9^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
hatred of the factories which they saw as prisons and
the wagework which they still despised.
But the disturbances raised a real apprehension in the
country. Ricardo almost alone among the respectable
people admitted that perhaps machinery did not always
operate to the immediate benefit of the workman, and
for this opinion he was regarded as having slipped, for
once, riom his usual acumen. To most observers the
sentiment was less reflective: the lower orders ’were
getting out of hand and should be sevei'cly dealt with.
And to the gentler classes, the situation seemed to indi¬
cate the coming of a violent and terrifying Armageddon.
Southey, the poet, wrote: “At this moment nothing but
the Army preserves us from that most dreadful of all
calamities, an insurrection of the poor against the rich,
and how long the Army may be depended upon is a
question which I scarcely dare ask myself'’; and Walter
Scott lamented, . . the country is mined beneath our
feet.”
Little wonder that Malthus and Ricardo were such
prophets of gloom and stnfe!
But all through this dark and troubled period, one
spot in Britain shone like a beacon through the storm.
In the dour mountains of Scotland, a good day’s post
from Glasgow, in country so primitive that the tollgate
keepers at first refused gold coins (never having seen
them before), stood the gaunt seven-stoiy brick mills of
a little community called New Lanark. Over the hilly
roads from Glasgow rode a constant stream of visitors—
twenty thousand signed the guestbook at New Lanark
between 1815 and 1825— and the visiting crowds included
such dignitaries as the Grand Duke Nicholas, later to be
Tsar Nicholas 1 of Russia, Princes John and Maximilian
of Austria, and a whole covey of parish deputations,
writers, reformers, sentimental ladies, and skeptical busi¬
nessmen.
What they came to see was the living proof that the
squalor and depravity of industrial life were not the only
and inevitable social arrangement. Here at New Lanark
the visions of the utopian socialists 97
were neat rows of workers’ homes with two rooms in
every house; here were streets with the garbage neatly
oiled up awaiting disposal instead of being strewn in
filthy disarray. And in the factories a still more unusual
sight greeted the visitors’ eyes. Over each employee hung
a little cube of wood with a different color painted on
each side: black, blue, yellow, and white. From darkest
to lightest, the colors stood for different grades of deport¬
ment: white was excellent; yellow, good; blue, indif¬
ferent; black, bad. At a glance the factory manager
could see how his work force was faring. It was mainly
yellow and white.
For another surprise there were no children in the
factories— at least none under the age of ten or eleven—
and those that did work toiled only a short ten-and-three-
quarter-hour day. Furthermore they were never punished;
no one in fact was punished, and save for a few adult
incorrigibles who had to be expelled for chronic dmnken-
ness or some such vice, discipline seemed to be wielded
by benignity rather than fear. The door of the factory
manager stood open and anyone could (and did) pre¬
sent his objections to any rule or regulation. Eveiyone
could inspect the book which contained the detailed
report of his deportment and thus served as referent
for the assignment of his colored cube, and he could
appeal if he felt that he had been unjustly rated.
Most remarkable of all were the little children. Instead
of running wild and fierce through the streets, the visi¬
tors found them in a large schoolhouse, fast at work and
play. The httlest were learning the names of the rocks
and trees they found about them; the slightly older were
leaiTiing grammar from a frieze where General Noun
contested with Colonel Adjective and Coi*poral Adverb.
Nor was it all work, delightful as the work seemed to be.
Regularly the children gathered to sing and dance under
the tutelage of young ladies who had been instructed
that no child’s question was ever to go unanswered, that
no child was ever bad without reason, that punishment
was never to be inflicted, and that children would learn
faster from the power of example than from admonition.
98
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
It must have been a wonderful and, indeed, an in-
piiing sight. And for the business-minded gentlemen
ho were less hkely to be carried away by the sight of
happy children than the tenderhearted ladies, thert was
the irrefu able fact that New Lanark was profitable
marvelously profitab e. This was an establishment run
a°thTt^^ eminently pracUcal one.
It was not only a practical saint who was responsible for
New Lanark but a most improbable one. Like so many
ot the early nineteenth-century reformers on whom we
look back as the Utopian Socialists, Robert Owen the
“benevolent Mr. Owen of New Lanark," was a stAmge
mixtuie of practicality and naivete, achievement and
fiasco, common sense and madness. Here was a man who
advocated the abandonment of the plow in favor of the
spade; a man who from scratch became a great capitalist
and from a great capitalist a violent opponent of private
property; a man who advocated benevolence because
it would pay dividends, and who then urged the aboli¬
tion of money.
It is hard to believe that one man’s life could take so
many twists. It began as a chapter straight from Horatio
Alger. Born of poor parents in Wales in 1771, Robert
Owen left school at the age of nine to become apprenticed
to a linen draper with the unlikely name of McGuffog.
He might have stayed a linen draper always and watched
the store name change to McGuffog and Owen, but in
tiTie l)usiness-hero style, he chose to go to Manchester;
and there, at the age of eighteen and on the strength of
c€, 100 borrowed from his brother, he set himself up as
a tiny capitalist manufacturing textile machineiy. But
the best was yet to come. A Mr. Drinkwater, the owner
of a large spinning establishment, found himself one
morning without a factoiy manager and advertised in
the local paper for applicants. Owen had no knowledge
of spinning mills, but he got the post in a fashion which
might have provided a test for countless writers on the
N'irtues of Pluck and Luck. ‘1 put on my hat,” wrote
the visions of the utopian socialists 99
Owen over a half century later, “and proceeded straight
to Mr. Drinkwaters counting house. 'How old are your
Twenty this May/ was my reply. 'How often do you get
dmnk in the week?’ ... 1 was never/ I said drunk m
my life/ blushing scarlet at this unexpected question.
‘What salary do you ask?’ 'Three hundred a year, was
my reply. 'What?’ Mr. Drinkwater said, with some sur¬
prise, repeating the words, ‘Three hundred a year! I
have had this morning I know not how many seeking the
situation and I do not think all their askings together
would amount to what you require.’ 'I cannot be governed
by what others seek,’ said I, 'and I cannot take less.
It was a characteristic Owen gesture and it succeeded.
At twenty he became the boy wonder of the textile world
—an engaging young man with a rather straight nose in
a very long face, and with large, frank eyes that adver¬
tised his candor. Within six months Mr. Drinkwater
offered him a quarter interest in the business. But this
was still only the prelude to a fabulous career. Within
a few years Owen had heard of a set of mills for sale in
the squalid village of New Lanark— coincidentally they
were owned by a man with whose daughter he had
fallen in love. To acquire either the mills or the hand of
the daughter looked like an impossible feat: Mr. Dale,
the millowner, was a fervid Presbyterian who would
never approve of Owen’s radical free-thinking ideas, and
then tliere was the question of how to find the capital to
buy the mills. Nothing daunted, Owen marched up to
Mr. Dale as he had once marched up to Mr. Drinkwater
and the impossible became done. He borrowed the
money, bought the mills, and won the hand of the daugh¬
ter in the bargain.
Matters might well have rested there. Within a year
Owen had made New Lanark a changed community;
within five years it was unrecognizable; in ten years more
it was world-famous. It would have been accomplishment
enough for most men, for in addition to winning a
European reputation for farsightedness and benevolence,
Robert Owen made a fortune of at least £.60,000 for
himself.
lOO
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
But matters did not rest there. Despite his meteoric
rise, Owen conceived of himself as a man of ideas rather
tlian as a mere man of action; New Lanark had never
been for him an idle exercise of philanthropy. Rather
It was an opportunity to test out theories which he had
evolwd for the advancement of humanity as a whole.
For Owen was convinced that mankind was no better
than its environment and that if that environment were
changed, a real paradise on earth might be achieved. In
New Lanark he could, as it were, test his ideas in a
laboratory, and since they succeeded beyond all measure
there seemed no reason why they should not be given
to the world.
He soon had his chance. The Napoleonic Wars subsided
and in theii' wake came trouble. A succession of what
Malthus would have called “general gluts” wracked the
country; from 1816 to 1820 with the exception of a
single year, business was very bad. The misery threatened
to explode: “bread and blood” riots broke out and a kind
of hysteria gripped the countiy. The Dukes of York and
Kent and a body of notables formed a committee to
look into the causes of the distress and purely as a matter
of course they called upon Mr. Owen, the philanthropist,
to present his views.
The committee was hardly prepared for what it got.
It had no doubt expected a plea for factory reform, for
Mr. Owen was widely known for his championship of a
shorter working day and the abolition of child labor.
Instead the notables found themselves reading a blue¬
print for social reorganization on a sweeping scale.
What Owen suggested was that the solution to the
problem of poverty lay in making the poor productive.
To this end he advocated the formation of Villages of
Cooperation in which eight hundred to twelve hundred
souls would work together in farm and factory to form
a self-sustaining unit. The families were to live in houses
grouped in parallelograms— the word immediately caught
the public eye— with each family in a private apartment
but sharing common sitting rooms and reading rooms
and kitchens. Children over the age of three were to be
lOl
THE VISIONS OF THE UTOPIAN SOCIALISTS
boarded separately so that they could be exposed to the
kind of education which would best mold their characters
for later life. Around the school were gardens to be
tended by the slightly older children, and around them
in turn would stretch out the fields where crops would
be grown— needless to say with the aid of spades and
without the use of plows. In the distance, away from
the living areas, would be a factory unit; in effect this
would be a planned garden city.
The committee of notables was considerably taken
aback. It was hardly prepared to urge the adoption of
planned social communities in a day of untrammeled
laissez faire, Mr. Owen was thanked and Mr., Owen s
ideas were carefully ignored. But Owen was nothing if
not single-pui-posed. He insisted upon a review of the
applicability of his plans and flooded Parliament with
tracts expounding his views. Again his detennination won
the day. In 1819 a special committee (including David
Ricardo) was put together for the purpose of trying to
raise the necessary ninety-six thousand pounds to estab¬
lish one full-fleged experimental Village of Cooperation.
Ricardo was skeptical although willing to give the plan
a trial, but the country was not skeptical at all; it found
the idea an abomination. One editorialist wrote: “Robert
Owen, Esq., a benevolent cotton-spinner . . . conceives
that all human beings are so many plants which have
been out of the earth for a few thousand years, and re¬
quire to be reset. He accordingly determines to dibble
them in squares after a new fashion. . . . Everybody, I
believe, is convinced of Mr. Owen’s benevolence and that
he proposes to do us much good. I ask him to let us alone,
lest he do us much mischief.” Another critic, William
Cobbett, then in exile in America for his owm radical
ideas, was even more scornful. “This gentleman,” he
wrote, “is for establishing communities of paupers! . . .
Wonderful peace, happiness, and national benefit are to
be the result. How the little matters of black eves, bloodv
noses, and pulling of caps are to be settled, I do not
exactly see. Mr. Owen’s scheme has, at any rate, the re¬
commendation of perfect novelty, for of such a thing as
102
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
a con^unity of paupers, I believe no human being has
ever before heard. . . . Adieu, Mr. Owen of Lanark.”
Owen (hd not, of course, envision a community of
paupers. He believed, on the contrary, that paupers
could become the producers of great wealth if they were
given a chance to work, and that their deplorable social
habits could be easily transfonned into virtuous ones
under the influence of a decent environment. And it was
not only paupers who were to be thus elevated. The
Villages of Cooperation were to be so manifestly superior
to the turmoil of industrial Ufe that other communities
would naturally follow suit.
But it was obvious that Owen held his views alone.
Serious-minded people saw in Owen’s scheme a disturb¬
ing threat to the established order of things, and radical-
minded people saw in it only a farce. The necessary
money for the trial Village was never raised, but now
there was no stopping the indomitable philanthropist.
He had been a humanist; now he became a professional
humanitarian. He had made a fortune; now he dedicated
it to the realization of his ideas. He sold his interest in
New Lanark and in 1824 set about building his own com¬
munity of the future. Not unnaturally he chose America
for his milieu, for where better to build Utopia than in
the midst of a people who had known political liberty for
fifty years?
For a site he bought from a religious sect of Germans
known as Rappites a tract of thirty thousand acres on
the banks of the Wabash in Posey County, Indiana. On
the Fourth of July, 1826, he dedicated it with a Declara¬
tion of Mental Independence— independence from Private
Property, Irrational Religion, and Marriage— and then
left it to shift for itself with its lovely wishful name of
New Haimony.
It could not and did not succeed. Owen had envisioned
a Utopia sprung full-blown into the world and he was
not prepared to wean one from the imperfect environ¬
ment of the old society. There was no planning: eight
hundred settlers poured in, helter-skelter, within a few
weeks. There was not even elementary precaution against
THE VISIONS OF THE UTOPIAN SOCIALISTS IO3
fraud. Owen was bilked by an associate who piled insult
upon injury by setting up a wliiskey distillery on land
that he had unfairly taken. And since Owen was not
there, rival communities sprang up: Macluria under one
William McClure and others under other dissidents. Ine
pull of acquisitive habit was too strong for the bond ot
ideas; in retrospect it is only astonishing that the com¬
munity managed to exist for as long as it did.
By 1828 it was apparent that the entei-prise was a fail¬
ure. Owen sold the land (he had lost four-fifths of his
entire fortune in the venture ) and went off to talk about
his schemes to President Jackson and then to Santa Ana
in Mexico. Neither of these gentlemen expressed more
than polite interest
Owen now came back to England. He was still the
benevolent (if slightly cracked) Mr. Owen, and his
career was about to take its final unexpected twist. For
while most opinion had mocked at his Villages of Co¬
operation, his teachings had sunk deep into one section
of the country: the working classes. This was the time
of the first modem trade-unions, and the leaders of the
spinners and the potters and the builders had come to
regard Owen as a man who could speak for their interests
—indeed, as their leader. Unlike his peers, they took his
teachings seiiously— while the Villages of Cooperation
were being debated by committees of notables, real
working cooperative societies based on his tracts wei*e
springing up throughout- the country on a more modest
scale: producers^ cooperatives and consumers* coopera¬
tives and even a few ill-fated attempts to follow Mr.
Owen’s ideas to the letter and do away with money.
Without exception, the producers’ cooperatives failed
and the moneyless exchanges ended in moneyless but
equally final bankruptcies. But one aspect of the coopera¬
tive movement took root. Twenty-eight devoted men who
called tliemselves the Rochdale Pioneers began the con¬
sumer cooperative movement. To Owen it was only of
passing interest, but with time it grew to be one of the
great sources of strength of the Labour party in Great
Britain, Curiously, the movement in which he took least
104
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
interest was to survive all the projects into which he
poured his heart and strength.
Owen had no time for cooperatives for a good reason-
on his return from America he had conceived a huee
moral crusade and he plunged into it with a typical
vigorous abandon. The onetime poor boy, onetime cap¬
italist, onetime social architect now drew around him the
leaders of the working-class movement. He bestowed a
properly impressive name on his project: the Grand
National Moral Union of the Productive and Useful
Classes. The name was soon shortened to the Grand
National Consolidated Trades Union, and since that was
still quite a mouthful, to the Grand National. Under its
banner the trade-union leaders ralHed, and in 1833 the
English working-class movement was officially launched.
It was a nationwide union— the precursor of the indus¬
trial trade-unions of our day. Its membership was five
hundred thousand— a mammoth figure for that time— and
it embraced virtually every important union in all of
England. But, unlike a modem union, its goals were not
limited to hours and wages or even to management pre¬
rogatives. The Grand National was to be an instrument
not only of social betterment but of social change. Hence
while its program asked for better wages and working
conditions, it went on to expound a fuzzy amalgam of
Villages of Cooperation, the abolition of money, and a
number of other ideas from the potpourri of Owen*s writ¬
ing.
Owen stumped the country for his final cause. It was
a flat fiasco. England was no more prepared for a nation¬
al trade-union than America for a local paradise. Local
unions could not control their members and local strikes
weakened the national body. Owen and his lieutenants
fell out; they accused him of atheism, and he charged
them with fomenting class hatred. The government
stepped in and with violence and vengeance did its best
to disrupt the growing movement. The employing classes
heard in the Grand National the knell of private property
and called for prosecution under antiunion laws. No
youthful movement could have withstood such an on-
THE
105
slauffht. Within two years the great union was cieaa, an
OwSi at the age of sixty-four had played his last histon-
He continued for another twenty years, the grand old
man of labor, urging his cooperative ideas, his pret-
erence for the spade, his naive distrust of money. In
1839 he had an audience with Queen Victoria despite
the protests of a group of tlie best people known as the
Society for Peaceably Repressing InfideUty. But he was
finished. In his last years he found a refuge in spiritual¬
ism, in endless tracts endlessly the same, and in lus
wonderful Autobiography, In 1858, eighty-seven years old
and still hopeful, he died.
What a romantic and fantastic stoiy! And looking back,
it is his story rather than his ideas which interests us.
Owen was never a truly original and certainly never a
flexible thinker. ‘‘Robert Owen is not a man to think
differently of a book for having read it,” was the devastat¬
ing way in which one contemporary writer characterized
him, and Macaulay, who fled at the sound of his voice,
called him “always a gentle bore.”
He was not, by any stretch of the imagination, an
economist. But he was more than that: he was an eco¬
nomic innovator who reshaped the raw data with which
economists have to deal. Like all the Utopian Socialists,
Owen wanted the world changed; but wliile others wrote,
powerfully or otherwise, he went ahead and tried to
change it.
And on second thought, perhaps he did leave one great
idea behind him. It is channingly illustrated in this
anecdote from the biography of his son, Robert Dale
Owen.
“When the child screams from temper, my dear
Caroline,” said his father (Robert Owen), “set him in
the middle of the nursery floor and be sure you don’t
take him up until he stops crying.” “But my dear, he’ll
go on crying by the hour.” “Then let him cry.” “It may
hurt his little lungs, and perhaps throw him into spasms.”
“I think not At all events, it will hurt him more if he
io6
THE WORLDLY PmLOSOPHERS
grows into an ungovernable boy. Man is the creature of
circumstances.”
“Man is the creature of circumstances.” And who makes
the circumstances but man himself? The world is not
inevitably good or bad, but to the extent that we make
it so. In that thought Owen left behind him a philosophy
of hope more powerful than all of his fanciful notions
about spades and plows or money or Villages of Coopera¬
tion.
Robert Owen is certainly the most romantic of that
group of nineteenth-century protesters against raw cap¬
italism, but he is by no means the most peculiar. For
sheer perversity of character, honor must go to Count
Claude Henri de Rouvroy de Saint-Simon and for indis¬
putable eccentricity of ideas there is no peer of Charles
Fourier.
Saint-Simon, as his rolling name suggests, was an
aristocrat; his family claimed descent from Charlemagne.
Bom in 1760, he was brought up to be conscious of the
nobility of his ancestry and of the importance of main¬
taining the luster of his name; every morning, as a youth,
he was awakened by his valet who would cry: “Arise,
Monsieim le Comte, you have great things to do today,”
The knowledge that one is a chosen vessel of history
can do strange things to a man. In Saint-Simon’s case, it
provided the excuse for an extravagant self-indulgence.
Even as a boy he confused a devotion to principle with
sheer pigheadedness; it is said that when a passing wagon
interfered with a childhood game, he threw himself down
across the road and obstinately refused to budge— and
who was to throw a young count into the ditch? Later
this same obstinacy led him to refuse to go to Commun¬
ion at his father’s behest— but the father, perhaps more
used to his son’s intransigence and certainly less awed by
it, promptly threw him in jail.
His self-indulgence might have turned him toward that
most self-indulgent of all political groups, the court of
Louis XVI. But it was redeemed by a love for a most
uncourtly idea: democracy. In 1778 the young count
went to America and distinguished himself in the Rev-
107
the visions of the utopian socxalists
olutionary War. He fought in five campaigns won the
Order of Cincinnatus, and most important of all, became
a passionate disciple of the new ideas of freedom and
equality, . ,
But this did not yet constitute Great Things, ihe
Revolutionary War left him in Louisiana; thence he
went to Mexico to urge the Viceroy to build a canal that
would have preceded the Panama. That might have
made his name, but the idea came to naught— it was, of
course, nine-tenths idea and one-tenth plan— and the
young revolutionary noble returned to France.
He was just in time for the Revolution there, and he
threw himself into it with fervor. His townspeople of
Falvy in Peronne asked him to be mayor and he refused,
saying that the election of the old nobility would be a
bad precedent; then when they chose him for the Na¬
tional Assembly anyway, he proposed the abolition of
titles and renounced his own to become plain Citoyen
Bonhomme. His democratic predilections were not a
pose; Saint-Simon had a genuine feehng for his fellow
man. Before the Revolution he had been posting to
Versailles one day, in the height of style, when he came
across a farmer's cart mired in the road. Saint-Simon got
down from his carriage, put his elegantly clad shoulder
to the wheel, and then found the farmer's conversation
so intei'esting that he dismissed his own vehicle and
rode to Orleans with his new-found peasant friend.
The Revolution dealt strangely with him. On the one
hand he speculated adroitly in Church lands and made
himself a modest fortune; on the other he busied himself
with a gigantic educational scheme which, because it
threw him into contact with foreigners, brought him
into disfavor and resulted in his being put in protective
custody. He escaped and then, in a gesture both roman¬
tic and truly noble, surrendered himself again when he
found that his hotel proprietor had been unjustly ac¬
cused of collaborating in his escape.
This time he went to jail. But there, in his cell, there
came to him the revelation for which he had, in a sense,
been waiting all his life. The revelation came, as such
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
visitations do, in a dream; Saint-Simon described it thus:
“During the crudest period of the Revolution, and
during a night of my imprisonment at Luxembourg,
Charlemagne appeared to me and said: ‘Since the begin¬
ning of the world no family has enjoyed the honor of
producing both a hero and philosopher of first rank.
This honor was reserved for my house. My son, your
successes as a philosopher will equal those which I
achieved as a warrior and politician.’ ”
Saint-Simon asked for no more. He obtained a release
from prison and the ihoney he had accumulated now
poured forth in a fantastic search for knowledge. This
man actually set out to know everything there was to
know— scientists, economists, philosophers, politicians, all
the savants of France were invited to his house, financed
in their work, and endlessly queried that Saint-Simon
might encompass the world’s intellectual scope. It was a
bizarre endeavor. At one time, having come to the con¬
clusion that he still lacked a firsthand acquaintance with
family life for the pursuance of his social studies, he
married— on a three-year contract. One year was enough:
his wife talked too much and his guests drank too much,
and Saint-Simon decided that marriage as an educational
institution had its limitations. Instead he sought the hand
of the most brilliant woman in Europe, Mme. de Stael;
she was the only woman, he declared, who could under¬
stand his plans. They met, but it was an anticlimax; she
found him full of esprit, but hardly the greatest philos¬
opher in the world. In the circumstances, his enthusiasm
also waned.
But the search for encyclopedic knowledge, while
stimulating, was financially disastrous. His expenditures
had been lavish to the point of recklessness; his marriage
unexpectedly expensive. He found himself reduced first to
modest circumstances and then to real poverty; he was
forced to find a clerical job and then to depend on the
kindness of an old seiwant for board and lodging. Mean¬
while he was writing, furiously writing an endless stream
of tracts, observations, exhortations, and examinations of
toe visions of the utopian socialists 109
society. He sent his works to the leading patrons of the
day with a pathetic note:
Monseiur:
Be my saviour, I am dying of hunger. ... For 15 days
I have lived on bread and water . . . sold everything
but my clothes, to pay for the expense of copies of
my work. It is the passion for knowledge and the
public welfare, the desire to find a peaceful means
of ending the frightful crisis which engages all
European society which has brought me to this
state of distress. . . .
No one subscribed. In 1823, although his family now
accorded him a small pension, he shot himself in despair.
But he could never quite do anything as he wished. He
only succeeded in losing an eye. He lived two more years,
ill, impoverished, dedicated, and proud. When the end
came, he gathered his few disciples around him and said,
“Remember that in order to do great things one must be
impassioned!”
But what had he done to justify such an operatic end?
A strange thing: he had founded an industrial religion.
He had not done it through his books, which were
voluminous enough but unread, nor through lectures, nor
through doing “great things.” Somehow the man himself
had inspired a sect, had gathered a small band of fol¬
lowers, and had given society a new image of what it
might be.
It was a strange, semimystical, and disorganized reli¬
gion, and little wonder, for it was built on an unfinished
and lopsided edifice of ideas. It was not even meant to
be a religion as such— and yet after his death there was
actually a Saint-Simonian Church with six departmental
churches in France and with branches in Germany and
England. Perhaps it is better compared to an order of
brotherhood: his disciples dressed in shades of blue and
ranked each other as “fathers and sons.” And as a nice
symbol of what the founder himself had stood for, they
no
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
wore a specml waistcoat which could be neither put on
nor taken off unassisted and which thus emphasized the
dependence of every man on his brothers. But the church
soon degenerated into Uttle more than a cult, for the
latter-day Saint-Simonians devised their own code of
morality, which in some instances was httle more than
a respectably codified immorality.
The gospel which Saint-Simon had preached is hardly
shocking to modem eyes. It proclaimed that “man must
vv'Oik if he is to share in society’s fmits. But compared
with the conclusions drawn from this premise, Robert
Owen’s society of parallelograms was clarity itself
“We suppose,” writes Saint-Simon, “that France sud-
denly loses her fifty leading physicists, her fifty leading
chemists, her fifty leading physiologists . . . mathemati¬
cians . . . mechanics and so on until three thousand
savants, artists, and artisans have been accounted for
(Saint-Simon is not noted for the economy of his style).
What would be the result? It would be a catastrophe
which would rob Fi*ance of her very soul.
But now suppose, says Saint-Simon, that instead of
losing these few individuals, France were to be deprived
at one blow of its social upper cmst: suppose it should
lose M. the brother to the king, the Duke de Berry, some
duchesses, the officers of the Crown, the ministers of
state, its judges, and the ten thousand richest proprietors
of the land— thirty thousand people in all. The result?
Most regrettable, says Saint-Simon, because these are all
good people, but the loss would be purely a sentimental
one; the state would hardly suffer. Any number of
people could discharge the functions of these lovely
ornaments.
So the moral is clear. It is the workers— industriels—
of all ranks and hierarchies who merit the highest rewards
of societv and the idlers who deserve the least. But what
do we find? By a strange miscarriage of justice, it is just
the opposite: those who do the least get the most.
Saint-Simon proposes that the pyramid be set aright.
Society is actually organized as a gigantic factory and it
should carry out the factory principle to its logical con-
Ill
the visions of the utopian socialists
elusion. Government should be economic, not political:
it should arrange things and not direct men. Rewards
should be apportioned to one’s social contribution: they
should accrue to the active members of the factory and
not to the lazy onlookers. It is not a revolution that Saint-
Simon preaches nor even socialism as we understand the
word. It is a land of paean of the industrial process and
a protest that in a society of toil, idlers should take such
a Uon s share of the wealth.
Not a word about how this is to be done: the later
Saint-Simonians went a step beyond their founder and
urged the end of private property, but even this left
them with little more than a vague program of social
'refonnation. This was a religion of work but it lacked a
proper catechism; it pointed to grave injustices in the
distribution of society’s wealth, but it gave disappoint¬
ingly little guidance to those who wanted to set tilings to
rights.
Perhaps it was just this lack of a program which helped
to account for the success of a man who was quite the
opposite of Saint-Simon. For whereas the ex-nobleman
had been inspired by a passion for the grand idea,
Charles Fourier was inspired by a passion for trivia. Like
Saint-Simon, Fourier beUeved the world was hopelessly
disorganized, but the cure he proposed was explicit down
to the tiniest detail.
Saint-Simon had been an adventurer in life; Fourier
was an adventurer in imagination. His biography is
largely a blank: bom in 1772, the son of a tradesman of
Besan9on, he spent his days as an unsuccessful commer¬
cial traveler. In a sense he did nothing, not even marry.
His passions were two: flowers and cats. It is only at the
end of his life that he is appealing, for he spent his last
years punctually sitting at advertised hours in his small
room awaiting the visit of some great capitalist who
would offer to finance his schemes to do over the world.
After all, this little salesman had written, *1 alone have
confounded twenty centuries of political imbecility; and
it is to me alone that present and future generations will
112
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
look for the origin of their immense happiness.” With
such a responsibility resting on his shoulders, he could
haidly afford not to be at hand when the appointed
savior capitahst would arrive with his moneybags in
train. But no one ever came.
Fourier, to be polite, was an eccentric; to be accurate
he was probably mildly insane. His world was a fantasy:’
the earth, he beUeved, had been given a hfe of eighty
thousand years; foiiy thousand of ascending vibrations
and the same number of descending. In between (never
mind the arithmetic) lay eight tliousand years of the
Apogee du Bonheur. We lived in the fifth of eight stages
of advancement, having pushed through Confusion, Sav-
ageiy, Patriarchism, and Barbai'ousness. Ahead lay Guar-
anteeism (not a bad bit of insight), and then the upward
slope of Harmony. After we reached utter bliss, however,
the seesaw would tip and we would work our way right
back down through all the stages to the beginning.
But as we worked our way ever deeper into Harmony,
things would really begin to pop: a Northein Crown
would encircle the Pole shedding a gentle dew; the sea
would become lemonade; six new moons would replace
the old solitary satellite; and new species would emerge,
better suited to Haimony: an anti-lion, a docile beast and
most serviceable; an anti-whale, which could be harnessed
to ships; an anti-bear; anti-bugs; and anti-rats. We would
live to be one hundred and forty-four years old, of wliich
one hundred and twenty years would be spent in the
unrestricted pursuit of sexual love.
All this plus a firsthand description of the inhabitants
of other planets gives to Fourier's writings the air of a
madman. Perhaps he was. But when he turned his starry
\*ision to this earth he saw in it chaos and unhappiness
and he saw, as well, a way to reorganize society.
His prescription was very exact. Society should be or¬
ganized into phalanxes—the French word is phalansteres
—which would consist of a kind of Grand Hotel arrange¬
ment, not too dissimilar from Owen's Villages of Co¬
operation. The hotel was carefully described: there would
be a large central building (its various rooms and their
the visions of the utopian socialists 113
dimensions were all thought out) and around it would be
fields and industrial establishments. You could hve in the
hotel at the scale best suited to your purse; first, second,
or third class, with just as much privacy as you desired
(including meals in your rooms) and with just enough
mingling to spread a leaven of culture. EflBciency would
be achieved through centralization; Fourier, the old
bachelor, paints a mouth-watering picture of the triumphs
of the central cuisine.
Everyone would have to work, of course, for a few
hours each day. But no one would shirk work, for each
would do what he best liked. Thus the problem of dirty
work was solved by asking who liked to do dirty work.
The children, of course. So there would be Little Hordes
who would go off gaily to the slaughter houses or to
mend the roads and have the time of their lives. And for
the minority of children who shrank from dirty work,
there would be Little Bands who would tend the flowers
and correct their parents’ bad pronunciation. Between all
workers there would be a game of competition to see
who did best: contests of pear growers and cultivators of
spinach and finally (once the phalanstery principle had
encircled the globe and the 2,985,984 necessary
phalansteres established) great battles of omelette chefs
and champagne bottlers.
And the whole affair would be profitable in the ex¬
treme; gains would i*un to thirty per cent. But it would be
communal profit: the surplus would be divided five-
twelfths to labor, four-twelfths to capital, and three-
twelfths to “ability,” and everybody would be urged to
become a part owner as well as a fellow worker.
Weird and fantastic as it seems, the Fourierist idea took
some hold, even in that fortress of practicality and com¬
mon sense, the United States. At one time there were
over forty phalansteries in this country, and if one groups
together the Owenite communities and the religious
movements of various sorts, there were at least one hun¬
dred and seventy-eight actual Utopian groups with from
fifteen to nine hundred members each.
Their variety was immense: some were pious, some
114
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
impious; some chaste, some licentious; some capitalistic,
others anarchic. There were Trumbull Phalanx in Ohio
and Modem Times on Long Island; there were Oneida
and Brook Farm and New Icaria and one rather remark¬
able phalanx— the North American Phalanx in New Jersey
-which endured from 1843 to 1855 and then lingered on,
half hotel, half community, until the late 1930 s. Of all
unlikely people, Alexander Woollcott was bom there.
None of the dream communities took solid root. Dream
worlds have a difficult time contending with the frictions
of reality, and of all the projected Utopian rearrange¬
ments of society, none was so far removed from practical¬
ity as the phalanstere. And yet, none is so beguiling. If we
could live in a phclamtere, who would not like to?
Fourier, gentle dreamer that he was, pointed with devas¬
tating truth to the miserable unhappiness of the world
in which he lived, but his prescription was too much
compounded of heavenly ingredients for the mortal
ills he wished to cure.
Do they appear ridiculous, these Utopians? It is tine
that they were all dreamers— but as Anatole France has
said, without dreamers, mankind would still live in caves.
There was not one without a touch of madness: even
Saint-Simon speculated solemnly on the possibility of the
beaver, as the most intelligent animal, someday replacing
humankind. But they are not noteworthy because they
were eccentrics or because of the richness and appealing
quality of their fantasies. They are worth our attention
because they were courageous, and to appreciate that
courage we must appraise and understand the intellectual
climate in which they lived.
They lived in a world which was not only harsh and
cmel but which rationalized its cruelty under the guise
of economic law. Necker, the French financier and states¬
man, said at the turn of the century, “Were it possible to
discover a kind of food less agreeable than bread but
having double its sustenance, people would be reduced
to eating onlv once in two days.” And such a sentiment,
hard though it might have sounded, did ring with a kind
the visions of the utopian socialists 115
of definitiveness. It was the world which was cruel, not
the people in it. For the world was run by economic
laws, and economic laws were nothing with which one
could or should trifle: they were simply thevc and to lail
about whatever injustices might be tossed up as an
unfortunate consequence of their working was as foolish
as to lament the ebb and flow of the tides.
The laws were few but final. We have seen how Adam
Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo elaborated the laws of
economic distribution. These laws seemed to explain not
only how the produce of society tended to be distributed
but how it should be distributed. The laws showed that
profits were evened out and controlled by competition,
that wages were always under pressure from population,
and that rent accrued to the landlord as society expanded.
And that was that. One might not necessarily like the
result, but it was apparent that this result was the natural
outcome of society's dynamics: there was no personal ill-
will involved nor any personal manipulation. Economic
laws were like the laws of gravitation and it seemed as
nonsensical to challenge one as the other. Hence an
elementary economics textbook of the times said: “A hun¬
dred years ago only savants could fathom them [economic
laws]. Today they are commonplaces of the nursery, and
the only real diflSculty is their too great simplicity.”
No wonder the Utopians went to such extremes. The
laws did look inviolable— and yet the state of society for
which they were held responsible was intolerable. So the
Utopians took their courage in both hands and said in
effect, the whole system must change. If this is capitalism
—with a nod of the head at Robert Blincoe chained to a
machine let us have anything else — Villages of Coopera¬
tion, moral codes, or the delightful resort atmosphere of a
phalansteve. The Utopians — and there were many besides
those mentioned in this chapter — were reformers of the
heart rather than the head. Their heritage is to be found
in the welfare ideals of the New Deal of Britain or Scan¬
dinavia rather than in the “scientific” convicHon of the
Russian Soviets.
Note that they were Utopian Socialists. The “utopia”
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
was not merely a matter of idealistic ends; it was also a
key to the means. For, in contradistinction to the Com¬
munists, these were reformers who hoped to persuade the
members of the upper classes that social change would be
for their own ultimate benefit. The Communists talked to
the masses and urged violence, if necessary, to encompass
their ends; the Socialists appealed to their own kind — to
the intelligentsia, the petit bourgeois, the freethinking
middle-class citizen or the intellectually emancipated
aristocrat-for adherents to their schemes. Even Robert
Owen hoped to get his brother millowners to see the
light.
But secondly, note that these were Utopian Socialists,
This meant they were economic refonners. Utopia-
builders had existed since Plato but it was not until the
French Revolution that they began to react to economic
as well as political injustice. And since it was early cap¬
italism which provided the chamber of horrors against
which they revolted, not unnaturally they turned their
backs on private property and the struggle for private
wealth. Few of them thought of refonn within the
system: remember that this was the age of the very first
watered-down factory legislation and that such giaadging
reforms as were painfully won were largely honored in
the breach. The Utopians wanted something better than
reform— they wanted a new society in which Love Thy
Neighbor could somehow be made to take priority over
the mean gouging of each for himself. In the communality
of property, in the waianth of common ownership, was to
be found the touchstone of human progress.
They were men of very good will. And yet, for all
their good intentions and their earnest theories, the
Utopians lacked the stamp of respectability; they needed
the imprimatur of someone with them in heart but whose
head would be somewhat more finnly attached to his
shoulders. And they found such a person in the most un¬
likely place— in the ultimate conversion to Socialism of
the greatest— by common consent the greatest— economist
of the age: John Stuart Mill.
117
the visions of the utopian socialists
Everyone in this chapter is a somewhat unbelievable
character but perhaps J. S. Mill is the most remarkable of
them all. His father was James Mill, historian, philos¬
opher, pamphleteer, friend and intimate of Ricardo and
Jeremy Bentham, one of the leading intellects of the early
nineteenth century. James Mill had definite ideas about
almost everything, and especially about education. His
son, John Stuart Mill, was the extraordinary result.
John Stuart Mill was born in 1806. In 1809 (not 1819)
he began to learn Greek. At age seven he had read most
of the dialogues of Plato. The next year he began Latin,
having meanwhile digested Herodotus, Xenophon,
Diogenes Laertius, and part of Lucian. Between eight
and twelve, he finished Virgil, Horace, Livy, Sallust,
Ovid, Terence, Lucretius, Aristotle, Socrates, and Aris¬
tophanes; had mastered geometry, algebra, and the
differential calculus; written a Roman History, an Al:)ridg-
ment of the Ancient Universal History, a History of Hol¬
land, and a few verses. ‘1 never composed at all in Greek,
even in prose, and but little in Latin,” he wrote in his
famous Autobiography. ‘‘Not that my father could be in¬
different to the value of this practice . . . but because
there really was not the time for it.”
At the ripe age of twelve, Mill took up logic and the
work of Hobbes. At thirteen he made a complete survey
of all there was to be known in the field of political
economy.
It was a strange, and by our standards a dreadful, up¬
bringing. There were no holidays, “lest the habit of work
should be broken, and a taste for idleness acquired,” no
boyhood friends, and not even a real awareness that his
education and rearing were significantly different from the
noi-mal. The miracle is not that Mill subsequently
produced great works, but that he managed to avoid a
complete destmction of his personality. He did have a
kind of nervous breakdown: in his twenties, the delicate
dry intellectual world of work and effort on which he
had been nourished suddenly became sterile and unsatis-
fying, and while other youths had to discover that there
could be beauty in intellectual activity, poor Mill had to
Il8 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
find that there could be beauty in beauty. He underwent
a siege of melancholy; then he read Goethe, then Words¬
worth, then Saint-Simon— all people who spoke of the
heart as seriously as his father had spoken of the brain.
And then he met Harriet Taylor.
There was, worse luck, a Mr. Taylor. He was ignored-
Harriet Taylor and Mill fell in love and for twenty years
wiote each other, traveled together, and even lived to¬
gether— all (if we are to believe their correspondence) in
perfect innocence. Then the barrier of Mr. Taylor was
removed by his death and the two finally married.
It was a superlative match. Harriet Taylor (and her
belated daughter, Helen) completed for Mill the emo¬
tional awakening which had begun so late; together, the
two women opened his eyes to women’s rights and, even
more importantly, to mankind’s right. After Harriet’s
death, when he was reflecting on the story of his life, he
reviewed their converging influences on himself, and he
wrote: “Who, either now, or hereafter, may think of me
and of the work I have done, must never forget that it is
the product not of one intellect and conscience, but of
three.”
Mill, as we have seen, learned all the political economy
there was to know at the age of thirteen. It was not until
thirty years later that he wrote his great text, the two
long, masterfully written volumes of the Principles of
Political Economy. It was as if he had accumulated thirty
years of knowledge just for this purpose.
The book is a total survey of the field: it takes up rent
and wages and prices and taxes and retreads the paths
that had been first mapped by Smith and Malthus and
Ricardo. But it is far more than a mere updating of doc¬
trines that had by now received the stamp of virtual
dogma. It goes on to make a discovery of its own, a dis¬
covery of monumental importance. For Mill brings to
light a principle which forever after rescues economics
from the categoiy of a dismal science.
The discovery, like so many great insights, was very
simple. It consisted in pointing out that the tnie province
of economic law was production and not distribution.
THE VISIONS OF THE UTOPIAN SOCIALISTS 119
What he meant was very clear: the economic laws of
production concern nature. There is nothing arbitral y
about whether labor is more productive in this use or
that, nor is there anything capricious or optional about
such economic phenomena as the diminishing powers of
productivity of the soil. Scarcity and the obduracy of
nature are real things and the economic rules of be¬
havior which tell us how to maximize the fruits of our
labor are as impersonal and as absolute as the laws of
the expansion of gases or the interaction of chemical
substances.
gut— and this is perhaps the biggest but in economics—
the laws of economics have nothing to do with distribu¬
tion. Once we have produced wealth as best we can, we
can do with it as we like. “The things are there,” says
Mill; “mankind, individually or collectively, can do with
them as they please. They can place them at the disposal
of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms. . . .
Even what a person has produced by his individual toil,
unaided by anyone, he cannot keep, unless by the permis¬
sion of society. Not only can society take it from him, but
individuals could and would take it from him, if society
. . . did not . . . employ and pay people for the purpose of
preventing him from being disturbed in [his] possession.
The distribution of wealth, therefore, depends on the laws
and customs of society. The rules by which it is deter¬
mined are what the opinions and feelings of the ruling
portion of the community make them, and are very
different in different ages and countries, and might be
still more different, if mankind so chose. . .
It was a body blow to the followers of Ricardo who
had rigidified his objective findings into a strait jacket for
society. For what Mill said was transparently obvious—
once it had been said. Never mind if the “natural” action
of society was to depress wages or to equalize profits or
to raise rents or whatever. If society did not like the
natural results of its activities, it had only to change
them. Society could tax and subsidize, it could expropri¬
ate and redistribute. It could give all its wealth to a king,
or it could run a gigantic charity ward; it could give due
120
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
heed to incentives, or it could-at its own risk-ignore
them. But whatever it did, there was no “correct” dis¬
tribution— at least none that economics had any claim to
fathom. There was no appeal to “laws” to justify how
society shared its fruits: there were only men sharing
their wealth as they saw fit.
It was a discovery of profound consequence. For it
lifted the whole economic debate from the stifling realm
of impersonal and inevitable law and brought it back into
the arena of ethics and morality. After Mill, economists
might argue that men deserved such and such remunera¬
tion for this and that reason, but they could never again
pretend that some abstract arithmetical force decreed
that this was the way it should be done.
The discovery did not make Mill a Socialist in quite the
sense of his Utopian brethi'en. Simply because society
coidd reorder its distribution as it saw fit did not mean
that it should upset the applecart. Mill believed that the
world could advance within its given structural frame¬
work and he put little faith in a wholesale reorganization
of the state.
“I confess,” he wrote, “I am not charmed with an ideal
of life held out by those who think that the nonnal state
of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the
trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each
other’s heels, which fonn the existing type of social Life,
are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but
the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of in¬
dustrial progress.”
But a distaste of acquisitiveness did not blind him to
its usefulness. “That the energies of mankind should be
kept in employment by the struggle for riches as they
were formerly by the struggle for war, until the better
minds succeed in educating the others into better things,
is undoubtedly better than that they should rust and
stagnate. While minds are coarse they require coarse
stimuli and let them have them.”
It was a philosophy of resignation— and hope. Mill was
a supreme believer in the abihty of men to control their
fate through reason. He believed that the working classes
121
the visions of tpie utopian socialists
would come to see the Malthusian specter and that they
would thereupon gladly and voluntarily regulate their
numbers. And if this hurdle was passed the rest would be
easy. For Mills recognition that distribution obeyed no
laws but human ones allowed him to see the world as
capable of progress. Eventually the world would reach
a stationary level: profits would have disappeared and
there would be no more growth, but within the existing
framework of society, improvements could still be made.
The state would prevent the landlord from reaping an
unearned benefit and it would tax away inheritances;
men would turn from the struggle for gain to the pursuit
of arts and life itself.
It would not be thoroughgoing socialism. While Mill
recognized that property had its abuses, he saw as well
that the property system was still in its infancy and
capable of refinement; the abuses need not be inseparable
from the institution. And then, in the system called com¬
munism, he saw a danger. For despite its claimed
superiority on economic grounds. Mill sensed in it a non¬
economic but supremely important threat, and he set
down his misgivings in these farsighted words:
... It is not by comparison with the present bad state
of society that the claims of Communism can be
estimated. . . . The question is, whether there would
be any asylum left for individuality of character;
whether public opinion would not be a tyrannical
yoke; whether the absolute dependence of each on all,
and the surveillance of each by all, would not grind
all down into a tame uniformity of thoughts, feelings,
and actions. . . . No society in which eccentricity is a
matter of reproach can be in a wholesome state.
Mill lived until 1873, a venerated, almost worshiped
man. His mildly Soeialist leanings were forgiven in ex¬
change for his vista of hope and his removal of the pall
of despair. After all, what he advocated was not so shock-
ing but tliat it could be embraced by almost everybody;
taxation of rents, and inheritance taxes, and the fonnation
122
THE WOBLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
of workmens cooperatives. He was not very sanguine
about the possibilities of trade-unions, and that was all to
the good, as far as respectable opinion went. It was a doc¬
trine English to the core: gradualist, optimistic, realistic,
and devoid of radical overtones.
Principles of Political Economy was an enormous suc¬
cess. It went into seven editions in the expensive two-
volume edition during his own lifetime and, characteristic
of Mill, he had it printed at his own expense in one cheap
volume which would be within the reach of the working
class. Five cheap editions also sold out before he died.
Mill became the Great Economist of his day; he was
talked of as Ricardo's rightful successor and heir, and
compared not unfavorably with Adam Smith himself.
And economics aside, the man himself was so re¬
spected. Mill was the author of Logic, of Liberty, of
Considerations on Repiesentative Government, and of
Utilitarianism, all classics in their fields. And more than
merely brilliant, he verged on being saintly. When Her¬
bert Spencer, his great rival in the area of philosophy,
found himself so straitened in circumstances that he was
unable to complete his projected series on social evolu¬
tion, it was Mill who offered to finance the project. “I
beg that you will not consider this proposal in the light
of a personal favor,” he wrote his rival, “though even if it
were I should still hope to be permitted to offer it. But
it is nothing of the kind— it is a simple proposal of co¬
operation for an important public purpose, for which
you give your labor and have given your health.
There was never a more typical gesture. Mill cared only
for two things: his wife, for whom he conceived a devo¬
tion which his friends thought verged on blindness, and
the pursuit of knowledge, from which nothing could
deflect him. When he was elected to Parliament his de¬
fense of human rights exceeded the temper of the day; he
was thereupon defeated, but he cared not a whit
way. As he saw the world, so he wrote and spoke, and the
only person who mattered, as far as approval went, was
his beloved Harriet.
After she died, there was her daughter, Helen, now
123
the visions of the utopian socialists
eaually indispensable. In gratitude, Mill wrote in his
Autobiography: “Surely no one before was so
Ktery of life.” He retired to spend his last days wi h
Helen in Avignon, near Harriets graye, a wondeifully
wise and thoroughly great man.
One last coincidence. His masterwork on economics,
with its message of progress and the
peaceful change and betterment, was published in i»4».
Perhaps it was not an epoch-making book, but it was
certainly an epoch-marking one. For by a curious °
fate another far smaller book— a pamphlet— was published
in the same year. It was entitled The Communist Mani¬
festo and in its few pages it undid, in bitter words, all
the calm and buoyant reasonableness with which J. S.
Mill had endowed the world.
VI
The Inexorable System
of Karl Marx
The Manifesto opened with portentous words: “a
spectre is haunting Europe-the spectre of Commu¬
nism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a
holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar,
Mettemich and Guizot, French Radicals and German
police-spies.”
The specter certainly existed: 1848 was a year of terror
for the old order on the Continent. There was a revolu¬
tionary fervor in the air and a rumble underfoot. For a
moment— for a brief moment— it looked as if the old order
might break down. In France the plodding regime of
Louis PhiHppe, the portly middle-class king, wrestled with
a crisis and then collapsed; the king abdicated and fled
to the security of a Surrey villa, and the workingmen of
Paris rose in a wild uncoordinated surge and ran up the
Red Flag over the Hotel de Ville. In Belgium a frightened
monarch offered to submit his resignation. In Berlin the
barricades went up and bullets whistled; in Italy mobs
rioted; and in Prague and Vienna popular uprisings imi¬
tated Paris by seizing control of the cities.
“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and
aims,” cried the Manifesto. “They openly declare that
their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow
of all existing social relations. Let tlie ruling classes
124
125
the inexorable system of KARL MARX
tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have
nothing to lose but them chains. They have a world to
The ruling classes did tremble and they saw the threat
of communism eveiywhere. Nor were their fears ground¬
less. In the French foundries the workmen sang radical
songs to the accompaniment of blows from their sledge
harnmers, and Heinrich Heine, the German romantic poet
who was touring the factories, reported that “really
people in our gentle walk of life can have no idea of the
demonic note which runs through these songs.’
But despite the clarion words of the Manifesto, the
demonic note was not a call for a revolution of commun¬
ism; it was a cry born only of frustration and despair. For
all of Europe was in the grip of reaction compared with
which conditions in England were positively idyllic. The
French government had been characterized by John
Stuart Mill as “wholly without the spirit of improvement
and . . . wrought almost exclusively through the meaner
and more selfish impulses of mankind” and the French
had no monopoly on such a dubious claim to fame. As for
Germany, well, here it was, the fourth decade of the nine¬
teenth century, and Pmssia still had no parliament, no
freedom of speech or right of assembly, no liberty of the
press or trial by jury, and no tolerance for any idea which
deviated by a hair’s breadth from the antiquated notion
of the divine right of kings. Italy was a hodgepodge of
anachronistic principalities. Russia under Nicholas I
(despite the Tsar’s onetime visit to Robeii: Owen’s New
Lanark) was characterized by the historian de Tocque-
ville as “the conierstone of despotism in Europe.”
Had the despair been channeled and directed, the
demonic note might have changed into a truly revolu¬
tionary one. But as it was, the uprisings were spontaneous,
undisciplined, and aimless; they won initial victories and
then, w^hile they were wondering what next to do, the old
order rocked invincibly back into place. The revolution¬
ary fei*vor abated, and where it did not, it was mercilessly
crushed. At the price of ten thousand casualties, the Paris
mobs were subdued by the National Guard, and Louis
126
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Napoleon took over the nation and soon exehanaerl
Second Republic for the Second Empire. In Belafum t f
country decided that it had better ask the king to stay
after all; he acknowledged the tribute by abolisEinn tZ
right of assembly. The Viennese and Hungarian crow
weie cannonaded from their strongholds, and in Gennanv
a constitutional assembly which had been bravely debaN
mg the question of republicanism broke down iiito
country to Frederick William IV of Prussia.^Stilfmore t
nominiously, that monarch declared that he would accent
no crown proffered by the ignoble hands of commoners
The revolution was over. It had been fierce, bloody'
but inconclusive. There were a few new faces in Europ^e
but the pohcies were much the same.
But to a little group of working-class leaders who had
just formed the Communist League, there was no cause
tor deep despair. True, the revolution for which they had
entertained high hopes had petered out and the radical
movements pocketed throughout Europe were being more
ruthlessly hounded than ever before. But all that could
be regaided with a certain equanimity. For according to
their understanding of history, the uprisings of 1848 were
only the small-scale dress rehearsals of a gigantic produc¬
tion that was scheduled for the future, and of the
eventual success of that awesome spectacle there could
be not the shadow of a doubt.
^ The league had just published its statement of objec¬
tives and called it the Communist Manifesto, But for all
its slogans and its trenchant phrases, the Manifesto had
not been written merely to whip up revolutionary senti¬
ment or to add another voice of protest to the clamor of
voices that filled the air. The Manifesto had something
else in mind; a philosophy of history in which a com¬
munist revolution was not only desirable but demon¬
strably inevitable. Unlike the Utopians who also wanted
to reorganize society closer to their desires, the Com¬
munists did not appeal to men’s sympathies or to their
addiction to building castles in the air. Rather, they
offered men a chance to hitch their destinies to a star
127
the inexorable system of KARL MARX
and to watch that star move inexorably across the his¬
torical zodiac. There was no longer a contest in which
one side or the other ought to win for moral or sentimen¬
tal reasons or because it thought the existing order was
outrageous. Instead there was a cold analysis or which
side had to win, and since that side was the proletariat,
their leaders had only to wait. In the end, they could not
lose.
The Manifesto was a program written for the future.
But one thing would have surprised its authors. They
were prepared to wait-but not for sevenUj years. They
were already scanning Europe for the likeliest incubator
of revolt. And they never even cast a glance in the direc¬
tion of Russia.
The Manifesto, as everybody knows, was the brain
child of that angry genius, Karl Marx. More accurately,
it was the result of collaboration between him and his
remarkable companion, compatriot, supporter, and col¬
league, Friedrich Engels.
They are interesting, and, of course, enormously im¬
portant men. The trouble is, they are no longer just men;
Marx the human being is obscured behind Marx the
Figure; and Engels behind the shadow of Marx. If we
are to judge by a count of worshiping noses, Marx must
be considered a religious leader to rank with Christ or
Mohammed, and Engels thus becomes a sort of Saint Paul
or a John. In the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow,
scholars have pored over their works with all the idolatry
they ridicule in the antireligious museums down the
street; but while Marx and Engels are canonized in
Russia, they are still crucified in much of the world.
They merit neither treatment, for they were neither
saints nor devils. Nor is their work either Scripture or
anathema. It belongs in the great line of economic view¬
points which have successively clarified, illuminated, and
interpreted the world for us, and like the other great
woiks on the shelf, it is neither without flaw nor devoid
of merit. The world has been preoccupied with Marx the
Revolutionary. But had Mai*x not lived there would have
128
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
been other Socialists and other prophets of a new society
The real and lasting impact of Marx and Engels is not
then- revolutionary activity, none of which bore too much
fruit during their own lifetimes. It is with Mai*x the
Economist that capitalism must finally come to grips.
For the final imprint he made on history was his predic-
tion that capitalism must inevitably and necessarily
collapse. On that prediction, on that “scientific” prognos¬
tication, communism has built its edifice.
But let us see the men.
7 very much opposites in appearance. Marx
looked hke a revolutionary. His children called him ‘The
Mooi, foi his skin was dark and his eyes deep-set and
flashing. He was stocky and powerfully built and rather
glowering in expression with a formidable beard. He was
not an orderly man; his home was a dusty mass of papers
piled in careless disarray in the midst of which Marx him¬
self, slovenly dressed, padded about in an eye-stinging
haze of tobacco smoke. Engels, on the other hand, would
pass for a member of his despised bourgeoisie; tall and
fair and rather elegant, he had the figure of a man who
liked to fence and to ride to hounds and who had once
swum the VVeser River four times without a break.
It was not only in their books that they differed; their
personalities were at opposite poles. Engels was gay and
observant and gifted with a quick and facile mind; it was
said that he could stutter in twenty languages. He had a
taste for the bourgeois pleasures in life, including a good
palate for wine, and it is amusing to note that although he
turned to the proletariat for his amours, he spent much
of his time romantically (and unsuccessfully) trying to
prove that his working-class mistress, Mary Burns (and
later, after her death, her sister, Lizzie), was actually
descended from the Scottish poet.
Mai'X was much more ponderous. He is the German
scholar par excellence, slow, meticulous, and painstak¬
ingly, even morbidly, perfectionist. Engels could dash off
a treatise in no time at all; Marx was always worr>dng
one to death. Engels was fazed only by Arabic with its
THK inexorable system of KARL MARX 129
four thousand verb roots; Marx, after twenty
practice, still spoke hideously Teutonic English. When he
writes to Engels of the great "‘chock” which events
caused him, we can almost hear him speak. But for all his
heaviness, Marx is the greater mind of the two; where
Engels supplied breadth and dash, he provided the
depth. . . 1
They met, for the second time, in 1844 in Pans and
their collaboration begins at this date. Engels had come
merely to call on Marx, but they had so much to say to
each other that their conversation lasted for ten days.
Thereafter there is hardly a product of the one that was
not edited or rewritten or at least debated with the other,
and their correspondence fills several volumes.
Their paths to that common meeting ground in Paris
were widely divergent. Engels was the son of a pietist.
Calvinist, narrow-minded father, a manufacturer in the
Rhineland. When Friedrich as a young man had shown
an incomprehensible taste for poetry, his father had
packed him off to Bremen to learn the export business
and to live with a cleric; religion and money-making, ac¬
cording to Caspar Engels, were good cures for a romantic
soul. Engels had dutifully applied himself to business, but
everything he saw was colored by a personality in revolt,
a happy-go-lucky pei*sonality but one that was incom¬
patible with his father s rigid standards. He went down to
the docks in the course of business, but his observant
eye took in not only the first-class accommodations “in
mahogany ornamented with gold” but the steerage as
well, where the people were “packed in like the paving-
stones in the streets.” He began to read the radical litera¬
ture of his time and by tlie age of twenty-two he was
converted to the ideals of “communism”— a word which
then had no very clear definition except insofar as it re¬
jected the idea of private property as a means for or¬
ganizing society’s economic effort.
Then he went to Manchester to enter his father s tex¬
tile business there, Manchester, like the ships in Bremen,
seemed to Engels a fagade. There were pleasant streets
lined with shops and suburbs ringing the city with pleas-
130
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
ant villas. But there was a second Manchester as well. It
was hidden behind the first and laid out so that the mill-
owners never had to see it on their trips to their offices. It
harbored a stunted population living in a state of filth and
despair, turning to gin and evangefism and doping them-
selves and their children with laudanum against a life
that was hopeless and brutal. Engels had seen similar
conditions in the factory towns of his Rhineland home
but now he explored Manchester until he knew every
last hovel and each ratlike abode. He was to publish his
findings in the most terrible verdict ever passed on the
world of industrial slums: The Condition of the Workin<y
Class in England in 1844. One time he talked of the
misery of the place to a gentleman friend and remarked
that he had never seen so “ill-built a city.” His companion
listened to him quietly and then said, “And yet there is a
great deal of money made here; good day, sir.”
He was writing now— treatises to show that the great
English economists were only apologists for the existing
order— and one of his contributions made an especial im¬
pression on a young man named Karl Marx who was
editing a radical philosophical magazine in Paris.
Unlike Engels, Marx came from a liberal, even mildly
radical, family background. He was bom in 1818 in Trier,
Gemiany, the second son of a prosperous Jewish family
which shortly thereafter adopted Christianity so that
Heinrich Marx, an advocate, might be less restricted in
his practice. Heinrich Marx was a respected man; he was,
in fact, even appointed Jiistizrat, an honorary title for
eminent lawyers, but in his day he had joined illegal ban¬
quet clubs which drank toasts to a republican Germany,
and he had reared his young son on a diet of Voltaire,
Locke, and Diderot.
Heinrich Marx hoped that his son would study law.
But at the universities of Bonn and Berlin, young Marx
found himself swept up in the great philosophical debate
of the day. The philosopher Hegel had propounded a
revolutionary scheme and the conservative German uni-
. versities found themselves split wide open over it.
Change, according to Hegel, was the rule of life. Every
131
the inexorable system of KARL MARX
idea irrepressibly bred its opposite and the two merged
into a synthesis which in turn produced its own contra¬
diction. And histoiy, said Hegel, was nothing but the ex¬
pression of this flux of conflicting and resolving ideas as
they fired now this and then that nation. Change-
dialectical change— was immanent in human affairs. With
one exception: when it came to the Prussian state, the
rules no longer applied; the Pmssian government, said
Hegel, was like '‘God walking on earth.
This was a powerful stimulus for a young student.
Marx joined a group of intellectuals known as the Young
Hegelians which debated such daring questions as athe¬
ism and pure theoretical communism in terms of the
Hegelian dialectic, and he decided to become a philoso¬
pher himself. He might have, had it not been for the
action of that godlike state. Marx's favorite professor,
Bruno Bauer, who was eager to procure an appointment
for him at Bonn, was dismissed for proconstitutional and
antireligious ideas (one evidently as bad as the other),
and an academic career for young Dr. Marx became an
impossibility.
He turned instead to journalism. The Rheinische Zei-
tung, a small middle-class liberal newspaper, to which he
had been a frequent contributor, asked him to take on its
editorship. He accepted; his career lasted exactly five
months. Marx was then a radical, but his radicalism was
philosophical rather than political. When Friedrich En¬
gels came respectfully to call on him, Mai*x rather dis¬
approved of that brash young man brimming with com¬
munist ideas, and when Marx himself was accused of
being a Communist, his reply was equivocal: "I do not
know communism,” he said, "but a social philosophy
which has as its aim the defense of the oppressed can¬
not be condemned so lightly.” But regardless of his dis¬
avowals, his editorials were too much for the authorities.
He wrote a bitter denunciation of a law which would
have pi evented the peasants from exercising their im¬
memorial rights to gather dead wood in the forests; for
this he was censured. He wrote editorials deploring the
housing situation; for this he was warned. And when he
13- THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
went so far as to say some uncomplimentary things about
the Tsar of Russia, the Rheinische Zeitung was sup¬
pressed. ^
Marx went to Paris to take over another radical jour¬
nal which was to be almost as short-lived as the newspa¬
per. But his interests were now turned in the direction
of politics and economics. The undisguised self-interest
of the Prussian government, the implacable resist¬
ance of the German bourgeoisie toward anything which
might alleviate the condition of the German working
classes, the almost caricaturesque attitudes of reaction
which characterized the wealthy and ruling classes of
Europe— all this had coalesced in his mind to form part
of a new philosophy of history. And when Engels came
to visit him and the two stmck up their strong rapport,
that philosophy began to take formal shape.
The philosophy was to take the name of dialectical ma¬
terialism; dialectical because it incorporated Hegers idea
of inherent change, and nuiterialism because it grounded
itself not in the world of ideas, but on the terrain of so¬
cial and physical environment.
“The materialist conception of history,” wrote Engels
many years later in a famous tract entitled “Anti-
Diihring” (because it was aimed against a Gennan pro¬
fessor named Eugen Duhring), “starts from the prin¬
ciple that production, and with production the exchange
of its products, is the basis of every social order; that in
every society which has appeared in histoiy the dis¬
tribution of the products, and with it the division of
society into classes or estates, is determined by what is
produced and how it is produced, and how the product
is exchanged. According to this conception, the ultimate
causes of all social changes and political revolutions are
to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing
insight into eteinal truth and justice, but in changes in
the mode of production and exchange; they are to be
sought not in the philosophy but in the economics of the
epoch concerned.” „ ^
The reasoning is not difficult to follow. Every society,
133
THE INEXORABLE SYSTEM OF KARL MARX
says Marx, is built on an economic base, is ultimately
grounded in the hard reality of human beings who have
organized their activities in order to clothe and feed and
house themselves. That organization can differ vastly
from society to society and from era to era. It can be
pastoral or built around hunting or grouped into handi¬
craft units or structured into a complex industrial whole.
But whatever the form in which men organize to solve
their basic economic problem, society will require a
whole superstructure of noneconomic activity and thought
—it will need to be bound together by laws, supervised
by a government, inspired by religion and philosophy.
But the superstructure of thought cannot be selected
at random. It must mirror the foundation on which it is
raised. No hunting community will evolve or could use
the legal framework of an industrial society, and simi¬
larly an industrial community obviously requires an en¬
tirely different conception of law, order, and government
than does a primitive village. Note that the doetrine of
materialism does not toss away the catalytie function and
creativity of ideas. It only maintains that thoughts and
ideas are the product of environment, even though they
aim to change that environment.
Materialism by itself would reduce ideas to mere pas¬
sive accompaniments of economic activity. That was not
Marx’s contention. For the new theory was dialectical as
well as materialist: it envisaged change, constant and in¬
herent change; and in that never-ending flux the ideas
emanating from one period would help to shape another.
“Men make their own history,” wrote Marx, commenting
on the coup detat of Louis Napoleon in 1852, “but they
do not make it just as they please; they do not make it
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
ciicumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from
the past.”
But the dialectical— the changing— aspect of this theoiy
of history did not depend merely on the interplay of
ideas and social structures. There was another and far
more powerful agent at work. The economic world itself
134
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
was changing; the ultimate reality on which the structure
of ideas was built was itself constantly in flux.
For example, the isolated markets of the Middle Ages
began to lock fingers under the impetus of exploration
and political unification, and a new commercial world
was boiTi. The old hand mill was replaced by the steam
mill under the impetus of invention, and a new form of
social organization called the factory came into being. In
both cases the ultimate reality of economic life itself
changed its form, and as it did, it forced a new social
adaptation from the community in which it was em¬
bedded.
And once such a change had taken place, it carried
with it a whole train of consequences. The market and
the factory were incompatible with the feudal way of life
—even though they were bom amidst it. They demanded
a new cultural and social context to go with them. And
they helped in that difficult birthing process by creating
their own new social classes: the market created a pro¬
fessional merchant class and the factoiy a proletariat.
But the process of social change was not merely a
matter of new inventions pressing on old institutions: it
was a matter of new classes displacing old ones. For each
society is organized into a class structure, into aggre¬
gates of men who stand in some common relationship
—favorable or otherwise— to the existing fomi of produc¬
tion. And social change threatens all of that. As the
technical conditions of production change— as factories
destroy handicraft industry, for example— the old classes
find that their accustomed situation is changing too;
those on top may find the ground cut from under them,
while those who were on the bottom may be carried
higher. We have seen just such an upset of the relative
position of social classes in Ricardo’s day in England,
when the capitalists, riding the wave of the Industrial
Revolution, were threatening to usurp the time-honored
prerogatives of the landed gentry.
Hence conflict develops. The classes whose position is
jeopardized fight the classes whose position is enhanced:
the inexorable system of KARL MARX 135
the feudal lord fights the rising merchant, and the guild
master despises the young capitahst.
But the process of history pays no attention to likes
dishkes. Gradually conditions change and gradually, but
surely, the classes of society are learranged. Amid tur¬
moil and anguish the division of w^ealth is altered. And
thus history is a pageant of ceaseless struggle between
classes to partition social wealth. For as long as the
technics of society change, no existing division of
wealth is immune from attack.
What did this theory augur for the present? It pointed
to revolution— inevitable revolution. For capitalism, ac¬
cording to tliis analysis, must also consist of a technical
base of economic reality and a superstructure of a social
class system. And if its technical base was evolving, then
necessarily, its superstructure must be subject to increas¬
ing strain.
That is exactly what Marx and Engels saw in 1848.
The technical base of capitalism— its anchor in reality—
was industrial production. Its superstracture was the
system of private property, under which a portion of so¬
ciety's output went to those who owned its great tech¬
nical apparatus. The conflict lay in the fact that the base
and superstmcture were incompatible.
Why? Because the base of industrial production— the
actual making of goods— was a highly organized, inte¬
grated, interdependent process, whereas the superstnac-
ture of private property was the most highly individual¬
istic of social systems. Hence the superstmcture and the
base clashed: factories necessitated social planning, and
private property abhorred it; capitalism had become so
complex that it needed direction but capitalists insisted
on a minous freedom.
The result was twofold. First, capitalism must destroy
itself. The planless nature of production must lead to a
constant disorganization of economic activity— to crises
and slumps and the social chaos of depression. The sys¬
tem was simply too complex; it was constantly getting
out of joint, losing step, and overproducing one good
while underproducing another.
^36 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Secondly, capitalism would unknowingly breed its own
successor. Within its great factories it would not only
create the technical base for socialism-mass production
-but it would create as well a trained and disciplined
class who would be the agent of socialism-the embit¬
tered proletariat. By its own inner dynamic, capitalism
would produce its owm downfall, and in the process, it
would nourish its own enemy.
It was a profoundly revolutionary insight into history,
not only for what it betokened for the future, but for the
whole new perspective it opened upon the past. We have
come to be famiUar with the “economic interpretation'
of history, and we can accept with equanimity a re-
evaluation of the past with respect to the struggle, say,
of the nascent seventeenth-century commercial classes
and the aristocratic world of land and lineage. But for
Mai*x and Engels, this was no mere exercise in historical
reinterpretation. The dialectic led to the future and that
future, as revealed by the Communist Manifesto, pointed
to an inevitable communist revolution which this same
dialectic would produce. In somber words the Manifesto
proclaimed: “The development of modem industry . . .
cuts from under its feet the veiy foundation on which
the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products.
What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are
its owm gravediggers. Its fall and the victoiy of the
proletariat are equally inevitable.”
The Manifesto, with its mmbling, inexorable inteipre-
tation of history, was not written in Paris. Marx's career
had been brief in that city. He edited a caustic, radical
magazine; he again mbbed the sensibilities of the Prus¬
sian government, and at its behest, he was expelled fiom
the French capital.
Pie was married now — in 1843 he had married JenRy
von Westphalen, who lived next door to him as a child.
Jenny was the daughter of a Prussian aristocrat and Privy
Councillor, but Baron von Westphalen was nevertheless
a humanist and liberal thinker. He had talked
Marx about Homer and Shakespeare and even told him
137
the inexorable system of KARL MARX
about the ideas of Saint-Simon despite their pronounce¬
ment by the local bishop as heresy. As for Jenny-she was
the belle of the town. Beautiful and with smtors galoie,
she could easily have made a more “suitable match than
the dark young man next door. But she was in love with
him and both families smiled their approval. For me
Marxes such a marriage would be a not inconsiderable
social triumph and for the baron it was, perhaps, a happy
vindication of his humanist ideas. One wonders if he
would have given his consent could he have foreseen
what was to happen to his daughter. For Jenny was
to be forced to share the bed of a common prostitute in
jail and would have to beg the money from a neighbor to
buy a coffin to bury one of her children. In place of the
pleasant comforts and the social prestige of Trier, she was
to spend the years of her life in two dismal rooms in a
London slum, sharing with her husband the calumny of
a hostile world.
And yet it was a deeply devoted union. In his dealings
with outsiders, Marx was unkind, jealous, suspicious, and
wrathful; but he was a devoted husband and father.
Later, much later, when Jenny was dying and Marx was
ill, this lovely scene was witnessed by her daughter.
Mother lay in the big front room and The Moor lay
in the little room next to it. ... I shall never forget
the morning when he felt strong enough to get up
and go into Mother’s room. It was as though they
were young again together— she a loving girl and he
an ardent youth starting out together through life and
not an old man shattered by ill-health and a dying
lady taking leave of each other forever.
The Marxes had moved to London in 1849. Expulsion
from Paris, four years before, had landed them in Bi*us-
sels, where they stayed (and the Manifesto was com¬
posed) until the revolutionary outbursts in 1848. Then
when the Belgian king had secured a firni enough grip on
his shaky throne, he rounded up the radical leaders in
his capital -and Marx went briefly to Gennany.
138
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
thl Zl took over
the editorship of a newspaper and it was only a matter
of time before the government closed it down. He printed
the last edition in red-and sought a haven in London
He was now in desperate financial shape. Engels was
m Manchester, leading his strange double life (he
was a respected figure on the Manchester Stock Ex¬
change), and he supplied the Marxes with a never-
ending stream of checks and loans. But the family faced
the bitterest poverty, nonetheless. There were, in all,
five of them, plus Lenchen, the Westphalen family
maid who stayed with them, unpaid, all their days.
Maix had no work— except his never-ending stint in the
Biitish Museum from ten o clock every moniing until
seven o clock at night. He tried to make a little money
by writing articles on the political situation for the New
York Tribune, whose editor, Charles A. Dana, was a
Fourierist himself and not averse to a few slaps at Euro¬
pean politics. It helped for a while, although it was
Engels who bailed Marx out by composing many of his
pieces for him— Marx meanwhile advising by letter as
follows: ‘ Du musst dein war-articles colour a little more.*'
When the articles stopped, he tried to get a clerical job
W'ith a railway, but was rejected for his atrocious hand¬
writing. Thereafter he pawned what was left to his
name, all the family silver and valuables having been
sold long ago. At times his want was so intense that he
sit home because his coat and even his
pawn; on other occasions he lacked the
postage stamps to send his works to the
publisher. And to compound his difficulties, he suffered
from the most painful boils. When he arrived home one
evening after writing in misery all day long in the Mu¬
seum he remarked, 'T hope the bourgeoisie as long as
they li\*e will have cause to remember my carbuncles.”
He had just composed the terrible chapter of Das Kapital
which describes the Working Day.
There was only Engels to fall back on. Marx wrote him
constantly, touching on economics, politics, mathematics,
was forced to
shoes were at
money to buy
139
the inexorable system of KARL MARX
military tactics, on everything under the sun, but espe¬
cially on his own situation. A typical excerpt reads:
My wife is ill. Little Jenny is ill. Lenchen has a sort
of nervous fever and I can’t call in tlie doctor be¬
cause I have no money to pay him. For about eight
or ten days we have all been living on bread and
potatoes and it is now doubtful whether we shall
be able to get even that. ... I have written nothing
for Dana because I have not had the money to buy
newspapers. . . . How am I to get out of this devil¬
ish mess? During the past week or so I have bor¬
rowed a few shillings and even pence^from workers.
It was terrible but it was absolutely necessary or
we should have starved.
Only the last years were a little easier. An old friend
left Marx a small bequest and he never again touched
the lower depths of poverty. Engels, too, finally came
into an inheritance and left his business; in 1869 he went
to his office for the last time and came over the fields to
meet Mai*x’s daughter, “flourishing his stick and laughing
and singing all over his face.”
In 1881 Jenny died; she had buried two of her five
children including her only son; she was old and tired.
Mai-x was too ill to go to the funeral; when Engels
looked at him he said, “The Moor is dead, too.” Not
quite; he lingered for two more years; disapproved of
the husbands whom his two married daughters had
chosen; grew weary of the bickering of the working-class
movement and delivered himself of a statement that has
never ceased to bedevil the faithful (“I am not a Marx¬
ist,” he said one day); and then on a March afternoon,
quietly slipped away.
\^ffiat had he done, in these long years of privation?
He had produced, for one thing, an intemational
working-class movement. As a young man Marx had writ¬
ten: The philosophers hitherto have only inteip reted
the world in various ways; the thing, however, is to
140
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
change it Marx and Engels had given the accolade to
the proletariat in their interpretation of history; now
that itlh^M ‘ proletariat so
that It should exert its maximum leverage on history.
It was not an attempt crowned with much success. Co-
mcident with the publication of the Manifesto, the Com¬
munist League had been formed, but it was never much
more than a paper organization; the Manifesto, which
was Its platform, was not then even placed on public
sale, and with the demise of the Revolution of 1848 the
League died too.
It was followed in 1864 with a far more ambitious
organization, the International Workingmen’s Associa-
ton. The International boasted seven million members
and was real enough to have a hand in a wave of strikes
which swept the Continent and to earn for itself a rather
fearsome reputation. But it, too, was doomed to have a
brief histoiy. The International did not consist of a
tough and disciplined army of Communists, but a motley
crew of Owenists, Proudhonists, Fourieiists, lukewarm
Socialists, rabid nationalists, and trade-unionists who
were leeiy of any kind of revolutionary theory whatso¬
ever. With considerable skill Marx kept his crew together
for five years and then the Inteniational fell apart; some
followed Bakunin, a giant of a man with a true revo¬
lutionist’s background of Siberia and exile (it was said
that his oratory was so moving that his listeners would
have cut their throats if he had asked them to), while
others turned their attention back to national affairs. The
last meeting of the International was held in New York
in 1874. It was a lugubrious failure.
But far more important than the creation of the First
International was the peculiar tone which Mai*x injected
into working-class affairs. This was the most quarrelsome
and intolerant of men, and from the beginning he was
unable to believe that anyone who did not follow his
line of reasoning could possibly be right. As an economist
his language was precise, as a philosopher-historian it
was eloquent, as a revolutionary it was scurrilous. He
called his opponents “louts,” “rascals,” even “bedbugs.”
THE INEXORABLE SYSTEM OF KARL MARX
141
Early in his career, when he was still in Brussels, Maix
had been visited by a German tailor named Weitlmg.
Weitling was a tried son of the labor movement; he ha
scars on liis legs from the irons of Prussian prisons an
a long history of selfless and valiant efforts on behalf
of the German workingman. He came to speak to Mai x
on such things as justice and brotherhood and solidarity,
instead he found himself exposed to a merciless cross-
examination on the “scientific principles” of socialism.
Poor Weitling was confused, his answers were unsatisfac¬
tory. Marx, who had been sitting as the chief examinei,
began to stride angrily about the room. Ignorance has
never helped anybody yet,” he shouted. The audience
was over.
Willich was another to be excommunicated. An ex-
Prussian captain, he had fought in the German Revolu¬
tion, and later was to become an outstanding general
on the Union side of the American Civil War. But he
clung to the “un-Marxist” idea that “pure will” could be
the motive power of revolution instead of “actual condi¬
tions”; for this notion— which Lenin was one day to prove
was not so farfetched after all— he, too, was dropped
from the movement.
And the list could be extended endlessly. Perhaps no
single incident was more provocative, more prophetic of
a movement which was one day to degenerate into an in¬
ternal witch-hunt for “deviationists” and “counterrevolu¬
tionaries” than the feud between Marx and Pierre Prou¬
dhon. Proudhon was the son of a French barrelmaker, a
self-educated brilliant Socialist who had rocked the
French intelligentsia with a book entitled What Is Prop¬
erty? Proudhon had answered. Property is Theft, and he
had called for an end to huge private riches although
not to all private property. Marx and he had met and
talked and corresponded and then Marx asked him to
join forces with himself and Engels. Proudhon’s answer
is so profoundly moving and so frighteningly indicative
of the future that it is worth quoting at some length.
Let us by all means collaborate,” he wrote, “in trying
to discover the laws of society, the way in which these
^4^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
laws work out, the best method to go about investigating
theni; but, for God's sake, after we have demolished all
the dogmatisms a priori, let us not of all things attempt
in our turn to instill another kind of doctrine into the
people. ... I applaud with all my heart your idea of
bringing to Hght all the varieties of opinion; let us have
good and sincere polemics; let us show the world the
example of a learned and far-sighted tolerance; but sim¬
ply because we are at the head of a new movement, let
us not set ourselves up as the leaders of a new intoler¬
ance, let us not pose as the apostles of a new religion-
even though this religion be the religion of logic, the re-
ligion of reason itself. Let us welcome, let us encourage
all the protests; let us condemn all the exclusions, all the
mysticisms; let us never regard a question as closed, and
even after we have exhausted our last argument, let us
begin again, if necessary, with eloquence and irony. On
that condition, I shall be delighted to take part in your
association— but otherwise, no!”
Marx’s answer was this: Proudhon had written a book
called The Philosophy of Poverty; Marx now annihilated
it with a rejoinder entitled The Poverty of Philosophy.
The pattern of intolerance was never to disappear. The
First International would be followed by the mild and
well-meaning Second— which included Socialists of such
caliber as Bernard Shaw, Ramsay MacDonald, and Pil-
sudski (as well as Lenin, Mussolini, and Laval!), and
then by the infamous Third, organized under the aegis of
Moscow. And yet, the impact of these great movements
is perhaps less than the persistence of that narrowness,
that infuriating and absolute inability to entertain a dis¬
senting opinion, that autocratic air, and that antipathy
for democracv which communism has inherited from its
single greatest founder.
Had Marx produced nothing more in his long years in
exile than a revolutionary labor movement, he would not
loom today so important a figure in the world. Marx was
only one of a dozen revolutionaries and by no means the
most successful; he was only one of at least that many
prophets of socialism and as a matter of fact he wrote
143
THE INEXORABLE SYSTEM OF KARL MARX
next to nothing about what that new society might be
hke. His final contribution lies elsewhere: in his dialecti¬
cal materiahst theory of history, and even more impor¬
tant, in his pessimistic analysis of the outlook for a capi-
tahst economy.
“The history of capitalism,” Stalin has written, has
entirely confirmed the theories of Marx and Engels con¬
cerning the laws of development of capitalist society . . .
that must inevitably lead to the downfall of the whole
capitalist system.” What were those laws? What was
Marx s prognosis for the system that he knew?
The answer lies in that enomious work Das Kapital—
(Capital). With Marx's agonizing meticulousness, it is
remarkable that the work was ever finished— in a sense it
never was. It was eighteen years in process; in 1851 it
was to be done “in five weeks”; in 1859 “in six weeks”;
in 1865 it was “done”— a huge bundle of virtually illegible
manuscripts which took two years to edit into Volume I.
When Marx died in 1883 two volumes remained: Engels
put out Volume II in 1885 and the third in 1894. The final
(fourth) volume did not emerge until 1910.
There are twenty-five hundred pages to read for any¬
one intrepid enough to make the effort. And what pages!
Some deal with the tiniest of technical matters and labor
them to a point of mathematical exhaustion; others swirl
with passion and anger. This is an economist who has
read every economist, a Gennan pedant with a passion for
footnotes, and an emotional critic who can write that
capital is dead labour, that vampire-like, only lives by
sucking hving labour and who tells us that capital came
into the world “dripping from head to foot, from every
pore, with blood and dirt.”
And yet one must not jump to the conclusion that this
is merely a biased and irascible text inveighing against
the sins of the wicked money-barons. It is shot through
with remarks which betray the total involvement of the
man with his theoretical adversary, but the great merit
of the book, curiously enough, is its utter detachment
from all considerations of morality. The book describes
^44 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
with fury, but it analyzes with cold logic. For what Marx
has set foi his goal is to discover the intrinsic tendencies
of the capitalist system, its inner laws of motion, and in
so doing he has eschewed the easy but less convincing
means of merely expatiating on its manifest shortcom
mgs Instead he erects the most rigorous, the purest
capitalism imaginable and within this rarefied abstract
system with an imaginary capitafism in which all the ob-
vious defects of real life are removed, he seeks his quarrv.
l^or if he can prove that the best of all possible capital¬
isms is nonetheless headed for certain disaster, it is cer¬
tainly easy to demonstrate that real capitalism will fol¬
low the same path, only quicker.
And so he sets the stage. We enter a world of perfect
capitalism: no monopolies, no unions, no special advan¬
tages for anyone. It is a world in which every commodity
sells at exactly its proper price. And that proper price is
its value— a tricky word. For the value of a commodity,
says Mai'x (and Smith and Ricardo before him), is the
amount of labor it has within itself. If it takes twice as
much labor to make hats as shoes, then hats will sell for
twice the price of shoes. The labor, of course, need not
be direct manual labor; it may be overhead labor which
is spread over many commodities or it may be the labor
which once went into making a machine and which the
machine now slowly passes on to the products it shapes.
But no matter what its form, everything is eventually re¬
ducible to labor, and all commodities, in this perfect sys¬
tem, will be priced according to the amount of labor,
direct or indirect, which they contain.
In this world stand the tw'O great protagonists of the
capitalist drama: worker and capitalist— the landlord has
by now been relegated to a minor position in society.
They are not quite the same protagonists we have met
earlier in similar economic tableaux. The worker is no
longer the slave to his reproductive urge. He is a free
bargaining agent who enters the market to dispose of
the one commodity he commands— labor-power— and if
he gets a rise in wages he will not be so foolish as to
THE INEXORABLE SYSTEM OF KARL MARX
145
squander it in a self-defeating proliferation of his num¬
bers.
The capitahst faces him in the arena. He is not a bad
fellow at heart, although his greed and lust for wealth
are caustically described in those chapters which leave
the abstract world for a look into 1860 England. But it
is woith noting that he is not money-hungry from mere
motives of rapacity; he is an owner-entrepreneur en¬
gaged in an endless race against his fellow owner-en¬
trepreneurs; he must strive for accumulation, for in the
competitive environment in which he operates, one accu¬
mulates or one gets accumulated.
The stage is set and the characters take their places.
But now the first difiiculty appears. How, asks Marx,
can profits exist in such a situation? If everything sells
for its exact value, then who gets an unearned increment?
No one dares to raise his price above the competitive
one, and even if one seller managed to gouge a buyer,
that buyer would only have less to spend elsewhere in
the economy— one man’s profit would thus be another
man’s loss. How can there be profit in the tvhole system
if everything exchanges for its honest worth?
It seems like a paradox. Profits are easy to explain if
we assume that there are monopolies in the system which
need not obey the leveling influences of competition or
if we admit that capitalists may pay labor less than it is
worth. But Marx will have none of that— this is to be pure
capitalism which will dig its own grave.
He finds the answer to the dilemma in one commodity
which is different from all others. That commodity is
labor-power. For the laborer, like the capitalist, sells his
product for exactly what it is worth-for its value. And its
value, like the value of everything else that is sold, is the
amount of labor that goes into it-in this case, the amount
of labor that it takes to “make” labor-power. In other
words, a laborer s salable energies are worth the amount
of sociaUy necessaiy labor it takes to keep that laborer
auve. Smitli and Ricardo would have agreed entirely;
the true value of a workman is the wage he needs in
order to exist. It is his subsistence wage.
^46 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
So far, so good. But here comes the key to profit The
laborer who contracts to work can only ask for a wage
which IS his due. What that wage will be depends, as
we have seen, on the amount of labor-time it takes to
keep a man alive. If it takes six hours of society's labor
to maintain a workingman, then (if labor is priced at
one dollar an hour ) , he is “worth” six dollars a day No
more. ^ '
But the laborer who gets a job does not contract to
work only six hours a day. That would be just long
enough to support himself. On the contrary, he agrees to
work a full eight-hour, or in Marx’s time a ten- or eleven-
hour, day. Hence he will produce a full ten or eleven
hours worth of value and he will get paid for only six.
His wage will cover his subsistence which is his true
value, but in return he will sell the value which he
produces in a full working day. And this is how profit
enters the system.
Marx called this layer of unpaid work “surplus value.”
But it is quite devoid of moral indignation. The worker
is only entitled to the value of his labor-power. He gets
it in full. But meanwhile the capitalist gets the full
value of his workers’ whole working day, and this is
longer than the hours for which he paid. Hence when
the capitalist sells his products, he can afford to sell them
at their true value and still realize a profit. For there is
more labor-time embodied in his products than the labor¬
time for which he was forced to pay.
How can this state of affairs come about? It happens
because the capitalists monopolize one thing— access to
the means of production themselves. If a worker isn’t
willing to work a full working day, he doesn’t get a job.
Like everyone else in the system, a worker has no right
and no power to ask for more than his own worth as a
commodity. The system is perfectly equitable and yet all
workers are cheated, for they are forced to work a longer
time than their own self-sustenance demands.
Does this sound strange? Remember that Marx is de¬
scribing a time when the working day was long-some-
times unendurably long — and when wages were, by and
the inexorable system of KARL MARX 147
large, little more than it took to keep body and soul to¬
gether. The idea of surplus value may make little sense
in a world where the sweatshop is veiy largely a thing or
the past, but it was not merely a theoretical construct at
the time that Marx was writing. One example may suffice :
at a Manchester factory in 1862 the average workweek
for a period of a month and a half was 84 hoursl For the
previous 18 months it had been 78/2 hours.
But all this is still only the setting for the drama. We
have the protagonists, we have their motives, we have
the clue to the plot in the discovery of “surplus value.
And now the play is set in motion.
All capitalists have profits. But they are all in competi¬
tion. Hence they try to accumulate and so expand their
scales of output, at the expense of their competitors. But
expansion is not so easy. It requires more laborers and
to get them the capitalists must bid against each other
for the working force. Wages tend to rise. Conversely,
suiplus value tends to fall. It looks as if the Marxian
capitalists will soon be up against the dilemma faced by
the capitalists of Adam Smith and David Ricardo— their
profits will be eaten away by rising wages.
To Smith and Ricardo the solution to the dilemma lay
in the propensity of the working force to increase its
numbers with every boost in pay. But Marx has ruled out
this possibility. He doesn’t argue about it; he simply
brands the Malthusian doctrine “a libel on the human
race —after all, the proletariat, which is to be the ruling
class of the future, cannot be so shortsighted as to dissi¬
pate its gains through mere unbridled physical appetite.
But he rescues his capitalists just the same. For he says
that they will meet the threat of rising wages by intro¬
ducing laborsaving machineiy into their plants. That will
throw part of the working force back onto the street and
theie, as an Industrial Reserve Amiy, it will serve tlie
same function as Malthus’ teeming population: it will
compete wages right back down to their former “value”
—the subsistence level.
But now comes the crucial twist. It seems as though
the capitalist has saved the day, for he has prevented
148
PHILOSOPHERS
wages trom rising by creating unemployment throueh
machinery But not so fast. By the vei? process through
which he hopes to free himself from one horn of the
dilemma, he impales himself on the other.
For as he substitutes machines for men he is simnl
taneously substituting nonprofitable means of production
foi profitable ones. Remember that in this never-never
vorld, no one makes a profit by merely sharp bargaining.
Whatever a maclune wiU be worth to a capitafist, you
can be sure tliat he paid full value for it. If a machine
wdl yield ten thousand dollars’ worth of value over its
whole Me, our capitafist was charged the full ten thou¬
sand doUars in the first place. It is only from his living
abor that he can realize a profit, only from the unpaid-
for hours of suiplus working time. Hence when he re-
cmces the number or proportion of workers, he is killing
the goose that laid the golden egg.
And yet, unhappy fellow, he has to. There is nothing
Mephistophelean about his actions. He is only obeying
his impulse to accumulate and trying to stay abreast of
his competitors. As his wages rise, he must introduce
laborsaving machinery to cut his costs and rescue his
profits— if he does not, his neighbor will. But since he
must substitute machinery for labor, he must also narrow
the base out of which he gleans his profits. It is a kind
of Greek drama where men go willy-nilly to their fate,
and in which they all unwittingly cooperate to bring
about their own destruction.
For now the die is cast. As his profits shrink, each
capitalist will redouble his efforts to put new laborsaving,
cost-cutting machinery in his factory. It is only by getting
a step ahead of the parade that he can hope to make a
profit. But since everyone is doing precisely the same
thing, the ratio of labor (and hence surplus value) to
total output shrinks still further. The rate of profit falls
and falls. And now doom lies ahead. Profits are cut to
the point at which production is no longer profitable at
all. Consumption dwindles as machines displace men and
the number of employed fails to keep pace with output.
Bankruptcies ensue. There is a scramble to dump goods
the inexorable system of KARL MARX 149
on the market and in the process smaller firms go under,
A capitalist crisis is at hand.
Not forever. As workers are thrown out of work, they
are forced to accept subvalue wages. As machinery is
dumped, the stronger capitalists can acquire machines
for less than their true value. After a time, surplus value
reappears. The forward march is taken up again. But it
leads to the same catastrophic conclusion: competition
for workers; higher wages, labor-displacing machinery; a
smaller base for surplus value; still more frenzied com¬
petition; collapse. And each collapse is worse than the
preceding one. In the periods of crises, the bigger firms
absorb the smaller ones, and when the industrial mon¬
sters eventually go down, the wreckage is far greater
than when the little enterprises buckle.
And then, one day, the drama ends. Marx’s picture of
it has all the eloquence of a description of Damnation:
‘‘Along with the constantly diminishing number of the
magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all ad¬
vantages of this process of transfonnation, grows the
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, ex¬
ploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the
working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and
disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of
the process of capitalist production itself . . . Centraliza¬
tion of the means of production and socialization of
labour at last reach a point where they become incom¬
patible with their capitalist integument. This integument
bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property
sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.”
And so the drama ends in the inevitable overthrow
which Marx had envisioned in the dialectic. The system —
the pure system — breaks down as it works upon itself to
squeeze out its own source of energy, surplus value. The
bieakdown is hastened by the constant instability which
arises from the essentially planless nature of the economy,
and although there are forces at work which act both to
prolong and to hasten its end, its final ^death struggle
is inescapable. And if the pure system is unworkable.
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
150
what possible hope can there be for the real system, with
all its imperfections, monopolies, cutthroat tactics, and
heedless profit seeking?
For Adam Smith, the capitalist escalator climbed ever
upward, at least as far as the eye could reasonably see.
For Ricardo that upward motion was finally stalled by
the pressure of mouths on insuflBcient cropland, which
brought a stalemate to progress and a windfall to the for-
timate landlord. For Mill the vista was made more re¬
assuring by his discovery that society could distribute its
product as it saw fit, regardless of what "economic laws”
seemed to dictate. But for Marx even that saving possi¬
bility was untenable. For the dialectic told him that the
state was only the political ruling organ of the economic
rulers, and the thought that it might act as a neutral
body, as an impartial third force which might balance
the claims of its conflicting members, would have seemed
little else but sheer wishful thinking. No, there was no
escape from the inner logic, the inexorable development
of a system which would not only destroy itself but
which, in so doing, would give birth to its successor.
As to what that successor might look like, Marx had
little to say. It would be "classless,” of course-by which
Marx meant that the basis for an economic division of
society based on property would be removed once so¬
ciety owned all the means of production of goods. Just
how society would "owm” its factories; what was meant
by "society”; whether there would or could be bitter
antagonisms between the managers and the managed,
between the political chieftains and the rank and file—
none of this did Mai-x specify. During a transitional period
of "socialism” there would be a "dictatorship of the prole¬
tariat”; after that, "pure” communism itself.
Marx, it must be kept in mind, was not the architect
of communism. That formidable task would fall to Lenin.
Das Kapital is the Doomsday Book of capitalism, and in
all of Mai-x there is almost nothing which looks beyond
the Day of Judgment to see what lineaments paradise
may present.
the INEXORAJBLE system of KARL MARX
What are we to make of his apocalyptic argument?
There is an easy way of disposing of the whole thing.
Remember that the system is built on value— labor value
—and that the key to its demise lies in that special phe¬
nomenon called surplus value. But tlie real world con¬
sists not of “values” but of real tangible prices. Marx
must show that the world of dollars and cents mirrors,
in some approximate fashion, the abstract world that he
has created. But in making the transition from a value-
world to a price-world, he lands in the most terrible
tangle of mathematics. In fact he makes a mistake.
It is not an irreparable mistake and by going through
an even worse tangle of mathematics one can make the
Maixist equations come out “right”— one can, that is, ex¬
plain a correspondence between the prices that really
obtain in life and the underlying values in teims of labor¬
time. But the critics who pointed out the error were
hardly interested in setting the scheme aright and their
judgment that Marx was “wrong” was taken as final.
When the equations were finally justified, no one paid
much attention. For regardless of its matliematical purity,
the Marxian rigmarole is at best a cumbersome and diffi¬
cult framework and an unnecessarily laborious method
of getting at the required understanding of how capital¬
ism works.
But while we might be tempted to toss the whole
analysis to one side because it is awkward and inflexible,
to do so would be to overlook its worth. Marx, after all,
did not strip capitalism down to its barest essentials
merely to indulge his bent for abstract argument. He did
so because he believed that in the simplicity of a theoreti¬
cal world the mechanics of the actual world would lie
clearly exposed; because he hoped that the very stark¬
ness of his model world would highlight tendencies hid¬
den in real life.
And so it did. For all its clumsiness, Marx's model of
the capitalist world seemed to work, to display a kind of
life of its own. Given its basic assumptions— the mise en
scene of its characters, their motives and their milieu—
the situation it presented changed, and changed in a way
^5^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
that was foreseeable, precise, and inevitable. We have
seen what these changes are: how profits fell, how capi¬
talists sought new machinery, how each boom ended in
a crash, how small businesses were absorbed in each
debacle by the larger finns. But all this was still within
the framework of an abstract world: now Marx applied
his findings on paper to the real world about him— the
actual world of capitalism, he said, must also display
these trends. ^
He called the trends the “laws of motion” of a capital¬
ist system— the path which capitalism would tread over
future time. And the astonishing fact is that almost all
these predictions have come true!
For profits do tend to fall in an enterprise economy.
The insight was not original with Marx, nor do profits
fall for the reason he gave— we can dispense with the
idea of exploitation contained in the theory of surplus
value. But as Adam Smith or Ricardo or Mill pointed
out— and as any businessman will vouchsafe— the pres¬
sures of competition and rising wages will serve quite
as well. Impregnable monopolies aside (and these are
few), profits are both the hallmark of capitalism and its
Achilles’ heel, for no business can ^permanently maintain
its prices much above its costs. There is only one way in
which profits can be perpetuated: a business— or an
entire economy— must grow.
But growth implies the second prediction of the Marxist
model: the ceaseless quest for new techniques. It was no
accident that industrial capitalism dates from the Indus¬
trial Revolution, for as Marx made clear, technological
progress is not merely an accompaniment of capitalism
but a vital ingredient. Business must innovate, invent,
and expeiiment if it is to survive; the business that
rests content on its past achievements is not long for this
enteiprising world. It is interesting to note that recently
one large chemical company announced that sixty per
cent of its income came from products that were un¬
known ten vears ago; and although this is an excep¬
tionally inventive industr\% the relationship between in¬
dustrial inventiveness and profitability generally holds.
153
THE INEXORABUE SYSTEM OF KARL MARX
The model showed still two more tendencies for cap¬
italism which have also come to pass. We hardly need
document the existence of business cycles over the past
hundred years nor the emergence of giant business en¬
terprise. But we might remark on the daring of Marxs
prediction. When Das Kapital appeared, bigness was the
exception rather than tlie rule and small enterprise still
ruled the roost. To claim that huge finns would come to
dominate the business scene was as starthng a predic¬
tion in 1867 as would be a statement today that fifty years
hence America will be a land in which small-scale pro¬
prietorships will have displaced giant corporations.
It was, all things considered, an extraordinary bit of
foresight. And note this; all these changes, vast and
portentous as they were, could not have been unearthed
purely by examining the world as it appeared to Marx’s
eyes. For these are historical changes, slow in their un¬
folding and stretched out over time; as real, but as un-
noticeable, as the growth of a tree. It was only by re¬
ducing the economic system to a microcosm and then by
obsei*ving that microcosm in its speeded-up life span that
this drift of the future could be apprehended.
It was not, of course, exact. Marx thought that profits
would not only fall loithin the business cycle, which they
do, but that they would display a long do\vnward secular
trend; this does not appear to have taken place. Marx
did not stop to consider that the economic particles with
which he played had feelings and volitions and con¬
sciences that could also change and that they would not
theiefore behave with the imperturbable predictability
of the particles under a chemist’s miscroscope. But for
all its shortcomings— and it is far from infallible, as we
shall see the Marxist model of how capitalism worked
was extraordinarily prophetic.
But everything that Marx had predicted so far was,
after all, innocuous. There remained the final prediction
of the model; for as the reader will remember, in the end
Marxs pure capitalism” collapsed.
Let it be said at the outset that this prediction as well
cannot be lightly bmshed aside. In Russia and Eastern
^54 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Europe capitalism has disappeared; in Scandinavia and
j has been partially abandoned; in Germany and
Italy It drifted mto fascism and emerged from its bath of
fire in less than perfect health. And while wars, brute po¬
litical power, exigencies of fate, and the determined
efforts of revolutionaries have aU contributed their share
the grim truth is that these changes occurred largely for
foresaw: capitalism broke doi^.
Why did it break down? Partly because it developed
the instability Marx said it would. A succession of busi-
ness crises compounded by a plague of wars, destroyed
the faith of the lower and middle elasses in the system.
But that is not the entire answer— we too have had our
wars and depressions, and capitahsm here is veiy much
alive. Something else spelled the difference between sur¬
vival and destruction: European capitalism failed not so
much for economic as for social reasons— and Marx pre-
dieted this too!
For Marx recognized that the economic difficulties of
the system were not insuperable. Although antimonopoly
legislation or antibusiness cycle policies were unknown in
Mai*x"s day, such activities were not inconceivable: there
was nothing inevitable in the physical sense about Marx's
vision. The Marxist prediction of decay was founded on
a conception of capitalism in which it was socially impos¬
sible for a government to set wrongs aright; intellectually,
ideologically, even emotionally impossible. The cure for
capitalism's failings would require that a government
would have to rise above the interests of one class alone
—and that, as Marx's doctrine of historical materialism
revealed, was to assume that men could free themselves
from the shackles of their immediate economic self-in¬
terest.
And it is just this lack of social flexibility, this bondage
to shortsighted interest, that weakened European cap¬
itahsm. For one who has read the works of Marx it is
friglitening to look back at the grim determination with
which so many nations steadfastly hewed to the very
course which he insisted would lead to their undoing. It
was as if their governments were unconsciously vindicat-
THE INEXORABLE SYSTEM OF KARL MARX 1$$
ing Marx’s prophecy by obstinately doing exactly what he
said they would. When in Russia under the Tsars all
democratic trade-unionism was ruthlessly stamped out,
when in England and Gennany monopohes and cartels
were officially encouraged, the Marxist dialectic looked
balefully prescient indeed. Until very recently, when
one considered that in France or Italy or Greece capital¬
ist governments could not collect taxes tliey levied on
tlieir own business communities, when one inspected the
enormous gulf between rich and poor and saw evidence
of the total indifference of the foimer for the latter, one
had the uneasy feeling that the psychological stereotypes
which Marx cast in his historical drama were all too
truly drawn from life.
And it is these veiy facts which give us the clue as to
why capitalism has survived in the United States. We
have had our share of reactionaries and revolutionaries.
The economic history of the United States contains more
than enough exploitation and ugliness. But capitalism
here nonetheless evolved in a land untouched by the dead
hand or aristocratic lineage and age-old class attitudes.
To some degree this resulted in a harsher social climate
in America tlian in Europe, for here we clung to the credo
of ‘^rugged individualism” long after the individual had
been hopelessly overwhelmed by the environment of
massive industrialism, whereas in Europe a traditional
noblesse oblige” existed side by side with its unconcealed
class divisions. Yet out of the American milieu came a
certain pragmatism in dealing with power, private as well
as public; an unstinting encouragement to enterprise,
whatever the social origins of its protagonist; and a gen¬
eral subscription to the ideals of democracy that steered
the body pohtic safely past the rocks on which it foun¬
dered in so many nations abroad.
It is in these attributes that the answer to Marxian
analysis lies. Marx was not so much ^^wrong” in his eco-
nomic vision as he was wrong in assuming that his psy¬
chological and sociological preconceptions were fixed
and unalterable. The economic laws of motion which his
model of capitalism revealed may still be visible in Amer-
^5^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
lean capitalism-indeed, they are-but they are faced
with a set of remedies which spring from political and
social attitudes quite beyond his imagination.
Some of these remedies arise from new attitudes and
values on the part of business itself. The rigid antilabor
stance of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century big
business has given way to a characteristically matter-of-
ract acceptance of unions by big corporations today. The
near-religious opposition to social-welfare policies found
among the old exponents of the philosophy of rugged
individualism has imperceptibly changed into the recog¬
nition (however grudging) that programs of social as¬
sistance are inescapable in the environment of twentieth-
centuiy urban life. In short, the attitudes of business have
proved to be as capable of enlightenment as the attitudes
of any other class, including (as Marx himself maintained
in the case of “neo-Malthusianism”) the working class.
Equally important, by way of countering the Marxian
argument, are changes in the role of government. As we
have seen, for Marx a government was inevitably the tool
of the ruling class, and as long as that class was openly
hostile to the working class, one could hardly expect the
government to be otherwise. But in the New World both
political and economic attitudes diverged from those of
mid-nineteentli-century Europe. On the one hand, while
capitalists fought their workers in America, they never
quite feared them as did capitalists in Europe. And on
the other hand, while government in America was often
tinctured with class interest, its democratic roots pre¬
vented it from ever becoming so tainted that it was no
longer capable of taking any action against the wishes
of the business community. Thus, capitalism in America
developed in a milieu of social consensus that brought
radically different results from those envisaged by Marx.
In retrospect we can see that capitalism was capable
of developing in many directions, just as communism is
today. Marx himself never contended that the underlying
structure of the economic system enjoined one and only
one kind of legal, political, and social supersti-ucture, but
rather that the economic undeipinnings rejoined limits
the inexorable system of KARL MARX 157
on the kind of superstructure that might be compatible
with them. Thus, capitalism could give rise to societies
as different— although 'structurally” similar— as the France
of Marcel Proust and the Germany of Thomas Mann not
to mention the United States of Sinclair Lewis and ot J. i .
Marquand. The tragedy is that for much of the world,
and especially for so much of the communist world,
the stei'eotypes of English capitalism of the 1850 s, with
its grasping, narrow-minded Manchester millowners
and its sodden and bitter working classes, is still taken as
the true likeness of capitalism everywhere.
But shorn of its overtones of inevitable doom, the
Maixist analysis cannot be disregarded. It remains the
gravest, most penetrating examination the capitalist sys¬
tem has ever undergone. It is not an examination con¬
ducted along moral lines with head-wagging and tongue-
clucking over the iniquities of the profit motive— this is
the stuff of the Marxist revolutionary but not of the
Marxist economist. For all its passion, it is a dispassion¬
ate appraisal and it is for this reason that its somber
findings must be soberly considered.
To repeat an earlier statement: it is with Karl Marx
the Revolutionary that the world has been preoccupied,
with Marxism as an expansive force and an intellectually
intolerant one. Certainly that is the immediate concern.
And yet it is not with Marx the Revolutionary that capi¬
talism must finally contend. When Khrushchev boasted
that communism would "bury” capitalism, it was not
military prowess but economic theory that gave him his
certitude. In the end the figure who must be proven
wrong is Mai*x the Economist, Mai*x the finicky scholar
who laboriously sought to prove, through the welter of
surface distraction, that the essence of capitalism is self-
destruction, The answer to Marx lies not so much in
pointing out the injustices of communism as in demon¬
strating that capitalism can continue to evolve and to
adapt its institutions to the never-satisfied demands of
social justice.
VII
The Victorian World
and the
Underworld of Economics
Karl Marx pronounced his sentence of doom on cap¬
italism in 1867; the system was diagnosed as the
victim of an incurable disease, and although no time¬
table was given, it was presumed to be close enough to
its final death stmggle for the next-of-kin— the Commu¬
nists— to listen avidly for the last gasp that would signal
their inheritance of power. Even before the appearance
of Das Kapital, the deathwatch had begun, and with
each bout of speculative fever or each siege of indus¬
trial depression, the hopeful drew nearer to the death¬
bed and told each other that the moment of Final Revo¬
lution would now be soon at hand.
But the system did not die. On the contrary, it seemed
to emerge from each attack of weakness with renewed
strength and to rebound from each crisis with a vigor
that dismayed the critics. True, many of the Marxist laws
of motion were amply verified by the march of events:
big business did grow bigger and recurrent depressions
and unemployment did plague society. But along with
these confirmations of the prognosis of doom, another
highly important and portentously phrased Marxist symp¬
tom was remarkable by its absence: the “increasing
misery” of the proletariat failed to increase.
158
VICTORIAN AVORUD— UNDERM^ORLD OF ECONOMICS 1 59
For Marx had believed that with the increasingly diffi¬
cult struggle of the system to maintain itself, tlie working
classes would be relentlessly ground underfoot, and that
when the final death throes of capitalism were at hand,
their revolutionary tempers would have snapped. With a
kind of grim justice, the cruelties of capitalism would
have brought into being its own executioner.
And that simply failed to happen. On the contrary, a
British Committee on Depression which convened to
look into the slump of 1886 reported that “there is no
feature in the situation which we have been called upon
to examine, as satisfactory as the immense improvement
which has taken place in the condition of the working
class.” And this was not just the patronizing cant of class
apologists: conditions were better, enormously better. In
1840, according to the calculations of Arnold Toynbee, the
wage of an ordinary laborer came to eight shillings a week,
while his family necessaries of hfe cost him fourteen
shillings; he made up the difference by begging, stealing,
sending his children to the mills, or simply by drawing
in his belt. But by 1875, although necessaries had gone
to fifteen shillings and a little over, his wages had nearly
drawn abreast. For the first time he was making enough
to keep body and soul together— a sorry commentary on
the past, but certainly a hopeful augury for the future.
And not only had wages gone up, but the very source
of suiplus value had diminished: hours were far shorter.
At the Jarrow Shipyards and the New Castle Chemical
Works, for example, the workweek had fallen from sixty-
one to fifty-four hours, while even in the sweated textile
mills, the stint was reduced to only fifty-seven hours.
Indeed the millowners complained that their wage costs
had risen by better than twenty per cent. But while
progress was expensive, it paid intangible dividends.
For as conditions ameliorated, the mutterings of 1848
died do^^. “You cannot get them to talk of politics so
long as they are well employed,” testified a Staffordshire
m^ufacturer on the attitude of his working force.
Engels had to recognize the trend,
he English proletariat is becoming more and more
i6o
THE WORIDLY PHILOSOPHERS
bourgeois,” mourned Engels in a letter to Marx, “so that
this most bourgeois of aU nations is apparently aiming
ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy
and a bourgeois proletariat as well as a bourgeoisie!"
Clearly, Marx was premature in his pronoimcement of
impending doom. For the Faithful, of course, the un¬
expected turn of events could be swallowed in the com¬
forting knowledge that “inevitable” still meant inevitable,
and that a matter of a generation or two came to little in
the grand march of history. But for the non-Marxist
surveyors of the scene, the great Victorian boom meant
something else. The world again appeared full of hope
and promise and the forebodings of a dissenter like Karl
Marx seemed merely the ravings of a discontented radi¬
cal. Hence the great intellectual bombshell that Marx
had prepared went off in almost total silence; instead of
a storm of abuse, Marx met the far more crushing igno¬
miny of indifference.
For economics had ceased to be the proliferation of
world views which now in the hands of a philosopher,
now a stockbroker, now a revolutionary seemed to illu¬
minate the whole avenue down which society was march¬
ing. It became instead the special province of professors
whose investigations threw out pinpoint beams rather
than the wide-searching beacons of the earlier economists.
There was a reason for this: as we have seen, Victorian
England had caught the steady trade winds of late-
nineteenth-century progress and optimism. Improvement
was in the air, and so quite naturally there seemed less
cause to ask disturbing questions about the nature of
the voyage. Hence the Victorian boom gave rise to a
roster of elucidators, men who would examine the work¬
ings of the system in greatest detail, but not to men who
would express doubt as to its basic merits or make trouble¬
some prognostications as to its eventual fate. In the new
professordom, men like Alfred Marshall, Stanley Jevons,
John Bates Clark, Leon Walras, Taussig, Menger-a
whole faculty of economists— took over the main line of
economic thought. Their contributions were often im¬
portant, yet they were not vital. Perhaps this was because
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERW'ORLD OF ECONOMICS l6l
there were no wolves in the world of economic theory
any more. There were only obedient, if imaginary, sheep.
The sheep were never more clearly delineated than in
a little volume entitled Mathematical Psychics which ap¬
peared in 1881, just two years before Marx died. It was
not written by the greatest of the academicians, but
perhaps by the most revealing of them— a strange, shy
professor named Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, a nephew
of that Maria Edgeworth who had once played charades
with Ricardo.
Edgeworth was undoubtedly a brilliant scholar. In his
final examinations at Oxford, when he was asked a
particularly abstruse question, he inquired of his exam¬
iners, “Shall I answer briefly, or at length?'" and then
proceeded to hold forth for half an hour, punctuating
his reply with excursions into Greek and the differential
calculus, while his examiners gaped.
But Edgeworth was not fascinated with economics
because it justified or explained or condemned the world,
or because it opened new vistas, bright or gloomy, into
the future. This odd soul was fascinated because eco¬
nomics dealt with quantities and because anything which
dealt with quantities could be translated into mathemat¬
ics! The process of translation required the abandonment
of that tension-fraught world of the earlier economists,
but it yielded in return a world of such neat precision and
lovely exactness that the loss seemed amply compensated.
To build up such a mathematical mirror of reality, the
woild obviously had to be simplified. Edgeworth's sim¬
plification was this assumption: every man is a pleasure-
machine. Jeremy Bentham had originated the conception
in the early nineteenth centuiy under the beguiling title
of the Felicific Calculus, a philosophical view of human¬
ity as so many living profit-and-Ioss calculators, each
busi y arranging his life to maximize the pleasure of his
psychic adding machine. To this general philosophy Edge-
worth now added the precision of mathematics to produce
a kind of economic paradise.
Of all men to have adopted such a view of mankind,
Edgeworth seems a most unlikely choice. He himself
162
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
was as ill-constructed a pleasure-machine as can be im-
apned. Neurotically shy, he tended to flee from the
pleasures p human company to the presumably less
pleasuie-filled confines of his club; unhappy about the
burden of material tilings, he received few of the pleas¬
ures which for mpt people flow from possessions His
rooms were bare his fibrary was the public one, and his
stock of material wealth did not include crockery, or
stationeiy, or even stamps. Perhaps his greatest source
of pleasure was m the construction of his lovely imaginary
economic Xanadu. ^
But regardless of his motives, Edgeworths pleasure-
machine assumption bore wonderful intellectual fruit.
Foi if economics was defined to be the study of human
pleasure-mechanisms competing for shares of society’s
stock of pleasure, then it could be shown— with all the
inefutability of the differential calculus — that in a world
of perfect competition each pleasure-machine would
achieve the liighest amount of pleasure that could be
meted out by society.
In other words, this was the best of all possible worlds
—or more accurately, it could be. Unfortunately, the
world was not organized as a game of perfect competi¬
tion; men did have the lamentable habit of sticking
together in foolish disregard of the beneficent conse¬
quences of stubbornly following their self-interest: trade-
unions, for example, were in direct controversion to the
principles of each for himself, and the undeniable fact
of inequalities of wealth and position did make the
starting position of the game something less than abso¬
lutely neutral.
But never mind, said Edgeworth. Nature has taken
care of that, too. While trade-unions might gain in the
short run through combination, it could be shown that
in the long run they must lose— they were only a re¬
grettable impei*fection in the ideal scheme of things. And
if high birth and great wealth seemed at first to prejudice
the outcome of the economic game, that could be re¬
conciled with mathematical psychics, too. For while all
men were pleasure-machines, some men were better
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 163
pleasure-machines than others. Men, for example, were
better equipped to run up their psychic bank accounts
than women, and the delicate sensibihties of the ‘'aristoc¬
racy of skill and talent” were more responsive to the
pleasures of good living than the clodlike pleasure-ma¬
chines of the laboring classes. Hence, the calculus of
human mathematics could still function advantageously;
indeed it positively justified those divisions of sex and
status which one saw about him in the hving world.
But mathematical psychics did more than rationalize
the tenets of conservatism. Edgeworth actually believed
that his algebraic insight into human activity might yield
helpful results in the world of flesh and blood. As he
wrote his book, a bloody stioiggle was going on between
the landlords and Irish peasants, and Edgeworth looked
into the matter in a chapter entitled “The Present Crisis
in Ireland.” His analysis involved such tenns as these:
dy _
dx2
^ dr dir / d^ir \
dx dy \ dxdy /
0‘Tr
dx^
“Considerations so abstract,” wrote Edgeworth, “it
would of course be ridiculous to fling upon the floodtide
of piactical politics. But they are not perhaps out of
place when we remount to the little rills of sentiment
and secret springs of motive where every course of action
must be originated.”
A j ^ sentiment,” indeed! What would
Adarn Smith have thought of this conversion of his pushy
merchants his greedy joumeymen, and his multiplying
categories of effete pleasure-
Edgeworths and a disciple of J. S. Mill, angrily^ an¬
nounced that he did not eat his dinner because he had
toted up the satisfactions to be gained therefrom but
because he was hungry. But there was no use protesting-
the scheme of mathematical psychics was so neft fo
aS'l'n "if’ troublesome human intransigences
nd so happily unbesmirched with considerations of hu-
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
164
man stiiviiig and. social conflict, that its success was
immediate.
Edgeworth’s was not the only such attempt to de¬
humanize political economy. Even during Marx’s lifetime
a whole mathematical school of economics had grov\m up.
In Gei-many an economist named von Thiinen came up
with a formula which yielded, he claimed, the precise
just wage of labor:
V a . p
Von Thiinen liked it well enough to have it engraved
on his tombstone; we do not know what the workingmen
thought of it. In France a distinguished economist named
Leon Walras proved that one could deduce by math¬
ematics the exact prices which would just exactly clear
the market: of course, in order to do tliis one had to have
the equation for every single economic good on the
market and then the ability to solve a problem in which
the number of equations would run into the hundreds of
thousands. But never mind the difficulties; the problem
could theoretically be done. At the University of Man¬
chester, a professor named W. Stanley Jevons wrote a
textbook on economics (it is suggestive that political
economy was now called economics, and that its exposi¬
tions were now texts ) in which general depressions were
dismissed as ‘‘evidently absurd and self-contradictory and
the stmggle for existence was reduced to “a Calculus of
Pleasure and Pain.” “My theory of Economics ... is
purely mathematical in character, wrote Jevons, and he
turned out of his focus eveiy aspect of economic life
which was not reducible to the jigsaw precision of his
scheme.
It was not all foolishness, although certainly much of
it was. Economics, after all, does concern the actions of
aggregates of people, and human aggregates, like ag¬
gregates of atoms, do tend to conform to statistical mles
and the laws of probability. The mathematical school
did unearth points of interest which the earlier econ¬
omists, with their eyes on the horizon, had hurried over.
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS l6$
But the trouble was, the psychic mathematicians too
forgot that the rules of behavior which underlay their
equations were convenient assumptions rather than actu¬
ally observed activity. They built a kind of ideal menag¬
erie, in which, as it were, intelligent monkeys weie
taught to count, given money, and set up in business
for themselves. While the official observers were busy
predicting the resultant price for bananas, they forgot to
ask whether trained monkeys in the zoo really behaved
hke tlieir unrestrained cousins in the jungle.
There were exceptions, of course. Leon Wah'as, the
French economist who was fascinated by the mathemat¬
ical analysis of markets, did not fall into the tempting
error of mistaking his arithmetic for the world. While he
developed his equations— far too complex to be solved in
actuality— he was careful to stress that this was a tool, a
metliod of inquiry, and not a statement of things as they
actually were or should be. In point of fact, Walras was
an agrarian Socialist and a proponent of ideas far more
radical than his dignified counterparts in tlie British Isles.
For him— and for the later generations of economists who
would profit by his work— mathematics was an avenue
for unravehng such recurrent but elusive words as “equi-
hbrium,” and not a mere game to be played for the
intellectual hurdles it presented.
But Walras was the exception. For the most part, the
official world saw humanity as so many accountants
constantly engaged in the careful calculation of their
behavior into debits of pain and credits of pleasure.
Whether such palhd motives were sufficient to describe
and account for the turbulent past or even the placid
present was a question which did not seem to matter.
And so, as a counterpart to this pale world of equations,
an underworld of economics flourished. There had always
been such an underworld, a strange limbo of cranks and
heretics, whose docti*ines had failed to attain the stature
of respectabihty. One such was Bernard Mandeville who
had shocked the eighteenth century with a witty demon-
sti'ation that virtue was vice and vice viiiaie. Mandeville
merely pointed out that the profligate expenditure of the
i66
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Sinful rich gave work to the poor, while the stingy recti-
hrde of the virtuous penny pincher did not; hence, said
Mandeville, pnvate immorality may redound to the public
welfare, whereas private uprightness may be a social
burden. The sophisticated lesson of this Fable of the Bees
was too much for the eighteenth century to swallow;
Mandeville s book was convicted as a pubhc nuisance by
a grand jury in Middlesex in 1723, and Mandeville him¬
self was thus consigned to economic limbo.
But whereas the earher eccentrics and charlatans were
largely banished by the opinions of some sturdy thinker
hke Smith or Ricardo, now the underworld claimed its
recruits for a different reason. There was simply no longer
any room in the oflScial world of economics for those who
wanted to take the whole burly gamut of human behavior
for their forum, and there was little tolerance in the
stuffy world of Victorian correctness for those whose
diagnosis of society left room for moral doubtings or
seemed to indicate the need for radical reform.
And so the underworld took on new life. Marx went
there because his doctrine was unpleasant and full of
the kind of behavior which would never do in a well-
mannered zoo. Malthus went there because his idea of
“general gluts” was an arithmetical absurdity and because
his doubts about the benefits of saving were totally at
variance with the Victorian admiration for thrift. The
Utopians went there because what they were talking
about was arrant nonsense and wasn’t “economics” any¬
way, and finally anyone went there whose doctrine failed
to accord with the dry and elegant world which the
academicians erected in their classrooms and fondly
believed existed outside them.
It was a far more interesting place, this underworld,
than the serene realms above. It abounded with wonder¬
ful personalities and in it sprouted a weird and luxuriant
tangle of ideas. There was, for example, a man who has
been almost forgotten in the march of economic idea^
He is Frederic Bastiat, a delightful Frenchman, who hyed
from 1801 to 1850, and who in that short space of time
and an even shorter space of hterary life— six years—
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 167
brought to bear on economics that most devastating of
all weapons, ridicule. Look at this madhouse of a world,
says Bastiat. It goes to enormous efforts to tunnel under¬
neath a mountain in order to connect two countries. And
then what does it do? Having labored mightily to facili¬
tate the interchanges of goods, it sets up customs guards
on both sides of the mountain and makes it as difficult
as possible for merchandise to travel through the tunnel!
Bastiat had a gift for pointing out absurdities; his little
book Economic Sophisms is as close to humor as eco¬
nomics has ever come. When, for example, the Paris-
Madrid raihoad was being debated in tlie French As¬
sembly, one M. Simiot argued that it should have a gap
at Bordeaux, because a break in the line there would
redound greatly to the wealth of the Bordeaux porters,
commissionaires, hotelkeepers, bargemen, and the like,
and thus, by emiching Bordeaux, would enrich France.
Bastiat seized on the idea with avidity. Fine, he said, but
let s not stop at Bordeaux alone. 'If Bordeaux has a right
to profit by a gap . . . then Angouleme, Poitiers, Tours,
Orleans . . . should also demand gaps as being for the
general interest. ... In this way we shall succeed in
having a railway composed of successive gaps, and which
may be denominated a Negative Railway’*
Bastiat was a wit in the world of economics, but his
private life was tragic. Bom in Bayonne, he was orphaned
at an early age and, worse yet, contracted tuberculosis of
the lungs. He studied at a university, and then tried
business, but he had no head for commercial details. He
turned to agriculture, but he fared equally badly there;
like Tolstoi s well-meaning count, the more he interfered
in the running of his family estate, the worse it did. He
dreamed of heroism, but his military adventures had a
Don Quixote twist: when the Bourbons were mn out of
Fiance in 1830, Bastiat rounded up six hundred young
men and led them to storm a royalist citadel, regardless
of cost. Poor Bastiat-the foili’ess meekly hauled down
its flag and invited everyone in for a feast instead.
^ It seemed that he was doomed to disappointment. But
his enfoiced idleness turned his interests to economics
i68
THE WOKEDLY PHILOSOPHERS
and he began to read and discuss the topics of the day.
A neighboring country gentleman urged him to put his
ideas on paper and Bastiat wrote an article on free trade
and sent it in to a Parisian journal. His thoughts were
original and his style wonderfully sharp. The article was
printed and overnight this mild scholar of the provinces
was famous.
He came to Paris. “He had not had time to call in the
assistance of a Parisian hatter and tailor” writes M. de
Molinari, and with his long hair, his tiny hat, his ample
frock-coat and his family umbrella, you would have been
apt to mistake him for an honest peasant who came to
town for the first time to see the metropolis.”
But the country scholar had a pen that bit. Every day
he read the Paris papers in which the deputies and
ministers of France argued for and defended their policies
of selfishness and blind self-interest; then he would
answer with a rejoinder that rocked Paris with laughter.
For example, when the Chamber of Deputies in the
1840's legislated higher duties on all foreign goods in
order to benefit French industiy, Bastiat turned out this
masterpiece of economic satire:
PETITION OF THE MANUFACTURERS OF
CANDLES, WAXLIGHTS, LAMPS, CANDLE¬
STICKS, STREET LAMPS, SNUFFERS, EXTIN¬
GUISHERS, AND OF THE PRODUCERS OF
OIL, TALLOW, RESIN, ALCOHOL, AND GEN¬
ERALLY EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH
LIGHTING
To Messieurs the Members of the Chamber of
Deputies
Gentlemen,
. . . We are suffering from the intolerable competition
of a foreign rival, placed, it would seem, in a con¬
dition so far superior to our own for the production
of light, that he absolutely inundates our national
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 10(
market with it at a price fabulously reduced. . . .
This rival ... is no other than the sun.
What we pray for, is, that it may please you to pass a
law ordering the shutting up of all windows, sky¬
lights, dormer-windows, outside and inside shutters,
curtains, blinds, bull’s-eyes; in a word of all openings,
holes, chinks, and fissures.
... If you shut up as much as possible all access to
natural light and create a demand for artificial light,
which of our French manufacturers will not benefit
by it?
... If more tallow is consumed, then there must be
more oxen and sheep ... if more oil is consumed,
then we shall have extended cultivation of the poppy,
of the olive . . . , our heaths will be covered with
resinous ti'ees.
Make your choice, but be logical; for as long as you
exclude, as you do, iron, com, foreign fabrics, in
propoHion as their prices approximate to zero, what
inconsistency it would be to admit the light of the
sun, the price of which is already at zero during the
entire day!
A more effective— if fantastic— defense of free trade has
never been written. But it was not only against protective
tariffs that Bastiat protested: this man laughed at every
form of economic double-thinking. In 1848, when the
Socialists began to propound their ideas for the salvation
of society with more regard for passion than practicability,
Bastiat turned against them the same weapons that he had
used against the ancien regime, ^‘Everyone wants to live
at the expense of the state, ’ he wrote, *^They forget that
the state lives at the expense of everyone.”
But his special target, his most hated “sophism,” was
the rationalization of private greed under the pretentious
cover of a protective tariff erected for the “national good.”
How he loved to demolish the specious thinking that
lyo
the worldly philosophers
argued for barriers to trade under the euise of ^
the duty on imported cloth to “protect" the French
workingman, Bastiat replied with this delicious paradox
Pass a law to this effect," wrote Bastiat to the Minister
of Commerce. No one shall henceforth be permitted to
employ any beams or rafters but such as are produced and
foshioned by blunt hatchets. . . . Whereas at present we
give a hundred blows of the axe, we shall then give three
Imndred. The work which we now do in an hour will
then require three hours. What a powerful encourage¬
ment will thus be given to labor! . . . Whoever shall
henceforth desire to have a roof to cover him must comply
with our exactions, just as at present whoever desires
Clothes to his back must comply with yours.”
His criticisms, for all their penetrating mockery, met
with little practical success. He went to England to’meet
the leaders of the free-trade movement there and returned
to organize a free-trade association in Paris. It lasted
only eighteen months— Bastiat was never any good as
an organizer.
But 1848 was now at hand and Bastiat was elected to
the National Assembly. By then the danger seemed to
him the other extreme— that men would pay too much
attention to the imperfections of the system and would
blindly choose socialism in its stead. He began a book
entitled Economic Harmonies in which he was to show
that the apparent disorder of the world was a disorder of
the surface only; that underneath, the impetus of a
thousand different self-seeking agents became transmuted
in the market place into a higher social good. But his
health was now disastrously bad. He could barely breathe
and his face was livid with the ravages of his disease.
He moved to Pisa where he read in the papers of his own
death and of the commonplace expressions of regret
which accompanied it: regret at the passing of “the great
economist,” the “illustrious author.” He wrote a friend:
“Thank God I am not dead. I assure you I should breathe
my last without pain and almost wish joy if I were
certain of leaving to the friends who love me, not poi-
VICTORIAK WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS I7I
gnant regrets, but a gentle, affectionate, somewhat melan¬
choly remembrance of me/’ He struggled to finish his
book before he himself should be finished. But it was too
late. In 1850 he passed away, whispering at the end
something that the listening priest thought was “Truth,
truth . . /’
He is a very small figure in the economic constellation.
He was not a fanatic, not a crusading reformer, not even
a major system-builder. His function, it seems, was to
prick the pomposities of his time; but beneath the raillery
and the wit lies the more distmbing question: does the
system always make sense? Are there paradoxes wheie the
public and private weals collide? Can we trust the auto¬
matic mechanism of private interest when it is perverted
at every turn by the far from automatic mechanism of
the political structure it erects?
The questions were never squarely faced in the Elysian
fields above. The work of J. S. Mill was now the Bible
and the official world of economics took httle notice of
the paradoxes proposed by its jester. Instead it sailed
serenely on toward the development of the quantitative
niceties of a pleasure-seeking world and the questions
raised by Bastiat remained unanswered. Certainly mathe¬
matical psychics was hardly the tool with which to unlock
the dilemma of the Negative Railway and the Blunt
Hatchet; Stanley Jevons, who with Edgeworth was the
gieat proponent of making economics a “science,” ad¬
mitted, About politics, I confess myself in a fog.” Un¬
fortunately, he was not alone.
And so the underworld continued to prosper. In 1879 it
gained an American recruit, a bearded, gentle, fiercely
self-sure man, who said that “Political Economy ... as
currently taught is hopeless and despairing. But this [is]
because she has been degraded and shackled; her tmths
dislocated; her harmonies ignored; the word she would
utter gagged in her mouth, and her protest against wrong
turned into an indorsement of injustice.” And that was
not all. For this heretic not only maintained that econo¬
mics had failed to see the answer to the riddle of poverty
172
PHILOSOPHERS
although it was clearly laid out before her eves but tbnt
Told to on-
which poets have sung and high-raised seers ha ve^ told
'a “ culmination of Cliristianity-
Ae c ty of God with its wahs of jasper and its gates^ of
in ^fhl Henry George. No wonder he was
m the underworld, for his early career must certainly
have seemed an uncouth preparation for serious thinking
to the cloistered keepers of the true doctiine. Hemy
George had been everything in life: adventurer, gold
prospector, worker, sailor, compositor, joumahst, govern-
ment bureaucrat, and lecturer. He had never even gone
to college; at thirteen he had left school to sliip out as
foremast boy on the 586-ton Hindoo bound for Austraha
and Calcutta. At a time when his contemporaries were
learning Latin, he had bought a pet monkey and watched
a man fall from die rigging, and become a thin, intense,
independent boy with a wanderlust. Back from the
East, he tried a job in a printing firm in his home town of
Philadelphia, and then at nineteen; shipped out again,
this time to California, with the thought of gold in mind.
Before he left, he rated himself on a phrenological
chart:
Amativeness . large
Philoprogenitiveness . moderate
Adhesiveness . large
Inhabitiveness . large
Concentrativeness . small
And so on, with a rating of ‘"full” on Alimentativeness,
“small” on Acquisitiveness, "large” on Self-esteem, and
“small” on Mirthfulness. It was not a bad estimate in
some respects— although it is odd to see Caution rated
“large,” for when George reached San Francisco in 1858
he skipped ashore, although he had signed on for a year,
and headed for Victoria and gold. He found gold-but it
was fool’s gold, and he decided the life at sea was the
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS I73
life for him after all. Instead— his bump of Concentrative-
ness being small— he became a typesetter in a San Fran¬
cisco shop, then a weigher in a rice mill, then, in his own
words, “a tramp.” Another trek to the gold fields was
equally unrewarding, and he returned to San Francisco
impoverished.
He met Annie Fox, and she appealed to his Amative¬
ness. He eloped with her; she was a seventeen-year-old
innocent and he a handsome young lad with a Bill Cody
mustache and pointed beard. The trusting young Miss
Fox took with her a bulky package on her secret marriage
flight; the young adventurer thought it might be jewels,
but it turned out to be only the Household Book of Poetry
and other volumes.
There followed years of the most wi*etched poverty.
Henry George was an odd-job printer and work was hard
to come by and ill-paid at best. When Annie had her
second child, George wrote: ‘T walked along the street
and made up my mind to get money from the first man
whose appearance might indicate he had it to give. I
stopped a man-a stranger-and told him I wanted $5.
He asked me what I wanted it for. I told him my wife
was confined and that I had nothing to give her to eat.
He gave me the money. If he had not, I think I was
desperate enough to have killed him.”
Now-at age twenty-six-he began to \vrite. He landed
a job in the composing room of the San Francisco Times
and sent a piece upstams to Noah Brooks, the editor
Brooks suspected tiiat the boy had copied it, but when
nothmg resembling it appeared in any of the other news¬
papers for several days he printed it, and then went
do%vnstairs to look for George. He found him, a slight
young man rather undersized, standing on a board to
u f ’ ^™sadmg journal. George began to
the CWne?e1?^**r''® interest ;\bout
d-grabbmg of the railroads, and the machinations of
^74 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Ae local trusts. He wrote a long letter to J. S Mill in
France on the immigration question and was graced with
a long affarmative reply. And in between his newly found
pohtical interest he had time for ventures in the best
jovmalistic tradition: when tlie ship Sunrise came to town
^ j hushed-up story about a captain and mate who
had hounded their crew until two men had leaped over¬
board to then- death, George and the Fast ferreted out
tlie story and brought the officers to justice.
^®wspaper was sold, and Henry George wangled
hunself a political sinecure-inspector of Gas Meters. It
was not that he wanted a life of leisure; rather, he had
begun to read the great economists and his central interest
was now clearly formed-aheady he was a kind of local
authority. He needed time to study and to write and to
dehver lectures to the working classes on the ideas of
the great Mill.
When the University of Galifomia established a chair
of political economy, he was widely considered as a strong
candidate for the post. But to qualify he had to deliver
a lecture before faculty and students and George was rash
enough to /oice such sentiments as tliis: “The name of
political economy has been constantly invoked against
every effort of the working classes to increase their
wages,” and then to compound the shock he added:
“For the study of political economy, you need no special
knowledge, no extensive library, no costly laboratory.
You do not even need text-books nor teachers, if you
will but think for yourselves.”
That was the beginning and die end of his academic
career. A more suitable candidate was foimd for the post
and George went back to pamplileteering and study. And
then suddenly, “in daylight and in a city street, there came
to me a thought, a vision, a call— give it what name you
please. ... It was that that impelled me to write Progress
and Poverty and that sustained me when else I should
have failed. And when I had finished the last page, in
the dead of night, when I was entirely alone, I flung my¬
self on my knees and wept like a child.”
As might be e.xpected, it was a book written from the
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 1 7 5
heart, a cry of mingled protest and hope. And as might
also be expected, it suflFered from too much passion and
too httle professorial circumspection. But what a contrast
to the dull texts of the day— no wonder the guardians
of economics could not seriously consider an argument
which was couched in such a style as this:
Take now . . . some hard-headed business man, who
has no theories, but knows how to make money. Say
to him: “Here is a little village; in ten years it will
be a great city— in ten years the raihoad will have
taken the place of the stage coach, tlie electric light
of the candle; it will abound with all the macliineiy
and improvements that so enormously multiply the
effective power of labor. Will, in ten years, interest
be any higher?”
He will teU you, “Nol”
“Will the wages of common labor be any higher. . . ?”
He will tell you, “No, the wages of common labor
will not be any higher. . .
“What, then, will be higher?”
“Rent the value of land. Go, get yourself a piece of
ground, and hold possession.”
A^d if, under such circumstances, you take liis ad¬
vice, you need do nothing more. You may sit down
and smoke yo^ pipe; you may lie around like the
lazzawni of Naples or the hperos of Mexico- you
may go up m a balloon or down a hole in the ground-
and without doing one stroke of work, without add’
y ill be nchl In the new city you may have a
176 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
We need not spell out the whole emotionally charged
argument: the crux of it hes in this passage. Henry George
is outraged at the spectacle of men whose incomes—
sometimes fabulous incomes-derive not from the services
they have rendered the community, but merely from the
fact that they have had the good fortune to hold ad¬
vantageously situated soil.
Ricardo, of course, saw all this long before him. But
at best, Ricardo had only claimed that the tendency of
a growing society to enrich the holders of its land would
redound to the misfortune of the capitalist. To Henry
George, this was only the entering wedge. The injustice
of rents not only robbed the capitalist of his honest profit
but weighed on the shoulders of the workingman as well.
More damaging yet, he found it to be the cause of those
industrial ‘"paroxysms,” as he called them, wliich from
time to time shook society to its roots.
The argument was not too clearly delineated. Pri¬
marily it rested on the fact that since rent was assumed
from the start to be a kind of social extortion, naturally
it represented an unfair distribution of produce to land¬
lords at the expense of workers and industrialists. And
as for the paroxysms— well, George was convinced that
rent led inevitably to wild speculation in land values (as
indeed it did on tlie West Coast) and just as inevitably
to an eventual collapse which would bring the rest of
the structure of prices tumbling down beside it.
Having discovered the true causes of poverty and the
fundamental check to progress, it was simple for George
to propose the remedy. It would consist of one single
massive tax on land, a tax which would absorb all rents.
And then, with the cancer removed from the body of
society, the millennium could be allowed to come. The
single tax would not only dispense with the need for all
other kinds of taxes, but in abolishing rent it would
“raise wages, increase the earnings of capital, extirpate
pauperism, abolish poverty, give remunerative employ¬
ment to whoever wishes it, afford free scope to human
powers, purify government, and carry civilization to yet
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDER'W'ORLD OF ECONOMICS I77
nobler heights.” It would be— there is no other word—
the ultimate panacea.
It is an elusive tliesis when we seek to evaluate it. Of
course it is naive, and the equation of rent with sin could
only have occurred to someone as messianic as George
himself. Similarly, to put the blame for industrial depres¬
sions on land speculation is to blow up one small aspect
of an expanding economy quite out of proportion to
reality: land speculations can be troublesome, but severe
depressions have taken place in countries where land
values were anything but inflated.
No, we need not linger here. But when we come to
the central body of the thesis, we must pause. For while
George's mechanical diagnosis is superficial and faulty,
his basic criticism of society is a moral and not a mechan¬
istic one. Why, asks Henry George, should rent exist?
Why should a man benefit merely from the brute fact
of ownership, when he may render no services to the
community in exchange? We may justify the rewards of
an industrialist by describing his profits as the prize for
his foresight and ingenuity, but where is the foresight of a
man whose grandfather owned a pasture on which, two
generations later, society saw fit to erect a skyscraper?
The question is provocative, but it is not so easy to
condemn the institution of rent out of hand. For land¬
lords are not the only passive beneficiaries of the growth
of society. The stockholder in an expanding company,
the workman whose productivity is enhanced by tech¬
nical progress, the consumer whose real income rises as
the nation prospers, all these are also beneficiaries of
communal advancement. The unearned gains which
accrue to a well-situated landlord are enjoyed in different
forms by all of us. The problem is not just that of rents,
but of all unearned income, and while this may be a
serious problem, it cannot be adequately approached
through land ownership alone.
And then the problem is not so drastic as it was viewed
by Henry George. A vast body of rents goes to small
landholders, farmers, homeowners, modest citizens. And
even in the monopolistic area of rental incomes-in the
lyo
the worldly philosophers
real-estate operations of a metropoHs-a shifting and
fluid market is m operation. Rents are not frozen in
archaic feudal patterns, but constantly pass from hand
praS s'lifflce ? appraised and reap-
United States has shrunk from six per cent of the national
mcome in 1929 to only three pef cent in the S’s
But no matter whether the thesis held together logically
OT whether its moral condemnation was fully justified.
The book sl^ck a tremendously responsive chord. Pro¬
cess and Poverty became a best seller and overnight
Henry George was catapulted into national prominence.
1 consider Progress and Poverty as the book of this half-
century, said the reviewer in the San Francisco Argo-
rmut, and the New York Tribune claimed that it had
no equal since the pubHcation of the Wealth of Nations
by Adam Smith. Even those publications like the Ex¬
aminer and Chronicle, which called it “the most per¬
nicious treatise on political economy that has been
published for many a day," only served to enhance its
fame.
George went to England; he returned after a lecture
tour an international figure. He was drafted to run for
mayor of New York and in a three-cornered race he beat
Theodore Roosevelt and only narrowly lost to the Tam¬
many candidate.
The single tax was a religion to him now. He organized
Land and Labor Clubs and lectured to enthusiastic
audiences here and in Great Britain. A friend asked him,
“Does this not mean war? Can you, unless dealing with
craven conditions among men, hope to take land away
from its owners without war?” “I do not see,” said George,
“that a musket need be fired. But if necessary, war be it,
then. There was never a holier cause. No, never a
hoUer causel”
“Here was the gentlest and kindest of men,” comments
his friend, James Russell Taylor, “who would shrink from
a gun fired in anger, ready for universal war rather than
that his gospel should not be accepted. It was the courage
. . . which makes one a majority.”
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS I79
Needless to say, the whole doctrine was anathema to
the world of respectable opinion. A Catholic priest who
had associated himself with George in his mayoralty
fight was temporarily excommunicated; the Pope himself
addressed an encyclical to the land question and when
George sent liim an elaborately printed and bound re¬
ply, it was ignored. “I will not insult my readers by
discussing a project so steeped in infamy,’’ wrote General
Francis A. Walker, a leading professional economist in
the United States; but while officialdom looked at his
book with shock or with amused contempt, the man
himself struck home to his audience. Progress and Poverty
sold more copies than all the economic texts previously
published in the country; in England, his name became
a household word. Not only that, but the import of his
ideas— albeit usually in watered form— became part of
the heritage of men like Woodrow Wilson, John Dewey,
Louis Brandeis. Indeed there is a devoted following of
Henry George’s still active today.
In 1897, old, unwell but still indomitable, he pennitted
himself to be drafted for a second mayoralty race, know¬
ing full well that the strain of the campaign might be
too much for his failing heart. It was; he was called
‘marauder,” “assailant of other people’s right,” “apostle
of anarchy and destruction,” and he did die, on the eve
of the election. His funeral was attended by thousands.
He was a religious man; let us hope that his soul went
straight to heaven. As for his reputation— that went
straight into the undeiworld of economics and there he
exists today; almost-Messiah, semicrackpot, and disturb¬
ing questioner of the morality of our world.
But something else was going on in the underworld,
something more important than Henry George’s fulmina-
bons against rent and his ecstatic vision of a City of God
to be built on the foundation of the single tax. A new and
vigorous spii-it was sweeping England and the Continent
and even the United States, a spirit which manifested
Itself in the proliferation of such slogans as “The Anglo-
Saxon race is infallibly destined to be the predominant
i8o
the worldly philosophers
force in the history and civilization of the world.” The
spirit ^^^s not coined to England; across the Channel,
Victor Hugo declared, “France is needed by humanity”;
m Russia the spokesman for absolutism, Konstantin
Fobyedonostsev, proclaimed that Russia’s freedom from
the taint of Western decadence had given her the acco¬
lade of leadership for the East. In Germany the Kaiser
was explainmg how der alte Gott was on theii* side, and
in the New World Theodore Roosevelt was making him-
selt the American spokesman for a similar philosophy.
The age of imperialism had begun, and the map makers
were busy changing the colors which denoted the owner¬
ship of the darker continents. Between 1870 and 1898
Britain added 4 million square miles and 88 million
people to its empiie; France gained nearly the same area
of territory with 40 milhon souls attached; Gemany
won a million miles and 16 million colonials; Belgium
took 900,000 miles and 30 million people; even Portugal
joined the race with 800,000 miles of new lands and 9
million inhabitants.
In tmth, three generations had changed the face of
the earth. But more than that, they had witnessed an
equally remarkable change in the attitude with which
the West viewed that process of change. In the days of
Adam Smith, it will be remembered, the Scots philosopher
regarded with scorn the attempts of merchants to play
the role of kings, and he urged the independence of the
American colonies. And Smith’s contempt for colonies
was widely shared: James Mill, the father of John Stuart
Mill, called the colonies “a vast system of outdoor relief
for the upper classes,” and even Disraeli in 1852 had put
himself on record as believing that “these wretched
colonies are millstones around our necks.”
But now all this had changed. Britain had acquired
her empire, as it had frequently been remarked, in a fit
of absent-mindedness, but absent-mindedness was re¬
placed by single-mindedness as the pace of imperialism
accelerated. Lord Rosebery epitomized the sentiment of
the day when he called the British Empire the greatest
secular agency for good the world has ever known.’
VICTOBIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS l8l
‘Tes/' said Mark Twain, watching a Jubilee procession
for Queen Victoria which proudly displayed the pomp
of England’s possessions, "the English are mentioned m
Scripture— ‘Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit
the earth.’” ^ ,
By most people, the race for empire was approvingly
regarded. In England, Kiphng was its poet laureate, and
the popular sentiment was that of the music-hall song:
We don’t want to fight, but by jingo if we do,
We’ve got the ship, we’ve got the men,
we’ve got the money tool
Another, rather different nod of approval came from those
who agreed with Sir Charles Crossthwaite that the real
question between Britain and Siam was “who was to get
the trade with them, and how we could make the most
of them, so as to find fresh markets for our goods and
also employment for those superfluous articles of the
present day, our boys.”
And then, too, the process of empire building brought
with it prosperity for the empire builders. No small part
of the gain in working-class conditions which had so
pleased the Committee on Depression was the result of
sweated labor overseas: the colonies were now the
proletariat’s proletariat. No wonder imperialism was a
popular policy.
Thioughout all of this, the oflBcialdom of economics
stood to one side, watching the process of imperial growth
with equanimity, and confining its remarks to the effect
wliich new possessions might have on the course of trade.
So again it was the underworld which fastened on this
new phenomenon of histmy with fascination. For as they
looked at the world-wide race for domination, they saw
something very ^fferent from the mere exciting clash of
politics or the inexplicable wliims of personalities in
power.
. ^ whole new direction to the drift of capital¬
ism; fact, they saw imperialism as signaling a change
m the fundamental character of capitahsm itself. More
182
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
portentous yet, they divined in the new restless process
ot expansion the most dangerous development which
capitalism had yet undergone-a development which led
to war.
It was a mild-mannered heretic who made this charge
the product, as he described himself, of “the middle
of a middle-sized town of
the Midlands. John A. Hobson was a frail little man
much worried over his health and plagued by an im¬
pediment in his speech which made him nervous about
lecturing. Bom in 1858, he prepared for an academic
career at Oxford; and by all we know of his background
and personality ( which is not much, for this shy and
retiring man even managed successfully to avoid Who's
Who), he was destined for the cloistered anonymity of
English public-school life.
Two factors intervened. He read the works of Ruskin,
the British critic and essayist who mocked at the bour¬
geois Victorian canons of monetary value and who trum¬
peted, “Wealth is life!’" From Ruskin, Hobson acquired
an idea of economics as a humanist rather than a scholas¬
tic science; and he turned from the dry refinement of
orthodox doctrine to the exciting construction of a world
where cooperative labor guilds would give a higher
value to human personality than the crass world of
wages and profits. Like all Utopians, Hobson insisted
that his scheme was not utopian; on the contrary it was,
he claimed, “as certain as a proposition in Euclid.”
As a Utopian he might have been respectable; the
English like eccentrics. It was as a heretic, a trampler on
the virtues of tradition, that he became an economic
pariah. Chance threw him into the company of a person
called A. F. Mummery, an independent thinker, a success¬
ful businessman, and an intrepid mountain climber (he
was to meet his death in 1895 on the heights of Nanga
Parbat). “My intercourse with him, I need hardly say,
writes Hobson, “did not lie on this physical plane. But he
was a mental climber as well. . . Mummery had specu¬
lated as to the cause of those periodic slumps in trade
which had worried the business community as far back
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 183
as the early eighteenth centuiy, and he had an idea as to
their origin, which was, as Hobson put it, considered by
the professordom “as equivalent in rationality to an at¬
tempt to prove the flatness of the earth.” For Mummery,
hearkening back to Malthus, thought that the cause of
depression lay in the fact of excessive saving, in the
chronic inability of the business system to distribute
enough purchasing power to buy its own products back,
Hobson argued at first and then became convinced
that Mummery was right. The two wrote The Physiology
of Industry, setting forth their heretical notion that sav¬
ings might undermine prosperity. But this was too much
for the official world to swallow. Had not all the great
economists, from Adam Smith onward, stressed the fact
that saving was only one side of the golden coin of
accumulation? Did not every act of saving automatically
add to the fund of capital which was used to put more
people to work? To say that saving might result in un¬
employment was not only nonsense of the most arrant
kind, but it was positively inimical to one of the legs of
social stability— thrift. The economic world was shocked:
the London University Extension Lectures found that
tliey could manage to dispense with Mr. Hobson^s pres¬
ence; the Charity Organization Society withdrew an
invitation to speak. The scholar had become a heretic
and the heretic now became, perforce, an outcast.
All this seems considerably removed from the prob¬
lem of imperialism. But ideas germinate in devious ways.
Hobson s exclusion from the world of respectability led
him into the path of social criticism, and the social critic
now turned his attention to the great political problem
of the day: Africa.
'^e background of the African problem was complex
and emotional. Dutch settlers had set up their inde¬
pendent states in the Transvaal country in 1836, solid
communities of Kaffir-flogging, Bible-reading” farmers.
But the land they chose, wide and sunny and exhilarating
as It was, hid more wealth than it displayed. In 1869
diamonds were discovered; in 1885 gold. Within a few
years the pace of an oxcart settlement was transformed
^^4 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
into the frenzied excitement of a community of specula¬
tors. Cecil Rhodes appeared on the scene with his pro-
; in a moment of madness
he sanctioned a raid into the Transvaal and the lonc-
stiained tempers of both English and Dutch burst their
bonds. The Boer War began.
Hobson had already gone to Africa. This “most timor¬
ous of God's creatures ” as he called himself, traveled to
Capetown and Johannesburg, talked with Kruger and
Smuts, and finally dined with Rhodes himself on the eve
of the Transvaal raid. Rhodes was a complicated and
perplexing personality. Two years before his African
adventure, a journalist had quoted him as saying:
I was in the East End of London yesterday and
attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the
wild speeches, which were just a cry for ‘bread,' Tread,’
Tread’ and on my way home I pondered over the scene,
. . . My cherished idea is a solution for the social prob¬
lems; i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of
the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial
statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus
population, to provide new markets for the goods pro¬
duced by them in the factories and mines. The Empire,
as I have always said, is a bread and butter question.”
We do not know whether he expounded the same senti¬
ments to Hobson; the probabilities are that he did. But
it would have made little difference. For what Hobson
saw in Africa dovetailed in the most unexpected way
with the economic heresy of wliich he and Mummery had
been con\4cted: the theory of oversaving.
He returned to Britain to 'write about jingoism and
the war in Africa and then in 1902 he presented the
world with a book in wliich his African observations
were strangely melded with his heretical views.
The book was called Imperialism; it was a devastating
volume. For here was the most important and searing
criticism which had ever been levied against the profit
system. The worst that Marx had claimed was that the
system would destroy itself; what Hobson suggested was
that it might destroy the world. He saw the process of
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 185
imperialism as a relentless and restless tendency of
capitalism to rescue itself from a self-imposed dilemma
a tendency which necessarily involved foreign commercial
conquest and which thereby inescapably involved a
constant risk of war. No more profound moral indictment
had ever been posed than the charge that the price of
the survival of a system was the death of those who lived
within it.
What was the substance of Hobson’s charge?
It was an argument almost Marxian in its impersonality
and inexorable development ( although Hobson had no
sympathy for the Marxists and their aims). It claimed
that capitalism faced an internal and insoluble difficulty
and that it was forced to turn to imperialism, not out
of a pure lust for conquest, but as a means of ensuring
its own economic survival.
That internal capitalist diflBculty was an aspect of the
system which had received sui-prisingly little attention
in the past— capitalism’s unequal distribution of wealth.
The fact that the workings of the profit system very often
resulted in the rich getting richer and the poor getting
childien had long been a topic for moral concern, but
its economic consequences were left for Hobson to point
out.
Tlie consequence he saw was most surprising. The in¬
equality of incomes led to the strangest of dilemmas— a
paradoxical situation in which neither rich nor poor could
consume enough goods. The poor could not consume
enough because their incomes were too small, and the
rich could not consume enough because their incomes
were too bigi In other words, said Hobson, in order to
clear its own market, an economy must consume every-
thing that it makes: each good must have a buyer. Now
if the poor cannot aflFord to take more than the bare
essentials, who is there to take the rest? Obviously, the
rich. But while the rich have the money, they lack the
physical capacity for that much consumption: a man
with a miUion-dollar income would have to consume
i86
THE WORUDLY PHILOSOPHERS
goods wolth a thousand times those bought by a man
with only a thousand doUars to spend. X a man
Ti! a consequence of an inequitable division of
,c .av^■S* “d— Torate
/ojced to save. They saved not only because most of
’ anyway, but because they could not very
to be co«d ““““ ‘“O
And it was tWs saving that led to trouble. The auto¬
matic savings of the rich strata of society had to be put
to use, unless the economy was to sufEer from the disas-
toous effects of a steady withdrawal of purchasing power.
But the question was hoto to put the savings to work.
Ihe classical answer was to invest them in ever more
factories and more production and thus to ascend to an
even higher level of output and productivity: Smith,
Kicardo, Mill, all the great economists agreed on this
solution to the problem. But Hobson saw a difficulty in
the way. For if the mass of the people were already
having trouble buying all the goods thrown on the market
because their incomes were too small, how, he asked,
could a sensible capitalist invest in equipment which
would throw still more goods on an overcrowded market?
MTiat would be gained from investing savings in another
shoe factor)% let us say, when the market was already
SAvamped with more shoes than could be readily ab¬
sorbed? What was to be done?
The answer was devilishly neat. The automatic savings
of the rich could be invested in one way which would
put them to use without the troublesome accompaniment
of more production at home. Tliey could be invested
overseas.
And this is the genesis of imperialism. It is, wote
Hobson, “the endeavor of the great controllers of in¬
dustry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus
wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign invest¬
ments to take oflF the goods and capital they cannot use
at home.”
The result is disastrous. It is not one nation only which
is sending its surplus wealth abroad. All nations are in
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS
the same boat. Hence there ensues a race to partition
the world, with each nation trying to fence off for its
investors the richest and most lucrative markets it can
seize. Thus Africa becomes a huge market (and a source
of cheap raw materials ) to be split among the capitalists
of England and Germany and Italy and Belgium; Asia
becomes a rich pie to be carved up among the Japanese
and the Russians and the Dutch. India becomes a dump¬
ing ground for British industry, and China becomes an
India for Japan.
Imperialism thus becomes the road to war— not a royal
road nor a road of adventure or misadventure, but a
sordid process in which capitalist nations compete for
fresh seedbeds for their unemployed wealth. A less inspir¬
ing cause for bloodshed could hardly be imagined.
Needless to say, such a theoiy of violence and sti*uggle
found little encouragement in the official world of econo¬
mists, Hobson, it was said, kept ‘^muddling economics up
witli other things” and since those '‘other things” were
hardly suggestive of a world organized around the pursuit
of pleasure, the official world regarded the theoiy of
imperialism as a display of the sort of bad table mamiers
one would expect of a man whose economics outraged
such common-sense doctrines as the social beneficence
of thrift.
But while the doctrine was scmpulously avoided by
those who might have subjected it to an intelligent, if
critical, scrutiny, it was embraced wholeheartedly by
another section of the underworld: the Marxists. The
• entirely original Avitli Hobson;
^ had been worked out by a Gemian economist named
Rodbei^s, and by Rosa Luxemburg, a fieiy Geiman
levolutionist. But Hobson^s ti-eatment was broader and
deeper, and it was embroidered into the royal cloak of
Marxist doctiine by none other than their leading theore¬
tician; an exile named Vladimir IHch Ulyanov-better
known as Lenin.
from its baptism somewhat
changed. Hobson had puzzled over the question of why
capitahst nations so avidly sought colonies after decades
88
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
of more or less mdifference to them. His theory of im-
penalism was not a dogma, and still less an ironclad
prediction of absolutely inescapable war. Indeed he
expressed the hope that rival imperialisms might arrange
side by side on a Hve-and-let-live basis. ^ ^
But m Marxist garb, the theory took on tones both
moie rnenacing and more inexorable. Not only was
imperialism placed as the capstone of the Marxist eco-
f a f V Marxist consecration of in-
tallibihty, but It was broadened and widened beyond
Hobsons framework until it accounted for the whole
social comp exion of latter-day capitalism as well. And
Wiiat a frightening picture emerged! —
Being the highest phase of capitalist development,
imperialism . . . draws witliin the orbit of finance-
capital exploitation all colonies, all races, and all
nations. ... In squeezing enormous sums of surplus
profit out of the millions of colonial workers and
peasants and in accumulating colossal incomes from
this exploitation, imperialism is creating a type of
decaying and parasitically degenerate rentier class,
as well as a whole stratum of parasites who live by
clipping coupons. In completing the process of
creating the material prerequisites of socialism (the
concentration of the means of production, the enor¬
mous socialization of labour, the growth of labour
organization), the epoch of imperialism intensifies
the antagonisms among the “Great Powers” and
gives rise to wars which cause the break-up of its
single world economy. Imperialism is therefore
capitalism moribund and decaying. It is the final
stage of development of the capitalist system. It is
the threshold of social revolution.
Tlie writer: J. V. Stalin. The occasion: The Third
Communist International. The date: 1928. But while
Stalin is the speaker, the voice is Lenin’s. And more
disturbing yet, Lenin’s conception of a ravaging and
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS 189
ravaged capitalism, internally corrupt and externally
predatory, is still the formal Soviet explanation of the
world in which we hve. Its vaHdity was again aflBi'med
by the oflBcial program of the Communist party adopted
in 1961:
Imperiahsm knows no relations between states other
than those of domination and subordination, of op¬
pression of the weak by the strong. It bases inter¬
national relations on diktat and intimidation, on
violence and arbitrary rule. It regards wars of ag¬
gression as a natural means of settling international
issues.
Of the fact of imperialism there is no doubt. No one
who is familiar with the liistory of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries can fail to mark the line
of plunder, territorial aggrandizement, and oppressive
coIoniaHsm which runs like a telltale thread through the
endless incidents of international jealousy, friction, and
war. If it is no longer fashionable to regard the First
World War as "purely” an imperialist conflict, there is
no doubt that imperialist jockeying for position did much
to bring it into being.
But conquest and colonies are as old as ancient Egypt,
and as the recent histories of Russia and China have
made clear, they will continue whether capitalism is
there to furnish an excuse or not. The question which
the economic theory of imperialism makes us face is
whether the conquest of the last fifty years has been
differently motivated from the conquest which came
before or which may follow after. It is a simple matter
to understand the thirst for power of the dynastic state.
Imperialism asks us to consider whether the more im¬
personal forces of the market economy can lead to the
same end result.
The apologists for the colonial system claimed that it
could not. In 1876 Bismarck himself wrote: “All the
advantages claimed for the mother country are for the
most part illusions. England is abandoning its colonial
190
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
policy; she finds it too costly.” And other defenders of
the system echoed his remarks : they pointed out that
colonies didn t pay ; that colonization was not under¬
taken gladly but that it was forced on the great powers
colrT^^ civilizing mission in the world; that
R mother country, and so on.
But they simply missed the point. True, some colonies
did not 1865 a Committee of Commons actually
lecommended the abandonment of all British holdings
save one on the west coast of Africa on the grounds that
they were highly unprofitable ventures. But while all
colonies did not yield a profit, some colonies were fabu¬
lously rewarding: the tea gardens in Ceylon, for example,
would return fifty per cent dividends on invested capital
m a banner year. And while all industry did not benefit
trom overseas markets, some important industries could
hardly^ have existed without them: the classic case in
point is the dependence of the British cotton industiy
on the Indian market. When the Japanese eventually
undersold the British in India, the Lancaster cotton mills
suffered a blow from wliich they have never fully re¬
covered to this day.
To be sure, there were other imperialist motives
generously mixed in with the purely economic, and the
economic compensatory effect of imperialism was not
quite so simple as J, A. Hobson had described it. But by
and large one could hardly find an explanation for the
thrust of European power into Africa and Asia that did
not contain some flavor of economic necessity. In the
case of Holland, for example, the huge plantation econ¬
omy of Java and Sumatra offered a field for profitable
investment of great importance for Dutch capital; in the
case of Malaya, invaluable and cheap raw materials pro¬
vided John Bull with a lucrative international monopoly;
in the case of the Middle East, there were oil and the
strategic control over shipping through the Suez Canal
From country to country the motives might differ, but
the common denominator of economic gain was to be
found in all.
"Wliat our industries lack . . . what they lack more and
r
VICrOBIAN WOKLD—XJNDERWOBLD OF ECONOMICS I9I
more, is markets,” said a French minister in 1885; and in
1926 Dr. Schacht, then president of the German Keichs-
bank, declared: ‘The fight for raw materials plays the
most important role in world pohtics, an even greyer
role than before the war. Germany’s only solution is her
acquisition of colonies,” While it was not all quite as
Hobson had foreseen, his somber prognostications seemed
confirmed. Capitalism could indeed find itself forced
by internal economic pressmes to turn to foreign eco¬
nomic exploitation, and foreign exploitation, as liistory
clearly demonstrated, could lead easily to war.
Does this mean that imperiahsm is inseparable from
capitahsm? The Marxists tell us that it is, and they
interpret every act of sending capital abroad as im-
periaUsm in one disguise or another; thus our efforts to
extend assistance to the backward nations are dubbed
“imperiahstic” by Communists in exactly the same way
that they label our investments in oil.
The reality seems a good deal more complicated than
this Marxian version, however. Imperiahsm is not just
foreign trade nor just foreign investment. It is these plus
pohtical interference, economic exploitation, military
force, and a bland disregard for the interests of the poorer
nation by the richer. What is so sticking about nineteenth-
century British investment in India, for example, is that
it was entiiely based on England’s needs, and not in the
shghtest degree motivated or shaped by India’s require¬
ments.
Some of this old-fashioned imperialism remains. In the
Near East vast consortiums of oil continue to maintain in
power some of the most corrupt and anachronistic govern¬
ments in the world. In Africa many capitalist enteiprises
-British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, South African,
and American— have stakes, often immense, in the de¬
velopment of Africa s untapped riches; and in the present
turmoil and confusion of African development, the rights
oi the native Africans to control and develop and enjoy
the wealth of their own land may easily be forgotten.
The si^ation is considerably different when we turn
to United States investment in politically more advanced
^92 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
-although economically still very backward-areas such
as houth America. Here we find large aggregates of
American capital that unquestionably exert powerful
mfluences over affairs in their “host” nations. Yet the
relationship of American corporations to their foreign
hosts IS not altogether the same as the typical imperiafist
relationship of the nineteenth century. Nationals of the
host countty far from being excluded from management
are tramed for and entrusted with nearly all managerial
and they typically sit on (and sometimes control )
the board of directors itself. The profits of foreign corpor¬
ations are usually heavily taxed, and the repatriation of
profits are hedged about by exchange restrictions. Most
important, the threat of expropriation— always politically
popular is allowed to dangle over the corporation as a
reminder of what will happen if it is found to have be¬
haved in some fashion contrary to the national interest
of the host nation.
Here, at least, the exercise of traditional economic
imperialism is on the wane. And even in the remaining
semi-colonial areas, the power of American (or Euro¬
pean) capital, while still very great, is contested by
changes that have definitely altered the attitude of these
areas to their capitalist overlords.
At the crest of imperialism, one-sixth of the world was
rich and powerful; five-sixths were supine, defenseless,
needy, and gullible. No more. The rich one-sixth is still
rich, but it is on the defensive both politically and
economically; the poor five-sixths are still poor, but
angrily aggressive. Asia has turned its back on Europe;
the Middle East is bursting with the rage of the beggar
who looks at the rich man and who sees— regardless of
sober considerations — the gross injustice of differing sta¬
tions in life. South America resents its subservience to
American power; Africa is beginning to dream grandiose
dreams of its own.
There is simply less room for the old attitudes of ter¬
ritorial seizure, commercial rape, and cultural disdain.
Imperialism is not yet wholly dead, but it is dying, and
the cause of its death, by a quirk of justice, lies in its own
VICTORIAN WORLD-UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS I93
past excesses. For it was its own injustices and indignities
which brought into being the bitter native nationalism
to which imperialism is now anathema.
In the whole sordid story, the United States was for¬
tunate enough until recently to play only a peripheral
role. We dabbled in imperialism in the Philippines and in
our ‘l)anana republics”; we had our military adventures
in Cuba and Texas. But for all the temptation, we never
plunged into a mad race for foreign soil. The reason is
not that we were less susceptible to the jingoism of the
times or that our economy displayed less of a need for
foreign outlets. The saving grace for the United States
was that we had an enormous empire, with all its ad¬
vantages of wider markets, rich materials, and dazzling
profits, right in our own back yard: we had the frontier.
While Europe had to turn to other continents, we could
turn to the West.
Thus, we never became a formidable imperialist power,
because we never had to do so: the frontier absorbed
aU the energy and all the capital we could muster. But
if we look at the fury and drive that went into the winning
of the West, we may be able better to understand the
natuie of the dynamism that drove other nations, not so
fortunately situated, to send their men and money over¬
seas.
Today we are stiU not a territorial imperialist in the
old-fashioned sense-as we have said, that avenue for the
employment of national ambition and capital is largely
closed. Yet in recent years we have been driven to a
Face!? ° imperialism.
to reaction has been
Thus our clandestine overthrow of the radical Guatemala
government, our abortive attempt to invade Cuba our
our
Is this imperialism? Certainly not in the classic tradi
194
the worldly philosophers
merits in those particular areas. To some extent these
military activities may have been meant to serve as
warnings against the rise, elsewhere, of radical govern¬
ments which might threaten larger aggregations of Amer¬
ican capital Most probably, however, American “im¬
perialism (for that is the unflattering word used by much
of the world to describe our action ) today represents tlie
reaction of a great power placed on the defensive by
the thrust of world events and seeking through military
force to maintain friendly governments in power and to
thwart unfriendly ones. This kind of imperialism is by
no means limited to capitalist nations, as the example
of Russia m Hungary and that of China in Tibet and India
reveal. Here the motive of economics is submerged within
the larger motive of the extension and strengthening of
political power itself. This does not make modern im¬
perialism— or, if we will, political imperialism— any less
dangerous than economic imperialism, but it does make
doubtful the claim that capitalism alone must bear the
responsibility for aggressive international behavior. If the
United States has in fact become an imperialist power—
and this is not yet clear— the causes must be sought as
much in the Pentagon and in Congress and among the
populace at large as in the circles of its corporate leaders.
John Hobson died in 1940; in the London Times a
properly circumspect obituary duly noted both his pres¬
cient ideas and his lack of general recognition.
For unrecognized he was. The most renowned econo¬
mist of the Victorian world was an economist utterly
unlike Hobson: Alfred Marshall— as considered, middle-
of-the-road, and “official” as Hobson had been intuitive,
extreme, and, so to speak, unauthorized. Yet it is fitting
that wc conclude this jouniey through the shadowy
regions of the underworld by retuiming again to Victorian
daylight. The economists who worked in that daylight
mav not have seen the disturbing sights revealed to more
ad\'enturous souls, but they did do one thing which the
heretics did not: they taught their world— and even our
world— its “economics.”
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS I95
Merely to look at Alfred Marshalls portrait is already
to see the stereotype of the teacher: white mustache,
white wispy hair, kind bright eyes— an eminently pro¬
fessorial countenance. At the time of his death in 1924,
when the greatest economists in England paid homage
to his memory, one of them. Professor C. R. Fay, pro¬
duced this indelible portrait of the Victorian professor
chez lui:
Pigou told me I ought to go and see him about a
subject for a Fellowship Dissertation. So one after¬
noon towards twilight I went to Balliol Croft. “Come
in, come in,” he said, running in from a little passage;
and I went with him upstairs, “Have you any idea
what to do?” he asked me. I said “no.” “Well, then,
listen,” he said, producing a small black book. He
proceeded to read out a list of subj'ects having pre¬
viously ordered me to hold up my hand when he
came to one I liked. In my nervousness I tiled to
close with the first subject, but Marshall took no
notice and read on. About halfway through the
second ^ page he arrived at “The Recent Geirnan
Financial Crisis.” Having been to Greifswald for a
summer I signaled acquiescence. “It wouldn’t suit
you at all,” he said. I kept quiet for another five
minutes, and, catching the word “Argentine” made
another noise which stopped him. My only reason
was that two of my uncles had been in business there.
Have you been there yourself?” he asked. “No,” I
replied, and he went on. A few moments later he
“Have you foimd a subject you
ike. I don t know,” I began. “No one ever does,”
he said, Tut that s my method. Now, what would you
A 5 T \ comparison of German
and English labour.” Upon which (for it was now
quite dark), he produced a little lantern with an
electiac button and began prowling around the
shelves handing out books in English and Gei-man
von Nostite, Kuhlman, about 30 in all. “Now,”
tie said, I U leave you to smell; when you’ve finished.
196
PHILOSOPHERS
How down the tube and Sarah wiU bring you some
H African strife that had
h?d fn A f^o/rierous American speculation
that had formed the cradle of environment for Henry
eorges ideas. Marshall, like his contemporary Edge-
AUlh*’ 'ri! P'®-®™“ently the product of a university.
Although he voyaged to America and even across Amer-
ica to San Francisco, his life, his point of view-and
inevitably his economics-smacked of the quietude and
rehnement of the Cambridge setting
But exactly what did he teach? One word can sum up
the basic concern behind Marshall’s teaching-the word
equilibrium. In^ contrast with Bastiat, who was dra^vn
to the irrationalities of economic sophistry, or with Henry
George, who was attracted to the injustices of life cloaked
with economic sanction, or with Hobson, who saw the
face of Mars behind the impersonal processes of capitalist
economics, Marshall was primarily interested in the
self-adjusting, self-correcting nature of the economic
world. As his most brilliant pupil, J. M, Keynes, would
later write, he created “a whole Copemican system, by
which all the elements of the economic universe are kept
in their places by mutual counterpoise and interaction.”
Much of this, of course, had been taught before. Adam
Smith, Ricardo, Mill had all expounded the market system
as a feedback mechanism of great complexity and effi¬
ciency. Yet between the over-all vision and the fine
working-out of details there was much imexplored ter-
ritoiy and foggy exposition: the theory of market equili¬
brium which Marshall inherited was a good deal more
imposing at a distance than up close. There were sticky
bits even about such basic matters as whether prices were
really a reflection of the cost of production of a good, or
of the final degree of satisfaction yielded by that good
—were diamonds high-priced, in other words, because
they were hard to find or because people enjoyed wear¬
ing them? Perhaps such questions would not make any¬
one but an economist’s heart beat faster, and yet so long
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS I97
as they remained obscure it was hard to think clearly
about many problems which economics sought to attack.
It was to these fuzzy questions of economic theory that
Marshall appHed himself. In his famous Principles he
combined a mind of mathematical precision with a style
that was leisurely, discursive, shot through with homely
example, and wonderfully lucid. Even a businessman
could imderstand this sort of economics, for all the hard
logical proofs were thoughtfully relegated to the foot¬
notes (with the result that Keynes irreverently said that
any economist would do better to read the footnotes and
forget the text than vice versa). At any rate, the book
was a tremendous success; originally published in 1890,
it is still prescribed fare for the student who aspires to
be an economist.
And what was the great conti-ibution of Marshall to the
conceptual tangles of economics? The main contribution
-the one to which Marshall himself returned time and
again-was the insistence on the importance of time as the
quintessential element in the working-out of tlie equi-
hbrium process.
For equilibrium, as Marshall pointed out, changed its
basic meaning according to whether the adjustment
process of the economy took place in a short-run or a
long-iTin period. In the short mn, buyers and sellers met
to higgle on the market place, but basically the bargain-
mg process revolved about a fairly fixed quantity of
pods-the diamonds which the diamond merchants
brought along with them in their suitcases. Over the
Jong run, however, the quantity of diamonds was not
faxed. New mines could be opened if the demand war¬
ranted it; old mmes could be abandoned if supply was
superabundant. Hence in the very short run it was the
^ whSh is, tlie demand for them
-winch exercised the more immediate influence on their
S'^unnlv'^^®’ long run, as the recurring flow
Sfiro??o“ "PP®r hand. Neflher cost nor
determmation of price: demand and supply, in Marshalls
THE WOBLDLY PHTLOSOPHEBS
198
o^vn words, were like “the blades of a pair of scissors,”
and it was as fruitless to ask whether supply or demand
alone regulated price as to ask whether the upper or
lower blade of the scissors did all the cutting. But while
both blades cut, one of them, so to speak, was the active
and one the passive edge— the utility-demand edge active
when the cut took place in the quick time span of the
given market; the cost-supply edge active when the
cutting extended over the longer period in which scales
of output and patterns of production were subject to
change.
It was, like everything Marshall touched with his
analytic mind, an illuminating insight. And yet more than
theoretical brilliance radiated from the Principles. If
Marshall was the finest intelligence of the “official” world
of economics, he was also its most compassionate intelli¬
gence. A genuine concern for the laboring poor, for the
“cringing wi*etches” he noted on his trips to the London
slums, for economics as a tool for social betterment— all
this was inextricablv woven into his book. Economics as
he conceived it was “an engine for the discovery of truth,”
but the particular truth toward which he directed the
engine was the cause— and cure— of poverty.
Why, then, was he not as significant in the history of
economic thought as his brilliance and balance would
seem to have warranted? The answer, ironically, lies in
the veiy element of Marshalfis analysis which was his
most important gift to economic analysis— the element
of time. For time, to Marshall, was abstract time; it was
the time in which mathematical curves exfoliate and
theoretical experiments may be run and rerun, but it
was not the time in which anything ever really happens.
That is, it was not the irreversible flow of historic time-
and, above all, not the historic time in which Marshall
himself lived. Think for a moment of what he lived to
see: a violent anti-capitalist revolution in Russia, a world-
encompassing war, the first rumblings of anti-colonialism.
Think of what lay just ahead: the decline of capitalism
in much of Europe, a world-wide change in the concep-
VICTORIAN WORLD— UNDERWORLD OF ECONOMICS IQQ
tion of government, a world-shaking depression in the
United States. Yet of the relevance of economics to all
these overwhelming changes, neither Alfred Marshall
nor still less his official colleagues had much, if any,
understanding. Natura non facit saltum—nahire makes
no sudden leaps— was the motto of the Principles in its
last edition in 1920 as in its first, in 1890. The fact that
history might make sudden leaps, that tlie world of
economics might be inseparably tied to the world of
history, that the long and short run of the textbook
imphed a totally dffierent conception of ‘‘time” from that
of the relentless ticking of the social clock— all this was
far removed from the notions of equilibrium which Mar¬
shall made the center of his economic inquiiy. For
nothing that he said could he be reproached, for he was
a man of gentle faith and deeply felt convictions. The
trouble was that nothing he said went far enough.
And even this might be condoned in hindsight were it
not for one thing. All the wliile that Marshall and his
colleagues were refining their delicate mechanism of
equihbrium, a few unorthodox dissenters were insisting
that it was not equilibrium but change— violent change
—which characterized the real world and which properly
formed the subject for economic inquiiy. War and revo¬
lution and depression and social tension were to their
minds the basic problems for economic scrutiny— not
equilibrium and the nice processes of adjustment of a
stable textbook society. But when the heretics and the
amateurs pointed this out to Victorian academic official¬
dom, their interruptions were resented, their warnings
shiTigged aside, theii’ prescriptions scorned.
Tlie complacency of the official world was not merely
a rueful commentary on the times; it was an intellectual
tragedy of the first order. For had tlie academicians paid
attention to the underworld, had Alfred MarshaU pos¬
sessed the disturbing vision of a Hobson, or Edgeworth
the sense of social wrong of a Henry George, tlie great
catasti-ophe of the twentieth century might not have burst
upon a world utterly unprepared for radical social change.
200
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
It teaches us, in retrospect, that ideas, however heretical,
cannot safely be ignored— least of all by those whose
interests are, in the best sense of that misused word,
conservati\'e.
vin
The Savage Society
of Thorstein Veblen
ONE hundred and twenty-five years had now passed
since the Wealth of Nations appeared in 1776, and
in that span of time it seemed as if the great economists
had left no aspect of the world unexamined: its mag¬
nificence or its squalor, its naivete or its sometimes sinister
overtones, its grandiose achievements in technology or
its often mean shortcomings in human values. But this
many-sided world, with its dozens of differing interpre¬
tations, had nonetheless one common factor. It was Euro¬
pean. For all its changing social complexion, this was
still the Old World, and as such it insisted on a modi¬
cum of punctilio.
Thus it was not without significance that when Dick
Aikwright, the barber s apprentice, made his fortune in
the spinning jenny he metamorphosed into Sir Richard:
the threat to England s traditional reign of gentlemanli¬
ness was neatly solved by inducting such parvenus whole¬
sale into the fraternity of gentle blood and manners. The
parvenus, it is true, brought with them a train of middle-
class attitudes and even a strain of anti-aristocratic senti¬
ment but they brought with them, as well, the sneaking
knowledge that there was a higher social stratum than
that attainable by wealth alone. As countless comedies
ot manners testified, there was a difference between the
beei baron, with all his millions and his purchased crest,
201
202
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
and the impoverished but hereditary baron next door.
The successful European money-maker might be rich
as Croesus, but the savor of Iris riches was a trifle dulled
by the recognition that this was only one— and by no
means the final— step up the social ladder.
All this was vastly different in America. Not only had
this country been founded by men who were deeply
opposed to gradations of name and birth, but the spirit
of individual independence and individual achievement
had sunk deep into the national folklore. In Ajnerica a
man was as good as he proved himself, and his success
needed no validation from a genealogist. Hence, while
there was not too much to differentiate the dark and
sw'cated mills of New England from the gloomy mills of
old England, when one looked into the manners and
behavior of their masters, the resemblance lessened. For
while the European capitalist was still caught in the
shadow of a feudal past, the American money-maker
basked in tlie sun— there were no inhibitions on his drive
to power or in the exuberant enjo>Tnent of his wealth.
In the bubbling last half of the nineteenth century, money
was the stepping stone to social recognition in the United
States, and having acquired a passport of suitable wealth,
tlic American millionaire needed no further visa for his
entree into the upper classes.
And so the game of money-making in the New World
was a rougher and less gentlemanly affair than the com-
pi.'titive stiTiggle abroad. The stakes were higher and
the chances for success were greater. The sportsmanship,
accordin<j:h\ was somewhat less.
In the ISGO’s, for example, Cornelius Vanderbilt, a
fal>ulous genius of shipping and commerce, found that
his own business associates were threatening his interests
—a not too uncommon occurrence. He wrote them a letter:
Ccntlomen:
'^'ou ha\ e undertaken to ruin me. I ^^ilI not sue you,
for law' takes too long. I will iTiin you.
Sincerely,
Cornelius Van Derbilt
the savage society of thorstein veblen 203
And he did. ‘What do I care about the law? Hain’t I got
the power?” asked the Commodore. Later J. Pieipont
Morgan was to voice much the same sentiment, if in a
slightly more polished form. When his associate, Judge
Gary, on a rare occasion ventured a legal caveat, Morgan
exploded: “Well, I don t know as I want a lawyer to tell
me what I cannot do. I hire him to tell me how to do
what I want to do.”
It was not only in their neglect of the fine processes
of the law that the Americans outdid their European
contemporaries; when they fought, they abandoned the
gentlemans rapier for the roughneck’s brass knuckles.
An instance in point is the sti-uggle for the control of the
Albany-Susquehanna Railroad, a vital link in a system
tom between Jim Fisk and the patrician Morgan. Morgan
held one end of the line in his own hands, and the other
terminal was a Fisk stronghold. The controversy was
accordingly resolved by each side mounting a locomotive
on its end of the track and running the two engines, like
gigantic toys, into one another. And even then the losers
did not give up, but retired as best they could, ripping
up tracks and tearing down trestles as they went.
In this melee for industrial supremacy no quarter was
asked and none given. Even dynamite had its uses, being
employed to eliminate one particularly sticky competitor
of the Standard Oil group, while less violent means, such
as kidnapping, were remarkable more for their ingenuity
than their immorality. In 1881, when a great blizzard
blew down the telegraph lines in New York, Jay Gould,
the mthless master of the money markets, was forced to
send his orders to his broker by messenger. His enemies
saw their chance and acted on it: they kidnapped the
boy, substituted another of the same general physiog-
nomy and for several weeks Gould was dismayed to
tind that his moves were all somehow known to his
adversaries in advance.
Needless to say, the pirates who thus forced each othei
to walk the plank could scarcely be expected to treat the
public with reverence. Gulling and milking the mvestoi
^^4 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
were taken as a matter of course, and the stock market
was regarded as a kind of private casino for the rich in
which the public laid the bets and tlie financial titans
fixed the croupier s wheel. As to what would happen to
the general run of bets under such an arrangement _
well that was tlie publics lookout, an attitude which
imght have been more commendable had not diese same
titans done eyeiything in their power to entice the public
to enter their preserves.
The pubhc, be it noted, responded with a when
the news got around that Gould or Rockefeller Wcis
buying rails or coppers or steels, the pubHc rushed to
get in for a free ride. The fact that it took a fleecing for
every killing never aflEected its unbounded faith, and on
the strength of this faith a virtual legerdemain of finance
was made possible, A head-spinning example was the
purchase of the Anaconda Copper Company by Henry
Rogers and William Rockefeller without the expenditure
of a single dollar of their own. This is how they did it;
1. Rogers and Rockefeller gave a check for $39
millions to Marcus Daly for the Anaconda prop¬
erties, on the condition that he would deposit it
in the National City Bank and leave it untouched
for a specified period,
2. They then set up a paper organization kno^vn
as the Amalgamated Copper Company, with their
own clerks as dummy directors, and caused Amal¬
gamated to buy Anaconda— not for cash, but for
$75 millions in Amalgamated stock wliich was
conveniently printed for the purpose.
3. From the National City Bank, Rogers and Rocke¬
feller now borrowed $39 millions to cover the
check they had given to Marcus Daly, and as
collateral for this loan they used the $75 millions
in Amalgamated stock.
4. They now sold the Amalgamated stock on the
market (first having touted it through their
brokers) for $75 millions.
5. With the proceeds, they retired the $39-million
THE SAVAGE SOCIETY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN 20 5
loan from the National City Bank, and pocketed
$36 millions as their own profit on the deal.
Of course this free-for-all involved staggering dis¬
honesty. A. B. Stickney, president of the Chicago, St.
Paul, and Kansas Railway, remarked that as gentlemen
he would trust his brother railroad presidents anywhere,
but that as rail presidents he wouldn't leave his watch
out of sight -with them for a moment. There was reason
for his cynicism. At one meeting of I'ailroad heads called
to agree on a schedule of common freight rates which
would rescue the roads from then constant suicidal game
of undercutting one another, one railroad president
slipped out during an intermission in the proceedings to
\viie the agreed schedule back to his oflBce so that his
line might be the first to undercut the rest. By chance
his wire was intercepted and when the meeting next
convened it was faced with the proof positive of the
impossibility of honor even among thieves.
It is an age which we are accustomed to look back
upon with a blush. Certainly it was grotesque in its
trappings ( at some parties cigarettes were wrapped in
hundred-dollar bills for the thrill of inhaling wealth),
and almost medieval in its wamor spirit. But let us not
misconstrue the spirit of the times. While the lords of
wealth rode roughshod over the public, they trampled
equally ruthlessly over each other, and their bold and
unprincipled behavior was less a calculated meanness or
a conscious flouting of Christian ideals than an unbridled
energy which knew no bamers of conscience and nice
usage. I owe the public nothing,” Morgan once said, and
he meant that remark literally as a credo of his philosophy
raAer than as a callous defi of the world. Business in
barony, was brutal business, and the price
ot morality was apt to be defeat.
And what did the economists make of all this?
W°d InTh^r^f' 7^® ^erican professionals had fol-
W forced t/rl P- their European teachers and
tney torced the American world intr. o _
2o6
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
never made for it. The fantastic game of monetary cut¬
throat was described as the process of “thrift and accumu¬
lation”; tlie outright fraud as “enterprise”; the gilded
extravagances of the age as colorless “consumption.”
Indeed, the world was so scrubbed as to be unrecog¬
nizable. One might read such leading texi:s as John Bates
Clark s DistYibxitiOTi of Woolth and never know that
America was a land of milhonaires; one might peruse
F. H. Taussig’s Economics and never come across a
rigged stock market. If one looked into Professor Laugh-
Un s articles in the Atlantic Monthly he would learn that
sacrifice, exertion, and skill” were responsible for the
great foiiames, and he would be told that every man had
a right “to enjoy the products of his exertion to the ex¬
clusion of everybody else”— presumably this included the
right to buy legislatures as well as diamonds.
OflBcial economics, in a word, was apologist and un-
perceptive; it turned its eye away from tlie excesses and
exuberance which were the very essence of the American
scene and painted instead a stereotype in formal lines
and lusterless color. What it lacked was not honesty or
courage or intellectual competence; those qualities it
possessed. What it suffered from was what Malthus had
once called “the insensible bias of situation and interest.”
The American economists were too much bound up in
the current of these enthusiastic times to back away from
theii* subject and view it coolly and clearly and at a
distance.
What was needed was the eye of a stranger— someone
like De Tocqueville or Bryce who could view the scene
with the added clarity and perspective that comes of
being foreign to it. In the person of Thorstein Bunde
Veblen— an American by birth but a citizen of nowhere
by nature— such an eye was found.
A very strange man, Thorstein Veblen. He was a
peasant in looks, a Norwegian farmer. A photograph
shows his hair, lank and flat, parted in the imddle ot a
gnomeUke head and falling in an inverted V over a low
and sloping forehead. Peasant eyes, shrewd and specu-
THE SAVAGE SOCIETY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN 207
lative peer out from behind a bltmt nose. An unkempt
mustache hides his mouth and a short scraggly beard
engulfs his chin. He is dressed in a thick unpressed suit
and there is a large safety pin attached to his vest: it
moors his watch. The photograph does not show two
more safety pins hooked into his pants where they sus¬
pend his socks, and it gives us only a suggestion of a thm
wiry frame, and a light, high-stepping, hunterlike noise-
less gait.
A strange appearance, but it hid a yet stranger person¬
ality. Those piercing eyes might hint at an equally pierc¬
ing mental scrutiny and that rustic exterior might prepare
one for a certain blunt quality of inquiry. But there was
no external sign of the keynote to Veblen’s life: his
alienation from society,
Ahenation is often a phenomenon of the sick, and by
our standards Veblen must have been neurotic indeed.
For he had a quality of nearly hermetic insulation. He
walked tlirough life as if he had descended from another
world, and the goings on which appeared so natural to
the eyes of his contemporaries appeared to him as
piquant, exotic, and curious as the rituals of a savage
community to the eye of an antliropologist. Other econo¬
mists— and this includes both Adam Smith and Karl Marx
—were not only in tlieir society, but tliey were of it;
sometimes full of admiration for the world about them
and sometimes filled with despair and rage at what they
saw. Not Thorstein Veblen. In the bustling, boosting,
giegarious community in which he lived, he stood apart:
uninvolved, unentangled, remote, aloof, disinterested, a
stranger.
Because he was a stranger, he was a nonconformist,
but not a radical. The world to Veblen was uncomfortable
and forbidding; he adapted to it as a missionary might
to a land of primitives, refusing to go native, but pre-
sei-ving his integrity at the cost of frightful solitude.
Many admired, even loved him, but he had no friends:
there was no man he called by his first name, and no
woman he could wholly love.
As might be expected, he was a mass of eccentricities.
2o8
THK WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
He refused to have a telephone, kept his books stacked
along the wall in their original packing cases, and saw
no sense in daily making up the beds; they were throwm
back in the morning and pulled up again at night. Lazy,
he allowed the dishes to accumulate until the cupboard
was bare and then washed the whole messy heap by
tiuning the hose on them. Taciturn, he would sit for
hours in silence when all his visitors were eager to hear
his pronouncements, A flouter of convention, he gave all
his students the same grade, regardless of their work, but
when one student needed a higher mark to qualify for a
scholarship, Veblen gladly changed a C to an A. An
evifciTit tevTiblc with an ax to grind for college administra¬
tions, he would (when the authorities so decreed) call the
roll with exaggerated care, carefully placing to one side
the cards of the students who were absent, and then when
the sheep were weeded from the goats, he would seem-
ingly by accident mix the two piles together again.
Curiously sadistic, he was capable of such meaningless
practical jokes as borrowing a sack from a passing fanner
and returning it to him with a hornet’s nest inside. Rarely
whimsical, he once told a little girl who inquired what
his initials T. B. stood for that they meant Teddy Bear;
she called him that but no one else dared. Enigmatic,
he refused to commit himself on anything; typically,
when someone once asked him his opinion of a certain
sociologist’s writing in a journal which Veblen edited,
he replied; “The average number of words on a page
is 400. Professor - ’s average is 375.” And perhaps strang¬
est of all, this sardonic and unprepossessing man had the
indefinable quality of being attractive to women. He was
always engaged in one liaison or another, and not always
of his own doing. “VTiat are you to do if the woman
moves in on you?” he once inquired of a friend.
A bewildering and complex personality, locked within
itself and with only one avenue for expression: he wrote
in razorlike English, in a style much like himself, in¬
voluted and laden with esoteric information and ter¬
minology, a kind of surgical style that left the world raw
and exposed but perfectly bloodless, so fine-edged was
THE SAVAGE SOCIETY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN 20g
his blade. He wrote of philanthropy and called it “essays
in pragmatic romance”; of religion and characterized ^
as “the fabrication of vendible imponderables in the nth
dimension.” He wrote of the main ecclesiastical organi¬
zations as “chain-stores” and of the individual church as
a “retail outlet”— cruel but telling phrases. He described
a walking stick as “an advertisement that the bearers
hands are employed otherwise than in useful effort and
he noted also that it was a weapon: “The handling of
so tangible and primitive a means of oflFense is very com¬
forting to anyone who is gifted with even a moderate
share of ferocity.” Gifted with ferocityl What a savage
and yet curiously dry phrase.
But what had this to do with economics? Nothing, in
the conventional sense of the word. Economics for Veblen
had no relation to the mannerly and precise game of the
Victorians in which the ways of the world were justified
by the differential calculus, and it bore little kinship with
the efforts of earlier economists to explain how things
worked themselves out. Veblen wanted to know some¬
thing else: why tilings were as tliey were in the first
place. Hence hds inquiry began not with the economic
play, but with the players; not witlr the plot, but with
the whole set of customs and mores which resulted in
that particular kind of play called “the business system.”
In a word, he delved into the nature of economic man
and his economic rites and rituals, and in this almost
anthropological approach it was as important for him to
notice that gentlemen can*ied walking sticks and went to
church as that landlords received something which society
called rent. He was seeking to penetrate to the true
nature of the society in wliich he lived, and in that search
through a maze of deceptions and conventions, he would
have to take hints and evidences wherever they revealed
themselves: in di*ess, mamiers, speech, or polite usage,
kike the psychoanalyst he often fastened on the smallest
tnvium when he believed it to be the projecting handle
ot some irnportant but buried reaKty, and again like the
psychoanalyst he sought for meanings which were often
strange and even repugnant to common sense.
210
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
His examination of society, as we shall see, is merciless.
.but Its bitmg quality comes not so much from a wish to
disparage as from the pecuHar coldness with which our
fondest notions are appraised. It is as if nothing were
tamiliar to Veblen, nothing too commonplace to merit his
attention, and therefore nothing beyond judgment. Only
a singularly detached mind, after all, would see in a
walking stick both a disguised advertisement of leisure
and a barbaric weapon.
The detachment seems to have been with him always.
Veblen was bom in 1857, a farm boy on the frontier, the
fourth son and. sixth child of an unmi grant Norwegian
family. His father, Thomas Veblen, was an aloof and
distant person, slow-thinking and independent; Veblen
later described him as tlie finest mind he ever met. His
mother, Kari, was warm, quick, and passionate; it was
she who taught Thorstein the Icelandic lore and Nor¬
wegian sagas which were to fascinate him all his life.
But from the beginning he was a queer child, lazy, ad¬
dicted to reading in the attic instead of doing his chores,
given to inventing nicknames which stuck, and pre¬
cociously bright. A younger brother has remarked: “From
my earliest recollection I thought he knew everything. I
could ask him any question and he would tell me all
about it in detail. I have found out since that a good deal
he told me was made of whole cloth, but even his lies
were good.”
To whatever makes an unusual personality was added
an upbringing which served to drive a wedge between
himself and the world as a place to be taken at face
value. He had a pioneer childliood: simple, austere,
sparse. Clothes were homemade, woolens unknown, over¬
coats fasliioned from calfskin. Coffee and sugar were
luxuries; so was such a simple garment as an undershirt.
But more important, it was a foreign-a stranger s-boy-
hood. The Norwegians in America formed their own
tight-knit and separate communities where Norwegian
was the common tongue and Norw^ay the true fatherland.
Veblen had to learn English as a foreign tongue, not per-
211
the savage society of thorstein veblem
fecting it iixitil he went to college, and it is typical of
tliat patriarchal self-enclosed commimity that the hrst
inkling Veblen had that he was going to college was
when he was called in from the fields to find his bags
packed and placed waiting in the carriage.
He was then seventeen and the college of his family s
choice was Carleton College Academy, a small outpost
of East Coast culture and enhghtenment near the Min¬
nesota township where the Veblens farmed, Thorstein
had been sent with an eye to his entering the Lutheran
ministry, and he found Carleton religious to the core.
But there was no hope of taming this already active and
iconoclastic intellect or fitting it into a pious atmosphere.
At the weekly declamation, rather than a conventional
discourse on the necessity of converting the heathen,
Veblen threw the faculty into an uproar with ‘‘A Plea
for Cannibalism” and “An Apology for a Toper.” When
asked if he was defending these instances of depravity,
Veblen blandly replied that he was merely engaged in
scientific observations. The faculty recognized his genius
but was a bit afraid of him. John Bates Clark, his teacher
(who was to become one of the outstanding academic
economists in the coimtry) liked him, but thought him
a “misfit.”
This odd and gifted misfit found the unhkeliest of
oppoitunities at Carleton. A romance sprang up between
Veblen and the niece of the president of the college,
Ellen Rolfe. She was an intellectual and a brilliant per¬
sonality on her own account, and the two drifted together
under a natural gi-avitation. Veblen read Spencer to Ellen,
converted her to agnosticism, and persuaded himself that
she was descended from the first Viking hero, Gange
Rolfe. ^
TTiey were married in 1888, but tlie relationship was
to be fuU of ups and downs. This isolated man who had
but little love to bestow seems to have needed the care
of a woman and with few exceptions (one beauty pro-
noimced him a “chimpanzee” ) he found it in abundance,
but the particular woman did not seem so much to
matter; Veblen was hardly faithful to EUen and she was
212
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
to leave him again and again, sometimes for his in¬
discretions, sometimes for the cruelty with which he
treated her, sometimes out of the sheer frustration of
tiying to read an inscrutable and walled-off mind. For
many years, however, Veblen himself would seek a
rapprochement, coming to her house in the woods un¬
announced, with a black stocking dangling from his hand
and inquiring, “Does this garment belong to you
Madamr
When Veblen left Carleton he had determined on an
academic career. There began instead the long, never-
ending cumulation of frustrations that would mark his
professional life. He was certainly unaggressive about
his interests, and yet a kind of ill luck seemed to dog
his footsteps: for example, once he was to ask a fonner
student to investigate for him a position with a civic
welfare organization in New York, and the student was
to comply— only to take the job for himself. But that was
to be many years later. Now Veblen obtained a post at
tiny Monona Academy in Wisconsin and then, when
Monona closed its doors pennanently after a year, he
went to Johns Hopkins, hoping for a scholarship to study
philosophy. The scholarship, despite flowery recommen¬
dations, failed to materialize. Veblen transferred to Yale
and in 1884 he graduated with a Ph.D. and a broad a,
but with no future and no prospects.
He returned home, sick from malaria he had contracted
in Baltimore and needing a special diet. But he was
anything but a grateful invalid. He pestered his family
by taking the horse and buggy when they were most
needed, and told them they were all tubercular and that
they would never be successful because they were not
dishonest enough. And he lay around and loafed. He was
lucky enough,” wrote a brother, to come out of a race
and family who made of family loyalty and solidarity
a religion.' . . . Thorstein was the only loafer in a highly
respectable community. * • • He read and loafed, and the
next dav he loafed and read.
Certainly he read everything: political tracts, econo¬
mics, sociology, Lutheran hymn books, treatises in an-
213
the savage society of thorstein veblen
thropology. But his idleness aggravated his isolation from
society and made it more bitter and still more mgrown.
He did occasional odd jobs, puttered with fi*uitless in¬
ventions, commented wryly on the gaudy events of the
day, botanized, talked with his father, wrote a few
articles, and looked for a job. None came. He had no
divinity degree and hence was unacceptable to leligious
coUeges; he lacked the polish and air which might have
commended him to others. When he married Ellen, much
to the dismay of her family, it was at least partly to find
a livelihood; it was hoped that he would secure a position
as economist for the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe
Railway of which her uncle was president.
But his capricious bad luck intervened. The railway
became involved in financial difficulties and was taken
over by a committee of bankers, and the position dis¬
appeared. Another opened up with the University of
Iowa; with his Ph.D., his letters of recommendation, his
wife’s connections, the appointment seemed sure. It fell
through— his lack of forcefulness and his agnosticism
counted heavily against him— and then another at St.
Olaf s was refused at the eleventh hour. It was as if the
fates were conspiring against him, forcing him to remain
in his isolation.
The isolation lasted seven years, and in those seven
years Veblen did virtually nothing except read. Finally
a family council was held. After all, he was thirty-four
now and he had never held a respectable position. It
was determined that he should take up his graduate
studies again and make another attempt to enter the
academic world.
He chose Cornell and in 1891 he walked into the office
Laughlin to announce, “I am Thorstein
Veblen. Laughlin, a pillar of conservative economics,
must have been taken aback; the speaker wore a coonskin
cap and corduroy trousers. But something about him
impres.sed the older man. He went to the president of
he university and secured a special grant to t^ke on
Vel^en as a fellow and the next year, when the University
ot Chicago opened its doors and took on Laughlin as
^^4 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPBDERS
the head of its economics department, he brought Veblen
along at a salary of $520 a year. It might be added that
on Laughlins death, his principal contribution to eco¬
nomics was adjudged to have been the fact that he
secured Veblen for Chicago.
The University of Chicago was not only Veblen s first
job— at age thirty-five— but it was an institution which
peculiarly mirrored the society he was to dissect. Rocke¬
feller had founded the university and a popular student
jingle went:
John D. Rockefeller,
Wonderful man is he.
Gives all his spare change
To the U. of C.
The university was not, as might have been expected,
tied to a policy of unremitting conservatism. Rather, it
was the incarnation, in educational circles, of the empire
building which had given it birth in the business world.
Its president was William Rainey Harper, an ambitious
man of only thirty-six, who was admiringly described by
Walter Hines Page as a type of captain of indushy. He
was an entrepreneur college president, who did not
hesitate to rob other colleges of their best men by
dangling pay before them, and like the Standard Oil
group, which was its father, the U. of G. succeeded, by
sheer bulk of financial strength, in cornering a large
section of the American intellectual capital. All this was
later to be caustically described by Veblehs pen, but
at the same time it provided him with an adequate milieu
of intellectuals. There was Albert Michelson, who was
to determine the speed of light with hitherto unknown
precision; Jacques Loeb, the physiologist; Lloyd Morgan
in sociology; there was a huge Hbrary, and a new journal
of economics to edit.
Veblen began to be noticed. His immense learning
earned him a reputation. “Tliere goes Dr. Veblen who
speaks twenty-six languages,” said a student. James Hay¬
den Tufts, a noted scholar, came upon him in an examma-
the savage society of thorstein veblen 215
tion room and teUs, “When I entered the room, the
examination had begun and someone I did not know was
asking questions. I thought his speech the slowest I had
ever heard-it was difficult for me to keep the begmnmg
of the question in mind until the end was reached, nm
after a while I began to see that here was a subtle mind
penetrating to fundamental issues without disclosing its
oivn views except the one determination to get to the
bottom of things.”
But his isolated personality was impenetrable. No one
knew what he thought about anything. People would ask
his wife if he were really a Sociahst; she had to tell them
she herself did not know. He was never without his
annor; a polite, controlled objectivity which stripped the
world of its emotional content and which kept those who
would most have hked to pierce his personal shield at
arm’s length. “Tell me. Professor Veblen,” a student once
asked him, “do you take anything seriously?” “Yes,” he
replied in a conspuatorial whisper, “but don’t tell any¬
one.”
In class— this borrows from his later hfe, but it seiwes
to illumine the man— he would come in gaunt and hag¬
gard from a long night over his books and, dz'opping a
bulky Gennan volume on the desk, would begin to turn
the pages with nervous fingers yellowed from his sole
vanity— a penchant for expensive cigarettes. The Reverend
Howard Woolston, a onetime student, has described it
thus: “In a low creaking tone, he began a recital of
village economy among the early Germans. Presently he
came upon some unjust legal fiction imposed by rising
nobles and sanctioned by the clergy. A sardonic smile
twisted his lips; blue devils leaped to his eyes. With
mordant sarcasm, he dissected the tortuous assumption
that the wsh of the aristocrats is the will of God. He
showed similar implications in modern institutions. He
chuckled quietly. Then returning to histoiy, he con¬
tinued the exposition.”
But not everyone appreciated his teaching methods.
His h ank feehng about students was the fewer the better
and he made no attempt to Hven the discussion; indeed
2i6
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
he delighted in driving his students away. He once asked
^ ^^hgious student the value of her church to her in kegs
of beer, and to another who sedulously copied his words
and who wanted a sentence repeated, he said he thought
it not worth repeating. He miunbled, he rambled, he
digressed. His classes dwindled; one ended up with but
one student, and later at another university a door card
which originally read: “Thorstein Veblen, 10 to 11, Mon¬
days, Wednesdays, and Fridays” was changed by slow
degi*ees to read: “Mondays: 10 to 10:05.”
But for the few who listened carefully to that bored
^oning voice, the idiosyncrasies were worth the reward.
“Why, it was creepy,” writes one former student. “It
might have been a dead man’s voice slowly speaking on,
and if the light had gone out behind those dropped eye¬
lids, would it have made any diflEerence? But we who
listened day after day found the unusual manner nicely
fitted to convey the detached and slightly sardonic in¬
tellect that was moving over the face of things. His
detached, free-ranging intellect attracted, and yet it
seemed a mutilated personality. The scholarliness of his
mind was amazing and delightful. He held in memory
detail that would have overwhelmed most minds and
become an end in itself, and never lost the magnificent
charting of large design. . . . The quiet voice might in one
minute make the most adroit use of a bit of current slang
or popular doggerel to point out an opinion, and the next
might be quoting stanza after stanza of a medieval Latin
hymn.”
His domestic economy was as tangled as the political
economy which he sought to unravel. He was living at
Chicago with his wife, Ellen, but that did not prevent
him from carrying on notoriously, to the displeasure of
President Harper. When he went so far as to go abroad
v^dth another woman, his position on the campus became
intolerable. He began casting around for another post.
He had spent fourteen years at Chicago, reaching me
magnificent salary of one thousand doUars in 1903. But
the years were far from wasted, for his insatiably mquisi-
tive, voraciously acquisitive mind had finally begun to
the savage society of thorstein VEBLEN 217
bear fruit. In a series of brilliant essays and two remail^
able books he established a national reputation— although
more perhaps for oddity than for anything else.
His first book was vratten when Veblen was forty-two.
He was still a lowly instructor and that year he had gone
to President Harper and asked him for the customary
few hundred dollars^ raise. Harper replied that he did
not suflBciently advertise the university and Veblen re¬
plied that he had no intention of doing so. But for the
intercession of Laughlin, Veblen would have left; if he
had. President Harper would have missed a most signal
advertisement. For Veblen was about to publish Tlw
Theory of the Leisure Class. There is no indication that
he expected it to make an especial impression; he had
read it to some of his students, dryly remarking that they
would find it polysyllabic, and he had had to rewrite
it several times before the publishers would accept it.
But unexpectedly, it was a sensation. William Dean
Howells devoted two long reviews to it and overnight
tlie book became the vade mecxim of the intelligentsia of
the day: as an eminent sociologist told Veblen, “It
fluttered the dovecotes of tlie East.”
No wonder it excited attention, for never was a book
of sober analysis written with such pungency. One picked
it up at random to chuckle over its wicked insights, its
barbed phrases, and its corrosive view of society in which
elements of ridiculousness, cruelty, and barbarousness
nestled in close juxtaposition with things taken for granted
^d worn smooth with custom and careless handhng.
electric, grotesque, shocking, and amusing,
^d the choice of words was nothing less than exquisite.
A small sample quote:
h-.' Vf 1-?“ France ... is said to have lost
his hfe through an excess of moral stamina in the
observance of good foim. In the absence of the
S^t masters
suffered his royal person to be toasted beyond re-
2i8
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
covery. But in so doing, he saved his Most Christian
Majesty from menial contamination.
For most people the book appeared to be nothing more
than just such a satire on the ways of the aristocratic
class, and a telling attack on the follies and foibles of
the rich. And so, on the surface, it appeared to be.
Veblen, in his brocaded prose, embroidered the thesis
that the leisure class advertised its superiority through
conspicuous expenditure— blatant or subtle— and that its
own hallmark— leisure itself— was also enjoyed the more
fully by being dangled before the eyes of the public. In
a thousand examples it held up to acid examination the
attitude that “more expensive” necessarily meant “better.”
Thus, for example,
We all feel, sincerely and without misgiving, that we
are the more lifted up in spirit for having, even in
the privacy of our own household, eaten our daily
meal by the help of hand-wrought silver utensils,
from hand-painted china (often of dubious artistic
value) laid on high-priced table linen. Any retro¬
gression from tlie standard of living which we are
accustomed to regard as worthy in this respect is
felt to be a giievous violation of our human dignity.
Much of the book was concerned vrith such a scrutiny
of the economic psychopathology of our daily lives: the
canons of monetary propriety were spelled out as com¬
pletely and in as quaint a light as if they were a recently
exhumed archaeological find. That much of the book was
savored with relish by everyone; in a land of advertise¬
ment and keeping up with the Joneses, it was impossible
to do otherwise than shake one’s head and ruefully admire
the unmistakable self-portrait. r j* i Umxr
But the descriptions of our penchant for ^splay, how¬
ever amusing or to the point, were no more than toe iJlu -
trative material of the book. For as the title ^5’
this was an inquiry into the theory of the leisure class. A
though Veblen miglit stop along tlie route to commen
the savage society of thorstein veblen 2ig
the more striking local scenery, his interest lay at the
terminus of his journey, in such questions as What is tne
nature of economic man? How does it happen that he so
builds his community that it will have a leisure class?
What is the economic meaning of leisiure itself?
To the classical economists such questions would have
been answerable in terms of common sense. They saw the
world in terms of individuals who rationally sought to bet-
ter their own self-interest. Sometimes, as with Malthus
hopelessly multiplying laboring classes, brute human na¬
ture got the upper hand, but by and large mankind was
depicted as a collection of reasoning beings. In the com¬
petitive struggle some rose to the top and some stayed at
the bottom, and those who were fortunate or sagacious
enough to prosper quite naturally took advantage of their
fortune to minimize their labors. It was aU very simple
and quite reasonable.
But such a view of mankind made little sense to Veblen,
He was not at aU sure that the force which bound society
together was the interplay of rationally calculated “self-
interest'’ and he was not even wholly convinced that lei¬
sure was in and of itself preferable to work. His readings
had introduced him to tlie ways of little-noticed peoples:
the American Indians and the Ainus of Japan, the Todas
of the Nilgiri hills and the bushmen of Australia. And
these people, in tlieir own simple economies, seemed to
lack a leisure class entii*ely. Even more striking, in such
communities where the price of survival was labor, eveiy-
one worked, whatever his task, without feeling demeaned
by his toil. It was not considerations of profit and loss
which provided the positive drive of these economies, but
a natural pride of workmanship and a parental feeling of
concern for the futm*e generations. Men strove to outdo
each other in the honorable performance of their daily
stints and if abstinence from labor-leisure-was con¬
doned at an, it was certainly not respected.
But another kind of community also opened itself to
} ^ Polynesians and the ancient Icelanders
and the shogunates of feudal Japan were a different kind
of premdustrial society: they had well-defined leisure
2 20
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
classes. These classes, be it noted, were not idlers. On the
contrary, they were among the busiest members of the
community. But their “work” was all predatory; they
seized their riches by force or cunning and took no part
in the actual production of wealth by sweat or skill
But although the leisure classes took without rendering
any productive service in return, they did so with the full
approval of the community. For these were societies
which were rich enough to be able to afford a nonpro¬
ductive class and aggressive enough in spirit to admire
them: far from being regarded as wasters or spoilers,
those who rose to the leisured ranks were looked up to as
the strong and the able.
As a consequence, a portentous change in fundamental
attitudes toward work took place. The activities of the
leisure class— the winning of wealth by force— came to be
regarded as honorable and dignified. Hence, by contrast,
pure labor became tainted with indignity. The irksome¬
ness of work, which the classical economists thought to be
inherent in the nature of man himself, Veblen saw as the
degradation of a once-honorable way of life under the im¬
pact of a predatory spii'it: a community that admires and
elevates force and brute prowess cannot beatify human
toil.
But what had all this to do with America or Europe? A
great deal. For modem man, in Veblen s eyes, was only a
shade removed from his barbarian forebears. Poor Pro¬
fessor Edgeworth would have shuddered at the view, for
it entailed nothing less than the junking of his pleasure-
machines and the substitution in their stead of warriors,
chieftains, medicine men, braves, and an underlying pop¬
ulation of humble awe-stmck common folk. “The dis¬
cipline of savage life,” wrote Veblen in a later essay, has
been by far the most protracted and probably the most
exacting of any phase of culture in all the life-history of
the race; so that by heredity human nature still is, and
must indefinitely continue to be, savage human nature.
And so in modem life Veblen saw the heritage of the
past. The leisure class had changed its occupation, it had
refined its methods, but its aim was still the same-the
221
the savage society of thorstein veblen
predatory seizure of goods without work. It did not, of
course, any longer seek for booty or women; baibauc
it was no more. But it sought for money, and the accuiim-
lation of money and its lavish or subtle display became
the modern-day counterpart of scalps hanging on one s
tepee Not only was the leisure class still following the old
pr?Ltory pattern, but it was upheld by the old attitudes
of admiration for personal strength. In the eyes of society,
the members of the leisure class were still the more war¬
like and more fearsome members of society, and accord¬
ingly, the underlying common folk sought to ape their
betters. Everyone, workman and middle-class citizen as
well as capitalist, sought through the conspicuous expend¬
iture of money-indeed through its conspicuous waste—
to demonstrate his predatory prowess. “In order to stand
well in the eyes of the community,” explained Veblen, “it
is necessary to come up to a certain, somewhat indefinite
conventional standard of wealth; just as in the earlier
predatoiy stage it is necessary for the barbarian man to
come up to his tribe’s standard of physical endurance,
cunning, and skill at arms.” And similarly, in modern so¬
ciety not only did everyone vie for fierce excellence in the
eyes of his fellow man, but as part of the same process,
everyone “instinctively” felt the indignity which attached
to nonpredatory means of livelihood, such as work.
Does tliis sound farfetched? We are not accustomed to
thinking of om'selves as barbarians and we writhe under
the comparison or scoff at it. But for all its strangeness,
there is a strain of truth in Veblen’s observations. There is
a social derogation of physical toil as opposed to the more
genteel pursuits of office employment. There is the fact
that the accumulation of wealth typically proceeds _ at
least in the case of a successful executive— well beyond
the point of rational wants and needs. We need not accept
\ eblen s anthropological explanation ( which is rather
weak m the light of contemporary research into primitive
commumties ) to profit by his principal insight-that the
sTood S f behavior can be far better under¬
stood m terms of deep-buried irrationalities than in terms
222
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
of the nineteenth-centur>' prettification of behavior into
reasonableness and common sense.
Just what these inationalities are-psychological or an¬
thropological-need not detain us here. SuflBce it that
when we trace our actions to their souree, we find our¬
selves m a substratum buried far below the nice explana¬
tions of sweet reasonabihty. In their classic studv of Mid-
dletoicn for example, Robert and Helen Lynd found that
all but the poorest section of the working class retrenched
on food and clothing before it would cut certain “neces-
saiy luxuries, while in middle- and upper-class behavior
the standard of display for display’s sake is amply testified
to on the advertising pages of any magazine. No one is
exempt from the vims of competitive emulation, and if
only in a literary way, the attitudes of Veblen’s predatory
barbarians help us to understand our own.
And there is still a final conclusion to be drawn. The
notion of man as a thinly civilized barbarian does more
than explain the presence of a leisure class and the ac¬
ceptance of display as the norm of expenditure. It gives a
clue to the nature of social cohesion itself. For the earlier
economists were not too successful in explaining what
bound society together in the face of the powerful di¬
vergent interests of its component classes. If Marx’s view
was right, for example, and the proletariat was irreconcil¬
ably and diametrically opposed to the capitalist, what
prevented the revolution from breaking out at once? Veb-
len provides an answer. The lower classes are not at
swords’ points with the upper; they are bound up with
them by the intangible but steely bonds of common atti¬
tudes. The workers do not seek to displace their mana¬
gers; they seek to emulate them. They themselves acqui¬
esce in the general judgment that the work they do is
somehow less ^‘dignified” than the work of their masters,
and their goal is not to rid themselves of a superior class
but to climb up to it. In tlie theory of the leisure class lies
the kernel of a theory of social stability.
After the Leisure Class appeared in 1899, Veblen had
a reputation— although more as a satirist than as an econ¬
omist. The radicals and intellectuals adored him, but he
the savage society of thorstein veblen 223
despised their praise. His feUow economists stp ques¬
tioned whether he were a SociaHst, and wondered wheth¬
er to take him seriously or not. They were justifiably be¬
wildered: he praised Marx in one sentence and criticized
him in the next and his most serious social judgments were
often cloaked in a kind of intellectual drollery which
might be taken as morbid humor or as a perfectly straight-
forward sentiment.
But meanwhile Veblen was working on another book—
his own definition of the business system. "The book, I am
credibly told/' he wrote to a friend, Mrs. Gregory, “is still
more Teyond' or as my friends who have seen it say, be¬
side the point. Its name is The Theory of Business Enter¬
prise— o. topic on which I am free to theorize with all the
abandon that comes of immunity to the facts."
The new book came out in 1904. Factual or not, it was
even more coruscating and still more curious than his first.
For the point of view which it advocated seemed to fly in
the face of common sense itself. Every economist from the
days of Adam Smith had made of the capitalist the driv¬
ing figure in the economic tableau; whether for better or
worse, he was generally assumed to be the central genera¬
tor of economic progress. But with Veblen all this was
turned topsy-turvy. The businessman was still the central
figure, but no longer the motor force. Now he was por¬
trayed as the saboteur of the system!
Needless to say, it was a strange perspective on society
which could produce so disconcerting a view. Veblen did
not begin, as Ricardo or Mai'x or the Victorians, with the
clash of human interests; he began at a stage below, in
the nonhuman substratum of technology. What fascinated
him was the machine. He saw society as dominated by
the machine, caught up in its standardization, timed to its
regular cycle of performance, geared to its insistence on
accuracy and precision. More than that, he envisaged the
economic ^ocess itself as being basically mechanical in
character. Economics meant production and production
machinelike meshing of society as it turned out
goods. Such a social machine would need tenders of
course technicians and engineers to make whatever ’ad-
224
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
justmcnts were necessar>' to ensure the most efficient co¬
operation of the parts. But from an ov'er-all view, society
could best be pictured as a gigantic but purely matter-of-
fact mechanism, a highly specialized, highly coordinated
human clockwork.
But where would the businessman fit into such a
scheme? For the businessman was interested in making
money, whereas tlie machine and its engineer masters
knew no end except making goods. If the machine func¬
tioned well and fitted together smoothly, where w'ould
there be a place for a man whose only aim was profit?
Ideally, there would be none. The machine was not
concerned with values and profits; it ground out goods.
Hence the businessman would have no function to per¬
form— unless he turned engineer. But as a member of the
leisure class he was not interested in engineering; he
wanted to accumulate. And this was something the ma¬
chine was not set up to do at all. So the businessman
achieved his end, not by working within the framework
of the social machine, but by conspiring against it! His
function was not to help make goods, but to cause break¬
downs in the regular flow of output so that values would
fluctuate and he could capitahze on the confusion to reap
a profit. And so, on top of the machinelike dependability
of the actual production apparatus in the world, the busi¬
nessman built a superstructure of credit, loans, and make-
believe capitalizations. Below, society turned over in
its mechanical routine; above, the structure of finance
swayed and shifted. And as the financial counterpart to
the real world teetered, opportunities for profit constantly
appeared, disappeared, and reappeared. But the price of
this profit seeking was high; it was the constant disturb¬
ing, undoing, even conscious misdirecting of the efforts of
society to provision itself.
It is at first blush a rather shocking thesis. That busi¬
nessmen should work against the interests of production
seems worse than heretical. It sounds foolish.
But before we dismiss the theory as the product of a
strangelv warped and bitter mind, let us look again at the
scene from which Veblen drew his subject. This was, let
the savage society of thobstein veblen 225
US remember, the age of Amencan which Mat-
thew Josephson has aptly called the time of the robber
barons. We have already seen ^xanaples of the ariogance
the unaccountable, guiltless power which the business
titans wielded like so many barbarian chiefs, and we
know the bizarre lengths to which they went m the
achievement of their often predatory goals. But while aU
this is grist for Veblen s mill, it does not quite justify his
contention of sabotage. For that we must look at one fur¬
ther shortcoming of the robber barons: tJiese nwn were
uninterested in producing goods* o a v.
We might illustrate with an incident from 1868. At that
time Jay Gould was fighting Vanderbilt for control of the
Erie Railroad, in a lusty footnote to industrial history in
which Gould and his men were forced to flee across the
Hudson River in a rowboat and barricade themselves in
a New Jersey hotel. But it is not the primitive nature of
their combat which we now stop to remark, but their
total unconcern for the actual railroad itself. For while
he was fighting Vanderbilt, Gould had a letter from a
superintendent telling him:
The iron rails have broken and laminated and worn
out beyond all precedent until there is scarcely a
mile of your road, between Jersey City and Sala¬
manca or Buffalo, where it is safe to run a train at
the ordinary passenger or train speed, and many
portions of the road can only be traversed safely by
reducing the speed of all trains to 10 or 15 miles per
hour.
When accidents piled up, one vice-president of the line
said, The public can take care of itself. It is as much as
I can do to take care of the railroad’ —by which he meant
frantically shoring up its crumbling financial embank¬
ments.
And Gould was no exception. Very few of the heroes
of the Golden Age of American finance had much interest
in the solid realities of what underlay their structure of
stocks and bonds and credits. Later on, a Henry Ford
the worldly philosophers
might mtroduce an era of intensely production-minded
captains of industry, but the Harrimans, Morgans, Fricks,
and Rockefellers were far more interested in the exciting
manipulation of huge masses of intangible wealth than in
the humdrum business of turning out goods. Henry Vil-
lard, for example, was widely heralded in 1883 as a busi¬
ness hero; in that year he hammered in the Gold Spike
that cmmected his great transcontinental Northern Pacific
hne.;^ousands cheered; Chief Sitting Bull (who was
specially let out of jail for the purpose) formally ceded
the hunting lands of the Crow Tribe to the railroad- and
the economists declared that Villard’s financial peccadil¬
loes were as nothing compared with his organizing genius
His admirers might have felt differently had they known
of a letter written by James Hill, a rival railroad man. He
had suiveyed the Villard empire with a less enthusiastic
glance and declared: . , . the lines are located in good
country, some of it rich and producing a large tonnage;
but the capitalization is far ahead of what it should be
for what there is to show and the selection of routes and
giades is abominable. Practically it would have to be
built over''
Or a final example: the founding of the United States
Steel Corporation in 1901. Viewed through Veblen’s eyes,
the steel combine was a vast social machine for producing
steel, an assemblage of plants, furnaces, rail lines, and
mines under a common management for their more ef¬
ficient coordination. But this was only a minor considera¬
tion in the eyes of the men who “made” U. S. Steel. The
eventual monster company had real assets of some $682
millions, but against this had been sold $303 millions of
bonds, $510 millions of preferred stock, and $508 millions
of common stock. The financial company, in other words,
was twice as “big” as the real one and nothing more lay
behind its common stock than the intangible essence of
“good will.” In the process of creating these intangibles,
however, J. P. Morgan and Co. had earned a fee of
$12,500,000, and subscription profits to underlying pro¬
moters had come to $50,000,000. Altogether, it cost $150,-
000,000 to float the venture. But all this might have been
SOCIETY
227
condoned had the new monopoly been used f [he
Ee for the provision of steel. It was not. For thirteen
years steel rails were quoted at $28 a ton, whereas it co
less than half of that to make them. In other words, the
whole gain in technological unification was subverted to
the end of maintaining a structure of make-believe b-
nance. , _
In the light of the times, Veblen s theory does not seem
so farfetched. It stung because it described, almost in the
terms of a savage ritual, practices which were recognized
as the ultimate of sophistication. But his essential thesis
was all too well documented by the facts: the function of
the great barons of business was indeed very different
from the functions of the men who actually ran the pro¬
ductive machine. The bold game of financial chicanery
certainly served as much to disturb the flow of goods as to
promote it.
Oddly enough, the book created less of a furor than the
Theory of the Leisure Class. Business Enterprise never
leaped the bounds of professional readership to take the
country*s intelligentsia by storm, as its predecessor had
done. The economists themselves regarded the book with
an uneasy eye: how could one take entirely seriously a
book which was so clever as this one? A sampling of his
mordant humor describes the “watcliful waiting” of a
businessman.
Doubtless this form of words, “watchful waiting”
will have been employed in the first place to de¬
scribe the frame of mind of a toad who has reached
years of discretion and has found his appointed place
along some frequented run where many flies and
spiders pass and repass on their way to complete
that destiny to which it has pleased an all-seeing and
merciful Providence to call them; but by an easy turn
ot speech it has also been found suitable to describe
that ma^re order of captains of industry who are
governed by sound business principles. There is a
certain bland sufficiency spread across the face of a
228
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
toad SO circumstanced, while his comely bulk gives
assurance of a pyramidal stability of principles.
It was certainly a diflBcult book to appraise. Perhaps the
most unexpected commentary was that one reader wrote
to Veblen asking his advice on how to make money.
But the Theory of Business Enterprise was more than
an acid treatment of the business system. It was, as well,
a theory of social change. For Veblen believed that the
days of the business leaders were numbered, that despite
their power, there was ranged against them a formidable
adversary. It was not the proletariat (for the Leisure
Class had shown how the underlying population looked
up to its leaders), but a still more implacable foe: the
machine.
For the machine, thought Veblen, “throws out anthro¬
pomorphic habits of thought.” It forced men to think in
terms matter-of-fact, in terms precise, measurable, and
devoid of superstition and animism. Hence those who
came in contact with the machine process found it in¬
creasingly diflBcult to swallow the presumptions of “na¬
tural law” and social difEerentiation which surround the
leisure class. And so society divided; not poor against
rich, but technician versus businessman, mechanic against
war lord, scientist opposed to ritualist.
In a later series of books, principally The Engineers
and the Price Sijstem and Absentee Ownership and Busi¬
ness Enterprise, he spelled out the “revolution in greater
detail. Eventually a corps of engineers would be recruited
from society to take over the chaos of the business system.
Already they held the real power of production in their
hands, but they were as yet unaware of the incompatibil¬
ity of the business system with a system of true industry.
But one day they would take counsel among themselves,
dispense with the “lieutenants of absentee ownership
and run the economy along the principles of a huge, well-
ordered production machine. And if they did not. Then
business would increase in predatoriness until it eve^u-
ally degenerated into a system of naked
guised prerogative, and arbitrary command m which t
the savage society of thorstein veblen 229
businessman would give way to a recrudescence of the
old war lord. We would caU such a system fascism.
But to Veblen, writing on The Technicians and Renohi-
tion in 1921, it was aU a long way off. pere is nothing
in the situation that should reasonably flutter the sensi-
bihties of the Guardians or of that massive body of well-
to-do citizens who make up the rank-and-file of absentee
owners, just yet.” It is that “just yet” which is so typical
of the man. Despite the studied impersonality of Ins style,
his animus bristles through his writing. And yet, it is not
a personal animus, not the rancor of one who is privately
afiFronted, but the amused and ironical detachrnent of a
man apart, a man who sees that all this is transient, and
viHiol Qnri mfikft-hftlieve will in time give way to
something else.
This is not the time to make an appraisal of what he
said; that will come later. But we might note a curious
comparison. Veblens general approach reminds us of a
most un-Veblenesque figure— that strange half-mad Uto¬
pian Socialist, Count Henri de Saint-Simon. Remember
that Saint-Simon also extolled the producer and mocked
the ornamental functionary. Perhaps it will serve to tem¬
per our judgment of Veblen's scorn of the business over-
lord if we refiect that at one time Saint-Simon’s jibes at
“M. the brother to the King” must have similarly shocked
public sentiment.
The year 1906 was Veblen's last at Chicago. He was be¬
ginning to be famous abroad; he had attended a banquet
at wliich the King of Norway was present and in an un¬
usual display of sentiment had sent the menu to his
mother, who was deeply moved that her son had met a
king. But at home things were not so good. His philander-
ings had gone too far, and despite his books and his newly
won rank of assistant professor, his conduct was not such
as to advertise the university in the manner advocated by
President Harper.
He sought a new position. But his fame was closer to
notonety than repute and he had much difficulty in find¬
ing another post. Eventually he went to Stanford. His
230
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
reputation had preceded him; his fearsome scholarship
his personal untouchability, his extramarital proclivities!
All were amply vindicated. He impressed those few of his
colleagues who could endure his maddening refusal to
commit himself on anything, and he became known as
the last man who knew everything.^’ But his home eco¬
nomics were unchanged: on one occasion, hoping to be
tactful, a friend referred to a young lady staying at his
house as his niece. “That was not my niece,” said Veblen.
And that disposed of that.
His wife had divorced him in 1911. He must have been
an impossible husband ( he would leave the letters from
his admirers in his pockets where she would be sure to
find them), and yet, rather pathetically, it was she who
hoped that the marriage would eventually right itself. It
never did, more than temporarily; once when Ellen
thought that she was pregnant, Veblen sent her home in
a panic. He considered himself totally unfit to be a father
and rationalized his fears with anthropological arguments
on the unimportance of the male in the household. Finally
a divorce became an inescapable necessity. “Mr. Veblen,”
wrote Ellen at the end of a long letter of self-commisera¬
tion, “though his part of the bargain is to furnish me with
$25 a month— probably will not do it.” She was right.
The year of his divorce he moved on again, this time to
the University of Missouri. He stayed in the house of his
friend Davenport, a well-known economist— a lonely and
idiosyncratic man writing in the cellar. Yet it was a period
of great productivity for Veblen. He looked back on the
days at Chicago and summed up the perversion of cen¬
ters of learning into centers of high-powered public rela¬
tions and football in the most stinging commentary ever
penned on the American university; The Higher Learning
in America, While it was still in composition Veblen said,
half seriously, that it would be subtitled “A Study in Total
Depravity.”
But more important, he turned his eyes to Europe
where the threat of war was imminent, and he wrote
about Germany, comparing her dynastic and warlike
state to a tapeworm, in these vitriolic words: . . . t e
231
the savage society of thorstein veblen
tapeworm’s relation to his host is not something easy to
beatify in words, or even to authenticate in such con¬
vincing fashion as will ensure his affectionate ^etentio
on grounds of use and wont.” The book on Impenal Ge -
rmmj suffered an unusual fate; although the propaganda
office of the government wanted to use it for war pur¬
poses, the Post Office found in it so many remarks un¬
complimentary to Britain and the United States that they
barred it from the mails.
When war finally came, he oflFered his services to Wash¬
ington: this man, to whom patriotism was only another
symptom of a barbaric culture, was not devoid of it him¬
self. But in Washington he was juggled about li]<e a hot
potato; everybody had heard of him, but no one wanted
him. Finally they shelved him in an unimportant post in
the Food Administration. There he behaved like himself:
he wrote memoranda on how best to get in the crops
but since his suggestions involved a wholesale reorganiza¬
tion of rural social and business ways, they were called
“interesting” and ignored. He proposed a steep tax on the
employers of domestic servants in order to release man¬
power; that too was overlooked. It was a typical Veblen
proposal; butlers and footmen, he said, “are typically and
eminently an able-bodied sort, who will readily qualify
as stevedores and freighthandlers as soon as the day*s
work has somewhat hardened their muscles and reduced
their bulk.”
In 1918 he came to New York to write for the Dial, a
hberal magazine. He had recently published An Inquiry
into the Nature of the Peace in which he baldly stated
that the alternatives facing Europe were a pei*petuation
of the old order with all its barbarous incentives to war or
the abandonment of the business system itself. The pro¬
gram was at first talked about and then lost its fashion;
Veblen touted it in the Dial, but with every issue, the cir¬
culation dropped. He was asked to lecture at the newly
formed New School for Social Research with a bevy of
stars: John Dewey, Charles A. Beard, Dean Roscoe
Found. But even that turned sour; he was still a mumbler
in the classroom and his lectures, which were filled to
232
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
overflowing at first, were reduced to a handful in short
It was a strange mixture of fame and failure H L
Mencken has written that “Veblenism was shining in full
bnlhance There were Veblenists, Veblen Clubs Veblen
lemedies for all the sorrows of the world. There were in
Chicago, Veblen Girls-perhaps Gibson Girls grown m’id-
despairing.” But for the man himself there
was nothing. A bust of himself in the lobby of the New
School caused him such acute embarrassment that it was
finally less prominently displayed in the library. Person¬
ally, he was nearly helpless, nurse-maided through the
eveiyday problems of living by a few devoted former
students, Wesley Mitchell and Isadora Lubin, already im¬
portant economists in their own right. For a while he
watched eagerly for a sign of a new world to come: an
age of engineers and technicians, and he hoped that the
Kussian Revolution might usher in such an era. But he
was disappointed in what he saw, and as Horace Kallen
of the New School has written, “When the thing failed to
come off, he gave signs of a certain relaxation of will and
interest, of a kind of turning toward death. . . .”
Belatedly he was offered the presidency of the Ameri¬
can Economic Association. He turned it down with the
comment, “They didn’t offer it to me when I needed it.”
Finally he went back to CaLifomia. Joseph Dorfman, in a
definitive biography, tells of his arriving at his small cabin
in the West and thinking that someone had unjustly
seized his plot of land. “He took a hatchet and methodi¬
cally broke the windows, going at the matter with a dull
intensity that was like madness, the intensity of a physi¬
cally lazy person roused into sudden activity by anger.”
It was all a misunderstanding, and he settled there, in
home-built rustic furniture that must have reminded him
of his boyhood, in coarse workmen’s clothes purchased by
mail from Sears, Roebuck, disturbing nothing of nature,
not even a weed, and allowing the rats and skunks to
brush by his legs and explore his cabin as he sat immo¬
bile, wrapped in unhappy distant thoughts.
It was neither a happy nor a successful hfe on which to
the savage society of thorstein veblen 233
look back. A second wife, whom he had married in 1914,
had had delusions of persecution and had been in^itu-
tionalized; his friends were far away; his work had been
captured by the dilettantes and was largely disregarded
by the economists and unknown to the engineers.
He was seventy now and he wrote no more. “I have de¬
cided not to break the Sabbath,” he declared. It is such
a nice Sabbath.” His friends came to see him and found
him more distant than ever. He was subjected to adula¬
tion and received letters from self-appointed disciples.
“Can you tell me in what house in Chicago it was that you
did your early via*itings and if possible what room? in¬
quired one.
In 1929, a few months before the great crash, he died.
He left behind a will and this unsigned penciled injunc¬
tion: “It is also my wish, in case of death, to be cremated,
if it can conveniently be done, as expeditiously and inex¬
pensively as may be, without any ritual or ceremony of
any kind; that my ashes be thrown loose into the sea, or
into some sizable stream running into the sea; that no
tombstone, slab, epitaph, eflSgy, tablet, inscription or mon¬
ument of any kind or nature, be set up in my memory or
name at any place or at any time; that no obituary, me¬
morial, portrait, or biography of me, nor any letters writ¬
ten to or by me be printed or published, or in any way
reproduced, copied, or circulated.”
As is always the case, his request was ignored: he was
cremated and his ashes strewn out over the Pacific, but
his memorialization by the written word began immedi¬
ately.
What are we to think of this strange figure?
It is hardly necessap^ to point out that he went to ex¬
tremes. His characterization of the leisure class, for ex¬
ample, was a masterpiece of portraiture on one page, but
a caricature on the next. When he picks out the silent
ccmponent of wealth in our accepted canons of beauty,
when he slyly mentions that “the high gloss of a gentle-
man s hat or of a patent-leather shoe has no more in-
tnnsic beau^ than a similarly high gloss on a threadbare
sleeve, he is on sound ground and we must meekly ac-
234
THE
cept the judgment of snobbery that has ^
our taste. But when he writes “The vnlo* Passed on
thrift, which is nearly TmeparaWe rteft suggestion of
he shades ofi So Iwd X‘7 “'n','’'’ '
picked him up on that one- "Has?h*’'^'’“*i®
crossed a pattur? iuLSterbraTowl Z hf i,
Sift' tftid h'^ '"h r?’ “tern of the cow her”
Lsdytd-“ ^teppeTcam.
len“ ctertterSi™ oflh” T" “Siti-sl Veb-
alcyon days of American capitalism was a robber baron
thoueh Veblens portrait of him, chilling
of business was
^sceptible to change, and that the institution of business,
much as the monarchy in England, might adapt itself to a
vastly altered world. More to the point-because it is
closer to Veblen s own approach-he did not see that the
machine, that wholesale rearranger of life, would change
the na^re of the entrepreneurial function just as much as
It would alter the thought processes of the workman, and
that the businessman himself would be forced into a
much more bureaucratic mold by virtue of his duties as
a manager of a vast, ongoing machine.
It is true that Veblens infatuation with the machine
leaves us a little wary; it is a jarring note in a philosopher
otherwise so devoid of lyricism. It may be that machines
make us think matter-of-factly-but about what? Charlie
Chaplin in Modern Times was not a happy or well-ad¬
justed man. A corps of engineers might well run our
society more eflSciently, but whether they would run it
more humanely is another question.
Yet Veblen did put his finger on a central process of
change, a process that looms larger than any other in our
time and that had been strangely overlooked in all the in-
the savage society of thorstein veblen 235
vestigations of his contemporary economists. Tlmt process
was the emergence of technology and science as the lead¬
ing forces of historic change in the twentieth century.
There is no doubt that the watershed of the technological
age is as great as any in history, and that the gradual in¬
troduction of machinery into the finest interstices and
over the largest spans of life is accomplishing a revolution
comparable to that in which men learned to domesticate
animals or to live in cities. Like every great discoverer of
that which is obvious but has been unseen, Veblen was
far too impatient; processes that will take generations,
even centuries, he expected to mature in decades or even
years. Yet it is to his credit that he saw the machine as
the primary fact of economic life in his time, and for this
single brilliant illumination he must be placed in the front
rank of economic philosophers.
And then, too, he gave economics a new pair of eyes
with which to see the world. After Veblen’s savage de¬
scription of the mores of daily life, the classical picture
of society as a well-mannered tea party became increas¬
ingly difficult to maintain. His scorn of the old school was
bitingly expressed when he once wrote: “A gang of Aleu¬
tian Islanders, slushing about in the wrack and surf with
rakes and magical incantations for the capture of shellfish,
are held . . • to be engaged on a feat of hedonistic equil¬
ibration in rent, wages, and interest,’* and just as he ridi¬
culed the classical attempt to resolve the primitive human
struggle by fitting it into a fleshless and bloodless frame¬
work, so he highlighted the emptiness of trying to under¬
stand the actions of modem man in terms which derived
from an incomplete and outmoded set of preconceptions.
Man, said Veblen, is not to be comprehended in terms of
sophisticated economic laws in which his innate ferocity
and creativity are both smothered under a cloak of ra¬
tionalization. He is better dealt with in the less flattering
but more fundamental vocabulary of the anthropologist
or the psychologist: a creature of strong and irrational
drives, credulous, untutored, ritualistic. Leave aside the
pmconceptions of another age, he asked of the econo¬
mists, and find out why man actually behaves as he does.
236
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
His pupil, \\ esley Clair Mitchell, a great economic in-
yestigator in his own right, summed him up tliis way:
“There was the disturbing influence of Thorstein Veblen
—that ^•isitor from another world \\'ho dissected the cur¬
rent commonplaces m IucIi the student had unconsciously
acquired, as if the most familiar of his daily thoughts
were the curious products wrought in him by outside
forces. No other such emancipator of the mind from the
subtle t> rann\' of circumstance has been known in social
science, and no other such enlarger of the realm of in
quiry.”
IX
The Heresies of
John Maynard Keynes
A FEW YEARS before his death, Thorstein Veblen had
done something oddly out of character— he had taken
a plunge in the stock market. A friend had recommended
an oil stock, and Veblen, thinking of the financial prob¬
lems of old age, had risked a part of his savings. He made
a little money on the venture at first, but his inseparable
bad luck plagued him— no sooner had the stock gone up
than it was cited in the current oil scandals. His invest¬
ment eventually became worthless.
The incident is unimportant in itself except insofar as it
reveals one more tiny chink in Veblen s armor. And yet,
m another context, this pathetic misadventure is curiously
revealing. For Veblen himself had fallen victim to the
same dazzlmg lure tliat blinded America: when the most
disenchanted of its observers could be tempted to swal¬
low a draught, is there any wonder that the country was
drunk with the elixir of prosperity?
Certainly the signs of prosperity were visible at every
hand. Ainenca in the late 1920 s had found jobs for 45
milhon of Its citizens to whom it paid some $77 billions in
wages rents, profits, and interest-a flood of incomTSm
parable to nothing the world had ever seen. When Her-
with the^htl f simplicity, “We shall soon
with the help of God be within sight of the day when
237
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
poverty will be banished from the nation ” he may have
been shortsighted-as who was not?-but he rested his
case on the incontrovertible fact that the average Ameri¬
can family hved better, ate better, dressed better and
enjoyed more of the amenities of life than had any aver¬
age family hitherto in the history of the world.
The nation was possessed of a new vision, one a great
deal more uplifting than the buccaneering ideals of the
robber barons. John J. Raskob, chairman of the Demo¬
cratic party, gave it precise expression in the title of an
article he wrote for the Ladies Home Journal: “Ever\^-
body Ought to Be Rich.” “If a man saves $15 a week,”
wiote Raskob, and invests in good common stocks, at the
end of twenty years he will have at least $80,000 and an
income from investments of around $400 a month. He will
be I'ich.”
That bit of arithmetic merely presupposed that such a
man would keep reinvesting his dividends, figured at
about six per cent a year. But there was an even more al¬
luring road to riches. Had a devotee of Raskob's formula
spent his dividends and merely allowed his money to in¬
crease with the trend of stock prices, he would have
achieved his goal of wealth just as rapidly and a good
deal less painfully. Suppose he had bought stock in 1921
with the $780 he would have saved at $15 a week. By
1922 his money would be worth $1,092. If he then added
another $780 yearly he would have found himself worth
$4,800 in 1925, $6,900 a year later, $8,800 in 1927, and
an incredible $16,000 in 1928. Incredible? By May, 1929,
he would have figured his worldly wealth at over $21,000:
in less than nine years his saxangs of $7,020 would have
tripled. And when the Great Bull Market had gone on for
nearly half a generation in an almost uninterrupted rise,
w'ho could be blamed for thinking this the royal road to
riches? Barber or bootblack, banker or businessman,
eveiyone gambled and eveiyone won, and the only ques¬
tion in most people’s minds was why they had never
thought of it before.
It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the sequel. In that
awful last week of October, 1929, the market collapsed.
239
the heresies of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
To the brokers on the floor of the Stock Exchange it must
have been as if Niagara had suddenly burst through the
windows, for a cataract of unmanageable selling con¬
verged on the market place. In sheer exhaustion brokers
wept and tore their collars; they watched stupefied as im¬
mense fortunes melted like spun sugar; they shouted
themselves hoarse trying to attract the attention of a
buyer. The grim jokes of the period speak for themselves:
it was said that with every share of Goldman Sachs you
got a complimentary revolver, and that when you booked
a hotel room the clerk inquired, “For sleeping or jump-
ing?
When the debris was swept away the wreckage was
fearful to behold. In two insane months the market lost
all the ground it had gained in two manic years; $40 bil¬
lion of values simply disappeared. By the end of three
years our investor's inflated paper fortune of $21,000 had
diminished by eighty per cent; his original $7,000 of sav¬
ings was worth barely $4,000. The vision of Every Man a
Wealthy Man had been shown up as an hallucination.
In retrospect it was inevitable. The stock mai*ket had
been built on a honeycomb of loans that could bear just
so much strain and no more. And more than that, there
were shaky timbers and rotten wood in the foundation
which propped up the magnificent show of prosperity.
Chairman Raskob's formula for retirement was arithmet¬
ically accurate enough, all right, but it left unanswered
the important question of how a man was to save $15 out
of an average pay envelope which came to only $30.
The national flood of income was indubitably imposing
in its bulk, but when one followed its course into its mil¬
lions of terminal rivulets, it was apparent that the nation
as a whole benefited very unevenly from its flow. Some
twenty-four thousand families at the apex of the social
pyramid received a stream of income three times as large
as six million families squashed at the bottom-the aver-
age income of the foitunate families at the peak was six
mndredand thiHy times the average income of the fam-
ihes at the base. Nor was this the only shortcoming. Dis¬
regarded m the hullabaloo of limitless prosperity were
240
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Uvo million citizens out of work, and ignored behind their
ta9ade of classical marble, banks were failing at the rate
of two a day for six years before the crash. And then there
was the fact that the average American had used his pros¬
perity m a suicidal way; he had mortgaged himself up to
his neck, had extended his resources dangerously under
the temptation of installment buying, and then had en¬
sured his fate by eagerly buying fantastic quantities of
stock-some 300 million shares, it is estimated-not out-
right, but on margin.
Inevitable or not, it was far from visible at the time. It
was a rare day that did not carry the news of some typical
figure assuring the nation of its basic health. Even so
eminent an economist as Irving Fisher of Yale was lulled
by the supei-ficial evidences of prosperity into announcing
that we were marching along a “permanently high pla¬
teau a figure of speech given a macabre humor by the
fact that stocks fell off the brink of that plateau one week
to the day after he made his statement.
But dramatic as it was, it was not the wild decline of
the stock market which most damaged the faith of a gen¬
eration firmly wedded to the conviction of never-ending
prosperity. It was what happened at home. A few items
from those dreary years may serve to illustrate. In Mun-
cie, Indiana— the city made famous by its selection as
“Middletown”— every fourth factory worker lost his job by
the end of 1930. In Chicago the majority of working girls
were earning less than twenty-five cents an hour and a
quarter of them made less than ten cents. In New York s
Bowery alone, two thousand jobless crowded into bread¬
lines every day. In the nation as a whole, residential con¬
struction fell by ninety-five per cent. Nine million savings
accounts were lost. Eighty-five thousand businesses failed.
The national volume of salaries dwindled forty per cent;
dividends fifty-six per cent; wages sixty per cent.
And the worst of it, the most depressing aspect of the
Great Depression, was that there seemed to be no end to
it, no turning point, no relief. In 1930, the nation manfully
whistled “Happy Days Are Here Again,” but the national
income precipitously fell from $87 billions to $75 billions.
XHE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 24 1
In 1931 the country sang ^'IVe Got Five Dollars ; mean¬
while its income plummeted to $59 billions. In 1932 the
song was grimmer: “Brother Can You Spare a Dime?
national income had dwindled to a miserable $42 billions.
By 1933 the nation was virtually prostrate. The income
of the country was down to $39 billions. Over half the
prosperity of only four years back had vanished without
a trace; the average standard of living was back where it
had been twenty years before. On street corners, in
homes, in Hoovervilles, 14 million unemployed sat, haunt¬
ing the land. It seemed as if the proud spirit of hope had
been permanently crushed out of America.
It was the unemployment that was hardest to bear. The
jobless millions were hke an embolism in the nation’s
vital circulation; and while their indisputable existence
argued more forcibly than any text that something was
wrong with the system, the economists wrung their hands
and racked their brains and called upon the spirit of
Adam Smith, but could offer neither diagnosis nor rem¬
edy. Unemployment— this kind of unemployment— was
simply not listed among the possible ills of the system: it
was absurd, impossible, unreasonable, and paradoxical.
But it was there.
It would seem logical that the man who would seek to
solve this impossible paradox of not enough production
existing side by side with men fiiiitlessly seeking work
would be a Left-winger, an economist with strong sym-
pthies for the proletariat, an angry man. Notliing could
be further from the fact. The man who tackled it was al¬
most a dilettante with nothing like a chip on his shoulder.
Ihe simple truth was that his talents inclined in every
direction. He had, for example, written a most recondite
book on mathematical probability, a book that Bertrand
Russell had declared “impossible to praise too highly”-
then he had gone on to match his skill in abstruse logic
s i accumulated a fortune
riches: deahng m international currencies and com-
impressive yet, he had written his mathe-
atics treatise on the side, as it were, while engaged in
242
the worldly philosophers
government service and he piled up his private wealth
himself for only half an hour a day while still
But this IS only a sample of his many-sidedness. He was
an economist, of course-a Cambridge don with all the
dignity and erudition that go with such an appointment-
but when It came to choosing a wife he eschewed the
^dies of learning and picked the leading ballerina from
Diaghilevs famous company. He managed to be simul¬
taneously the darling of the Bloomsbury set, the cluster
of Britain's most avant-garde intellectual brilliants, and
also the chairman of a life insurance company, a niche in
hfe rarely noted for its intellectual abandon. He was a
pillar of stability in delicate matters of international di¬
plomacy, but his official correctness did not prevent him
from acquiring a knowledge of other European politicians
that included their mistresses, neuroses, and financial prej¬
udices. He collected modem art before it was fashionable
to do so, but at the same time he was a classicist with the
finest private collection of Newton's writings in the world.
He ran a theater, and he came to be a Director of the
Bank of England. He knew Roosevelt and Churchill and
also Bernard Shaw and Pablo Picasso. He played bridge
like a speculator, preferring a spectacular play to a sound
contract, and solitaire like a statistician, noting how long
it took for the game to come out twice running. And he
once claimed that he had but one regret in life— he wished
he had drunk more champagne.
His name was John Maynard Keynes, an old British
name (pronounced to rhyme with ‘Vains”) that could be
traced back to one William de Cahagnes and 1066.
Keynes was a traditionalist; he liked to think that great¬
ness ran in families, and it is true that his own father was
John Neville Keynes, an illustrious enough economist in
his own right. But it took more than the ordinary gifts of
heritage to account for the son; it w'^as as if the talents that
wnuld have sufficed half a dozen men were by happy ac¬
cident crowded into one person.
By a coincidence he was bom in 1883, in the very year
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 243
that Karl Marx passed away. But the two economists who
thus touched each other in time, although each was to
exert the profoundest influence on the philosophy of the
capitalist system, could hardly have differed from one an¬
other more. Marx was bitter, at bay, heavy and disap¬
pointed; as we know, he was the draftsman of Capitalism
Doomed. Keynes loved life and sailed through it buoyant,
at ease, and consummately successful to become the ar¬
chitect of Capitalism Viable. Perhaps we can trace Marx’s
passionate prophecy of collapse to the thread of neurotic
failure which marked his practical life; if so we can surely
credit Keynes’s persuasive salesmanship of reconstruction
to the exhilaration and acliievement which marked his.
His boyhood was Victorian, Old School, and premoni¬
tory of brilliance. At age four and a half he was already
puzzling out for himself the economic meaning of inter¬
est; at six he was wondering about how his brain worked;
at seven his father found him a “thoroughly delightful
companion. He went to a Mr. Goodchild’s preparatory
school where he gave evidence of his flair for handling his
fellow men: he had a “slave” who obediently trailed him
with his schoolbooks, a service rendered in exchange for
assistance with the knottier problems of homework, and
a “commercial treaty” with another boy whom he dis¬
liked: Keynes agreed to get the boy one book a week out
of the library in exchange for which the party of the sec¬
ond part agreed never to approach within fifteen yards
of the party of the first.
At fourteen he applied for and won a scholarship to
Eton. Horror stories on English public schools to the con-
tran^ he was neither sadistically abused nor intellectually
quashed. bloomed; his marks were superlative; he
won prizes by the score; bought himself a lavender waist¬
coat; acquired a taste for champagne; grew tall and
Tfo^STd mustache; rowed; became
!h« w ri " '■m.sual for
eadmaster made a speech; Keynes described it perfectly
^44 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
in five phrases: ‘It was the usual stufiF. Ought to show our
thankfulness; remember dignity of school; if anytliing
done must be of best; as always before.”
Eton was a vast success; Kings College at Cambridge
was to be a triumph. Alfred Marshall begged him to be¬
come a full-time economist; Professor Pigou-MarshalFs
heir-to-be— had him to breakfast once a week. He was
elected Secretary of the Union, a post automatically carry¬
ing an eventual presidency of one of the most famous
nongovernmental debating societies in the world; he was
sought out by Leonard Woolf and Lytton Strachey and
the nucleus of what was to be known as the Bloomsbury
group came into being; he climbed mountains ( Strachey
complained at the “multitudes of imbecile mountains”);
bought books; stayed up in the small hours arguing;
shone. He was a phenomenon.
But even phenomena must eat and there came the ques¬
tion of what to do. He had very little money and the pros¬
pect of an academic career offered less. And he had larger
visions: “I want to manage a railway or organize a Tmst,”
he wrote to Strachey; “it is so easy and fascinating to mas¬
ter the principles of these things.”
No one offered him a railway or a trust and he chose
instead to try the public route to success. He took the
civil service examinations with an apparent indifference
that made Strachey’s sister ask if his insouciance was a
pose. No, he had it all figured out and so what was the
use of fretting; he was sure to land in the top ten. Of
course he did; he was second, and his lowest mark was
in the economics section of the examination. The ex¬
aminers presumably knew less than I did, he explained
later, a remark which would be unforgivably presumptu¬
ous if it were not, in this case, entirely true.
Hence, in 1907 to the India Office. Keynes hated it He
was spending his freshest energies at home on an early
draft of his mathematical treatise, and he found the post
of a minor official in public office a far cry from runnmg
a railway. After two years he had had enough. His efforts
he declared, consisted in having one pedigreed buU
shipped to Bombay, and all that he had found m govern-
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 245
ment work was that an ill-considered remark might result
in your being “snubbed.” He resigned and went back to
Cambridge. But his years could not have been so utterly
useless. From what he learned of Indian affairs he wiote
a book in 1913 on Indian Currency and Finance which
everyone admitted to be a small masterpiece, and when a
Royal Commission was formed that same year to look in-
to the Indian currency problem Keynes at twenty-nine
was asked to be a member— a remarkable honor.
Cambridge was more to his liking. He was an immedi¬
ate success and as a mark of the esteem in which he was
held, he was given the editorship of the Economic Jour¬
nal, Britain's most influential economic publication— a post
he was to hold for thirty-three years.
Even more pleasant than Cambridge was Bloomsbury.
Bloomsbuiy was both a place and a state of mind; the
little group of intellectuals to whom Keynes had belonged
as an undergraduate had now acquired a home, a philos¬
ophy, and a reputation. Perhaps not more than twenty or
thirty people ever belonged to that charmed circle, but
their opinions set the artistic standards of England— after
all, it included Leonard and Virginia Woolf, E. M. For¬
ster, Clive Bell, Roger Fiy, Lytton Strachey. If Blooms¬
buiy smiled, a poet's name was made; if it frowned, a
painter was declasse. It is said that it could use the word
“really" in a dozen different intonations, of which sophis¬
ticated boredom was by no means the least. It was a
group at once idealistic and cynical, courageous and fra¬
gile. And slightly mad: there was the incident known as
the Dreadnought Hoax in which Virginia Woolf (then
Stephen) and a few co-conspirators dressed up as the
Emperor of Abyssinia and entourage and were thus es¬
corted vdth honors aboard one of His Majesty's most
closely guarded battleships.
In all of this, Keynes was a central figure; adviser
councilor, referee. He could talk about anything with
complete assurance: William Walton the composer^ Fred¬
erick Ashton the choreogi*apher, and many another artist
or professional was used to Kevnes's “No, no, vou're ab¬
solutely vTong about that . . His nickname, it might be
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
added was Pozzo, a sobriquet pinned on him after a Cor-
sican diplomat known for his multifarious interests and
his scheming mind.
It was a rather dilettantish beginning for one who
to set the capitalist world by its ears.
was
somewhat disrupted Bloomsbury.
Ke>mes was called to the Treasury and assigned to work
on Britain’s overseas finances. He must have been some¬
thing of a phenomenon there, too. An anecdote in point
was later recounted by an old associate: “There was an
urgent need for Spanish pesetas. With difficulty a smallish
sum was raked up. Keynes duly reported this to a relieved
Secretary to the Treasury who remarked that at any rate
for a short time we had a supply of pesetas. ‘Oh no!’ said
Keynes. ‘What!’ said his horrified chief. T Ve sold them
all; Tm going to break the market.’ And he did.”
He was soon a key figure in the Treasury. His biog¬
rapher and fellow economist, Roy Harrod, tells us that
men of ripe judgment have declared that Keynes con¬
tributed more to winning the war than any other person
in civil life. Be that as it may, he managed to find time
for other things. On a financial mission to France he was
seized with the bright idea that it would help balance the
French accounts with the Bi-itish if they sold some of
their pictures to the National Gallery. He thus casually
acquired a hundred thousand dollars’ worth of Corot,
Delacroix, Forain, Gauguin, Ingres, and Manet for the
British, and managed to get a Gezanne for himself: Big
Bertha was shelling Paris and prices were pleasantly de¬
pressed. Back in London he attended the ballet; Lydia
Lopokova was dancing the part of the beaut>^ in “The
Good-Humored Ladies” and she was the rage. The Sit¬
wells had her to a party where she and Kevnes met. One
can imagine Keynes with his classic English and Lydia
with her classic stmggles with English: “I dislike being in
the country in August,” she said, “because my legs get so
bitten bv barristers.”
But all this was tangential to the main thing-the settle¬
ment of Europe after the war. Keynes was now an im-
247
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
portant personage— one of those unidentified men one sees
standing behind the chair of a head of state ready to whis¬
per a guiding word. He went to Paris as Deputy for the
Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic
Council with full power to make decisions and as repre¬
sentative of the Treasury at the Peace Conference itself.
But he was only second echelon; he had a grandstand
seat but no power to interfere directly in the game. It
must have been an agony of frustration and impotence,
for at close quarters he watched while Wilson was out-
maneuvered by Clemenceau and the ideals of a humane
peace replaced by the achievement of a vindictive one.
*7t must be weeks since IVe written anyone,” he wrote
to his mother in 1919, ‘'but IVe been utterly worn out,
partly by work, partly by depression at the evil around
me. IVe never been so miserable as for the last two or
three weeks; the Peace is outrageous and impossible and
can bring nothing but misfortune behind it.”
He dragged himself from the sickbed to protest against
what he called the “murder of Vienna,” but he could not
stop the tide. Tlie peace was to be a Carthaginian one
and GeiTnany was to pay a sum of reparations so huge
that it would force her into the most vicious practices of
intemational trade in order to earn the pounds and francs
and dollars. This was not the popular opinion, of course,
saw that in the Versailles Treaty lay the un¬
witting goad for an even more formidable resurgence of
German autarchy and militarism.
He resigned in despair; then three days before the
treaty was signed he began his polemic against it. He
called It The Economic Consequences of the Peace; when
It appeared that December ( he wrote it at top speed and
Hir>0, It made his name.
and crushing. Ke>mes had seen
the protagonists at work and his descriptions of them
combined the skill of a novelist with the cutting insight
of a Bloomsbury critic. He ^vrote of Clemenceau that “He
kind Tnrl T and one disillusion-man-
md. mcludmg his onm colleagues not least”, and of Wil¬
son, . . . hke Odysseus, he looked vdser when seated ”
“4^ the worldly philosophers
But while his portraits sparkled, it was his analysis of the
naim that had been done that was unforgettable For
Keynes saw the Conference as a reckless settlement of
pohtical grudge in utter disregard of the pressing prob¬
lem of the moment-the resuscitation of Europe into an
integratmg and functioning whole.
The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues,
being preoccupied with others,— Clemenceau to crush
the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a
deal and bring home something that would pass
muster for a week, the President to do nothing that
was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that
the fundamental problems of a Europe starv'ing and
disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question
in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of
the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into
the economic field, and they settled it as a problem
of theology, of politics, of electoral chicane, from
every point of view except that of the economic fu¬
ture of the States whose destiny they were handhng.
And he went on to deliver this solemn waming:
The danger confronting us, therefore, is the rapid
depression of the standard of life of the European
populations to a point which will mean actual starva¬
tion for some ( a point already reached in Russia and
approximately reached in Austria). Men will not al¬
ways die quietly. For starvation, which brings to
some lethargy and a helpless despair, drives other
temperaments to the nervous instability of hysteria
and to a mad despair. And these in their distress may
overturn the remnants of organization, and submerge
civilization itself in their attempts to satisfy desper¬
ately the overwhelming needs of the individual. This
is the danger against which aU our resources and
courage and idealism must now cooperate.
The book was an immense success. The unworkability
249
the heresies of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
of the treaty was manifest almost from the moment of its
signing, but Keynes was the first to see it, to say it, and
to suggest an outright revision. He became known as an
economist of extraordinary foresight, and when the
Dawes Plan in 1924 began the long process of undoing
the impasse of 1919, his gift for prophecy was confirmed.
He was famous now, but there remained the question
of what to do. He chose business, the riskiest possible
business, and with a capital of a few thousand pounds he
began to speculate in the international market. He nearly
lost it all, was helped with a loan from a banker who had
never met him but who was impressed by his work during
the war, recouped, and went on to roll up a fortune
worth then two million dollars. It was all done in the
most casual way. Keynes disdained inside information-
in fact, he once declared that Wall Street traders could
make huge fortunes if only they would disregard their
“inside” information— and his own oracles were nothing
but his minute scrutiny of balance sheets, his encyclo¬
pedic knowledge of finance, his intuition into personali¬
ties, and a certain flair for trading. Abed in the morning
he would study his items of financial intelligence, make
his decisions, phone his orders, and that was that; the
day was now free for more important things, like eco¬
nomic theory. He would have gotten along famously with
David Ricardo.
He made money, by the way, not only for himself.
He became the Bursar of King’s College and turned a
small fund of £30,000 into one of £380,000. He managed
an investment trust and guided the finances of a life
insurance company. But he never did-despite his under¬
graduate wish— run a railway.
Meanwhile— there was always more than one thing
going on at a time with Keynes— he wrote for the Man¬
chester Guardinn, gave regular classes in Cambridge
in which he spiced diy theory with an intimate account
ot the goings on and personalities of the international
commodity marts, bought more pictures, acquired more
Lydia Lopokova. The ballerina be¬
came the wife of the Cambridge don, a new role which.
250 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
somewhat to the surprise (and relief) of Keynes’s friends
she failed to perfection. She gave up her professional
career, of cowse, but a visiting friend later reported
hearmg alarming thumps and crashes from above: Lydia
was still practicing her art.
She was extremely beautiful; he was altogether the
proper admirer, not handsome but taU and dignified. His
large, somewhat gawky frame provided a suitable
pedestal for a longish, triangular inquisitive face: a
stiaignt nose, a clipped mustache held over from Eton
days, full, mobile lips, and a rather disappointing chin.
The eyes were most revealing; under arching brows they
could be grave, icy, sparkling, or “soft as bees’ bottoms
in blue flowers,” as one editor wrote, depending, perhaps,
on whether he was acting as government emissary,
speculator, Bloomsbury brilliant, or balletomane.
There was one odd mannerism: Keynes liked to sit
like an English variant of a Chinese mandarin, with his
hands tucked out of sight in the opposing sleeves of his
coat. It was a gesture of concealment made all the more
curious because of his inordinate interest in other people’s
hands and his pride in his own. Indeed, he even went to
the extent of having casts made of his and his wife’s
hands and talked of making a collection of casts of his
friends’; and when he met a man the first thing he noticed
was the character of his pahns and fingers and nails.
Later, when he first talked with FrankUn Roosevelt, he
noted down this description of the President:
, . . But at first, of course, I did not look closely at
these things. For naturally my concentrated attention
was on his hands. Firm and fairly strong, but not
clever or with finesse, shortish round nails like those
at the end of a business man’s fingers. I cannot draw
them right, yet while not distinguished (to my eye)
they are not of a common type. All the same, they
were oddly familiar. Where had I seen them before?
I spent ten minutes at least searching my memory
as for a forgotten name, hardly knowing what I was
saying about silver and balanced budgets and public
THE HERESIES OF JOHN I^IAYNARD KEYNES 2^1
works. At last it came to me. Sir Edward Grey. A
more solid and Americanized Sir Edward Grey.
It is doubtful whether Roosevelt would have written
as he did to Felix Frankfurter: “I had a grand talk with
K. and liked him immensely,” had he knovim that he was
being summed up in the eyes of the other as a business¬
man's version of an Enghsh Foreign Secretary.
By 1935 it was already a brilliantly established career.
The book on Indian Currency and Finance had been a
tour de force, albeit a small one. The Economic Conse¬
quences of the Peace had made an eclat, and the Treatise
on Probability was an equal triumph, although far more
specialized. An amusing incident in regard to this last
book: Keynes was having dinner with Professor Max
Planck, the mathematical genius who was responsible
for the development of quantum mechanics, one of the
more bewildering achievements of the human mind.
Planck turned to Keynes and told him that he had once
considered going into economics himself. But he had
decided against it-it was too hard. Keynes repeated the
story with relish to a friend back at Cambridge. “Why,
that s odd, said the friend. “Bertrand Russell was telling
me just the other day that he d also thought about going
into economics. But he decided it was too easy.”
• ^ as we know;
in 1923 a Tract on Monetary Reform again raised the eye-
rows of the world Now Keynes was inveighing against
the fetishism of gold, against the peculiar passivity evi¬
denced by men s abdication of conscious control of their
own cuiTencies and their transfer of this responsibility to
e impel sonal mechanism of an international gold stand-
ard It was a technical book of course, but like all of
surely bVIdded^f up with telling phrases. One thrust wiU
S- of ^ ^ ^”Slish aphorisms: talk-
o ong run consequences of some venerable
Then to lop i, off. in 1930 he hod published a Treathe
^5^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
on Money-a long, difficult, uneven, sometimes brilliant
and sometimes baffling attempt to account for the be¬
havior of the whole economy. The Treatise was a fascinat-
ing book, for it took as its central problem the question
of what made the economy operate so unevenly-now
bustling with prosperity, now sluggish with depression.
The question, of course, had absorbed the attention of
economists for decades. Great speculative crashes aside
—like the 1929 bust and its predecessors in history (we
nave seen one such in eighteenth-century France when
the Mississippi Company collapsed) — the normal course
of trade seemed to evidence a wavelike succession of
expansions and contractions, not unlike a kind of econo¬
mic breathing. In England, for example, business had
been bad in 1801, good in 1802, bad in 1808, good in
1810, bad in 1815, and so on for over a hundred years;
in America the pattern. was the same although the dates
were slightly different.
What lay behind this altemation of prosperity and
depression? At first the cycles of business were thought
to be a sort of mass nervous disorder: '‘These periodic
collapses are really mental in their nature, depending on
variations of despondency, hopefulness, excitement, dis¬
appointment, and panic,” wrote an observer in 1867. But
although such a statement was undoubtedly a good
description of the state of mind in Wall Street or Lom¬
bard Street, Lancaster or New England, it left un¬
answered the basic question: What causes such a wide¬
spread nervous hysteria?
Some early explanations looked outside the economic
process for an answer. W. Stanley Jevons, whose Vic¬
torian economics of Pain and Pleasure we have met be¬
fore, ventured an explanation which pinned the blame on
sunspots— not quite so farfetched an idea as it might at
first appear. For Jevons was impressed by the fact that
business cvcles from 1721 to 1878 had an average dura¬
tion, from boom to boom, of 10.46 years, and that sun¬
spots (which had been discovered in 1801 by Sir William
Plerschel ) showed a periodicity of 10.45 years. The cor¬
relation, Jevons was convinced, was too close to be purely
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 253
accidental. Sunspots, he thought, caused weather cycles,
which caused rainfall cycles, which caused crop cycles,
which caused business cycles.
It was not a bad theory— except for one thing. A more
careful calculation of the sunspot cycles lengthened their
periodicity to eleven years and the neat correspondence
between celestial mechanics and the vagaries of business
broke down. Sunspots went the way of astronomy and
the quest for the motivating factors of business cycles
returned to more earthbound considerations.
It returned, as a matter of fact, to an area first bum-
blingly but intuitively pointed out by Malthus a century
before— the area of saving.
Perhaps we wiU remember the doubtings of Parson
Malthus— his rather inarticulate feeling that saving could
somehow result in a “general glut.” Ricardo had scoffed;
Mill had pooh-poohed; and the idea had become part of
the paraphernalia of tlie underworld. To say that saving
might be a source of trouble— why, that was impugning
thrift itself! It was almost immoral: had not Adam Smith
WTitten, ‘"What is prudence in the conduct of every pri¬
vate family can scarce be folly in that of a great nation”?
But when the early economists refused to consider that
saving might be a stumbling block for an economy, they
were not indulging in moral proselytizing; they were only
obsei-ving the facts of the real world.
For in the early 1800 s, by and large those who saved
were the very same people as those who put savings to
use In the hard-pressed world of Ricardo or Mill, vir¬
tually the only people who could aflFord to save were
wealthy landlords and capitalists, and any sums they
scraped together were profitably employed in buying
lands or enlar^ng factory operations. Hence saving was
nghtly called accumulation,” for it represented a two-
sided com; on the one hand the amassing of a sum of
money, and on tlie other hand its immediate employment
mom'mon^" buildings or land to make still
century, the
•ucture of the economy changed. Tlie distribution of
^54 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPILERS
wealth improved and along with it the possibility of sav-
mg became open to more and more members of so¬
ciety. And at the same time, business became larger
and more depersonalized; increasingly it looked for new
capital not just in the pockets of its individual manager-
owners but also in the anonymous pocketbooks of savers
all over the country. Hence saving and investing became
divorced from one another— they became separate opera¬
tions carried out by separate groups of people.
And this did introduce trouble into the economy —
Malthus was right after all, although for reasons he had
never seen.
The trouble is so important— so central to the problem
of depression— that we must take a moment to make it
clear.
We must start out by understanding how we measure
the prosperity of a nation. It is not by its gold— poverty-
stricken India is rich in gold. Nor is it by its physical
assets— buildings, mines, factories, and forests did not
evaporate in 1932. Prosperity and depression are not so
much matters of past glories but of present accomplish¬
ments; therefore they are measured by the incomes that
we earn. When most of us individually (and therefore
most of us collectively) enjoy high incomes, the nation
is well off; when our total individual (or national) in¬
come drops, we are in depression.
But income— national income— is not a static concept.
Indeed the central characteristic of an economy is the
floto of incomes from hand to hand. With every purchase
that we make, we transfer a part of our incomes into
someone else*s pocket. Similarly every penny of our own
incomes, be it wages, salaries, rents, profits, or interest,
ultimately derives from money which someone else has
spent. Consider any portion of the income which you
enjoy and it will be clear that it has originated from
someone else’s pocket: when he engaged your services,
or patronized your store, or helped maintain the coipora-
tion in which you own bonds or stock.
It is by this process of handing money around-taking
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 2 55
in each others wash, it has been described— that the
economy is constantly revitahzed.
Now to a large extent this process of handling income
around takes place quite naturally and without hindrance.
All of us spend the bulk of our incomes on goods for our
own use and enjoyment— on consumption goods, so-
called— and since we go on buying consumption goods
with fairly consistent regularity, the handing around
of a large portion of our national income is assured. The
fact that we must eat and clothe ourselves, and that we
crave enjoyment, ensures a regular and steady spending
on the part of all of us, and thus further ensures a regular
and steady receiving on the part of others.
So far eveiy thing is quite simple and direct. But there
is one portion of our incomes which does not go directly
out onto the market place to become another's income:
that is the money we save.
If we tucked our savings into mattresses or hoarded
them in cash, we should obviously bi*eak the circular flow
of income. For then we should be simply freezing some
part of the income stream that was handed to us, and
returning to society less tlian it gave to us. If such a
freezing process were widespread and continued, there
would soon be a cumulative fall in eveiybody's money
income, as less and less was handed around at each turn.
We should be suffering from a depression.
But this dangerous break in the income flow does not
in fact take place. For in a civilized community we do
not freeze our savings. We put them into stocks or bonds
or banks and in this way make it possible for them to
be used again. Thus, if we buy new stock we give our
savings directly to business; if we put our savings in a
’ they can be used on loan by businessmen who seek
capital. Whether we bank our savings or use them to buy
insurance or securities, the chamiels exist for those savings
to go back into circulation via the activities of business.
T lousiness,
ley a^ain turn up as someone's wages, someone’s salary
01 someone s profit.
But-and notice this vital fact-there is nothing auto-
^56 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
matic about this savings-investment channel. Business
does not ordinarily need savings to carry on its operations-
It works within its regular budget and pays its expenses
horn the proceeds of its sales. Business only needs savin^^s
iin fPeration-for its regular receip'ts
will not usually provide it with enough capital to Iniild
^ ^^ctory or to add substantially to its equipment.
And here is where the trouble enters. A thrifty com¬
munity will always attempt to save some part of its in¬
come. But business is not always in a position to expand
Its operations. To take an obvious case, it is apparent that
the days of great expansion for the radio industry-as
contrasted with the television industry-are pretty much
a thing of the past. Now if— for reasons we must look
into later-all industiy is in the position of the radio
industry, then obviously investment will be veiy small.
And therein lies the possibility of depression. If otir
^vmgs do not become invested bij expanding business
firms, our incojnes must decline. We should be in the
spiral of contraction as if we had frozen our
savings by hoarding them.
Can such an eventuality come to pass? We shall see.
But note meanwhile that this is a strange and passionless
tug of war. Here are no greedy landlords, no avaricious
capitalists. There are only perfectly virtuous citizens pru¬
dently attempting to save some of their incomes, and
perfectly vii'tuous businessmen who are just as pmdently
making up their minds whether the business situation
warrants taking the risk of buying a new machine or
building a new plant. And yet, on the outcome of those
two sensible decisions the fate of the economy hangs.
For if the decisions are out of joint— if businessmen invest
less than the community tries to save, for example— then
the whole economy will have to readjust to the crimp of
depression. The enormous question of boom or slump
depends— more than on anything else— on this.
The vulnerability of our fate to the seesaw of savings
and investment is, in a sense, the price we pay for eco¬
nomic freedom. Tliere is no such problem in Soviet Russia
nor was there such in the Egypt of the Pharaohs. For in
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 257
economies of edict both savings and investment are de¬
termined from above, and a total control over the nation s
entire economic life ensures that the nation s savings
will be just the right amount to finance its pyramids or
power plants. But not so in a capitalist world. For there
both the decision to save and the impetus to invest are
left to the free decisions of the economic actors them¬
selves. And because those decisions are free, they can be
out of joint. There can be far too little investment to
absorb our savings or far too little saving to support our
investment. Economic freedom is a highly desirable state
—but in bust and boom we must be prepared to face its
possible consequences.
We have almost lost sight of John Maynaid Keynes
and the Treatise on Money. But not quite. For the
Treatise was a sparkling exposition of this seesaw of
savings and investment. Tlie idea was not original with
Keynes— a long list of important economists had already
pointed to the critical roles of these two factors in the
business cycle. But, as with eveiything that Keynes
touched, the bare abstractions of economics took on a
new luster in his prose. Thus;
It has been usual to think of the accumulated wealth
of the world as having been painfully built up out
of that voluntary abstinence of individuals from the
immediate enjoyment of consumption, which we call
Thrift. But it should be ob\dous that mere abstinence
is not enough by itself to build cities or drain fens.
... It is Enterprise which builds and impz'oves the
worlds possessions. ... If Entei-prise is afoot, wealth
accumulates whatever may be happening to Thrift;
and if Enterprise is asleep, wealth decays whatever
Thrift may be doing.
But for all its masterful analysis, no sooner had Keynes
VTitten the Treatise than, figuratively, he tore it up. For
the seesaw theory of savings and investment failed at
one central point: it did not explain how an economy
258
the worldly philosophers
could remain in a state of prolonged depression. Indeed
as the very analogy of the seesaw indicates, it seemed
as if an economy which was weighted do\vn by surplus
r ofhe“ ^^Sht itself aL sw'ing
For savings and investment-Thrift and Enterprise-
\vere not utterly unconnected economic activities. On the
conttary, they were tied together in the market where
businessmen bought savings-or at least borrowed
them: the money market. Savings, like any other com¬
modity, had Its price: the rate of interest. Therefore (so
It seemed), at the bottom of a slump when there was a
flood of savings, its price should decline-exactly as when
there was a glut of shoes, the price of shoes declined. And
as the price of sayings cheapened-as the rate of interest
went down— the incentive to invest appeared very likely
to increase: if a new factory was too expensive to build
when the money for it would cost six per cent, might it
not look much more profitable when the money could be
had for a payment of only three per cent?
Hence the seesaw theory seemed to promise that there
would be an automatic safety switch built right into the
business cycle itself; that when savings became too abun¬
dant, they would become cheaper to borrow, and that
thereby business would be encouraged to invest. The
economy might contract, said the theory, but it seemed
certain to rebound.
But that was exactly what failed to happen in the
Great Depression, The rate of interest declined, but
nothing happened. The old nostrums were trotted out—a
pinch of local relief and a large dose of hopeful waiting
—and still the patient failed to improve. For all its intel¬
lectual elegance, something was patently missing from
the neat formulation of the swing of savings and invest¬
ment with the rate of interest always hovering over the
seesaw to see that it was kept in motion. Something else
must be holding the economy back.
Keynes’s master book had been brewing for some time.
“To understand mij state of mind,” he had vratten to
■HIE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 259
George Bernard Shaw in 1935— he had just reread Marx
and Engels at Shaw’s suggestion and found them little to
his liking, . . you have to know that I believe myself to
be writing a book on economic theory which will largely
revolutionize— not, I suppose at once, but in the course of
the next ten years— the way the world thinks about eco¬
nomic problems. ... I can’t expect you or anyone else
to believe this at the present stage. But for myself I don’t
merely hope what I say— in my own mind, Tm quite sure.”
He was, as usual, quite right. The book was to be a
bombshell. Yet it is very doubtful whether Mr. Shaw
would have recognized it as such had he attempted to
digest it. It had a forbidding title. The General Theory of
Employment^ Interest, and Money, and a still more for¬
bidding interior: one can imagine Shaw goggling on page
25 at “Let Z be the aggregate supply price of the output
from employing N men, the relationship between Z and
N being written Z = ^ (N), which can be called the
Aggregate Supply Fimction.” And if this were not enough
to frighten off almost anyone, there was a great dearth
of that panorama of social action which the layman had
come to expect from a perusal of Smith or Mill or Marx.
T^s was an endless desert of economics, algebra, and
abstraction, with trackless wastes of the ifferential cal¬
culus and only an oasis here and there of delightfullv
refreshing prose.
^d yet the book was revolutionary: no other word will
quite do. It stood economics as decisively on its head as
Jiad such ottier revolutionary works as the Wealth of
Nations or Das Kapital '
For the book had a startling and dismaying conclusion.
automatic safety mechanism after aUI
or dovm, but it could also be standing perfectly Sill And
It was just as capable of standing still on the ground floor
But how could this beP Would not the flood of savings
260
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
at the bottom of the slump push down the rate of interest
and would this not in turn interest business in the pos¬
sibility of using cheap money to expand its plant?
Keynes found the solution to the problem in the sim¬
plest and most obvious (once it had been pointed out)
fact of economic life: there would be no flood of saoin<rs
at the boUom of the trough For what happened when
an economy went into an economic tailspin was that its
income contracted, and what happened as its income
contracted was that its savings were squeezed out. How
could a community be expected to save as much when
everyone was hard up as when everyone was prosperous,
asked Keynes. Quite obviously, it could not. The result of
a depression would not be a glut of savings, but a drying-
up of savings; not a flood of saving, but a hackle.
And so it was, in fact. In 1929 the American private
citizenry put aside $3.7 billions out of its income; by
1932 and 1933 it was saving nothing—in fact it was even
drawing do\vn its old savings made in the years before.
Corporations, which had tucked away $2.6 billions at the
top of the boom after paying out taxes and dividends,
found themselves losing nearly $6 billions three years
later. Quite obviously Keynes was right; saving was a
kind of luxury which could not withstand hard times.
But the practical consequence of that decline in saving
was more portentous than the individual tragedies which
accompanied it. It resulted in a paralyzing situation where
the economy was in perfect economic balance, even
though it was in the throes of social agony. For if there
was no surplus of savings, there would be no pressure
on interest rates to encourage businessmen to borrow.
And if there was no surplus of investment (and the very
essence of depression, as we have seen, is that investment
is not large enough), then there would be no impetus
for expansion. The economy would not budge an inch.
Thus the paradox of poverty amidst plenty and the
anomaly of idle men and idle machines. To be sure, at
the bottom of a slump there is a heartless contradiction
between a crying need for goods and an insuflSciency of
production. But the contradiction is purely a moral one.
261
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
For the economy does not operate to satisfy human wants
—wants are always as large as dreams. It turns out goods
to satisfy demand— ond demand is as small as a person's
pocketbook. Hence the unemployed are little more than
economic zeros; they might as well be on the moon for
all the economic influence they exert on the market place.
Once investment has declined and the economy has
shnmk in size, social misery appears. But not— as Keynes
points out— effective social misery: the nation's conscience
will not do as an ejBFective substitute for enough invest¬
ment. And since savings decline along with investment,
the economic flow turns over evenly, quite unperturbed
by the fact that it is smaller than it used to be.
A peculiar state of aflFairs, indeed: a ti*agedy without a
villain. No one can blame society for saving, when saving
is so apparently a private viitue; it is equally impossible
to chastise businessmen for not investing when no one
would be so happy to comply as they— if they saw a
reasonable chance for success. No, the diflSculty is no
longer a moral one; this is no question of justice, exploita¬
tion, or even human foolishness. It is a technical difficulty,
almost a mechanical fault. But its price is no less high
for all of that. For the price of inactivity is unemployment.
But worse follows. Keynes had explained how an
economy in the trough of depression could fail to generate
its own automatic recovery. That was gloomy enough.
But when you turned the Keynesian proposition around,
it gelled trouble at the top of the business cycle as well.
For just as savings contracted when the economy
contracted, so they would expand when the economy
expanded. And that simple fact had a frightening con-
sequence.- It meant that every boom was constantly
thieatened wtth collapse. For if at any time investment
^ontaneously slowed down, the nation s swollen savings
around of mcomes would be broken, and the process of
contraction would begin. process ot
analysis, the economy hung on the
investaent business carried out. When
investment was low, the economy shrank in size; when
262
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
investment was high, it pulled the nation up with it- if in
vestment failed to remmn high, it pei-mitted the p’roeess
of contraction to begin again. Riches and poverty boom
and slump, all depended on the willingness of business
And here was the most indigestible fact of all. The
wilhngness to invest could not go on indefinitely. Sooner
or later, investment was bound to contract
For at any time, an industry is limited by the size of
the market to ^^'hlch it caters. Let us take the example of
the lailroads in the 1860’s-a time of vast investment in
new railroad lines. The early railway magnates were not
building for the markets of I960; had they proceeded
to lay the trackage the economy would need a hundred
yeais hence, they would have been building lines to non¬
existent cities in uninhabited territory. So they built what
could be used— and then they stopped. Similarly with the
auto industry. Even if Henry Ford had been able to find
the capital to build the present-day River Rouge plant in
1910, he would have gone bankrupt in a hurry: the roads,
the gas stations, the demand for that many cars were
simply lacking. Or to bring the matter to the present, the
country’s utility plants are now spending $8 billions a
year to add to their capacity; but they cannot spend $80
or even $18 billions— although someday they may have to.
. no one could use that much power.
Not only is investment limited in size, but typically it
proceeds in spurts. You cannot build a railway line mile
by mile to keep pace with demand: you build one entire
line at a time. You cannot enlarge an auto plant piece¬
meal l'>eyond a certain size: then you must build an
entirely new plant. And having built that line, having
constructed that plant, you have satisfied the market
for a time. You cease investing.
Ancient Egypt [wrote Keynes] was doubly fortunate
and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in that
it possessed two acti\aties, namely pyramid-building
and the search for the precious metals, the fruits of
which, since they could not serve the needs of man
THE HERESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 263
by being consumed, did not stale with abundance.
TTie Middle Ages built cathedrals and sang diiges.
Two pyramids, two masses for the dead are twice as
good as one; but not so two railways from London
to York.
And so investment typically has its pattern: at first
eagerness to take advantage of a new opportunity; then
caution lest enthusiasm lead to overbuilding; then in¬
activity when the market has been satisfied for the time
being.
If, as each separate investment project came to a halt,
another immediately appeared, there need never be a
slump. But such is not likely to be the case. The mere
fact that human wants are vast does not mean that any
investment will pay for itself: the economy is littered with
businesses which have died of rash and foolhardy over¬
expansion. Most investment needs more than the stimu¬
lus of sanguine expectations; it needs something more
concrete: some new invention, some better way of doing
things, some intriguing product to catch the public eye.
And such opportunities, as any businessman will tell you,
are not always there.
Hence when one investment project dies, there may not
be another ready to step into the breach. If there is-if
mvestment maintains its size, although it changes its com-
position-the economy, will sail smoothly along. But if
mere is no ready substitute for each investment casualty
Ae pressure of savmgs wiU malce |tself felt and contrac¬
tion will begin. And needless to say, investment does not
thrive in such a dwindling market.
gloomy diagnosis of The General
First that an economy in depression mwht well stau
if prosperity depended on investment- for
And third, that investment was an undependable drive
-^4 the worldly philosophers
u heel for the economy; through no fault of the business¬
man It teas constantly threatetxed with satiety, and satiety
spellec] economic shrinkage.
In a word, the economy lived in the shadow of collapse.
Certainly it was a morbid outlook. But it would have
been utterly unlike Ke>Ties to content himself with mak-
imj; a diagnosis of gloom and letting it go at that. With
all its prophecy of danger. The General Theory was ne\’er
meant to be a book of doom. On the contrarv, it held out
a promise and it proposed a cure.
As a matter of fact, the cure had begun before its actual
prescription was WTitten; the medicine was being applied
before the doctors were precisely sure what it "was sup¬
posed to do. Tlie Hundred Days of the New Deal had
enacted a flood of social legislation that had been backing
up for twenty years behind a dam of go\’ernmental
apathy. These laws were meant to improve the social
tone, the morale, of a discontented nation. But it was
not social legislation which was designed to re\'italize the
patient. That tonic was something else: the deliberate
undertaking of government investment.
It be gan not so much as investment as makeshift work-
relief. Unemplo\anent had reached the point at which
some sort of action was dictated by pure political neces¬
sity'— after all, this was a time when there had recently
been riots in Dearborn and a ragged march on ^^^ashing-
ton, when families huddled for warmth in municipal
incinerator buildings and even scrabbled for food in
O
garbage trucks. Relief was essential and began under
Hoover: then under Roosevelt relief turned into leaf-
raking. and leaf-raking turned into constructive enterprise.
The go\ ei*nment was suddenly a major economic investor
itself: roads, dams, auditoriums, aii*fields, harbors, and
housing projects blossomed forth.
Ke\'nes came to Washington in 1934 — this was when
he made his notes on the impression of President Roose-
\'elt’s hands— and urged that the program be extended
further. The statistics showed that the bottom had fallen
out of pri\'ate investnient acti\dt\L* business expansion.
the heresies of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 265
which had pumped out $15 billions in wages and salaries
and profits in 1929, had fallen to the appalling figure of
$886 millions in 1932-a drop of ninety-four per cent.
Something had to start up the investment motor which
pulled the economic car up the shaft, and he hoped that
government spending would act as such a stimulus by
bolstering the nations general buying power— “priming
the pump” it was called in those days.
Hence when The General Theory came out in 1936,
what it offered was not so much a new and radical pro¬
gram as a defense of a course of action which was already
being applied. A defense and an explanation. For The
General Theory clearly pointed out that the catastrophe
facing America and, indeed, the whole Western World,
was only the consequence of a lack of sufficient invest¬
ment on the part of business. And so the remedy was
perfectly logical: if business was not able to expand, the
government must take up the slack.
With his tongue only partly in his cheek Keynes had
written :
If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with bank
notes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coal
mines which are then filled up to the surface with
town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on
well tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes
up again . . . there need be no more unemployment
and with the help of the repercussions, the real in¬
come of the community would probably become a
good deal larger than it is. It would, indeed, be
more sensible to build houses and the like; but if
there are practical difficulties in the way of doing
this, the above would be better than nothing.
To some it no doubt appeared that many of the more
unorthodox WPA projects were no more sane than
Keynes s whimsical proposal. But now, at least, they had
un'^Jbr^i^ ^ private enterprise found itself
mvestment, then the government mu.t fill i, ” as C "
266
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
could— the need for stimulation of some sort was so im-
perative that almost anything was better than nothing
And if investment could not be directly stimulated
why then, at least consumption could. For while invest¬
ment was the capricious element in the system con¬
sumption provided the great floor of economic activity
hence the WPA projects were thought to attack the
problem with a two-edged sword: by dkectly helping
to sustain the buying power of the otherwise unemployed,
and by leading the way for a resumption of private busi-
ness expansion.
Keynes himself in a letter to The New York Times in
1934 wrote, “I see the problem of recovery in the follow-
ing light: How soon will normal business enterprise come
to the rescue? On what scale, by which expedients, and
for how long is abnormal government expenditure ad¬
visable in the meantime?’'
Note abnonnal. Keynes did not see the government
program as a permanent interference with the course of
business or as anything but a helping hand to a system
that had slipped and was stinggling to regain its balance.
It seemed the essence of common sense; in fact it was
the essence of common sense. And yet the pump-priming
program never brought the results that the planners had
hoped for. Total government spending, which had
hovered at the $10-billion level from 1929 until 1933, rose
to $12 billions, to $13 billions, then to $15 billions in 1936.
Private investment picked itself up from the floor and
recovered two-thirds of its loss: private firms invested
$10 billions by 1936. The national income and national
consumption rose by fifty per cent after three years of
government injections. And yet unemployment lingered
on; it was manageable now, but there were still at least
9 million out of work— hardly a mark of a new economic
era.
There were two reasons why the cure did not work
better. First, the govemment program of investment was
never carried out to the full extent that would have been
necessary to bring the economy up to full employment.
Later, in the Second World War, govemment spending
the heresies of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 267
rose to the monumental figure of $103 billions: that
brought not only full employment, but inflation. But with¬
in the framework of a peacetime economy in the thirties,
such all-out spending was quite impossible; indeed, even
a modest program of government investment soon
brought mui-murs that Federal power was overstepping
its traditional bounds.
The second reason is closely allied with the first.
Neither Keynes nor the government spenders had taken
into account that the beneficiaries of the new medicine
might consider it worse than the disease. Government
investment was meant as a helping hand for business. It
was interpreted by business as a threatening gesture.
Nor is this surprising. The New Deal had swept in on
a wave of antibusiness sentiment; values and standards
that had become virtually sacrosanct were suddenly held
up to skeptical sci*utiny and criticism. The whole con¬
ception of ‘T)usiness rights,” "property rights,” and the
“role of goveiTiment” was rudely shaken; within a few
years business was asked to forget its traditions of un¬
questioned pre-eminence and to adopt a new philosophy
of cooperation with labor unions, acceptance of new mles
and regulations, reform of many of its practices. Little
wonder that it regarded the government in Washington
as inimical, biased, and downright radical. And no won¬
der, in such an atmosphere, that its eagerness to under¬
take large-scale investment was dampened by the un¬
easiness it felt in this unfamiliar climate.
Hence eveiy effort of the government to undertake a
program of suflScient magnitude to mop up all the un¬
employed— perhaps a program twice as large as it did in
fact undeitake-was assailed as further evidence of social¬
ist design. And at the same time, the halfway measures
which the government did employ were just enough to
fiighten business away from the undertaking of a full-
scale eflFort by itself. It was a situation not unUke that
found m medicine; the medicine cured tire patient of one
Illness, only to weaken him with its side effects. Govern¬
ment spending never truly cured the economy-not be-
268 THE WOBLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
cause it was economically unsound, but because it was
ideologically upsetting.
It was not meant to be upsetting; it was a policy bom
of desperation rather than design. Had the government
not begun to open the valve of public investment, eventu¬
ally private business would surely once again have led
the way: it always had in the past, and despite the
seventy of the Great Depression, it would in time un¬
questionably have found new avenues of adventure. But
it was impossible to wait. The American people had
waited for four long years, and they were in no mood to
wait much longer. Not only were there disturbances in
the land, but there were troubling voices in the air. The
voice of Marx rang louder than it ever had in the past;
many pointed to the unemployed as prima-facie evidence
that Marx was right. The mumble of Veblen was discer¬
nible in the faddish vogue of the technocrats who wanted
to call out not the proletariat but the engineers. And
there was the still more chilling voice that never wearied
of pointing out that Hitler and Mussolini knew what to do
with their unemployed. In this welter of remedies and
advocacy of desperate action, the voice of The General
Theory, the gentlemanly tones of Keynes, were certainly
moderate and reassuring.
For while Keynes espoused a policy of managing capi¬
talism, he was no opponent of private enterprise. “It is
better that a man should tyrannize over his bank-balance
than over his fellow citizens,” he had written in The
General Theory, and he went on to state that if the
government would only concern itself with providing
enough investment, the working of the vast bulk of the
economy could and should be left to private initiative.
In review. The General Theory was not a radical solu¬
tion; it was, rather, an explanation of why an inescapable
femedy should work. If an economy in the doldmms
could drift indefinitely, the price of government inaction
might be graver by far than the consequences of bold
unorthodoxy.
The real question was a moral, not an economic one.
During the Second World War, Professor Hayek wrote
the heresies of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 269
a book The Road to Seiidom, which, for all its exaggera¬
tions, contained a deeply felt and sincere indictment ot
the overplanned economy. Keynes sympathized with and
liked the book. But while praising it, he wrote to Hayek:
I should . . . conclude rather diflFerently. I should say
that what we want is not no planning, or even less
planning, indeed I should say we almost certainly
want more. But the planning should take place in a
community in which as many people as possible,
both leaders and followers, wholly share your own
moral position. Moderate planning will be safe
enough if those carrying it out are rightly oriented
in their own minds and hearts to the moral issue.
This is in fact aheady true of some of them. But the
curse is that there is also an important section who
could be said to want planning not in order to enjoy
its fruits, but because morally they hold ideas exactly
the opposite of yours, and wish to serve not God but
the devil.
Is this, perhaps a naive hope? Can capitalism be
managed— in the sense that government planners wiU
turn the faucet of investment on and off in such a way as
to supplement, but never to displace, private investment?
Certainly this is one of the central issues of today. But let
us postpone discussion of it to the coming chapter.
For here we are deahng with the man Keynes and his
beliefs, however misguided, idealistic, impractical, or
salutary we may value them. And it would be a giave
error in judgment to place this man, whose aim was to
rescue capitalism, in the camp of those who want to
submerge it. Time, he urged the socialization of invest¬
ment; but if he saciificed the part, it was to save the
whole.
For at heart he was a conservative and not much in¬
clined to mask the fact. ‘‘How can I accept the [com¬
munistic] doctrine,” he had wi'itten in 1931— when the
point was by no means so clear to many others, “which
sets up as its bible, above and beyond criticism, an obso-
270
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
lete textbook which I know not only to be scientifically
erroneous but without interest or application to the
modern world? How can I adopt a creed which, prefer-
rmg the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish proletariat
above the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, who with all
their faults are the quality of life and surely carry the
seeds of all human achievement?’'
No, one might quibble with his theories, with his diag¬
nosis, and with his cure-although, in justice, it must be
said that no more thoughtful theory, no profounder
diagnosis, and no more convincing cure has yet been pro¬
pounded by those who insist that Keynes was only a
mischievous meddler with a system that worked well
enough. But no one could gainsay his aim: the creation
o a capitalist economy in which unemployment— the
single gieatest and gravest threat to its continuance—
would be forever eliminated.
He was a man incapable of doing only one thing at a
time. While he was constructing The General Theory in
his mind, he was building a theater in Cambridge with
his pocketbook. It was a typically Keynesian venture.
Starting at a loss, the theater was in the black in two
years, and its artistic success was immense. Keynes was
everywhere at the same time: financial backer, ticket
taker ( on one occasion when the clerk failed to material¬
ize), husband of the leading lady (Lydia acted in
Shakespeare, with extremely good notices), even con¬
cessionaire. He attached a restaurant to the theater and
jealously watched its receipts, graphing them against
different types of entertainment to ascertain how food
consumption varied with the state of one’s humor. There
was a bar, too, where champagne was sold at a specially
low discount to promote its wider consumption. It was
probably the most pleasant interlude in his pleasant life.
But it did not go on for long. In 1937 his success story
was cut short; he suffered a heart attack and was forced
into idleness. Well— comparative idleness. He continued
to do an active trading business and to edit the Economic
Journal and to write a few brilliant articles in defense of
271
the heresies of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
The General Theory, One academician had said, upon its
appearance, “Einstein has actually done for Physics what
Mr. Keynes believes himself to have done for Economics, "
and Keynes was not a man to let someone get away with
that. When he wanted to, he could wield an acid pen,
and he now set to work systematically to demolish his
critics, singly and en masse; sometimes with sarcasm,
occasionally with brilhance, and not infrequently with
petulance: “Mr. X refuses to understand me,” seemed to
rise like a sigh of despair from many of his brief com¬
munications.
But the war was approaching; Munich was followed by
worse. Keynes watched in indignation the pusillanimous
letters of some Left-wingers to the New Statesman and
Nation, on whose board he managed to find time to serve.
He wrote to its columns; “Surely it is impossible to be¬
lieve that there can really be such a person as ‘A Socialist'!
I disbeheve in his existence,” and then, “When it comes
to a showdown, scarce four weeks have passed before
they remember that they are pacifists and write defeatist
letters to your columns, leaving the defence of freedom
and civilization to Colonel Blimp and the Old School Tie,
for whom Three Cheers.”
When the war came, Keynes was too ill to be a perma¬
nent member of tlie government. They gave him a room
in the Treasury and picked his brains. He had already
written another book, How to Pay for the War, a daring
plan that urged defeired savings as the principal means
of financing the war. The plan was simple— a portion of
eveiy wage earner s pay would automatically be invested
in government bonds wliich would not be available for
redemption until after the war. Then, just when consumer
buying would again be needed, the savings certificates
could be cashed.
Compulsory saumg-what a change from his earlier
efforts to achieve a kind of compulsory mvestment! But
die change was m the times and not in Keynes’s tliinking.
The old problem had been too little investment and its
symptom had been unemployment. The new problem
was too much mvestment-an all-out annament^efFort-
272
the worldly philosophers
and its symptom was inflation. But the framework of
The General Theory was as useful in understancliiw
inflation as it had been in understanding inflation’s op^
posite-unemployment. Only it was upside down. Now
more and more incomes were being handed out with each
turn of the whee , instead of less and less. Now savings
were far short of what was needed to balance out the
flow of income, instead of being embamassingly large.
_ Accordmgy, the cure was the opposite of the depres¬
sion tonic Then Keynes had urged that investment be
bolsteied by every possible means; now he urged that
savings must be increased.
_ The point is important because many have mistakenly
judged Keynes as an economist who favored inflation. He
did tayor reflation” ( a pumping-up of incomes and not
juices) from the depths of the depression. But to think
that he favored inflation for inflation’s sake was to dis¬
regard such a passage as this from The Economic ConsC’
quences of the Peace:
Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to
destioy the Capitalist System was to debauch the
currency. By a continuing process of inflation, gov¬
ernments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an
important part of the wealth of their citizens. By
this method they not only confiscate, but they con¬
fiscate arbitrarily, , , . Lenin was certainly right.
There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning
the existing basis of society than to debauch the
currency. The process engages all the hidden forces
of economic law on the side of destruction, and does
it in a manner which not one man in a million is
able to diagnose.
But despite its logic and its appeal— Keynes made much
of the fact that his deferred savings plan would serve to
widen the distribution of wealth by making everyone an
owner of government bonds— the plan failed to arouse
much support. It was too new; the old methods of taxa¬
tion and rationing and voluntary-savings drives were
the HEBESIES of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
h-ied and tmsty weapons of war finance A
scheme was tacked on as an ornamental Houiish bu
was never given the central place Keynes had envisaged
for it
^But he had no time to lament its cool reception; he was
now fully embroiled hi the British war effort. In 1941
he flew via Lisbon to the United States. It was to be the
first of six such trips; Lydia went with him as his nuise
and guardian. Ever since his first heart attack she had
assumed the role of timekeeper for her indefatigable
husband and many a dignitary had been politely but
firmly ushered out at the expiration of his allotted stay.
“Time, gentlemen,” said Lydia, and business stopped.
His trips to the United States involved the precarious
problems of Britain’s war finance and the overhanging
question of what was to happen in the terrible postwar
interim. Britain was not the only one concerned; the
United States, as well, wanted to lay the foundation for
a flow of international trade which would avoid the
desperate financial warfare which had ah*eady led to
physical warfare. An International Bank and an Inter¬
nation Monetary Fund were to be established which
would act as guardians of the intemational flow of
money; in place of the old dog-eat-dog world where each
nation sought to undercut everyone else, there would be
a new cooperative effort to help out a nation which found
itself in monetary diflSculties.
The final conference was held at Bretton Woods.
Keynes, despite his illness and fatigue, clearly dominated
the conference; not when it came to winning all his points,
for the final plan was far closer to the American proposals
than to the British, but by viitue of his personality. One
of the delegates gives us an insight into the man in this
entiy in his journal:
This evening, I participated in a particularly re-
cherclie celebration. Today is the 500th anniversaiy
of the Concordat between King’s College, Cam¬
bridge, and New College, Oxford, and to commemo¬
rate the occasion, Keynes gave a small banquet in
274
thk worldly philosophers
his room . . Ke^es, who had been looking for¬
ward to the event for weeks as excitedly as a school¬
boy, was at his most charming. He delivered an
exquisite allocution. ... It was an interesting example
of the curiously complex nature of this extrLrdinary
man. So radical m outlook in matters purely inteh
ectual, m matters of culture he is a true Burkean
conservative. It was aU very pianissimo, as befitting
? K? t emotion when he spoke of our
debt to the past was truly moving.
the conclusion
of the conference- If we can continue in a larger task
rL'? is hope for
the world —the delegates rose and cheered him.
As always, his major efforts did not preclude a few
minor ones He was made a Director of the Bank of
ngland ( Which will make an honest woman of the
other IS anyone s guess,” he had declared) and chairman
or a new committee on the music and arts which had
been established, like the English universities, under the
aegis of the government Thus, while he was carrying
the weight of presenting Britam s point of view to an
international economic council, he was also keeping up
a stream of correspondence on music travelers, the Vic-
Wells Ballet, poetry reading, and library exhibits. And
of course he kept on collecting; he scooped the Folger
Library on a rare volume of Spenser and explained a
little guiltily to the librarian that he had used the Foreign
Office bag to have the catalogue sent over to him.
And the honors started to pour in. He was elevated to
the peerage: he was now Lord Keynes, Baron of Tilton,
an estate which he had bought in middle life only to
discover to his delight that one of the branches of the
Keynes line had once owned these lands. There were
honorary degrees to be accepted at Edinburgh, at the
Sorbonne, and from his own university. There was an
appointment to the Board of Trustees of the National
Gallery. And still there was work: the first loan to Britain
had to be negotiated and Keynes, of course, was given
THE HEBESIES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES
275
the task of presenting Britain’s viewpoint. When he re¬
turned from that trip and a reporter asked him if it were
true that England was now to be the forty-ninth state,
Keynes’s reply was succinct; “No such luck.”
In 1946 the ordeal was over. He went back to Sussex to
read and relax and prepare for a resumption of teaching
at Cambridge. One morning there was a fit of coughing;
Lydia flew to his side; he was dead.
The services were held in Westminster Abbey. His
father, John Neville Keynes, aged ninety-three, and his
mother, Florence, walked up the aisle. For all their sor¬
row, few parents could have wished for more in a son.
The country mourned the loss of a great leader, gone just
at a time when his acumen and wisdom were most needed;
as the Times said in a lengthy obituary on April twenty-
second, “By his death the country has lost a great English¬
man,
He was not an angel by any means. This most sparkling
of the great economists was only a human being, albeit
a remarkable one, with all the faults and foibles of any
person. He could win twenty-two pounds from two
countesses and a duke at bridge and crow delightedly;
he could also undertip a bootblack in Algiers and refuse
to rectify his e^or saying, of all things, “I will not be a
party to debasing the currency.” He could be extraor¬
dinarily kind to a slow-thinking student ( economists, he
said, should be humble, like dentists) and obnoxiously
cutting to a businessman or high oflScial to whom he
happened to take an intuitive dislike. Sir Harry Goshen
the cha^an of the National Provincial Bank, once
rubbed Keynes ™g by urging that “we let matters
take their natural course.” Keynes replied, “Is it more
appropriate to smile or rage at these artless sentiments?
Kej^es himself gave the clue to his own genius-al-
ough he was not at the time writing about himself
both loved and rather lovingly derided as “an rsurd
-7^ THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
old man"), Keynes speUed out the qualifications for an
economist:
The study of economics does not seem to require
any speciahzed gifts of an unusually liigh order.
Is it not, intellectually regarded, a very easy subject
compared with the higher branches of philosophy or
pure science? An easy subject, at which very few ex-
cell The paradox finds its explanation, perhaps, in
that the master-economist must possess a rare co7n-
hination of gifts. He must be mathematician, his¬
torian, statesman, philosopher— in some degree. He
must understand symbols and speak in words. He
must contemplate the particular in terms of the gen¬
eral, and touch abstract and concrete in the same
Bight of thought. He must study the present in the
light of the past for the purposes of the future. No
part of man s nature or his institutions must lie en¬
tirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and
disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and in¬
corruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near the
earth as a politician.
Marshall— as Keynes says— only approximated that
ideal, for Victorian that he was, his economics lacked
the necessary iconoclasm to give it deep social penetra¬
tion. Keynes came closer: the Bloomsbury attitude of
“nothing sacred" spilled over into the sacred precincts of
economic orthodoxy; once again the world was put into
focus by a man not so blind as to fail to see its sicloiess,
and not so emotionally and intellectually dispossessed as
to wish not to cure it. If he was an economic sophisticate,
he was politically devout, and it is in this curious com¬
bination of an engineering mind and a hopeful heart that
his greatness lies.
X
The Modern World
IN 1930, while most people were darkly occupied with
the deepening depression, Keynes was toying with
an idea of a very different hue. In disregard of his own
dictum that in the long run we are all dead, he had just
taken a glimpse into the future— the long-term future—
and he had come up with a prophecy quite in contrast
with the Cassandra-like rumblings of the day. For what
Keynes saw ahead— barring such catastrophes as an un¬
controllable flood of population or a totally destructive
war— was not a continuation of the current state of misery
and doubt, but a prospect so fair as to be almost unbe¬
lievable-nothing less than Adam Smith’s heralded land
of universal plenty,
Keynes called his little excursion into the future Eco¬
nomic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (of whom, it
might be added, he himself had none). And what were
these possibilities? WeU, not to wax too lyrical, they
hinted at something like a modest millennium; by the
year 2030 Keynes thought the economic problem might
be solved — not just the immediate crimp of depression,
but the economic problem itself, the age-old fact of Not
Enough to Go Around. For the first time in history, man¬
kind Biitish mankind, at any rate — would have emerged
from a struggle against want into a new milieu in which
everybody could with ease be given a generous helping
at the communal table.
277
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
It was a typically Keynesian thrust in an unexpected
direction After the First World War, when the world
was basking in a glow of self-congratulation, it was
Keynes who had rattled the skeleton in the closet- now in
the thirties when the world turned to self-commiseration
It was the same Keynes who bravely talked of an impend-
mg end to its travail. But he was not merely wliistling in
the dark. On the contraiy, he was only taking up a strand
of economics which had absorbed aU the master planners
or the past— the tendency of capitahsm to grow.
In times of depression that tendency was apt to be
overlooked. And yet, looking backward over two hundred
years of capitalism, it was not merely a meaningless
succession of exliilarating booms and frustrating busts
which had characterized the system, but a steadv, albeit
highly irregular, i/pu;ard climb. The forty million English¬
men of Keynes's day most certainly did not consider
themselves the benefactors of a bountiful providence,
but for all the hardships of tlie times, they unquestionably
enjoyed a far better seat at Nature’s table than the ten
million Englishmen of Malthus’ time.
It was not tliat Nature herself had become more gen¬
erous. On the contrary, as the famous Law of Diminish¬
ing Returns made clear. Nature yielded up her wealth
more gmdgingly as she was more intensively cultivated.
Tlie secret to economic gi*owth lay in the fact that each
generation attacked Natiu*e not only with its own energies
and resources, but with the heritage of equipment ac¬
cumulated by its forebears. And as that heritage grew—
as each generation added its quota of new knowledge,
factories, tools, and techniques to the wealth of the past-
human productivity increased with astonishing rapidity.
A factoiy worker in the 1960’s in the United States turned
out between four and five times as much goods in an
hour’s toil as a worker at the time of the Civil War— not
because he worked harder or moi*e skillfully, but because
he worked with mechanical helpers which made him a
superman compared with his Ci\'il War predecessor.
And if onlv this process of steadily enhancing produc¬
tivity would continue for another century— a mere three
279
THE MODERN WORLD
generations-then capitalism would have done the trick.
For another hundred years of amassing wealth, Keynes
calculated, at the same pace as the last hundred years,
would multiply England’s real productive wealth by
seven and one-half times. By the year 2030, every woiker
would have at his elbow machinery which would make
him a superman in terms of his grandfather who lived m
1930. , , ,
And such a vast increase in productiveness could make
all the difference. It could relegate economics as a science
of scarcity to the history books. The new problem of
society would be not how to find leisure, but how to cope
with unprecedented quantities of it. With a grin Keynes
quoted the traditional epitaph of the old charwoman :
Don’t moum for me, friends, don’t weep for me never.
For I’m going to do nothing for ever and ever.
With psalms and sweet music the heavens’ll be ringing.
But I shall have nothing to do with the singing.
It was, of course, only a theoretical jaunt into the future
and no one took it very seriously. The machinery was
clanking too alarmingly in 1930 for anyone to regard such
a prospectus as much more than a pleasant fantasy, and
Keynes himself soon lost sight of it in the immediate
problem of analyzing the nature of the unemployment
which was paralyzing the world.
But wishful or sober, Keynes’s vista is important for us.
For with Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren
we are for the first time confronted with the question of
our own futures. Everything we have considered hereto¬
fore is, after all, only history. The evolution of the regu¬
lated and codified world of the seventeenth century into
the atomistic market capitalism described by Adam
Smith; the near escape of that capitalism from the land¬
lord-dominated economy anticipated by Ricardo or the
overpopulated subsistence society feared by Malthus- its
presumptive self-destruction forecast by Marx; its chronic
depressive tendency dissected by Keynes-all these ad¬
ventures and misadventures of capitaHsm, however in-
280
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
teresting, nevertheless lacked a certain element of sus¬
pense. For we knew at each juncture of history what the
outcome would finaUy be. Now we are placed in a more
uncomfortable position. As we turn to the modem econo¬
mists, we are no longer discussing the ideas which helped
shape our past: it is our own society, our own fate our
children s inheritance wliich lie in the balance.
And so we must turn from a study of our past to an
appraisal of our future. Wliere does capitalism stand
today; where is it going; what signposts point to the years
ahead. These are the great questions of contemporary
economics and it is to them that we must now bend our
attention.
Perhaps we should begin by taking stock. We will be
better able to judge the chances and dangers which may
lie in store for us if we have a clear idea of where the
present finds us. So let us put this crucial question: Hoto
well do Americans fare tinder their present economic
system?
Some fare very badly.
In the mid-1960’s— years in which average living stand¬
ards were never higher— a sizable fraction of Americans
still lived in conditions of economic misery and want. In
the crowded Negi*o and Puerto Rican slums of New York,
the drear}'^ agricultural backwash communities of Missis¬
sippi and Tennessee, large numbers of American families
still experienced levels of economic 'well-being” which
failed by any standard to provide lives of decency. Some
eight million families— one out of every six— scrimped
along on annual incomes of less than $3,000; and four
and a half million single persons— more than one out of
every f/iree— subsisted on incomes of $1,500 or less. This
was not Asiatic poverty by a long shot, as witness the
forests of television masts even in tlie poorest urban
neighborhoods, but it was a level of economic meanness
in which television was bought at the expense of decent
medical care and was enjoyed in the crowded and smelly
“comfort” of an all-too-often rat-infested living-bedroom.
If we take a family income of $4,000 a year as the begin-
THE
8l
nine of economic independence-a figure which allots
fandlv of four-then we find that almost one out of evci y
five non-farm American families had failed to reach this
Lst rung on the ladder of true economic f ^^quacy by
the middle 1960’s. And this does not
older people ending their productive hfetimes-thirty per
cent of whom were under the $2,000 mark.
In a society which boasts of its stupendous economic
success this is hardly cause for unrestrained jubilation.
Indeed it means that for the lowest quarter of the nation
capitalism as a system of high living standards, personal
dignity, or individual “affluence” is still little more than
a myth, or, worse, a bitter mockery.
But it is possible to become indignant over such facts
without viewing them in perspective. And the peispective
is this: nowhere in the world has humanity succeeded
in scraping together enough from nature or in shaiing
out that which it has scraped together in such a way as to
provide a measure of decency for all. In the teeming
continents of the East, the Malthusian dilemma at its
realest and most awful has actually lowered human living
standards in many nations over the past fifty years. Asi¬
atics stand at the actual threshold of survival itself. In
Africa, the Near East, South America, and Eastern
Europe, grinding poverty is the rule rather than the ex¬
ception, In Europe the highest standards that have been
achieved— in Switzerland, for example— are only slightly
over half the average American standard; and Switzerland
is twice as well off per capita as the Netherlands,
Nor have the socialist nations done much better. Al¬
though som6 of them have shared out their wealth more
equitably than we, they have failed to produce as much
wealth, and the resulting slices of cake, although more
uniform, are thinner. And Russia, for all her original
egalitarian ideals and her hard-driving attempts to catch
up with the Western World, is far down the scale of
umversal plenty. It is difficult to compare Russian stand¬
ards of living with American, since many services for
2^2 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
wliich we pay— such as medical care, higher education, or
rent— are piovided free or very inexpensively by the
Soviet government, but certainly the enjoyment of mate¬
rial well-being in Russia is still far below that of our
economy.
Against this somber backdrop, American capitalism has
peifoimed exceedingly well. Despite our submerged
fourth of a nation, we are closer than any community in
history to attaining that bright goal seen by Keynes-an
economy without poverty. Indeed, we are almost there!
For if the trend of the past continues into the future for
another twentij years, we may within our own lifetimes
usher into being the first economy of universal sufficiency
the world has ever seen.
The possibility is clearly there. In 1929 our average
income for all families and unattached individuals was
$2,340. Translate this into the dollar values of the mid-
1960 s and you boost the mid-mark of American living
standards in the zenith year of pre-Depression capitalism
to the equivalent of about $4,500 of 1965 purchasing
power.
Today the comparable figure for the average after-tax
income of all families and unattached individuals is ap¬
proaching $7,500. In other words, with all price increases
washed out, the average household is some two-thirds
better off than it was in the so-called heyday of American
capitalism. Now project this rate of improvement forward
another thirty-odd years to the year 2000, and a genuinely
impressive and certainly unprecedented vista opens. By
2000 our average-household income— at today's values—
would be nearly $15,000. And if we should avoid the
wasted years of a major depression, the figure would be
considerably higher.
Better yet. In that potential world of plenty, the gulf
between rich and poor will likely have narrowed still
further. For over the past thiidy years, the income of less-
well-off households has risen half again as fast as the in¬
come of upper-income households. Partly this has been
due to a great leap in the productivity of the working
class; partly it has been due to a deliberate attempt to
THE MODERN WORLD
283
limit wealth at the top by policies of progressive taxa¬
tion. As a result, according to the calculations of Dr.
Simon Kuznets, the share of the nation s income going
to the very apex of the economic pyramid— the upper one
per cent of income receivers—has been nearly sliced in
half since 1929. And while the concealing of top incornes
via expense accounts, tax-exempt interest, and capital
gains has undoubtedly made the real decline a good
deal less in fact than these figures indicate, there can be
no doubt that capitalism is handing out its rewards on a
more egalitarian basis than ever before.
So if the trend of the past continues, then in the hope¬
ful vistas of the future we can expect the lowest quarter
of the nation to have done better than merely ride with
the current. It is not likely that the rich will be much
further squeezed, for already tax avoidance has become
a dangerous competitor of old-fashioned money-making.
But the redistribution may yet be brought about by shunt¬
ing more of tlie gains from growth toward the lower in¬
come brackets instead of sharing them with rich and
poor alike.
To be sure, there is a caveat. The redistribution of the
past has been brought about, as we have seen, because
the average working person has been carried along on the
flood tide of economic growth even faster and farther
than the capitahst. Significantly, the factory worker —
Karl Marx s proletarian hero and tJhie proverbial underdog
of capitalism— is no longer to be found among the ranks
of the poor. The worker in an average manufacturing
establishment makes $5,000 a year, and one in five makes
more than $6,500.
But there is a danger that in our system there will
develop a new lower class that will not be lifted up on the
general advance. The tenant farmers on submarginal
farms, the inhabitants of bypassed areas like the Cumber-
lands, the discouraged slum families caught in the “cul-
^re of poverty,” and above all the Negro, victim of
decades of oppression that is not yet ended-all these
ail to respond to the rise of the economy because they are
not in the economy. Their poverty is social rather than
284 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
economic— a fact that reflects well enough on the sheerly
functional characteristics of capitahsm, but that makes
their poverty neither less ugly nor any easier to remedy.
For the majority, however, the outlook is surely hopeful
Does this mean, then, that capitahsm has solved its ec¬
onomic problems, whatever its lingering social ones? Is
the future now the bright path indicated by Keynes?
Not necessarily. For if capitahsm is growing richer, it
is also growing in other directions and displaying other
trends— not all of them healthy ones. Capitahsm has ful¬
filled its most pressing requirement— the provisioning of
its constituents. It holds out a prospect of an even better
life. Now we must inquire whether there are other forces
at work which may project a veiy different vision of the
future.
We must go back a few years to study what these forces
may be. And so we hsten first to a warning voice that
came in 1932.
Significantly, it had nothing to do with Keynes s vista
of the future, and it was certainly not couched in his en¬
tertaining mixture of whimsey and hopeful economics.
The warning lay in the dry statistics of a hook— The
Modern Corporation and Private Property— ^nd its au¬
thors, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, wasted no time
on the year 2030. They were concerned about a trend
which would materialize a great deal sooner.
It was this: If the dominant trend of American business
continued for another fifty years, the traditional fabric of
capitalism would be destroyed.
For looking at the American market place, Berle and
Means found an appalling statistic: in 1932, one-half of
all corporate wealth was in the hands of just two hundred
companies. Worse yet, at the rate at which the two hun¬
dred behemoths seemed to be growing, compared with
the three million pigmies which made up the rest of
American enteiprise, by 1950 it appeared likely they
would control three-quarters of the nation’s incorporated
wealth. And by 1975 or thereabouts-to carry Berle and
Means’s figures to their logical, if unstated, conclusion, the
THE MODERN WORLD
285
two hundred giants would virtually rule the economic
life of the nation, not unlilce the feudal principalities
which once ran the economic life of Europe.
But it was not just the statistics of size that impressed
the two observers— although the biggest of these com¬
panies was already wealthier than twenty-one of the
states of the Union. The shattering impact of their statis¬
tics was in the implication they held for the market sys¬
tem itself. For when the heads of the companies that
turned out nearly half the goods America bought could
be comfortably seated around the banquet table of a
modest hotel, the whole traditional concept of competi¬
tion suddenly appeared woefully unrealistic.
Were U. S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel, each respect¬
fully and warily eyeing the other, to conduct themselves
as if they were just two vegetable hawkers in a crowded
market? Were the three fiinas in automobiles who did two-
thu'ds of the business to act as if they didn’t know they
controlled their industry? Or the three who occupied
the same position in cigarettes, or farm machineiy, or
tires, or office machinery, or tin containers?
Obviously not. It was no longer each man for himself
and devil take the hindmost. The new situation dictated
a new philosophy of live and let hve. And although such a
code of behavior might be a great deal easier on the busi¬
nessman, what did it do to the consumer? The whole
moral justification for capitalism lay in the fact that in a
competitive market the consumer was king. When ec¬
onomic life was carried out imder the aegis of enonnous
enterprises that no longer had to compete, it looked very
much as if the royal mantle had been shifted to the
shoulders of the producers.
And to compound the danger, these producers were
no longer even responsive to the economic interests of
their “owners.”
Traditionally, of com-se, it was just the conflict of in¬
terests of owners which made up the mechanism of the
mark^ in the first place. But the men who ran American
Telephone and Telegraph or Pennsylvania Railroad were
not the owners of those companies. All they had to show.
286
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
by way of ownership, was a tiny fraction of millions of
outstanding shares. The average holdings of management
among the nations biggest corporations were less than
three per cent of their shares. In a third of the biesrest
companies they were less than one per cent
The actual owners, in the eyes of the law, were thou¬
sands of stockholders, scattered about the counti-y who
held one, ten, or even a thousand shares each. But’these
innumerable owners displayed none of the time-honored
preiogatives of ownership: they neither operated their
businesses nor had a voice, save at the most distant
remove, in their operation. Many didn’t even know what
their TOmpanies made. “Oxvnership” seemed to have
drifted into a kind of passive speculation, a ticket to in-
corne, a piece of paper which might be advantageously
traded on the market.
And this left the managers singularly free to pursue
whatever ends they desired. The element of compulsion,
which still drove the owner-manager of a comer drug¬
store to behave in the market as Adam Smith had said
he had to behave, was lacking for the great corporation
executives. Freed from the immediate pressure of com¬
petition, only remotely responsible to the thousands of
legal owneis who dutifully voted their proxies as
management urged them to, the rulers of giant business
were in a state of economic limbo.
They might, of course, behave as the textbooks
preached. Or they might simply milk their corporations
for their own gain: one tobacco company president,
over stockholder protests, paid himself a million dollars
a year. Or they might embark on the most praiseworthy
labor or community relations. But the point was, it was
no longer possible to predict their actions by pointing to
the simple motive of “self-interest” in a simple environ¬
ment of competition.
Such a system of independent managership might be
good or bad— but it was certainly not traditional capital¬
ism. For the essence of capitalism was that no producer
could set himself up as an independent force, to do exact¬
ly as he wished. All were locked together in a chain-step
the modern world
287
march and the result-as Adam Smith had never wearied
at irmarket smiled at the fictional character of o™er-
lov. aTirl simnlv ran their businesses— reconciling the
dafx^s of labor stockholder,
themselves-as best they could and as ^ ^
One Observer-Professor James Burnham m a booK
called The Managerial Reooiutioii— suspected we wct
drifting into a society in which a self-perpetuating o y
of professionals would order the economic world, much
as Veblen had once hoped his engmeers would do. Bum
ham even had the chilling notion that the professional
managers of neocapitahsm resembled no one quite so
much in the tasks they performed as the professional
managers of the Russian commissariats and the Nazi
combines.
That was one avenue into the future along which the
economy seemed to be moving thirty years ago. We shall
return to it later, for the question of whether private
property is crystallizing into a kind of latter-day feudalism
is obviously of prime importance for any appraisal of the
future.
But it was not the only warning voice. From a different
quarter of the economic world came a second caution,
equally concerned with the decline of traditional capital¬
ism. This time, however, the threat was not huge busi¬
ness: it was huge government.
We have already briefly met its protagonist: Dr. Fried¬
rich Hayek. The reader will perhaps remember that dur¬
ing the Second World War Dr. Hayek attacked govern¬
ment planning in The Road to Seifdomy about which
Keynes seemed to be of two minds— both liking the book
and disagreeing with it.
But while Keynes disagreed witli Hayek about the
need for planning, his defense of the dangers of planning
did seem rather weak. Hayek had watched the progres¬
sive enslavement of his native Central Europe under the
288
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
iron i-ule of fascism and he believed he saw in that relent¬
less process something like an internal law. He believed
m fact, that once a government had interfered enough
with the market mechanism it had no alternative but to
embrace the economy in a top-to-bottom rigid grip
It was not every government action which thus’ carried
the seeds of proliferation. Of some interference-for some
welfare purposes, or to redress an obviously inequitable
balance of power, or to offset a bad depression-Hayek
appioved. It was another kind of government activity
whose consequences he feared: the direct control over
economic activity itself.
Koi what seemed to mark off this kind of planning from
the milder and more beneficent sorts of government in-
teiference was that planning was characterized by a pe¬
culiar inability to call a halt to itself. Once set in motion,
an inner necessity forced it to expand.
That necessity did not rise from the personal motives
of the planners— one might almost say it arose despite
them. For the planners did not set out in every case to
contiol the nations entire economy. All they wanted to
do was to plan a few sections of that economy— say, its
steel output or its export industry.
But there was a difficulty. It was not so simple to plan
just one part of an otheiwise planless society— indeed, the
task was like trying to walk a straight line through a
crowd. However carefully calculated the plan, however
thoughtfully hedged against contingencies, something
invariably turned up which threw it out of kilter. Perhaps
it was a business which failed to meet a deadline with
some essential subassembly; perhaps a union which went
out on strike; perhaps merely the changing tastes of con¬
sumers which upset prices in the rest of the economy.
Such miscarriages of expectations are the despair of
every private businessman. But what is only a private
misfortune for him is a national calamity for the planner.
For if a large and integrated plan for a vital section of the
economy collapses, it may endanger the entire productive
effort of the community itself. So what is a planner to do
when he meets his unavoidable trouble-spots? The an-
the modern world
289
swer-the easy and obvious and sensible ^nswer-is to
plan still more, to widen the original plan so as to em¬
brace the unruly elements of the economy within the
smooth mechanism of directed activity. u .
Thus in England, for example, in order to achieve the
planned production of the nationalized
the late 1940’s, it was necessary to introduce a plan tor the
recruitment of labor, and in order to achieve the planned
recruitment of labor, a planned schedule of wages had to
be set up, and in order to keep coal-mining wages at a
suitable differential over other wages, the whole national
pattern of industrial pay became a matter of concern.
What had started as a simple output plan became neces¬
sarily a far wider one. Just as the easiest way to walk
through a crowd is to order it to line up in straight rows,
so the easiest way to have a plan work is to make it work.
And in the end? Hayek feared that planning led in¬
exorably to what Lenin called Who Whom: who plans
whom, who directs, chooses, allocates what to whom? It
spelled the end not only of capitalism but of personal
liberty as well.
That was a second fate which seemed to lie hidden in
the trend of capitalist development. And as if two such
prospects for the future were not enough, still a third ap¬
peared. This one asked the most depressing question of
all: Can capitalism continue to grow?
The question was put in the late 1930"s by a man who
could be seen almost any day hurrying across the Harvard
Yard to lecture to his class. Professor Alvin Hansen was
one of the most respected of the American economists;
behind his back he was called “the American Keynes.”
When he went down to Washington to testify in the
monopoly investigations ( he appeared complete with
green eyeshade and classroom pointer), he turned the
committee into a hushed private seminar, “The discus¬
sion is getting so interesting. Doctor,” said the chairman,
that we are violating our rules on all sides.”
No wonder it was interesting. Hansen felt that the
whole environment of capitalism was changing and
290
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
changing in a most unfortunate way. A great current
which had carried the capitalist ship along in the past
was petering out, and henceforth progress would have'to
be made without the aid of a constant, favoring, urgent
stimulus. ’ ®
What was the stimulus? No one would have been more
sui prised than Malthus — it was population growth.
Malthus had believed that the gieat barrier to economic
progress was the flood of mouths which gobbled up any
slight surplus society might wring from Nature. But Han¬
sen saw population growth in a different light. While a
runaway population might swamp society, a reasonable
rate of increase should have the opposite effect. It should
spur society on by giving it a constantly growing demand
for new homes, more clothes, larger quantities of goods
of every kind. A regular increase in the nation^s census-
provided it was held within bounds— was the safest and
surest guarantee that an adventurous program of ex¬
pansion would turn out to have been a sensible under¬
taking.
In the past that regular increase in population had
certainly taken place. Each decade had brought with it a
vast new market; between 1800 and 1810 we had added
a million Americans to the nation; between 1810 and 1820,
2 million; in the next decade twice that, and in the decade
of the Civil War twice that again. The ten years at the
turn of the century saw 12 million added to the nation,
and in each of the decades that ended in 1910, 1920, and
1930 fifteen million citizens had been added to our
population.
But looking at the census figures of the 1930's, Hansen
found an alarming trend. The rate of population growth
was slowing down. In England and France it had virtual¬
ly come to a stop; in America it was rapidly tapering
off. We were still a growing nation— but a much more
slowly growing one.
In the depression thirties only 8 million new customers
enlarged the market— /m// the usual increase. No wonder,
said Hansen, that this depression proved so difficult to
cure. And in the ten years which loomed ahead from 1940
291
the modern world
to 1950 only 6 million were estimated to appear-only
one-third of the normally expected extra market. Then
by the last quarter of the century, if the trend continued,
the great era of growth would come to a complete stop.
America would face a static population,
Malthus would have been delighted; Hansen was not.
For this meant that the single greatest stimulus to invest¬
ment could not henceforth be counted on. And if invest¬
ment were to be deprived of its surest ally, if there were
to be a slackening in the process of investment growth on
which everyone from Adam Smith to Keynes had pinned
his hopes, what would happen to the American prospects
for the future?
The possibility could not be summarily written off. To
be sure, the fabulous enrichment of the American people
had not depended entirely on population growth. There
had been the West to conquer, and there had been a
protean flow of revolutionary want-creating inventions.
But just as population growth could no longer be relied
upon to exert its powerful impetus (think of the housing
alone needed to satisfy a fifteenfold increase in American
population in the nineteenth century!), so the old frontier
was a thing of the past. The West was no longer unex¬
plored territory where any man might make his fortune;
it was a stalwart competitor of the East.
And what did all this imply? It meant that in the future
the stimulus for capitalism’s investment would rest on the
shoulders of technological progress alone. And this car¬
ried with it a diflSculty of a special kind. The great in¬
ventive contributions of mankind had always come in
sudden bursts: an era of industrial revolution; an era of
railroadization; an era of electrification; another of auto¬
motive building. Each cluster of inventions had resulted
in a spurt of investment, but when each had run its course,
the hectic activity of building was succeeded by a period
of quiescence.
The future might be equally as inventive as the past—
perhaps even more so. But the pace of invention was like-
apt to be as sporadic and irregular. Unless the
economy were bolstered between its periods of technologi-
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
292
cal advance, it would surely develop a succession of de-
pressions-deep depressions made all the more intractable
by the lack of an undercurrent of steady population
gro'wth or the easy availability of new geographical mar¬
kets.
And the upshot was this: it looked as though the
government motor which had been hastily rigged during
the worst of the depression doldrums would have to be
converted into a fixed auxiliary engine. The old free-
enterprise system would have to settle for a partner-an
unwanted but necessary partner— in the shape of a perma-
nent stream of government spending to keep the economy
moving steadily on ahead. The era of self-directed, self-
powered capitalism had come to an end; a new era of
state-controlled “mature” capitalism was beginning.
It was hardly an outlook calculated to instill a bland
confidence in the future. And these were only the major
issues which perturbed the diagnosticians of capitalism
in the late 1930 s and early 1940’s. There was a host of
subsidiary questions too, recurring flurries of concern
about gold or labor or agriculture or tariffs and inter¬
national trade. But the three main questions— the drift
toward corporate bigness, the danger of overplanning,
and the uncertainty of growth— seemed to penetrate to the
heart of the matter. For these tendencies appeared as
trends of capitalist development and as such seemed to
pose a series of deep-rooted, indigenous problems for
the future.
Were these worries justified, or were the trends only
transient diflBculties? Over a quarter of a century has
passed since the questions were propounded, and capital¬
ism has had ample time to rid itself of any temporaty
aberrations which might have misled its observers in the
1930 s. If the trends were only a passing phase, then the
dangers they suggested should be much less evident to¬
day. Are they? , , 1 _
Well consider the fact that in the late 1950 s the Imn-
dred and thirty-odd largest manufacturing
accounted for half the manufacturing output m the United
293
the modern world
c. f . that the two hundred and fifty biggest firms
t. S out a tw o? gc^ds equal in value to the output of
the entire economy prior to the war. These J
indicate that Berle and Means s fears were g^oundlu s.
Nor were those of Dr. Hayek. By the late I960 s tota
state local and Federal government expenditure had
grov^^ to comprise one out of every four dollars of oui
Gross National Product. Our Federal budget, despite the
attempts of Republicans and Democrats alike to paie it
down, seemed to display an intractable expansive impe¬
tus; Federal expenditures for purposes rose fiom
$40 billions in 1949 to more than $130 billions by 1967.
Most of this, to be sure, was associated with a growing
level of national defense. Yet to many people the trend
seemed to indicate that Hayek’s premonitions of a self-
feeding drift to planning were indeed justified and
that the implications for freedom were anything but
auspicious.
Dr. Hansen s misgivings with regard to growth looked
somewhat less prescient at first. There had been trembles
in the line of economic advance to be sure, but from the
late 1930's through and then beyond the war, the pace
of advance had been spectacular. Gross National Product,
which was less than $100 billions when Hansen issued
his wamings about a “mature” economy, had grown to
seven times that size— and measured in tonnages and yard¬
ages of output, rather than in rising prices, total produc¬
tion had quadrupled since 1935. Yet the fact that growth
had been largely brought about by two wars and a mount¬
ing level of government expenditure continued to raise
Hansen's question: would we grow if government spend¬
ing stopped?
Thus the warnings posed by the investigators of capi¬
talism in the late 1930 s do not seem to have been without
substance. The centi’al questions of a quarter centuiy
ago continue today to comprise the great economic ques¬
tions facing capitalism. Let us follow the main lines of
contemporary economic thought to find out what these
problems portend for the future.
294 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Are we headed for an economy in which a few business
giants will have swallowed up all economic activity?
Certainly the statistics of business size are awesome. Be¬
fore World War II when a company like General Motors
achieved a billion dollars’ worth of sales it rated a headline
in the financial pages. Nowadays the only interest that “a
billion dollars,” as a unit of measurement holds for the
financial community is whether General Motors will make
once or twice that sum as profit.
Yet the raw facts of bigness dramatize but do not eluci¬
date the issue. And that issue is not the emergence of
individual Brobdingnagian firms, but the question of
whether en masse the giants are taking over more and
more the economic activity of the nation.
Here the evidence is surprising. The top 100 industrial
coiporations owned 25 per cent of all industrial corporate
wealth in 1929; in 1960 they owned 31 per cent. This is
evidence of continued growth of the business giants, but
growth at a much less alarming rate than that feared by
Berle and Means. Perhaps equally important, the degree
of concentration within various industrial markets— that
is, the proportion of sales in those markets made by the
biggest companies— seems to have remained virtually
unchanged in most cases since the end of World War II.
What has brought about this slowdown in over-all ex¬
pansion and this stabihty in concentration ratios? Many
factors have undoubtedly combined to bring about the
result— the anti-trust laws that have prevented big busi¬
nesses from mergers that might have affected concen¬
tration ratios, the generally prosperous state of the econo¬
my that has encouraged the formation and growth of
smaller businesses, the decline of the old-fashioned ty¬
coon bound for acquisition by the newer-fashioned “pro¬
fessional” manager interested in preserving his corporate
empire for the long run.
Does this mean that Berle and Means’s worries about
business giantism are to be set aside? Far from it. We
have avoided the danger of galloping concentration but
we have by no means avoided the consequences of an
economic system in which big managed businesses, rather
THE MODERN WORLD
295
than smaU “owned” businesses are the main protagonists
of the market process. , ^ r
We can see the result in the changmg character of that
Before
•egulating
m
or
example, it was made pretty plain that competition
the lexicon of large enterprise, largely meant tempting
customers away from rivals by product differentiation
by fancy service or better advertising or more enticing
corporate images. This new definition of competition gave
every advantage to the consumer except one. It no longer
gave him a mechanism which automatically operated to
push prices down to the lowest level compatible with
costs of production. Indeed, sometimes the new competi¬
tion” seemed to ensure that the customer paid not the
lowest but the highest possible price. In 1957, for ex¬
ample, the Ford Motor Company announced new car
prices up some 2.9 per cent over the previous year. Two
weeks later General Motors published a price list which
was up an average of 6.1 per cent. Whereupon the Ford
Company quickly revised its prices upward, in order ( as
a company spokesman explained ) “to meet competition.”
Thus even if the big corporations were extending their
sway only very slowly within the total economy, within
the industries in which they were predominant, something
foreseen by Berle and Means was indeed taking place. It
was the slow breaking down of the traditional function
of the market as the supreme economic authority of a
free-enterprise economy. In the old atomistic world on
wliich the theory of capitalism had been based, it could
truly be said that the consruner was king and that the
business firm was his servant. In the new world of indus¬
trial giants, the consumer was no longer the unequivocal
master of the economy. Indeed, as Professor Berle wrote
in 1957, “some of these corporations are units which can
be thought of only in somewhat the way we have hereto¬
fore thought of nations.”
Does this mean that the corporation is today free of all
the tra^tional web of competitive controls, which from
Adam Smith s time on have been rehed upon to bend in-
296 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
dividual self-interest to the social will? Does it mean that
the consumer, the much lauded master of capitalism, is
now only a puppet-king— encouraged in his ceremonial
office, which is buying, but prevented from performing
his real oiffice, which is ruling?
The situation is not quite that black. Whereas loithin
the oligopolistic markets (to use the technical term for
markets controlled by only a few sellers) competition is
giving way to * administered” prices, among oligopolies a
meaningful economic battle rages. The battle of prices no
longer is waged* between U.S. Steel and Bethlehem, but it
still engages all steel against all aluminum, all aluminum
against all glass, glass against plastics, plastics against
wood, wood against concrete, and concrete— to complete
the circle— against steel. In this battle of industries, the
consumer still plays his pivotal role and still commands a
foimidable power.
In addition, one contemporary economist, John Ken¬
neth Galbraith, has called attention to a new safeguard in
this world of competing oligopolies. Great masses of pow¬
er on one side of a market, he points out, are often faced
by ‘"countervailing” masses of power on the other. Thus
the great corporation is matched against the great union;
the great producer of raw materials is faced with an
equally powerful processor of its products; the enormous
manufacturer must contend with the enormous chain re¬
tail outlet or chain department store. Such countervailing
power does not arise in every case, and not in all circum¬
stances— including, most importantly, the cucumstance of
inflation when big business and big labor use their power
not against each other but in tandem against the con¬
sumer. But in ‘normal” circumstances there often appears
to be a division of power across the market, which pm-
vides some of the price protection no longer afforded by
a competitive atomization of power on each side of the
market. _ i i j
And then Galbraith has pointed out another overlooked
aspect of the world of oligopoHes-it is a good deal pleas¬
anter world than the old dog-eat-dog competitive sitaa-
tion For the old economic combat of competition was
297
the modern WOxU-A^
not an unmted blessing: while it held eco.io™“
s- roi'Sd"^^ .r '£5-
goino: to stay in business. Hence a degree of oligopoly, y
Se mSt, also allows him to lift liis workers’ noses from
*^^e™esult is a contradiction of textbook gospel. It is
not the nation’s competitive industries that pioneer in re¬
search or forward-looking labor policies. The show¬
pieces,” writes Galbraith, “are, with rare exceptions the
industries which are dominated by a handful of large
firms. The foreign visitor, brought to the United St^es
. . . , visits the same firms as do the attorneys of die de¬
partment of Justice in their search for monopoly.”
What are we to make of this whole complex issue of
corporate power? As with many economic problems, theie
are no black-and-white answers. If Berle and Means were
unduly pessimistic in anticipating an engulfing growth of
the giant corporations, they were eminently foresighted
in predicting that huge entei-prises, managed by men who
were no longer beholden either to the “owners” of the
business or to the “market,” would constitute a form of
power quite imlike that on which capitalism was pre¬
sumably founded. That this power can be used irrespon¬
sibly and to the detriment of the consumer is obvious. At
the same time it is also evident that the great oligopolies
are not yet an encrusted economic feudalism and that
their very size leads not only to economic problems but
also to some far7reaching social benefits.
In short, we seem to confront a form of economic pow¬
er great with possibilities for economic good or evil,
which is not yet “rationalized” within an overarching
philosophy of political economy nor regulated within a
system of institutional controls. In the end, of course, un¬
less we are resigned to a kind of business neo-feudalism,
the new corporate powers must find a legitimate place
29S THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
within, and not above, their larger social and political
matrix. What that place will be, how their responsibilities
will ultimately be defined, and in what way the new bal¬
ance of economic power will be achieved are questions
which today-and surely for a long while to come-will
remain among the crucial problems with which modem
capitalism must be concerned.
One thing is certain, however. The continuing expan¬
sion or^ individual corporate giants makes the continuing
expansion of the total economy doubly important— not
only as a means of affording more goods and services to
the nation, but to ensure that big business growth will
not engulf the economy.
And hence our concern with corporate bigness brings
us, by an unexpected route, back to Professor Hansens
problem. What are the chances that we will continue to
grow? And how much must we rely on government sup¬
port in order to grow?
At first sight, unlike the frightening statistics of busi¬
ness size, the statistics of economic growth seem to dispel
all of Hansen’s worries. He was concerned, we will re¬
member, with the slowing down of our rate of population
growth and with the added burden which would thus be
thrast on technology as the principal carrier of capital¬
ism s growth. In the late 1930’s these seemed like grave
problems, but distance has lent a new perspective to them.
For following World War II a totally unexpected upsurge
in the birth rate— from about 17 per 1,000 in 1935 to nearly
25 per 1,000 in the 1950’s— radically changed the popula¬
tion outlook. In retrospect, the low birth rates of the
thirties appear to have been a Depression and post-De-
pression phenomenon, and the long secular increase in
population bids fair to continue for a very considerable
period. Indeed, as we have seen in our chapter on Mal-
thus, if there is any worry stemming from the population
outlook, it is that our rate of growth may be too high, not
too low.
More important, in hindsight it is clear that in the 1930 s
the modern world
299
we seriously underestimated the power of the technologi¬
cal thrust behind the economy. Only recently have we
become aware that the curve of technology is rising al¬
most vertically beneath our feet, that we are only entering
the age of science. A Harvard professor has computed,
for example, that of all the scientists of whom history has
ever known, ninety per cent are alive today; a General
Electric vice-president reports that of all the money spent
by all public and private sources for research and devel¬
opment in the United States since 1776— $100 bilhon in
all-half was spent in the last ten years.
Thus, the technological prospect for growth also looks
bright. Does this lay the ghosts that Hansen conjured up
in the committee rooms in the 1930 s? Not quite. If the
momentum of our economy seems secure— certainly much
more secure than it seemed in the anxious days when
Hansen warned about the long-term outlook— it still has
its problemsome aspects.
The first of these concerns the relationship between
arms spending and growth. A fact that is often overlooked
when we reflect pridefully on oiu: economic record since
World War II is the degree to which our economic ex¬
pansion has been aided by military expenditures. First
the Second World War itself, as the cure for the doldmms
of the post-Depression semirecovery; then the stimulus of
Korea; then the continuing alerts of the Cold War; and
finally Vietnam: with the exception of the first five post¬
war years, military expenditures never faded to add at
least $20 billion and in most years $30 to $50 billion of
purchasing power each year. Today roughly a tenth of
our total output is bought by the Defense Department,
and the indirect repercussions of those purchases sustain
an even larger proportion of output.
Does this mean that we are a “war economy”— that in
the event of effective world disarmament we would suffer
a collapse? Few, if any, economists believe so. A gradual
phasmg-out of defense spending should enable many
aims contractors to switch to peacetime goods, while the
w^n d associated with lower defense spending
would also swell the demand for these goods
300 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Yet, if few economists see disarmament as the cause of
a major depression, most economists do see it as the signal
for a considerable increase in peacetime public spending.
Why? In part the answer lies in the backlog of unsatisfied
public needs that have a high moral priority on output—
the repair of our decaying cities, the solution of our
snarled transportation problem, the cleansing of our air
and water, and the provision of care for the aged, of rec¬
reation for the young, and of education for a college-
bound generation.
But also in part the reason is that most economists feel
that the private sector, left to itself, might well fail to
generate enough purchasing power to absorb the enor¬
mous output of our present-day economy. Although priv¬
ate investment and private spending will continue to be
the mainstreams of economic activity, nearly all econo¬
mists agree that there is need for an important subsidiaiy
stream of public expenditure if we are to be certain that
the volume of demand will be large enough to buy up all
our production.
What is the reason for this fear? It is that we have ex¬
perienced a drag of unemployment, even during the best
years of our postwar growth. Until the mid-1960's, our
rate of joblessness hovered between 4 and nearly 7 per
cent— not so serious as to constitute a major threat to our
well-being, but certainly not good enough to enable us to
consider ourselves a full-scale economic success. Worse,
unemployment was concentrated in certain social groups
that could least well fend for themselves; in 1966, for ex¬
ample, the unemployment rate was 7.3 per cent among
laborers, and reached up to 30 per cent among Negro
young people. Only by applying tlie extra push of public
demand, many economists believe, can this waste of
human resources be kept to a minimum.
To this we must now add a second problem. It is that
technology has been steadily changing the structure of
employment. A look at the table below makes the point
clear:
THE MODERN WORLD
301
Distribution of Employed Workers (Percentages)
1900
1963
Agriculture,
forests,
fisheries
38
8
Manufacturing,
mining, transportation,
construction, utilities
37
36
Trade,
professional and
personal services,
government
25
56
Concealed within the table is a dramatic fact. Some¬
where during the past sixty years— in fact, during the
late 1940 s-the number of people engaged in providing
services of various kinds— clerks, teachers, policemen,
lawyers— exceeded the number engaged in making or
handling goods. A society concerned primarily with pro¬
duction has given way to one concerned primarily with
administration and distribution.
What has brought about this dramatic shift? The an¬
swer is largely technology, which has steadily replaced
the work done by people in the goods-producing parts of
the economy v^th work done by machines. As a result,
labor has left those areas in which machines were more
economical than humans and has entered the fields of
services in which humans are far superior to machines.
What has this to do with the future? The answer is that
we now stand at what may be the threshold of a new era
of technological advance— an era in which machines can
be made to perform more and more work in the service
sector. Anyone who has visited a modem bank or insur¬
ance company or corporate office and seen the batteries of
silent computers and clunking electric printers knows that
machines can now do the work of filing clerks and ac¬
countants and tellers and office managers and junior exec¬
utives. In other words, technology may be entering the
fields that have hitherto provided the great refuge for the
labor that has been displaced from the farm and the fac-
toty. The question is, then, where will future displaced
labor go?
The question is not difficult to answer. If we want to
apply the skills of tomorrow's workers who may be un¬
able to find work in the traditional places, where would
302 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
we look? We would look to precisely those areas that the
economists have aheady selected for their high moral
urgency— to the repair of the cities, the strengthening of
the public safety and convenience, the improvement of
education and recreation, and so on. In a word, the new
frontier for employment is apt to lie in the same direction
as the new priorities for spending~in the groioth of public
rather than private activity.
Thus, curiously enough, Hansen seems to have been
right in his final prognosis, even if not in liis immediate
outlook. The expected slowdown in population growth or
in technology did not materialize— indeed, just the con¬
trary— but the expected rehance on government spending
did.
Thus, the pursuit of Dr. Hansen's problem brings us
back to consider Dr. Hayek's. For if our future expansion
is to take place in an environment of government parti¬
cipation, then planning will play a far more important role
in our economy. Does that portend the road to serfdom?
Must planning end in Lenin's Who Whom?
It can. When a country in misfoiiune plans— say, an
underdeveloped country in a desperate hurry for indus¬
trialization-then planning almost inevitably encroaches
on the prime areas of economic freedom. You cannot plan
for survival without allocating men to jobs and materials
to producers, and it is doubtful whether you can make
such allocations and still retain a free-market system.
But all planning is not planning for survival. In a coun¬
try such as the United States, planning would not be to
ration scarcity but to assure the advent of abundance. And
in such a setting there is much less reason to expect an
explosion of planning to set in. It is not a matter of indif¬
ference to an underdeveloped country if its economic
plans fail to live up to expectations; it is a matter of
tier bellies in the whole nation. But not so in a wealthy
economy. The main purpose of planning in a rich com¬
munity is to ensure that enough economic activity is car¬
ried on to prevent a slump or unemployment, or to assme
that the quality of life keeps pace with the sheer quantity
of production. Short of defense considerations, it is rare
the modern world
303
that such planning activities caiTy a life-and-death ur¬
gency. Suppose, for example, that the f
not mature according to schedule, there is no need
to take over the nations cement plants: the highways
unlike the expenditures of an underdeveloped nation can
wait. It is this lack of urgency which makes
Planning in a wealthy nation can have a flexibility it can
never have when every project is a matter of the highest
national importance. ^
Nonetheless, there is a final caveat. Planning m the
form of government expenditure need not be a selt-teed-
ing process in a society of wealth, but we cannot so easily
dismiss the possibility of a cumulative growth of planning
in the form of a network of controls over our oligopolistic
markets. Indeed, unless we find a way to prevent huge
accumulations of market power from imposing their wills
on society, either as producers of commodities or as sup¬
pliers of labor, the government will have to provide a
planning mechanism which may indeed grow large and
tight. No economist has yet provided a compelling pre¬
scription for restoring the old market interplay to its tra¬
ditional role of command. And at least one eminently re¬
spectable economist, Ben Lewis, commenting on the
decline of the self-regulating market, has written unequiv¬
ocally on what wifi, take its place: “The years ahead will
see a great increase in conscious, collective government
controls and of government enterprise. . . . The conviction
that great power over the economy must reside only in a
government of the people will be acted on relentlessly,
bluntly, and with force.”
Whether or not such planning may be in fact the road
to serfdom is hard to say. Much depends on one’s politi¬
cal sympathies, on what Malthus called “the insensible
bias of situation and interest.” Perhaps in the end the
crucial factor wifi be-as Keynes suggested-the moral
reservations of the planners themselves ( he rather hoped
it will be remembered, that the planners would vaguely
disapprove of plaiming). It may weU be that in an econ¬
omy of want and impatience such moral hopes would be
304 the worldly philosophers
frail and foolish. Whether they will be reasonable hopes
in an economy of growing affluence we do not know. Al¬
most surely the future will see a rise in the importance of
planning, in part to sustain and guide our growth, in part
to control the huge and increasingly independent produc¬
tive units of the economy. Whether, fifty years from now,
the forebodings of Hayek or the more sanguine possibil¬
ities envisaged by Keynes will more accurately describe
the texture of our economy is perhaps the most important
question facing the economic society in which we live. It
is not without significance that its outcome may depend as
much on moral factors as on the impersonal process of
economic evolution alone.
And so the issues remain— only half resolved. The weak¬
ening of the traditional competitive mechanism before the
power of the great business oligopolies, the seemingly
permanent use of government expenditure as a means of
assuring growth, the new problems of planning— all re¬
main in mid-development. If the worst fears of the econ¬
omists and social observers who first spied these trends
have not been realized, the trends themselves are very
much in evidence. To put it differently, the economic
structure of capitalism has developed much as was pre¬
dicted, but the social consequences of these structural
changes are not yet fully clear.
Does this mean that capitalism itself is, so to speak, on
trial?
That is a question we must postpone to our final chap¬
ter. For there is yet one more voice to be heard from. It
is by all odds more sympathetically inclined toward cap¬
italism than any we have listened to in this chapter.
Strange, then, that it will give us more cause to ponder the
future than any of the critics.
XI
Beyond the Economic
Revolution
The voice belonged to Joseph Schumpeter.
No one ever knew quite what to make or this small,
dark, aristocratic man with a taste for dramatic prose arid
theatrical gestures. Typically he said of himself later in
life that he had always had three wishes: to be a great
lover, a great horseman, a great economist. Two of these
three wishes, he maintained, had been granted to him.
Everyone agreed that he was brilliant — and perplexing.
His students at Harvard complained that he was never
predictable, and they were entirely right. At the tender
age of twenty-seven— his teacher said of him that he was
never a beginner— Schumpeter had set the economic
world on its ear with a truly path-breaking exposition of
the process of economic growth and at thirty he had
added another feather to his cap with a superb history of
economic doctrines. But the students who attended his
classes in the late 1930’s were regularly shocked to hear
this expositor of capitalist growth declare, with obvious
enjoyment, that depressions, far from being unmitigated
social evils, were actually in the nature of "a good cold
douche for the economic system!
His fame increased with the years— and so did his per¬
plexingness. His earlier books were followed by a monu¬
mental work on business cycles and then in 1942— a few
305
3o6 the worldly philosophers
years before his death— by one of the most provocative
books ever written on the future of capitalism: CapitaJ-
ism. Socialism, and Democracy. But his students still had
to reconcile the fact that he was the most "hopeless"’ of
conservatives and at the same time an admirer of Marxist
economics; a sarcastic critic of the critics of capitalism,
and yet its severest critic himself; a scoffer at those who
fussed over every sign of trouble in the economy, and
himself a diagnostician of its failing health.
What was most vexing of all was this: Schumpeter had
written engagingly on what he called "plausible capital¬
ism”— a capitalism which could achieve Keynes’s goal of
universal sufBciency. He agreed with his economic breth¬
ren that there was no purely economic reason why the
system should not have another successful run. He neither
punctured the arguments for the defense of capitalism
nor raised new economic issues overlooked by the critics.
He even went so far as to predict that the system would
endure for another fifty or a hundred years.
And yet, in his point-blank fashion, he wrote this final
appraisal of the future: “Can capitalism servive? No. I do
not think it can.”
Had sentiment alone moved his pen, it would never
have written such a sentence. Schumpeter was the most
romantic of economists, and capitalism to his eyes had all
the glamour and excitement of a knightly jousting tourney.
But that was just the trouble. The jousting tourney re¬
quired a properly stirring setting, and in the humdrum,
matter-of-fact, businesslike atmosphere which business it¬
self was fostering, the old pioneering capitalist spirit
could never survive.
For capitalism, to Schumpeters mind, could maintain
its forward momentum only as long as capitalists behaved
like knights— or at least pioneers. Not all of th^, of
course: for every daring entrepreneur, there was bound
to be a whole flock of timid followers. But the driving
impetus for the system came from men of courage, men
who risked their fortunes to implement new ideas, who
dared to innovate, to experiment, to expand.
And that type was on the wane. Worse, it was being de-
beyond the economic revolution
307
stroved by its own civilization. Daring as the capitalist
was' his civilization was pre-eminently built on a lational,
inquiring, skeptical attitude. Originally that rationalism
had destroyed the pretensions of kings and lords But now
it turned its cold and disconcerting gaze on itself. Money
isn’t everything,” said the intellectuals, and in so doing
they sowed a seed of doubt about the values of money¬
making as an end in itself. “Private property is no more
sacred than the divine right of kings/ said the intellec¬
tuals, and in so doing they exposed the basis of privilege
in a business society to be no more necessary or inviolable
than that of privilege in a feudal society. The romantic
ideals, the sacrosanct ideology of business were thus held
up to the harsh light of rationality, and the result was that
the values of the business way of life lost their attractive
glow. You cannot hold a jousting tourney if the audience
thinks the whole performance is slightly ridiculous; even
the most ardent of knights will lose his zest if no one ap¬
plauds his success.
But capitalism was not only falling from an attack by its
intellectuals; it was decaying from the inside as well. The
once daring, independent, perhaps unscrupulous, but al¬
ways energetic knight of business was being replaced by
a very unknightly figure in a lackluster costume. The new
lords of business were “managers,” depersonalized ex¬
perts, private bureaucrats. That was the real impact of
big business— not its supposed menace to competition. Big
business meant conservative business— not necessarily in
policies or social ideas, but in economic daring. For as the
capitalist metamorphosed into the manager, he ceased to
care about capitalism as such: he settled for his large
steady income and the security of his position in society
and forgot about the days of risk and the quest for bound¬
less wealth.
And so, in the end, capitalism would become old-
fashioned. It would no longer be a meaningful word, an
idea that could move men to action or rally supporters in
a time of crisis. In time it would disappear before the on¬
coming march of socialism and its disappearance would
3o8 the worldly philosophers
be marked by neither a bang nor a whimper. Capitalism
would fade away with a resigned shrug of the shoulders.
What a peculiar thesis this isl
It can neither be proved nor disproved, for note this
fact: it has nothing to do with the laws of economics.
Whether there are laws of social development, of ideolog¬
ical evolution, we do not know, and in any event if
Schumpeter s estimate of the vitality left in the system is
correct, it will only be our children or our grandchildren
who will be in a position to appraise the accuracy of his
diagnosis.
But right or wrong, Schumpeter s ideas are interesting
to us for another reason. For here is the first of the great
economists who has carried his economic analysis of cap¬
italism to its final optimistic conclusion, and then, disre¬
garding the outcome of his economic thinking, has
pronounced doom on the system for a noneconomic rea¬
son. For the first time, an economist has said that eco¬
nomic development by itself did not ultimately determine
the history-making process by which the fate of capitalism
would be settled. If Schumpeter was right, a whole chap¬
ter of economic history was coming to a close.
As we have followed that chapter down the short but
furiously active avenue which began two hundred years
ago, we were struck by the diversity of the worlds into
which the economists molded the actual world itself. But
behind this diversity was a common thread, a thread of
continuity which we should now stop to recognize. It was
this: If one could divine the nature of the economic forces
in the world, one could foretell the future.
It was not that politics or ideas were thought to be un¬
important or that the economists did not see that at every
juncture in history the power of the sword and the pen
played a role of crucial importance. It was that the power
of the purse was even more important. Kings might fight
parliaments and parliaments might fight wars; presidents
might do wise things and foolish ones, but all the while,
the economic body of society was playing out its incred-
beyond the economic revolution 3^9
ibly complicated game of self-aggrandizement, and ac¬
cording to how that game went, so went the future.
And in the largest sense, so it did. Before capitalism
came into being wealth followed power, and power was
an adjunct of mihtary or ecclesiastical or political pres¬
tige. In such a world, the future depended upon the de¬
cisions— even the whims— of a few men, and history was
very nearly equated with adventure.
But after tlie economic revolution the old order
changed. Now power followed wealth, and wealth ac-
ciTied to the winners of the game of the market place.
Hence when the economists sought to predict what would
happen when many men, each seeking to enlarge his
worldly scope, collided in the market place, they were in
fact predicting the broad future of society. Individuals
would still rise above the mass to impose their will on
others, but for society as a whole, it was the process of
money-making which gave it its elan, its movement, and
its direction. Business cycles were not the decree of any
man, but the upshot of the market; riches and poverty de¬
pended on no monarch’s pleasure, but rose, fluctuated,
and disappeared as the market mled. To a greater extent
than ever before, history became an automatic process,
and the mold of the future was cast by an anonymous,
predictable, gamelike struggle.
The predictions varied, for they placed diflPerent stress
on different aspects of the game. Adam Smith saw the ac¬
cumulation of capital as the decisive feature of the market
world, whereas Malthus and Ricardo picked out the
counterforce of population growth. Marx emphasized the
struggle between worker and capitalist, Veblen the strug¬
gle between technicians and financier, and Hobson
pointed to the need of huge masses of capital for overseas
rttcirRcis.
No single economic thread extended over the whole
diapter of capitalist society. But each thread did for a
while prowde the motif of the future. Society did grow it
threatened with an inundation of population it did
itness a class struggle, a contest between finance and
produce, on. an inrperialist th.-nst. Indeed, if the v"5o.;;,ns
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
310
and the Utopians failed to make a significant contribution
to an understanding of their futures, it was because they
failed to see the imperiousness of the economic forces at
work.
But all the while that society was engaging in its single-
purposed economic game, another conflicting motive was
at work. Capitalism, do not forget, is the only society in
human history in which neither tradition nor conscious
direction supervises the total effort of the community; it
is the only society in which the future, the needs for to¬
morrow, are entirely left to an automatic system. Scant
wonder then that no sooner had the boat been set adrift
than the passengers began to worry. A ship without a cap¬
tain might work very well— at least so the designers prom¬
ised— but suppose it did not? Suppose, for example, that
its social results were not so pleasing as its economic ones
—or suppose the economic ones were not so pleasing to
some as to others? Then what?
At first, nothing. Adam Smith could afford to scoff at
those who hoped to improve society by “doing good,’"
since he firmly believed that welfare was best achieved as
a by-product of economic action. To Malthus and Ri¬
cardo, the notion that motives other than economic should
be allowed to intrude into, perhaps to upset, the market
mechanism would have been a willful perversion of a
demonstrably proper way of life.
The change began with John Stuart Mill and the Uto¬
pians. When Mill pointed out that economics had no ul¬
timate solution to the problem of distribution, that society
might do with the fruits of its toil as it saw fit, he intro¬
duced into the mechanical calculus of the market a con¬
flicting calculus of moral judgment.
It was not moral judgment only in the laudatory sense.
It was moral as opposed to mechanical; it was the as¬
sertion of independent conscious decision about the ends
we desired from the economic process, as opposed to a
passive acquiescence in the ends which emerged when we
did nothing. The ends we desired might well be less sen¬
sible than the ends which evolved from the unnnpeded
action of the market-but that, of course, depended on
311
beyond the economic revolution
whether the person who adjudged a change as being sen¬
sible” was a gainer or a loser from its eltect.
But once set in motion, the process of mterfermg with
the market process did not stop. The namral outcome of
the social stiaiggle was thwarted, channeled, encoui aged,
and dammed at every turning-one reason, for example,
that Marx’s inexorable predictions never quite mateiial-
ized was that we interceded in the game whenever it ap-
neared it might otherwise proceed to a final checkmate.
We curbed monopolies, we encouraged labor unions, we
regulated competition, we intervened in the business cy¬
cle, we did a thousand and one things to make the eco¬
nomic game yield the results we wanted of it— not the re¬
sult it would naturally bring.
It is not that economic motives are dead: far from it.
Despite our oligopolistic trends, if the principle of buy
cheap and sell dear” did not still organize our otherwise
undirected economy, we should face chaos on the market
place tomorrow. If the drive to amass wealth did not still
impel people to shift from job to job, to change the direc¬
tion of their business eflForts, to expand or contract their
business operations, we should have a sluggish, inert,
changeless economy instead of an active, fluid, and dy¬
namic one. The economic motive is still present and still
vitally important.
And therefore society still displays purely economic
trends. Indeed, the forecasts of the modem economists
are nothing but the projections of the consequences of the
puzely economic charactei'istics of our market society. But
society no longer obeys its economic impulse alone. The
very fact that the trends and problems of the last chapter
are inconclusive is evidence that there is more at work
than impersonal, mechanical forces. The questions which
face us in the future are not the purely economic ones of
whether corporations will natm’ally gi’ow larger or wheth-
ei we will suffer from xmemployment, but the moral ones
or whether we will let coiporations grow unchecked and
whether we will allow unemployment to develop un¬
checked. Government planning, public investment, anti-
312
TKE WORLDLY PHILOSOPITCRS
monopoly policy-these are the tools of the antieconomic,
moral impulse. *
To the extent that this is true, to the extent that we no
longer let the game of economics proceed unhindered to
its natural outcome, we are going beyond the economic
revolution. After two centuries of sailing almost as the
winds directed us, the tiller of society is again in our
grasp. More and more we have taken on our own shoul¬
ders the responsibility for selecting our destination-with
all the inescapable dangers as well as the chances for
progress that active navigation must bring. We are leav¬
ing behind us a world in which our futures were shaped,
at least in the large, by the pressures of economic action;
we are proceeding into a world where economic forces
will play an important but no longer a predominant role.
What new factors will come to bear on us in that future
we do not entirely know. We are by no means a fully con¬
trolled economy and so we can count with certainty on
many of the old economic problems— booms and busts,
the struggle between monopoly and competition, the end¬
less squabble over the division of the economic cake. The
problems may be muted in the new environment, but they
will be there to contend with. Perhaps we shall face such
subtle problems as those raised by Joseph Schumpeter— a
slow but penetrating change in the atmosphere of capi¬
talism and in its attitudes toward private property. Such
possibilities must be reckoned with, but they are beyond
the scope of our foreknowledge.
But two great issues we shall surely face and their im¬
portance for our survival as a free economy will be more
important than all the old economic pressures or any of
the new ideological ones.
First, we must face the political problem of isolation.
For there is a disturbing fact which we must take into
account: most of mankind has never had, does not now
have, and in all probability will never have any contact
with' capitalism whatsoever. Capitalism is not the dom¬
inant system of organizing man s economic activities; on
BEYOND THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
313
the contrary-if we judge by nose-counting-it is some¬
thing of a rarity, and almost an antique rarity at that.
The whole turbulent drama which we have foUowed in
these pages has been confined to a fraction of the ear* s
surface, and during all these two hundred years, to count¬
less miUions of Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Africans, or South
American peons the notion of a fluid and dynamic econ¬
omy in which new products appeared and disappeared, in
which a great chain of transactions bound together man
and man, has never been anything but a tangential curi¬
osity-strange, rude, disturbing, and often exploitative.
That is still true today. But whereas a century ago one
might have guessed that the precapitalist world would de¬
velop into capitalism, today for a bilhon people, at least,
that is a vanished hope. Perhaps four human beings out of
ten live under regimes which have turned their backs on
capitalism, and even if those regimes fail and fall, it is
doubtful in the extreme whether their subjects will turn to
a system which they have been taught to believe is harsh,
cruel, and wicked.
Even in those areas of the world — lilce part of South
America — where the development into capitalism is still
possible, it is very unlikely that the end product will much
resemble the kind of world we know. When we see the
strange anachronisms of skyscrapers and peons plowing
with a wooden stick, airplanes and oxcarts that give to
Latin America its picturesqueness, we are perhaps re¬
minded of seventeenth-century England, with its half-
formed market economy. But there is a difference— a vital
difference. In the seventeenth century, England led the
world; in the twentieth century, the precapitalist countries
are furiously struggling to catch up with it.
And this long and arduous process of catching up can¬
not be thought of solely in economic terms. For economic
development— the long, steady rise in output and living
standards— will not take place without social and political
change. And it is here that we find the most diflScult and
dangerous problems of the backward nations.
For it is not easy to remake the social and political
fabric of a nation just emerging from a tradition-bound
314 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
past. An uncomprehending peasantry must be converted
into a modem farming population; a ragged corps of
casual laborers must be made over into a disciplined work
force; bazaar-minded traders must become production-
minded entrepreneurs; nepotistic and corrupt state bu¬
reaucracies must change into reliable civil servants. UnUl
these changes begin, economic development will wait
But to put these into effect is, in fact, to overthrow a
whole way of life— and very often, to overthrow a govern¬
ment and a social order wedded to that way of life.
Hence the process of economic and social and political
change tends to be a long-drawn-out and turbulent affair.
If it could be done quickly, that would be one thing. But,
unfortunately, this is not the prospect that the logistics of
development offer. It is a painfully slow task for nations
that are barely staying alive to accumulate the capital
goods by which the great escape from poverty can be
made. It takes years for a nation which is still striving to
achieve widespread literacy to acquire the pool of skills
and knowledge which is a requisite for economic growth.
Nothing can be done overnight to relieve the dependence
of many poor nations on the single crop they export to
the impredictable markets of the world. And meanwhile,
to lengthen the timetable still more, a torrent of popula¬
tion growth washes away the small gains in production
under a deluge of births— Malthus’ specter come to life.
The situation is not that black in every underdeveloped
nation. There is a spectmm of conditions (and hopes) for
the backward lands at least as great as or greater than that
among the industrially advanced nations. But in general
the implication is plain. Economic development is not a
smooth evolutionary process. It tends, on the contrary, to
be a disruptive revolutionary process. It is not a healing
and annealing climb, but a fearful ascent, in which old
and stagnant regimes perish, and new— and very likely,
nithless— regimes achieve power. It is not a time of gen¬
eral contentment, but a time of wild aspirations and
equally black despairs, of fierce resentments, of terrible
sacrifices— imposed as well as freely borne.
In a word, economic development does not hold out the
BEYOND THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 3^5
easy hope that it will encourage the rise of democratically
orientated, economically free societies. More likely is the
prospect of authoritarian poHtics, strong-man govern¬
ments mild or not-so-mild dictatorships, combined with
authoritarian economics, s^ong-arm economic measures,
mild or not-so-mild collectivisms.
Thus in the great contest among economic systems m
the underdeveloped areas, capitalism does not enjoy a
favored position-at least not in many nations. Indeed a
realistic appraisal of the obstacles and possibilities leads
us to the unwelcome conclusion that communism may
well be the dfrecf/on-although not necessarily the final
destination— toward which these countries swing.
For regardless of the ulterior quality of its motives or
the perversion of its purposes, communism does have one
article in its export kit which we do not: a technique for
vastly accelerating the rate of growth of the impoverished
nations of the world. This technique is collectivism— often
an iron collectivism which finds its most stark expression
in the barrack-communes of the Chinese. What collec¬
tivism does— and very likely does more effectively than a
free or "mixed” economy— is to mobilize the resources,
material and human, of an underdeveloped economy, and
to direct them with massive impact upon the problem of
building the capital needed for sustained growth.
From our point of view, the cost of this collectivism is
fearfully liigh. Not only does it often dispense summarily
with the political liberties which are the treasured and
delicate achievement of the West, but it deliberately de¬
nies the economic freedom which is no less a hard-won
and precious Western achievement. Collectivism does not
await the slow, often wasteful, growth-producing ways of
the market. It simply puts men where they are needed,
whether their acquisitive impulses would put them there
or not. It is the method of the stick rather than the carrot
—the method of ruthless force rather than voluntary
choice. ^
Such a system is naturally repugnant to Western eyes,
et It need not be so to many Eastern and Southern eyes.
The harsh discipline of collectiyism is much less notice-
3 1 6 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
able at the margin of existence where life is already hor¬
ribly disciplined. The loss of liberty is hardly a loss to men
who have never known liberty. Such a method of achiev¬
ing growth would be unsupportable for people who have
already benefited from a long history of past growth. But
to a people who now exist in conditions of misery and
despair, it may offer the only means of escaping rapidly
from the insupportable present into a better future.
In this contest of economic systems, it matters not
whether our aims are ultimately more noble, more human¬
itarian, or more virtuous than the Communists’. Because
we cannot easily encourage a revolutionary collectivism,
we are very apt to appear in the eyes of a sweated Boliv¬
ian miner or a debt-ridden Brazilian tenant farmer as
defenders of reaction, while the Russians play the role of
Robin Hood. It is neither realistic nor necessarily advis¬
able that we should attempt to steal the Communists’
thunder. But this leaves us with the immeasurably more
difficult and subtle task of persuading the world’s dispos¬
sessed that we are just as concerned with their lot, just as
eager to aid reform as the Russians— although our means
and slogans are less dramatic and our promises less
tinged with paradise than theirs. Perhaps it leaves us with
the prior job of convincing ourselves that this is indeed
the case.
Thus the great external problem facing capitalism is not
economic at all. It is the political problem of establishing
itself as the arsenal, not only of production, but also of
hope and meaningful freedom to the anonymous hun¬
dreds of millions who may otherwise distrust us, fear us,
and— if the awful day should ever come— take arms
against us.
That is the external problem.
There is an internal one, too. For as we depart, little
by little, from a philosophy of laissez faire and espouse a
philosophy of active guidance, the question of social re¬
sponsibility is inescapably thrust upon us. As long as the
game of economics was played without fear of its con¬
sequences, indeed, in glad acceptance of them, t e mat
BEYOND THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 31?
ter of responsibility lay in the background. It \vas not the
business of business to vv^orry about its social obligations,
nor the concern of trade-unions to fret over the repercus¬
sions of their acts. Responsibility was purely a matter for
the government; it was political rather than economic.
In the future that area of responsibility must vastly
broaden. As long as our fate lay in the hands of an im¬
personal process, who could be called to task for whatever
unpleasant consequences matured? But as our future be¬
comes increasingly the object of our own selection, it is
no longer possible to avoid the question of the kind of
futui*e we want. Do we want a more equal distribution of
income or a less equal distiibution? Do we want big busi¬
ness or little business? Do we want free labor unions or
circumscribed labor unions? Do we want inflation or de¬
flation? AU these choices— and many others— he within our
own controL
Curiously the more successful om* economic mechan¬
ism, the more pressing become these pohtical— and moral
—problems. Growth, as Professor Galbraith has pointed
out, brings us more and more out of the old environment
of want into a new environment of plenty, and in this in¬
creasingly affluent atmosphere the time-honored rationale
which sanctified profit-oriented production begins to lose
its self-evident purpose. There was a time when every act
of production, by adding a needed bit to the skimpy pile
of social wealth, justified itself without further question.
But as our streets become clogged with traffic, as our re¬
frigerators bulge with food and our closets with clothes,
more and more of society's production takes on a “luxury”
pleasant, but hardly comparable to the production of
roads when there were no roads, of food when we were
still hungry, of clothes when many people still wore rags.
Worse, as we go on heaping up the items of a richer and
richer life, those goods and services which fail to cater to
the market demand of an affluent society lag behind. Our
schools, our slums, our health, our recreational space, our
cultural activities get short-changed; our “social balance”
gets badly tipped. As Galbraith writes in The A-ffluent So¬
ciety, The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-
the woru)ly philosophers
conditioned, power-steered and power-braked automobile
out for a tour passes through cities that are badly paved
made hideous by litter, bhghted buildings, billboards and
posts for wires that should long since have been put un¬
derground. They pass on into a countryside that has been
rendered invisible by commercial art. . . . They picnic on
exquisitely packaged food from a portable icebox by a
polluted stream and go on to spend the night at a park
which is a menace to publie health and morals. Just be¬
fore dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent,
amid the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect
vaguely on the curious unevenness of their blessings. Is
this, indeed, the American genius?”
Affluence, and its uses and misuses, are not problems
which government alone can resolve. Rather, they make
vivid and ineseapable the faet that the political super¬
vision over the economic process becomes more and more
a problem for the entire electorate. The more we desire to
intervene into the automatic working of the market sys¬
tem, the more profoundly we wish to reshape the eco¬
nomic complexion of society, the more does the electorate
itself become its ovra guardian, its own counselor for
good and evil, the director of its own destiny. A govern¬
ment may impose its will on a monopoly, on a credit
splurge, on a gold crisis. But only a whole people can vote
a change in the texture and social balance of its basic
economic efforts.
And hence, curiously, economics takes on a new sig¬
nificance in a world in which “pure” economic society is
on the wane. “Men cannot hve without an economic theol¬
ogy,” Galbraith wrote in 1952, and never was that truer
than when men must themselves determine the course of
their owm society and elect what destination they wish to
steer it toward. In the past, when economics was only an
aggregative, mass process, the great economists could
stand aside from the flow of events and shed their light on
historv purely as commentators, as analysts, or as disin¬
terested prophets. In the present, as economics becomes
entangled in the political decision-making process, that
aloofness is no longer justified. There is no longer only
beyond the economic revolution 319
one possible conclusion for the economic drama but
many, and the economists must not only describe for us
the course on which we are sailing but point out other
courses, other destinations to which we may, if we wish,
direct ourselves.
This is not to say, alas, tliat one finds economists in gen¬
eral today keenly aware of the historic responsibilities and
implications of theii* task. The trend of economic H^ought
in our time is not toward the "magnificent dynamics” of
the future, but turns aside from such^ speculative social
forecasting to a consideration of more "scientific” matters.
Many economists build "models” which reveal very skill¬
fully the relationships of an economy in growth, or con¬
cern themselves with complex quasi-engineering problems
of labor inputs and commodity outputs. These are veiy
useful studies, but they do not open our eyes to the full
meaning of tlie economic futures they project. For in these
edifices of theory there is usually left unexamined the
question of how economic growth will affect social
change, or of the relevance of purely quantitative con¬
siderations to a system which produces not only goods but
attitudes, morale, morality.
Perhaps this prevalent disinterest in the long-i*un evolu-
tionaiy portents of capitalism is merely the tacit expres¬
sion of a quiet confidence that capitalism is here, if not
forever and ever, at least for a good long sti*etch. Perhaps
it is evidence of an unwillingness to peer too closely into
the dangerous possibilities of a time of great histoi'ic
stress.
But if the temper of most contemporary economists
tends to be unadventuresome and academic, there is no
lack of prophecy and persuasion to which we can turn.
Only they are not new voices. They go back— all of them
—to the arguments and architecture of the great econ¬
omists themselves.
Thus at the extreme left stand the Marxists, whose pre¬
diction of the ultimate undoing of our system is little
changed from the days of Karl Marx himself. Their proph¬
ecy we know; their persuasion is that we should line up
on the side of history, as they see it. It is not a blueprint
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
320
of the future which the Marxists try to sell us, but a sense
of historical participation, of joining the winning team, of
riding the “wave of the future.” If Russia or China were
not there as an object lesson in applied Marxism, their
uxgings might be a more formidable competitor for our
belief. As things now stand, the rigors which are the price
of rapid collectivist growth have an appeal only to the
most miserable peoples in the world— those who have
never known anything but a beggar s lot. Perhaps our
task is to understand with genuine compassion the hard
choice that history has enjoined on the poor— and to at¬
tempt in every way to facilitate their escape from poverty.
To the right of the Marxists are the Socialists. Many of
them are Marxian in their prognosis of capitalism’s end,
but they are not Marxian in their prediction of things to
come. The Marxists extol the inevitability of history; the
Socialists extol tlie idea of hberty inherent in social
change. The Marxists are not so much interested in What
Comes Next— but this is the very heart and essence of the
socialist persuaders. Whether the society of the future is to
be centralized or built on old-fashioned guilds; whether it
is to be entirely plarmed, or only partially so; the extent to
which the consumer should have a voice, and the extent
to which the producer should be heard-these are the
burning questions of socialism— but not of communism.
While the Marxists hold out the prospect of blindly and
trustingly enlisting oneself with the inexorable process of
history, the Socialists ask us to join them in shaping his¬
tory as they wish it.
Next on the spectrum of prophecy and persuasion are
the advocates of managed capitalism. Unlike the Social¬
ists they do not believe that capitalism must disappear,
and unlike the SociaHsts they do not want to displace the
institution of private ovraership with public ownership.
Their central philosophy is something else again: they
feel that capitalism can be maintained if we intervene
sufficiently to make it viable. Left to itself, they say,
capitalism may run off the rails-if not its economic rails,
then its moral rails. Given a strong VO^cy oi ^^dan""’
it can continue to prosper. Hence we are asked to ensure
321
beyond the economic revolution
our futures with a strong pillar of government investoent
with active enforcement of antimonopoly laws, with the
encouragement of public activity as well as private. This
road to the future lies in jna/cing capitalism work-rather
than in relying on its inner stability.
Not so say the next group of public counselors, the
protagonists of the Right-of-Center. Capitalism can work
only in an atmosphere of hands-off. Wliile liberal airns
may be commendable, the liberal means are incompatible
with the essence of a market economy itself. Let the
system alone and it will fare well; try to patch it up and
you will only succeed in hopelessly paralyzing it.
It is some such spectrum of prophecy and persuasion
that we face.
As we listen to the debates which now surround us—
and which will command our attention as long as our
society survives— we can recognize the voices of the past.
Adam Smith still speaks to us from the platform to the
Right; Karl Mai*x seeks to emoll us in the legions of the
Left. We can distinguish the voice of John Stuart Mill
in the words of tlie Socialists, and that of John Maynard
Keynes in the arguments of the liberal capitalist le-
formers. The analytic insight of Ricardo, the gloomy
presentiments of Malthus, the vision of the more utopian
Utopians, the complacency of the Victorians, the dis¬
quietude of the underworld, the shrewd skepticism of
Veblen— they are all there.
Much of &e teaching of the great economists no longer
quite applies. And yet, it has not gone entirely out of date.
For the great economists gave men an understanding of
the world which has become part of our everyday
philosophy. What they taught us was that the world was
not just an unrelated confusion but a concatenated pro¬
cess, not just happening but developing. They gave us an
understanding of our environment so that we might profit
by it more fully; they gave us an understanding of our
past so that we might better comprehend the process
which is sweeping us into the future.
We shall need their insight as we progi'ess into the
future. As the control of our destiny devolves increasingly
322 TI-IE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
upon ourselves, we shall have to make choices— desper¬
ately important ones— among the counsels of the present.
It is from the scope and wisdom of the economists of the
past that we must reap the knowledge with wliich to
face the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book, more than most, owes its existence to others
than the author. The economic treatises of the last two
centuries would fill a fair-sized warehouse, and someone
who presumed to rummage in that warehouse without
a pretty fair idea of its contents would soon be over¬
whelmed.
Certainly I could never have undertaken such a pro¬
ject unless I knew what I was searching for, and therefore
it is my guides— my teachers— to whom I should like to
express my indebtedness. But while my guides led me to
the warehouse and told me what was in it, they cannot
be held responsible for the selection of ideas which I
have exhumed. My purpose has been to illustrate great
fiowerings of thought and not to document them, to rouse
the interest of the curious reader and not to drown it,
and therefore my selection of material may dismay a
scholar. Some men of justly great fame to the professional
economist have been cavalierly dismissed with a line or
two or not mentioned at all; others of minor importance
may merit several pages. It is admittedly an arbitrary
rearrangement of the Hall of Fame, but I must ask the
scholar to recognize that many great economic ideas are
interesting only to a professional, and that many minor
figures in the history of economics have at least pro¬
pounded interesting mistakes.
My deepest appreciation must go to Dr. Adolph Lowe
323
THE WORLDLY PHn^OSOPHERS
324
of the New School for Social Research, whose help and
advice I have had on every page. In particular I am
indebted to him for an understanding of Adam Smith and
David Ricardo, although he cannot be held to blame for
whatever damage I have done his teaching. Even more
than that, I am grateful to him for his wann, inquiring,
and passionately human conception of economics, not
as an intellectual plaything, but as a vehicle for social
betterment.
To many others at the New School I also owe a debt
of thanks: to Drs. Hans Neisser and Eduard Heimann
for the instruction I have received at their hands, and
particularly to Dr. Heniy Aubrey whose many concrete
suggestions and criticisms were invaluable. To my teach¬
ers at Hai-vard goes a belated tribute, above all to my
tutor. Dr. Seymour Harris, who was the source of an
enthusiasm that has lasted many years.
A special note of thanks is due my friend Peter Bern¬
stein for his frequent and valuable counsel. And my most
heartfelt appreciation goes to my wife, who has patiently
endured the ups and downs of writing with superhuman
good nature, who has given generously of her aid, and
who has conti-ibuted most of all by steadfastly believing
that the book would one day, after all, be done.
Finally, I wish gratefully to acknowledge permission
to quote from Roy Harrod’s Life of John Maynard Keynes
and from John Ma^mard Keynes’s Economic Conse¬
quences of the Peace.
New York
Robert L. Heilbroner
A GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
Economic reading, by popular hearsay, is a veritable
desert of dusty prose. In all honesty, much of it is: the
student of economics must be prepared for long joumeys
vi^ithout a single refreshing sentence; it takes the en¬
durance of a camel and the patience of a saint to finish
some of the great texts.
But not aU economics falls into this category. There
is much that is alive, provocative, and stimulating even
to the novice, and much more that is sufficiently interest¬
ing, persuasive, or important to warrant a certain amount
of heavy going. These are the books I am recommending
here. They are by no means an exploration of all eco¬
nomics— no short list could possibly do that. These are
merely good jumping-off points from which to reconnoiter
one area of the whole field. There are difficult books
here, but no impossible ones and no unrewarding ones.
For one reason or another I enjoyed or profited from
them all. And incidentally, many of the books mentioned
below are available in paperback.*
The reader might want to begin by taking a chance on
an economic textbook to see what economics is really
It is well worth a try, provided he is prepared
* Paperback reprints appear so fast it is bard to keep up witl
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
326
to go through it at his leisure, with education rather than
entertainment as his aim. Out of a dozen good texts I
would suggest these two: Economics, An Introductory
Analysis by Paul A. Samuelson ( McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., New Yoik, 1966), and Economics: Principles and
Policy by Royall Brandis ( Richard D. Iiwin, Inc., Home-
wood, Illinois, 1962).
It is less simple to suggest reading in the history of
economic doctrines-to suggest, that is, a book which
co\’ers the scope of this one, but in greater detail and with
more attention to the full range of economic ideas. The
standard is Gide and Rist, A History of Economic Doc¬
trines (G. G. Hamp & Co., London, 1948), which is
thorough and full of interesting side lights. Deeper and
more critical is Eduard Heimann’s History of Economic
Doctrines (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1945), but
it requires a considerable degree of familiarity with the
field. Better, perhaps, is a mimeographed two-volume set
published by August Kelley in 1949: Lecture Notes on
Types of Economic Theory. This is the actual transcript
of the classroom lectures delivered by Wesley Clair
Mitchell, one of America’s great economists, just before
his death. Mitchell delves into biography, social history,
and economic ideas all at once and with great skill and
charm. The two short books (together they are only five
hundred-odd pages) will more than repay the concentra¬
tion they justly ask. and the fact that they were originally
lectures gives them an easy lightness in style which
greatlv simplifies the task. TTiey even contain questions
as’.ed by pupils in the classroom.
.4 reader xs'ho wishes excerpts from most of the great
economists might look into Robert Lekachman s Varieties
of Economics^ (Meridian, New York, 1962). There is a
short textual comment, and brief passages give one the
pith of a wide range of thinkers. And finally, Joseph
Sdnunpeter’s posthumous History of Economic Analysis
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1954) is a master¬
piece of its kind, a trulv encyclopedic survey of economic
analvsis. as brilliant and as opinionated as its author.
It is apt to be pretty rough going for the non-professional;
A GUIDE TO FURTHER READING 3^7
I suspect that most academic economists have never read
it thi*ough. . ir 1. 1
The subject of the rise of capitahsm itself has been
fascinatingly dealt with in Karl Polanyis The Great
Transformation'^ (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1944).
Polanyi s book is mainly a study of the difficulty of im¬
posing the market idea in the eighteenth century on a
nonmarket-oriented world, but it also deals with con¬
temporary aspects of this same problem. I found it wholly
absorbing. On much the same subject, but focused on a
different aspect of the rise of capitalism, R. H. Tawney s
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism'^ (New York, 1937,
recently reissued by Harcourt, Brace & Co. ) is in a class
by itself. It is a profound work written in an unsurpass¬
able style by a great historian. Max Weber, The Protes¬
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism^ (G. Allen and
Unwin, London, 1930) is another classic in the field but
somewhat more demanding of the reader. The person
who wants a less specialized overview of the history of
capitalist evolution might look into my own The Making
of Economic Society'^ (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1962).
For further historical background, the reader might
turn to H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of
Medieval Europe'^ (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York,
1937) or the heavy but definitive two volumes by Eli
Heckscher, Mercantilism (G. Allen and Unwin, London,
1935). Both are texts, not casual reading. Or there is the
Cambridge Economic History of Europe in two volumes
with many first-rate and fascinating essays by various
economic historians (Cambridge University Press, Lon¬
don, 1952). For enjoyment I would suggest England in
1815, the first volume of a History of the English People
in the Nineteenth Century by Eli Halevy (E. Benn,
London, 1949) or Paul Mantoux, The Industrial Revolu¬
tion in the Eighteenth Century (Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
New York, 1928), one of the best books in economic
history that I know. Another excellent introduction is
Phyllis Deane’s The First Industrial Revolution"^ (Cam¬
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965), lucid and
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
I know of no biography of Adam Smith which I would
recommend for pleasure. The Wealth of Nations ( Modern
Library, Ine., New York, 1937) has an introduction by
Max Lerner wlrich is instructive and the book is, of course
in a class by itself. It eannot easily be read through, cover
to cover, but it ean be wandered through with pleasure
and profit.
As with Adam Smith, so with Malthus and Ricardo.
The non-professional reader has sfim piekings. Keynes
has written a niee short sketch of Malthus in his Essays
in Biography (Horizon Press, New York, 1951) and
Mitchell’s treatment of Ricardo in the aforementioned
Lecture Notes is wholly absorbing. The whole of Ricar¬
do’s writing is now available in a multivolume edition
edited under the scrupulous eye of Mr. Piero Sraffa,
Works of David Ricardo (Cambridge University Press,
London, 1951) and the last volume contains a good deal
of not terribly interesting biographical material. But the
reader is not advised to hurl himself into Ricardo unless
he is prepared for intellectual bruises: it is all abstract
argument and no easy gomg at all. If eurious, nonetheless,
try the second volume of Sraffa’s work, in which Malthus’
Principles is reproduced with Ricardo’s annihilatory com¬
ments affixed to eveiy paragraph. Here are the two
friendly adversaries at their best. And for Malthus proper
and the population dilemma, read On Population (Mo¬
dern Libraiy, Random House, New York, 1960), with a
most interesting introduction by Gertrude Himmelfarb.
Better yet, any one of a mnnber of modem books on the
population problem.
There is no use trying to read the Utopians. Try in¬
stead Alexander Gray’s The Socialist Tradition (Long¬
mans, Green & Co., Inc., London, 1946) on which I have
leaned heavilv for Saint-Simon and Fourier. The style
is a trifle arch, but some of the quainter figures can bear
this, and the book is heavily and avowedly biased in
favor of Utopian as opposed to “scientific” socialism. It
the immersion takes, the library will give one aecess to
the originals: warning, however-they are all intolerably
verbose. There is a nice old-fashioned biography of
A GUIDE TO FURTHER READING 3^9
Robert Owen by F. Podmore (Appleton, New Yo^,
1907) and a more factual but less readable one by G. D.
H Cole (E. Benn, London, 1925). Neither, however,
does adequate justice to this astounding man: perhaps
his own story. The Life of Robert Oioen (Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., New York, 1920 ) is best for that.
Personally I prefer John Stuart Mill to any of these,
and strongly recommend his Autobiography (latest edi¬
tion, Columbia University Press, New York, 1944), a
classic in itself. There is also an excellent biography by
Michael Packe (Macmillan, 1954). If Mill interests one.
Dr. Friedrich A. Hayek has recently published the cor¬
respondence between Mill and Harriet Taylor, John
Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1951) which sheds a new light on the
man himself. And as far as economics is concerned. Mill
repays the effort. Principles of Political Economy (Long¬
mans, Green & Co., Inc., New York, 1909) is beautifully
written and still full of interest to the modern reader.
The literature on Marx is voluminous. The reader might
tackle a good straightforward biography by F. Mehring,
Karl Marx: The Story of His Life^ (Ann Arbor Paper
Books, University of Michigan), but I would suggest a
book by Edmund Wilson, To The Finland Station"^
(Harcourt, Brace h Co., New York, 1940). This is, among
other things, a biography of Marx and Engels, a review
of their work, and a critique of historical writing in
general, the excellence of all of which is enhanced by a
superlative style. It is like reading a novel.
However, Edmund Wilson is not much interested in
Marx’s economic analysis of capitalism, and the reader
who wishes to learn more of that might turn to Paul M.
Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (Oxford
University Press, New York, 1942). This is difficult think-
ing, but not difficult reading, and it is the best explana¬
tion of Marx s economic doctrines that I know. Contem¬
porary Capitalism (Random House, New York, 1956)
by John Strachey is more chatty and rather shallow, but
does serve to spoon-feed the basic ideas of Marxian
analysis to the general reader. It is also an interesting
330 THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
“second-thoughts” book by a somewhat skeptical Marxist.
Das Kapital itself can be tackled in a one-volume Modem
Libraiy edition, or one can sample Marx on Economics,'*
edited by Robert Freedman (Harvest Book, Harcourt,
Brace & Co.; New York, 1961). Still better is the Hand¬
book of Mai-xism (Random House, New York, 1935). This
is a selection of the best of Marx’s writings including his
superb historical sketches and bits of Das Kapital itself.
Also included are important works by Engels and Lenin
and a smattering of Stalin. It is a good compendium of
Marxist thinking, interesting both as historical master¬
pieces and as an acid comment on tlie level to which
most Marxist writing has currently degenerated.
There is no volume on the Victorians themselves. Again
Mitchell’s Lecture Notes or Gide and Rist’s History will
be of some help. Tlie reader might wish to look at Alfred
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (recently reissued by
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1948). It is ponderous
but not difficult; the obstacle is the amount of patience,
not the amount of knowledge needed. Keynes, by the
way, has a nice biogi'aphical bit on both Marshall and
Edgeworth in his Essays in Biography.
The underworld makes for more enjoyable reading.
Henry George is out of date, but his Progress and Poverty
(Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1926) retains an
emotional appeal and is written in a rich— often overrich
—journalistic style. Hobson is more serious and more
absorbing. Imperialism (G. Allen and Unwin, London,
1938) is still to the point and enormously interesting,
more so than Lenin’s famous pamphlet by the same name.
Veblen himself makes magnificent reading, if you take
to his st>’le. Not everyone does, but aficionados go about
quoting his gems. The Theory of the Leisure Class
(Modem Libi'ary, Inc., New York, 1934), is his best-
known work, but I would suggest The Portable Veblen
(The Viking Press, New York, 1950) with a brilliant
introduction by Max Lemer which projects the man
himself and his basic ideas with great clarity. The book
itself covers a wide variety of Veblen’s work. For Veblen s
life, one can turn to the definitive biography by Joseph
A GUIDE TO FURTHER READING 33 ^
Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (The Viking
Press New York, 1947), which is, unfortunately, a bit
pedestrian. The times themselves are both trenchantly
and rollickingly illustrated in a superb book by Matthew
Josephson, The Robber Barons^ ( Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
New York, 1934).
There is only one biography of Keynes; the compre¬
hensive but somewhat pompous Life of John Maynard
Keynes by Roy Harrod (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New
York, 1951). Better to meet the man himself directly
thiough his sparkling and lucid prose, and for this the
Economic Consequences of the Peace (Harcourt, Brace
& Co., New York, 1920) and Essatjs in Persuasion (Har¬
court,’ Brace & Co., New York, 1951) are both excellent.
The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money"’ (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1964) is
very difBcult going; the Treatise on Money (Harcourt,
Brace & Co., New York, 1930) is a better first reader,
although none too easy. The meat of Keynes has been
put forth in many popularized versions, of which the
best known is Robert Lekachman’s The Age of Keynes
(Random House, New York, 1966).
The issues of the last chapters have been compellingly
discussed in many books aimed at the general reader. It
is wortliwhile to refer to Berle and Means’s The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (The Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1933) and to Berle’s Twentieth Century Capi¬
talist Revolution*’ (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York,
1954). A wittier and more iconoclastic view of corpora¬
tions can be found in Thurman Arnold’s urbane Folklore
of Capitalism*’ (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1937).
Along the same line, James Burnliam’s The Managerial
Revolution** (The John Day Co., New York, 1941) is
general enough to offer no obstacle to the nonprofessional
and is a provocative— sometimes provoking— book. One
might also consult a highly readable book by John K.
Galbraith, American Capitalism, The Concept of Counter¬
vailing Power** (Houghton Mififlin Co., Boston, 1952) or
his well-known The Affluent Society** (Houghton Mifflin
Co., Boston, 1958). And do not overlook the tough but
THE WOBLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
fascinating volume by Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy^ (Harper & Bros., New York,
1947). In somewhat the same vein, Hayek’s Road to Serf-
dom^ (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1944) is en¬
grossing, and for a less frightening view of the future
one might look into my own The Limits of American
Capitalisin'^ (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1966).
Finally the great problems of the developing nations
are discussed in a number of accessible books: W. W.
Rostow’s Stages of Economic Groioth^ (Cambridge Uni¬
versity Press, New York, 1960) is very well known and
warrants the reading. The Strategy of Economic Develop¬
ment^ by Albert Hirschman (Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1958) is more technical but very interesting. C.
E. Black's The Dynamics of Modernization (Harper &
Row, New York, 1966) is a sweeping survey that puts
the developmental process into sharp focus. And for a
last, somewhat controversial view, let me again im¬
modestly put forward my own book. The Great Ascent^
(Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1963),
Index
Absentee Ownership and Busi¬
ness Enterprise ( Veblen), 228
accumulation, 84, 91, 145, 147-
149, 183, 221, 240; Smith’s
law of, 58-61, 65; Raskob’s
giow-rich plan, 238-240; see
also investment
affluence, 299-300, 303-304, 317-
318
Affluent Society, The (Gal-
braitli), 317
Africa, 15, 281, 313; foreign ex¬
ploitation of, 183-185, 187,
190-191; nationalism in, 192
Albany-Susquehanna Railroad,
203
Anialgamated Copper Co., 204
American colonies, 38-39, 180
American Economic Association,
232
American Revolution, 5, 9, 29,
36, 39, 106-107
American Telephone & Tele¬
graph Co., 285-286
Anaconda Copper Co., 204
Aristotle, 27
Arkwright, Sir Richard, 48, 53,
201
Asia, 281; foreign exploitation
of 187, 190; nationalism in,
192
Atlantic Monthly, 206
Autobiography (J. S. Mill), 117,
123
Autobiography (R. Owen), 105
Bakunin, Mikliail A., 140
Bank of England, 242, 274
Banks, Sir Joshua, 69
Baring, Alexander, 70, 84
Bastiat, Frederic, 167-171, 196
Belgium, 124, 126, 137, 180,
187, 191
Bentham, Jeremy, 117, 161
Berle, Adolph A., 284-287, 293,
294-298
Betlilehem Steel Co., 285, 296
birtli control, 80-82
Bismarck, Otto von, 189
Blincoe, Robert, 94-95, 115
Bloomsbury group, 242, 244, 245,
276
Boer War, 183-184, 243
Bonar, James, 72
Brandeis, Louis D., 179
Bretton Woods conference, 273
British Empire, 61-62, 180-181,
184, 189-192
Brook Farm, 114
Buccleuch, Henry Scott, Duke
of, 36-38
Bullionists, 28
Bumham, James, 287
business cycles, depressions, 60,
88, 159, 163-164, 252, 282,
291-292, 299, 305, 309-310,
311-312; Maltlius’ “general
gluts,"’ 74, 89-91, 166, 253-
254; Marx on, 135, 151-155,
158-159; Mummery-Hobson
over-saving tlieory, 182-183;
353
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
334
business cycles (Cont.)
the Great Depression, 238-
241, 258, 259-261, 264-265,
281-283, 290; sunspot theory,
252-253; Keynes's analysis,
251-252, 256-266, 271-272,
277-278; flow of income, 254-
257, 271-272; savings-invest-
ment seesaw, 253-263; govt,
spending for relief, 264-268,
288
business expansion, 255-257,
260-267, 284-285, 290-299;
see also economic growtli;
economic planning; invest¬
ment
businessmen: called ‘‘saboteurs”
by Veblen, 221-227, 233-239;
opposed to New Deal spend¬
ing, 267; see also capitalists
Byng, Sir John, 48
Califomia, University of, 174
Cambridge University, 196, 242,
244, 245, 249, 251, 270, 274,
275
Cantillon, Richard, 39
capital: in precapitalist world,
15-18, 19-20, 21-22; commer¬
cialization of, 21-22; see also
business expansion; economic
growtli; in\ estment
capitalism: rise of, 8-29; defini¬
tion of, 26; Smith on, 29, 39-
48; English factory operation,
48-52, 56-62, 60-62, 94-96;
Mill on production and dis-
b'ibution, 118-121; Ricardo's
class-conflict theory, 68, 71,
84-91; Malthus’s “general
ghils,” 89-92, 166; Utopians’
challenges to, 113-116; Marx-
Engels analysis of, 131-136,
142-157: and imperialism,
181-183. 184-194; golden age
of in U.S., 201-206; leisure
class in, 217-223, 233-234;
btisinessman as saboteur of,
223-228, 233-234; prosperity
and depression cycles in, 237-
242, 252-272; Keynes's idea of
managing, 268-269; present
condition of, 281-284; present
trends in, 284-304; (see also
coi-porations; economic plan¬
ning; government); future of,
277-281, 305-322; in competi¬
tion with collectivism, 314-
316; social responsibility in,
316-322
capitalists, 13-14, 18-19, 306-
308; early industrial, 36-38,
48-49, 52-54, 56-60; and con¬
flict witli landowners, 36-38;
68-71, 85-90, 134, 144; as
portrayed by Marx, 144-149,
151-152, 297; imthless strug¬
gle among, in U.S., 202-206;
seen by Veblen as saboteurs,
223-228
Capitalism, Socialism, and De¬
mocracy (Schumpeter), 305-
307
Carlyle, Thomas, 67
Ceylon, 190
Chaplin, Charles, 234
Chicago, University of, 213-216,
229
China, 187, 189, 194, 313, 315,
320
Church, 11-14, 18, 23-24
Clark, John Bates, 160, 206, 211
class conflict, Ricardo's, 68-72;
Marx's, 133-135, 154-156,
309; Veblen's, 222, 309
Clemenceau, Georges, 246-248
Cobbett, William, 101
Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 11
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 84
collectivism, 315-316; 319; see
also communism
Columbus, Christopher, 23, 28
commercial revolution, 21-22,
134
Committee on Depression (Eng¬
land, 1886), 159, 181
communism, 66; and socialism
compared, 115-116, 319-320;
INDEX
335
MiU on, 120-121; “spectre
haunting Europe,” 124-125;
Marx’s role in, 127-128, 130-
131 140-143, 150, 157;
Kej^es on, 269-270; and un-
derdeveloped nations, 315-
316; see also dialectical ma¬
terialism
Communist League, 126, 140
Co m m u n ist Man ifesto. The
(Marx and Engels), 123-127,
136, 137, 140
Communists, 116, 124-125, 126,
140, 158, 189, 319-320; soo
also communism; Russia
competition, 43-47, 60, 61, 146,
152; and American business,
284-304 passim
compulsory saving, 270
Condition of the Working Class
in England in 1844, The
(Engels), 130
Considerations on Representa¬
tive Government (Mill), 122
conspicuous consumption, 61,
206, 218, 221; see also leisure
clnss
consumer, 57, 60, 103, 285, 287,
296-297
cooperative movement, 104-106
Cornell University, 213
Com Laws, 69, 70, 88, 89
coiporations, 59, 61, 156, 192,
260; giant growth of, 47, 153,
284-287, 294-298; Marx’s pre¬
dictions on, 153; breakdown
of competition among, 296-
297; controlled by managers,
not owners, 286-288, 307;
oligopolies and countervailing
power among, 296-298
countei-vailing power, 296-297
Crossthwaite, Sir Charles, 181
Cuba, 193
Daly, Marcus, 204
Dana, Charles A., 138
Das Kapital (Maix), 138, 143-
157, 158, 259; analysis of pure
capitalism, 144-149, 151; on
profit and surplus value, 146-
151; on labor power, 145-146;
on machinery and unemploy¬
ment, 148-149; mistakes in,
151-156; predictions of capi¬
talism’s development, 153-157
Dawes Plan, 249
Dearborn, Mich., riots in, 264
Defoe, Daniel, 32
depressions, see business cycles,
depressions
Dewey, John, 179, 231
Dial magazine, 231
dialectical materialism, 132-136,
143, 154-155; definition of,
132
diamonds, 146, 147
Diderot, Denis, 130
Diminishing Returns, Law of,
278
disannament, 299-300
Disraeli, Benjamin, on colonics,
180
distribution, 115, 118-120, 185,
310
Disfrihntion of Wealth (J. B,
Clark), 206
Dominican Republic, 193
Dorfman, Joseph, 232
Drake, Sir Francis, 23, 28
Diiliring, Eugen, 132
East India Co., 41, 72
Economic Consequences of the
Peace, The (Keynes), 247-
248, 251, 272-273
Economic Haimonies (Bastiat),
170
Economic Journal, 245, 270
Economic Possibilities for our
Grandchildren (Keynes), 277,
279
economic growtli, 152, 278, 305,
314-317, 319-320; capitalism’s
need of, Marx’s view, 152-
153; corporation expansion,
284-286, 292-298; related to
population gi'owth, 289-292,
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
economic growth (Cont.)
298; in U.S. future, 298-304,
317-318; Communist techni¬
que, 315
economic planning, governmen¬
tal, 135, 268-269, 287-289,
292, 302-303, 311-312, 318-
321
economic revolution ( rise of
market system), 9-29; see also
Chapter XI
economics, 1-2, 5, 8, 27, 206,
276; rise of, as a study, 8,
26-29; as mathematical study,
160-166; as humanitarian
study, 182-183; and moral
judgment, 310
Economics (F. H. Taussig), 206
Economic Sophisms (Bastiat),
167
economists, 8-9, 18, 201, 205-
206, 308-309, 311; role of, in
history, 1-5, 318-320; Maltlms
the first professional, 71-72;
Keynes on, 275-276; the Great
Economists, 1-5, 308-309,
318-319, 321-322
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro, 161-
164, 171, 196, 199, 220
Edgeworth, Maria, 75, 76, 161
Egypt, 8, 189, 256-257, 262-263
Elizabeth I, Queen of England,
19-20, 23
Ellis, Havelock, 78-79
Engels, Friedrich, 127-143, 159-
160, 259; Marx, 127-132, 138-
140; background, private life,
129-130, 139-140; on class
structure of society, 132, 143;
aid with Das Kapital, 143
engineers, in Veblen’s theories,
223-224, 228, 268
Engineer.? and the Price Stjs-
icm. The, (Veblen), 228
England, 19-33, 40-41, 109, 115,
154, 201, 278-279; precapital¬
ist trade, industry, ll, 17-23,
25, 313; land enclosure, 20-
21; working-class conditions.
19-22, 31-33, 40, 49-54, 58-
59, 94-97, 100, 129-130, 146-
147, 159; early capitalist in¬
dustry, 28-29, 48-50, 60-61,
62; population question, 64-
66, 69, 81-84, 290; landlord-
industrialist conflict, 68-71,
86-90; business depressions,
100-101, 159, 182-183, 252-
253; first trade unions, 103-
106; imperialism, 179-193
passim; financing World War
II, 271-273; economic plan¬
ning, 289; see also British
Empire
equilibrium in market mecha¬
nism, 196-200
Erie Railroad, 225
Essatj on the Principle of Pop¬
ulation (Malthus), 67, 77, 79-
80
Europe: and commercial revolu¬
tion, 21-22, 26, 29; revolu¬
tionary uprisings in 1848,
124-125; decline of capitalism
in, 153-156, 288; living stand¬
ards in, 281-282
I
Fable of the Bees (Mandeville),
166
factory, 32, 48-52, 57, 59, 94-
96, 116, 134, 135-136, 146
fascism, 154, 228-229, 287-288
Fay, Prof. C. R., 195-196
felicific calculus, 161
financiers, ruthless competition
among, 201-205, 224-228, 234
Fisher, Irving, 240
Fisk, James, 203
flow of income, 254-256, 259-
260, 272
Ford, Henry, 225-226, 262
Ford Motor Co., 295
Foreign Policy Association, 69
Fourier, Charles, 106, 111-114
Fox, Annie ( Mrs. Henry
George), 173
Fox, Charles James, 56
France, Anatole, 114
INDEX
337
France, 25-26, 107-110, 155,
167-170, 180, 252; precapi¬
talist trade, industry, 9-12, 18-
19, 25; Revolution of 1848,
124-125; colonies, 180, 190-
192; population problems,
290-291; see also French
Revolution
Franklin, Benjamin, 38-39
Frederick William IV, King of
Prussia, 126
free trade, 87-88, 168-170
French Revolution, 9, 62, 107-
108, 116
Fugger family, 13-14 _
Galbraith, Dr. John Kenneth,
296, 317-318
General Electric Corp., 299
General Motors Corp., 294, 295
General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money (Keynes),
258-271
George, Hem*y, 172-179, 196,
199
Germany, 10, 35, 109, 130-131,
132, 154, 155, 157, 164; and
Revolution of 1848, 124-126;
Prussian govt., 126, 131, 132,
158; imperialism, 180, 187,
191; Veblen on, 231; and Ver¬
sailles Treaty, 247
Glasgow, University of, 30, 34,
62
“gluts,” 74, 89-91, 100, 166, 253
Godric of Finchdale, Saint, 14
Godwin, William, 66-67, 73, 80
Gold, 23, 28, 251, 254
Goshen, Sir Harry, 275
Gould, Jay, 203-204, 225
government: intervention in
business, 47-48, 57-59, 267-
268, 287-288; role of in Marxes
tlieories, 149-151, 153-156;
spending, 57, 264-268, 291-
293, 299-304; see also eco¬
nomic planning; investment,
governmental
Grand National ( working-class
movement), 104-105
Great Britain, see British Em¬
pire; England
Great Depression, see under
business cycles
Great Economists, 1-5, 122, 318-
319, 321-322; see also eco¬
nomists
Greece, 155
Grey, Sir Edward, 251
Gross National Product, 293
growth, see economic growth
Guatemala, 193
guilds, 14, 16-19, 25, 135, 182,
320
Hansen, Dr. Alvin, 289-290,
293, 298-302
Harper, William Rainey, 214,
216, 217, 229
HaiTod, Roy, 246
Harvard University, 289, 299,
305
Hayek, Dr. Friedrich, 268-269,
287-289, 293, 302, 304
Hegel, Georg WiUielm Fried¬
rich, 130-131, 132
Heine, Heinrich, 125
Herschel, Sir William, 252
Higher Learning in America,
The (Veblen), 230
Hill, James, 226
history, materialist conception
of, 132-136, 140, 143, 154
Hitler, Adolf, 268
Hobbes, Thomas, 117
Hobson, John A., 182-188, 190,
194, 196, 199, 309
Holland, see Netherlands
Hoover, Herbert, 237-238, 264
Howells, Wilham Dean, 217
How to Pay for War (Keynes),
271
Hugo, Victor, 180
Hume, David, 30, 34, 37-39, 66
Hungary, 194
Hutcheson, Francis, 35
Imperial Germany (Veblen),
231
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
338
imperialism, 179-182, 184-194,
309
Imperialism (Hobson), 184
income: in Smith’s self-regulat¬
ing market, 45-46; national,
in U.S., 237, 239, 240-241,
265-266; the measure of pros¬
perity, 254; flow of, 254-256,
261-262, 272; distribution of,
in U.S., 280-283
India, 7, 187, 190, 191, 254,
313
Indian Currency and Finance
(Keynes), 245, 251
Industrial Revolution, 25, 52, 60,
134, 152
inflation, 266-267, 271-272, 296
innovation, 18-20, 25-26, 152;
see also invention
Inquiry into the Nature of the
Peace, An (Veblen), 231
installment buying, 240
interest rate, 258-260
International Bank, 273
International Monetary Fund,
273
International Workingmen’s As¬
sociation, 140
invention, 25-26, 134, 152, 263,
291; see also innovation
investment, 237-240, 264-265,
269, 300; imperialism, 186;
and saving, 253-264, 271-272;
a matter of individual choice,
256-257, 261-262; low interest
rate a spur to, 258; and busi¬
ness expansion, 255-257, 260-
261. 264-265, 298; limited by
size of market, 262-263; gov¬
ernmental, 264-268, 271, 292,
299-302, 320-321; and in¬
flation, 266-267, 271-272; and
population growth, 290-291;
military expenditure, 299; see
also accumulation
Isabella, Queen, 23
Italy, 23, 124, 125, 154, 155,
187
Jackson, Andrew, 103
Japan, 187, 190
Jevons, W. Stanley, 160 164
171, 252
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 29, 38
Josephson, Matthew, 225
Kallen, Horace, 232
Keayne, Robert, 10, 24, 25
Keynes, John Maynard, 2, 196,
197, 242-276, 284, 321; his
many-sidedness, 242-244, 245
270-271, 273-274; early life,
education, 243-244; World
War I and peace terms, 246-
249; his market speculation,
249; on money, saving, invest¬
ment, 251-252, 256-266, 291;
on business cycles, 252, 261-
264; on govt, spending, plan¬
ning, 264-269, 287-288, 303;
managed-capitalism theory,
268-269; World War II, trips
to U.S., 271-274; on compul-
soiY saving, 271-273; on
future of capitalism, 277-279,
282, 306-307
Keynes, John Neville, 242, 275
Khrushchev, Nikita, 157
King, Gregory, 64-65
Kipling, Rudyard, 181
Korean War, 299
Kuznets, Dr. Simon, 283
labor: supply, 12, 28, 54-56, 58-
59, 86, 296; wages, 12, 28,
45, 46, 53, 55, 70-71, 84-88,
115, 119, 145-148, 152, 159,
283, 289; and the market sys¬
tem, 15-18, 21-22, 28, 46, 47;
strikes, 17, 105, 140; child,
32, 46, 49, 59, 94-98, 159;
productivity, 31-32, 50-53,
119, 278-279, 282; division
and specialization of, 39-40,
50-52, 55; social attitude
toward. 48, 50, 219-220, 221;
unions, 47, 103-105, 122, 155,
162, 267, 296; legislation per-
INDEX
taming to, 57-60, 105, 115,
264; labor power, 145-147;
unemployment, 148, 158, 182-
184, 239-241, 261, 262-267,
270, 272, 279, 300
Labour Party, British, 103
laissez-faire, 37, 57, 101, 265,
316
Lancaster, England, 190
land: as economic entity, 15-18,
22; enclosure of, England,
19-21; and population growth,
79-82; productivity of, 79-81,
86, 118-119; Henry George
on ownership of, 175
landowners: conflict with capi¬
talists, 37, 57, 68-71, 85-89;
and food prices, 68-71, 86;
and rent, 85-89, 92, 93, 115,
119, 175-178; and wages, 86-
89
Laughlin, J. Laurence, 206, 213-
214, 217
Law, Edmund, 39
Law, John, 26
leisure class, 217-223, 227-228,
233-234
Lenin, Nikolai, 142, 150, 187,
188, 272, 289, 302
Lewis, Ben, 303
Liberty (J. S, Mill), 122
Lion, The, magazine, 94
Litton, England, 94
Lloyd George, David, 248
Locke, John, 39, 130
Logic (J. S. Mill), 122
Lombe brothers, 32, 46
Lopokova, Lydia ( Mrs, J. May¬
nard Keynes), 246, 249, 270,
273, 275
Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III),
125-126, 133
Louis Philippe, King of the
French, 124
Lubin, Isadore, 232
Luddite riots, 95
Luxemburg, Rosa, 187
Lynd, Robert and Helen, 222
Macaulay, Thomas Babington,
105
MacDonald, J. Ramsay, 142
machines, 95, 278-279; Marx on,
144, 147-149, 152; Veblens
preoccupation with, 223-224,
228, 234-235
Mackintosh, Sir James, 93
Malthus, Daniel, 66-67
Malthus, Tliomas Robert, 67,
75-76, 90-91, 92, 93, 94, 115,
303, 310, 321; population
tlieory, 68, 72-74, 77-84, 91,
147, 219, 278, 291, 309;
background and private life,
71-73, 75-76, 93; “general
gluts,” 74, 89-91, 100, 166,
253; friendship with Ricardo,
75-77, 90-91; Principles of
Political Economy, 74, 88; on
landlords and rent, 88-89; on
saving, 90-91, 166, 183, 253
Managerial Revolution, The
(Burnham), 287
Manchester, England, 49, 53,
130, 147
Manchester, University of, 164
Manchester Guardian, 249
Mandeville, Bernard, 39, 165-
166
market, 15; Smith’s laws of, 42-
48, 52-61, 196; self-regulat¬
ing, 45-49, 303; rise of, Marx¬
ian view, 133-134; foreign,
185; equilibrium of, Mar¬
shall’s theory, 196-200; see
also business cycles, depres¬
sions; business ex'pansion;
competition; countervailing
power; economic planning;
investment; self-interest
market system, 9-26, 46-47,
313-316; definition of, 9-10,
15, 26; moral Judgment in,
310-312; social responsibility
in, 316-322; see also capital¬
ism
Marshall, Alfred, 160, 194-200,
275-276
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
340
Marx, Karl, 43, 124-157 passim,
166, 259, 268; on collapse of
capitalism, 49, 135-137, 143,
147-150, 153, 156-161, 279;
and communist movement,
127-128, 131, 139-143, 150,
157, 319-322; personal attri¬
butes, 127-129, 137-139, 142,
243; background and private
life, 129-131, 136-138, 243;
journalism, 131-132, 136; on
class structure of society, 133-
135, 156, 159-160, 283-284,
297, 309; “I am not a Marx¬
ist,” 139; his achievements,
127, 139-143, 157; see also
Das Kapital
Marx-Engels Institute, Moscow,
127
Mathematical Psychics (Edge-
worth), 161-164
mathematical school of econom¬
ics, 164-165
McClure, William, 103
Means, Gardiner, 284-287
Mencken, H. L., 232, 234
Monger, Karl, 160
Merchant Adventurers Co., 11
merchants, 9-14, 18, 19, 25, 27,
29, 57, 58, 134
Mexico, 103, 107
Middle East, 190, 192
Middletown (Lynd), 222, 240
Mill, James, 75, 117, 180
Mill, John Stuart, 116-123, 125,
152, 171, 186, 253, 259; pri-
v^ate life, 116-118, 121-123;
and socialism, 116, 120, 121,
321; on production as eco¬
nomics’ province, 119-121; on
distribution as noneconomics
field, 119-121. 150. 310; on
communism, 121; and Henry
George, 173-174
Mirabeau, Victor Riqueti, Mar¬
quis de, 37, 38
Mississippi Co., 26, 252
Missouri, University of, 230
Mitchell, Wesley C., 232, 236
Modem Corporation and Private
Property, The (Berle and
Means), 284-287
Modem Times, N.Y., 114
money, 8, 10, 22-24, 34; Owen's
distmst of, 103, 105; Keynes
on, 251-252, 257-259
monopoly, 58, 155, 226-227,
296-297, 311, 321; see also
oligopoly
moral judgment in the market
process, 310-312
Morgan, J. Pierpont, 203, 226
Mummery, A. F., 182, 184
Muncie, Ind., 240
Mussolini, Benito, 142, 268
Napoleon, 70, 71
Napoleonic Wars, 70, 77, 100
Near East, 191, 281
Necker, Jacques, 114
Nedierlands, 187, 189, 281
New Deal, 59, 264, 267
New Harmony, Ind., 102-103
New Icaria, 114
New Lanark, Scotland, 97-101
New School for Social Research,
231
New Statesman and Nation, 271
New York Stock Exchange, 239
New York Times, The, 266
New York Tribune, 138, 178
New Zealand, Maoris of, 15
Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 96,
125
North American Phalanx, NJ.,
114
Northern Pacific Railroad, 226
oligopoly, 296-297, 302-304, 311
Oneida Colony, 114
Owen, Robert, 98-106, 115
Oxford University, 34, 39, 62,
273
Paley, William, 65, 83-84
Panama Canal, 107
Paris, 10, 37-38, 124-125, 132.
136, 137, 168, 170, 246
INDEX
Paris-Madrid railroad, 167
Pennsylvania Railroad, 285
Petty, Sir William, 12, 39
Philippine Islands, 193
Philosophy of Poverty, The
( Proudhon ) , 142
Physiocracy, 37-38
Physiology of Indtistty, The
(Mummery and Hobson), 183
Pitt. William, the younger, 62,
65, 84
Planck, Max, 251
planning, see economic plan¬
ning; social planning
pleasure-machine, man as, 161-
162, 220
Pobyedonostsev, Konstantin, 180
Political Arithmetick, school of,
12, 28
Political Justice (Godwin), 66
Polo, Marco, 23
population: Smith’s law of, 53-
55, 61, 66; problem of decline
in, 66-67, 67, 69, 290-291,
298; problem of surplus, 67,
77-83, 86-88, 91-92, 309;
curbs on growth of, 80-83;
first census, 83; gro'wth of, an
economic stimulus, 290-291,
298, 309; see also under
England; Malthus; Ricardo;
Smith; United States
Portugal, 13, 23, 180, 191
PoveHy of Philosophy, The
(Marx), 142
Prague, 124
Price, Dr. Richard, 64, 65, 69
prices, 54-55, 196-197; and com¬
petition, in Smith’s law, 43-47;
and production, in Smith’s
law, 45-46, 54-55; grain, 69-
71; “administered” by oli¬
gopolies, 295-297
Principles (Marshall), 197-200
Principles of Political Economy
Malthus), 74, 88
Principles of Political Economy
(MiU), 118-122
341
Principles of Political Economy
(Ricardo), 84
production: and prices, in
Smith’s law, 44-45, 53-55; tlie
province of economics, 119-
120; and distribution, in Mai*x-
ian theory, 132-133; Veblen
on, 223-228; determined by
demand, not want, 261
profit (and gain), 9, 12-15, 55,
115, 119-120, 224; Church
view of, in 1644, 20; in Smith s
laws of market, 44-46, 60;
Marxian view of, 145-149, 152
Progress and Poverty ( Henry
George), 174-176, 178, 179
proletariat, 18, 125, 134, 136,
147, 158, 159-160, 181, 270,
283; dictatorship of, 150;
Veblen’s tlieory on, 222
Protestantism, 23-24
Proudhon, Pierre, 141-142
pump-priming, 264-265
purchasing power, 90, 185-186,
265-266, 282-283, 300
Quesnay, Frangois, 37-39
Rappites, 102
Raskob, John J., 238-239
reflation, 272
rent, 85-89, 92, 175-178
Revolution of 1848, 124-126
Revolutionary War, American,
see American Revolution
Rhodes, Cecil, 184
Ricardo, David, 68, 92-93, 96,
101, 115, 117, 119, 122, 145,
147, 152, 196, 249, 310, 321;
on class conflict in society,
68, 71, 134; on lando\vners
and rents, 71-72, 85-90, 93,
176, 279; background and pri¬
vate life, 71-78, 92-93; friend¬
ship with Malthus, 72, 75, 77-
78; on Malthus’ “general
gluts,” 74, 89-90, 186, 253;
on population, 84, 94, 147,
150, 309; Principles of Po-
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
342
Ricardo, David (Cont,)
litical Economy, 84; on ma¬
chines and labor, 94
Rickman, John, 83
Road to Soidom, The (Hayek),
269, 287-289
“robber barons,” 224-225, 234,
238
Rochdale Pioneers, 103
Rockefeller, John D., 204, 214
Rockefeller, William, 204
Rodbertus, Johann Karl, 187
Rogers, Henry Huddleston, 204
Rolfe, Ellen ( Mrs. Thorstein
Veblen), 211-212, 213, 216,
230
Roman Catholic Church, 13, 14,
18, 23, 74, 179
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 242,
250-251, 264
Roosevelt, Theodore, 178, 180
Rosebery, Lord, 180
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 67
Ruskin, John, 182
Russell, Bertrand, 241, 251
Russia, Soviet, 8, 115, 127-128,
189, 194, 256, 282, 287, 315,
320; Tsarist, 96-97, 125, 153-
154, 155, 180, 187
Saint-Simon, Claude Henri,
Count de, 106-111, 114, 118,
137, 229
Saint-Simonian Church, 110
San Francisco Post, 173
San Francisco Times, 173
saving: a factor in depressions,
90, 183, 184, 186-187, 253-
264; related to imperialism,
184-186; and investment-the
seesaw theory, 255-264; and
investment— Keynes's discov¬
ery, 259-264; compulsory,
271-273
Say, J. B., 90
Scandinavia, 115, 154
Schacht, Hjalmar, 191
Schiunpeter, Joseph, 305-308,
312
Scott, Sir Walter, 38, 96
self-interest, 8, 42, 43-47, 58,
59-60, 219, 286
Shaw, George Bernard, 142, 259
Sidgwick, Henry, 163
single tax, 176-179
Smith, Adam, 7, 10, 30-63, 90,
118, 122, 145, 163, 166, 196,
259, 277, 321; impact on
Western world, 29, 30, 61;
character and private life, 30,
33-35, 38-39, 62; at Glasgow
Univ., 30, 34-35, 62; Theory
of Moral Sentiments, 33, 35,
62; sojourn in Europe, 36-38;
attitude toward America, 38-
40, 180; on division of labor,
39-40, 50-52, 87; democratic
views, 41-42, 49, 57-60, 62,
180, ^7; laws of the market,
42-48, 57-58, 61, 115, 150,
152, 196, 279, 286, 287; laws
of accumulation and popula¬
tion, 53-55, 60, 65, 183, 186;
on “doing good,” 59, 310; his
ideas and Ricardo’s, 68-69,
71, 84, 87, 88; on saving, 183,
186, 253; see also Wealth of
Nations
socialism and socialists, 115-116,
121-122, 136, 169, 320; see
also Utopians
social planning, 100-101
South America, 192, 281, 313
Southey, Robert, 96
Soviet Union, see Russia
Spencer, Herbert, 122, 211
Spengler, J. J., 81
Stael, Madame de, 108
Stalin, J. V., 143, 188
Standard Oil Co., 203, 214
Stanford University, 229-230
state, Marxist conception of,
154-156
Stickney, A. B., 205
stock market, 204, 225-240, 249
Strachey, Lytton, 244-245
sunspots, 253
INDEX
343
supply and demand, 46, 90-91,
185-186, 197-198; see also
market. Smith's laws of
surplus value, 146-152, 159
sui'vival, historic problem of, 6-
9, 26, 302-303
Sutherland, Duchess of, 20
Switzerland, 281
Taussig, F. H., 160, 206
Taylor, Haniet, 118, 122-123
Taylor, James Russell, 178
Technicians and Revolution,
The (Veblen), 229
technocrats, 268
technological progress, 25, 95,
152, 235, 291, 298-299, 301
Tell-el-Amama, tablets of, 15
Theory of Business Enterprise,
The (Veblen), 223-228
Theory of Moral Sentiments,
The (A. Smith), 35, 45, 62
Theory of the Leisure Class,
The (Veblen), 217-222, 227-
228
thrift, see savings
Thiinen, J. H. von, 164
Tibet, 194
time, in Marshall's equilibrium
theory, 197
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 136, 206
Townshend, Charles, 35-36
Townshend, Rev, James, 78
Toynbee, Arnold, 159
Tract on Monetary Reform
(Keynes), 251
Transvaal, 183
Treatise on Money (Keynes),
251-252, 257-258
Treatise on Probability (Keynes),
251
Trumbull Phalanx, Ohio, 114
Tufts, James Hayden, 214
Twain, Mark, 181
imderdeveloped countries, 80-
82, 302, 312-316
United States: population
grovi4h, 82-83, 290, 298-299;
Owen, Fourier colonies in,
102-103, 112-114; capitalist
development in, 155-156, 282;
foreign economic operation,
179-180, 191-194, 273; law¬
less competition among capi¬
talists, 202-206; prosperity,
crash and Great Depression,
237-241, 260, 263-268, 282,
290; govt, spending, planning,
266-268, 287-288, 299-304;
labor productivity in, 278;
living standards, 280-284;
economic growth, giant cor¬
porations, 274-293, 283-304
United States Steel Co., 226,
285, 296
rmiversal plenty, 277, 281-283,
306, 315
urbanization, 24
usuty, 23-24
Utilitarianism (J. S, MiU), 122
Utopia, Godwin's, 66-67
Utopians, 66-67, 93, 98, 105,
114-116, 126, 166, 182, 310,
321
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 202, 225
Veblen, Thorstein Bunde, 61,
238, 268, 287, 309, 321; ec¬
centricities, private life, 206-
209, 211-212, 215-217, 229-
231; approach to economics,
209- 210; early life, education,
210- 213; at Chicago Univ.,
213-214, 229; Theory of the
Leisure Class, 217-222, 233-
234; Theory of Business En¬
terprise, 223-225, 228; other
books, 228, 230-231; and
World War I, 230-231; deatli,
233; appraisal of his work,
233-236
Versailles Treaty, 247
Victoria, Queen of England, 105,
181
Vietnam, 193, 299
Villages of Cooperation, 100-
106, 112, 116
344
THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS
Villarcl, Henry, 226
Voltaire, 30, 37, 56, 130
Walker, Gen. Francis A., 179
Walker, Samuel, 52
Walpole, Horace, 36
Walras, Leon, 160, 164-165
war, 154, 187-189, 230-231
Washington, D.C., march on,
264
Wealth of Nations (Smith), 29,
38-58, 59, 62, 63, 68, 178;
writing and publication of,
37-39; comprehensiveness, 39-
41; laws of tlie market, 42-48,
52-55, 58
Wxlgwood, Josiah, 52
\W\stphalen, Jenny von, 136-139
What Is PropeHy? (Proudhon),
141
Willich, August, 141
Wilson, Woodrow, 179, 247
Woolf, Leonard, 244, 245
Woolf, Virginia, 245
WooUcott, Alexander, 114
Woolston, Rev. Howard, 215
worldly philosophers, definition
of, 4
World War 1, 189, 230-231, 246-
247, 278
World War II, 266-267, 268.
299
WPA, 265, 266
Yale University, 212
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Robert L. Heilbroner has been studying the great econo¬
mists ever since he was introduced to them in Harvard
University in 1936. He was graduated stimma cum laucle
and Phi Beta Kappa and went on to practice economics
in government and business and then to complete his
graduate studies at the New School for Social Research.
The Worldly Philosophers, his first book, achieved an
immediate success with its publication in 1953 and has,
with the publication of this edition, been translated into
a dozen languages and become a standard introduction to
economics in scores of colleges and universities. Sub¬
sequent books— in particular The Future as History
(1959), The Making of Economic Society (1962), and
The Great Ascent (1963) — have also reached a wide
public, both academic and general. Dr. Heilbroner is
Adjunct Professor of Economics at the New School, where
he teaches, and has lectured before the National War
College and many business, government and university
audiences. He is married and lives in New York City and
Martha’s Vineyard.
345
THE JAMMU & KASHMIR UNIVERSITY
library.
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